The courts of the United States, under the Constitution and
laws, have equity jurisdiction. Unless the general principles of
equity have been modified by the laws or usages of a particular
state, those general principles will be carried out everywhere in
the same manner, and equity jurisprudence be the same when
administered by the courts of the United States in all the
states.
Hence the decision of a state court in a case which involved
only the general principles of equity and was not controlled by
local law or usage is not binding as authority upon this Court.
In the case of
Neves v.
Scott, 9 How. 196, this Court decided two points --
one, that volunteers could, in that case, claim the interference of
chancery to enforce the marriage articles in question, and the
other that the articles constituted an executed trust.
The supreme court of Georgia does not agree with this Court upon
the first point. Nevertheless this Court does not change its
decision.
Moreover the second point upon which this Court rested the case
does not appear to have been brought before the Supreme Court of
Georgia, and of course it expressed no opinion upon the point.
This case was argued at December term, 1849, and is reported in
50 U. S. 9 How.
196. It being suggested afterwards that, at the time when the case
was argued and decided, Richard Rowell, the principal defendant,
was dead, the judgment was stricken out and the cause argued
again.
Page 54 U. S. 270
MR. JUSTICE CURTIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case came on to be heard at the December term, 1849, and
was argued by counsel. The decision of the Court is reported in
50 U. S. 9 How. 196
under the name of
Neves v. Scott. At the present term it
was suggested to the Court that at the time when the cause was
argued and decided, Richard Rowell, the principal party defendant
in interest, was dead, and thereupon proceedings took place which
made his representatives parties, and the decree heretofore entered
was stricken out, the cause brought forward, and again heard at the
present term. It has been elaborately and ably argued upon the
grounds
Page 54 U. S. 271
on which it was rested at the former hearing and upon one
additional ground, which will first be adverted to.
It appears that a short time before the former argument, the
Supreme Court of Georgia, where the marriage articles in question
were made and the parties thereto domiciled, in a suit between
other persons claiming a separate interest under these articles,
had made a decision, involving an equitable title like that passed
on by this Court. This decision was not made known to us at the
former hearing, and the respondent's counsel now maintains that it
is binding on this Court as an authoritative exposition of the
local law of Georgia by the highest tribunal of that state.
To appreciate this position it is necessary to ascertain what
questions have been decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia and are
for decision by this Court.
By reference to the case in
50 U. S. 9 How. 196
it will be found that there were two questions presented to this
Court, either of which, being decided in favor of the complainant,
would dispose of the cause.
The first was whether the trusts manifested by this particular
instrument, were what a court of equity deems executed trusts --
that is, trusts actually defined and declared and in the view of a
court of equity created -- or whether a court of equity would treat
the instrument as only exhibiting an incomplete intention to create
some trusts at a then future period, and the second being whether
the complainants, as collateral heirs of one of the settlers, can
have the aid of a court of equity to enforce the delivery of the
property to them, or are precluded from that relief by the fact
that they are not issue of the marriage -- in other terms, whether
by the rules of equity law, the complainants are volunteers, or
within the consideration of the articles. No question has arisen
concerning any statute law of Georgia, nor was it then nor is it
now suggested that any word or phrase or provision of the articles
should bear any peculiar or technical meaning by reason of any
local law or custom. Indeed, the actual intentions of the parties
are so plain that no doubt has been suggested concerning them, and
the only inquiry in either court has been how far and in favor of
what parties a court of equity will lend its aid to carry those
intentions into effect. And accordingly the Supreme Court of
Georgia as well as this Court has resorted to the decisions of the
High Court of Chancery in England and to approved writers on equity
jurisprudence as affording the proper guides to a correct decision.
If, according to sound principles of the law of equity, a trust
existed or the complainants have an equitable right to the specific
performance of an agreement to create a trust, then the relief is
to be granted; otherwise it is to be refused.
Page 54 U. S. 272
Such being the nature of the questions, we do not consider this
Court bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The
Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States
shall extend to all cases in equity arising between citizens of
different states. Congress has duly conferred this power upon all
circuit courts, and among others upon that of the District of
Georgia, in which this bill was filed, and the same power is
granted by the Constitution to this Court as an appellate
tribunal.
Wherever a case in equity may arise and be determined under the
judicial power of the United States, the same principles of equity
must be applied to it, and it is for the courts of the United
States, and for this Court in the last resort, to decide what those
principles are and to apply such of them to each particular case as
they may find justly applicable thereto. These principles may make
part of the law of a state, or they may have been modified by its
legislation or usages, or they may never have existed in its
jurisprudence. Instances of each kind may now be found in the
several states. But in all the states, the equity law recognized by
the Constitution and by acts of Congress and modified by the latter
is administered by the courts of the United States and upon appeal
by this Court.
Such has long been the settled doctrine of this Court,
repeatedly and steadily affirmed in whatever form the question has
been presented. In
United States v.
Howland, 4 Wheat. 115, Chief Justice Marshall
said:
"As the courts of the Union have a chancery jurisdiction in
every state, and the Judiciary Act confers the same chancery powers
on all, and gives the same rule of decision, its jurisdiction in
Massachusetts must be the same as in other states."
So Mr. Justice Story, in
Boyle v.
Zacharie, 6 Pet. 658, says:
"The chancery jurisdiction given by the Constitution and laws of
the United States is the same in all the states of the Union, and
the rules of decision are the same in all."
See also Robinson v.
Campbell, 3 Wheat. 222;
Livingston v.
Story, 9 Pet. 654;
Russell v.
Southard, 12 How. 139.
But while we do not consider this decision of the Supreme Court
of Georgia a binding authority on which we have a right to rest our
decision, the respect we entertain for that learned and able court
has led us to examine its opinion with great care, and although we
find it not consistent with some of the views heretofore taken by
us of one of the questions arising under this marriage settlement,
we do not find that the ground on which our decision was actually
rested was at all examined by that learned court. That ground
is
"That the deed in question is a marriage settlement, complete in
itself; an executed trust which
Page 54 U. S. 273
requires only to be obeyed and fulfilled by those standing in
the relation of trustees for the benefit of the
cestuis que
trust according to the provisions of the settlement."
50 U. S. 9 How.
211. This position does not appear to have been taken by the
counsel for the complainants in the Supreme Court of Georgia, nor
is it noticed by the court in its opinion, though it is conceded in
the course of the opinion that while
"courts of equity will not enforce a mere gratuitous gift, or a
mere moral obligation or voluntary executory trust, it is
otherwise, of course, where the trust is already vested."
On the former argument in this Court we formed the opinion that
the instrument in question did completely define and declare, and
so did create, certain trusts; that they were, in the sense of a
court of equity, trusts executed; that the complainants were
cestuis que trust; that the failure to interpose trustees
to hold the property created no difficulty, each party to the
settlement being regarded, so far as may be necessary to effectuate
their intent, as holding their several estates as trustees for the
uses of the settlement; and so the complainants were entitled to
the relief prayed.
We find nothing in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia
in conflict with these views, because we do not find they were
there adverted to, and after considering the elaborate and able
argument of the respondent's counsel at this term, we remain
satisfied of the correctness of our opinion, and judgment must be
entered accordingly.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Georgia and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is
now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this Court that this
cause be, and the same is hereby reversed with costs, and that this
cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said circuit court
for further proceedings to be had therein in conformity to the
opinion of this Court.