The principles established in the preceding case of
Union Bank of Louisiana v.
Stafford again affirmed.
Although the complainants were not the same as in the preceding
case of
Union Bank of Louisiana v.
Stafford, yet the respondents were the same and the
subject matter was a breach of the same transaction. The only
difference is stated fully in the opinion of the Court, and by
agreement of parties the two cases were consolidated in the court
below and to be argued together.
Page 53 U. S. 344
MR. JUSTICE GRIER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The New Orleans Canal & Banking Company filed its bill in
the District Court of the United States for Texas against Josiah S.
Stafford and wife, setting forth that the bank by ,an act of
contract of sale and mortgage made on 12 July, 1844, in the Parish
of Rapides and State of Louisiana, sold to William Mainer Stafford
thirty-three negro slaves which the bank had purchased at a
sheriff's sale of the property of Isaac Thomas at the suit of
Adelia E. Flint. By this act of sale and mortgage, William M.
Stafford covenanted to pay, as the price of the slaves, the sum of
$12,853, with interest in eight annual installments. That in
addition to the vendor's privilege reserved on the slaves sold,
William M. Stafford further mortgaged his interest in some other
slaves which said Stafford had purchased on 6 November, 1843, at a
sheriff's sale at the suit of the Union Bank of Louisiana. That
Stafford agreed that in case any of the installments were not paid
when they severally became due, then the bank might obtain an order
of seizure and sale or judgment in the ordinary way at their option
and sell the mortgaged premises to the highest bidder without
benefit of appraisement. That the respondents, with full notice of
this act of sale and mortgage and of the claims of the complainant,
fraudulently removed and transported all the slaves to Texas and
now hold and detain them and endeavor to scatter and secrete them
for the purpose of evading the just claims of complainant. That the
slaves are now in possession of the court by a receiver in a
certain suit pending between the Union Bank of Louisiana and the
respondents. That four of the notes secured by complainant's
mortgage are due and payable and remain unpaid. That William M.
Stafford has no property in Louisiana; that he resides in the State
of Louisiana and without the jurisdiction of the court, and cannot
therefore be made a party to the bill.
Page 53 U. S. 345
This bill was taken
pro confesso against the husband.
The wife filed an answer in which she admits the contract of sale
and mortgage between the bank and William M. Stafford, but alleges
a purchase of them by James A. M'Waters, who holds them by a deed
of trust for her separate use. She claims that she is a
feme
covert and that by the laws of Louisiana she has a lien upon
all the slaves in the bill mentioned for the security of her
matrimonial, dotal, and paraphernal rights to the amount of
$66,000. She admits the slaves were all brought to Texas except
five, four of whom are dead, and that the others are now in
possession or ordered to be delivered to a receiver appointed by
the court at the suit of the Union Bank of Louisiana, and prays
that the bill may be dismissed because William M. Stafford, James
A. M'Waters, and the Union Bank are not made parties to the
bill.
To meet the allegation of matrimonial, dotal, and paraphernal
rights, the complainants amended their bill and gave in evidence a
mortgage by respondents, duly acknowledged to bar the rights of the
wife, dated 11 May, 1836, and including the thirty-three slaves now
in question, with some others. Also that an order of seizure and
sale of forty-five negroes, including these thirty-three, was
regularly issued and the slaves sold to General Isaac Thomas on 8
August, 1840.
That on 15 September, 1840, Thomas mortgaged them again to the
bank to secure the payment of ten thousand dollars. That in
November, 1842, Adelia E. Flint, by execution on a judgment which
had a lien on the property of Thomas anterior to the mortgage of
the bank, sold at sheriff's sale thirty-three of said negroes,
which were purchased and paid for by the Canal Bank in 1844.
The amended answer of the wife sets up the defense that she was
a minor in 1836, and therefore the first mortgage to the bank was
not valid to bind or affect her rights; she pleads also the statute
of limitation of two years, averring that since the slaves were
brought to Texas, she has held them adversely to the claim of the
mortgagee. But there is no evidence on the record to show that she
was a minor in 1836 or that William M. Stafford sold the slaves in
question to M'Waters, or that M'Waters had any title to them
whatever. That the slaves were carried to Texas by respondent's
husband clandestinely to avoid the pursuit of creditors is also
satisfactorily proved.
The defenses made on the argument in this Court were:
1. The minority of the plaintiff.
This was an allegation of the answer not responsive to the bill,
and there was no proof to substantiate it.
The statement of a witness in his cross-examination that he
Page 53 U. S. 346
heard Stafford say his wife was not of age in 1836 was not
responsive to any question proposed to him by the respondents, and
is no evidence of the fact.
2. The charter of the Canal Bank, complainant, has a section in
the same words with that which we have noticed in the opinion just
delivered in the case of the Union Bank, and what we have said in
that case as to the power of the wife to join her husband in such
securities to the bank equally applies to the present case, and
need not be repeated.
3. The plea of the statute of limitations has also been disposed
of in the preceding case.
4. What was said in the previous case as to the propriety of
dismissing the bill for want of proper parties equally applies to
this.
The forty-five slaves sold to Thomas, including the thirty-three
now in question, were never taken from the possession of
respondents, and though Thomas proves that he offered a reward of
$500, he was unable to get information by which to distinguish or
sever them from the other slaves in possession of respondents.
Hence we see the reasons for these transfers to William M.
Stafford, the younger brother of respondents, who was without means
to pay, and the very liberal terms given by the bank were evidently
for the purpose of favoring the defendants and leaving the slaves
in their possession. We cannot shut our eyes also to the fact that
respondents were the real actors and persons interested in all
these manifold and complicated mortgages, sales, and transfers,
which all seemed to have but one result, to-wit, that the
respondents kept possession of the slaves and never paid their
debts. And having clandestinely carried them away and attempted to
scatter and conceal them from the pursuit of their creditors, it
would be a reproach to a court of equity if it could be truly said
that it was unable to afford the complainants a remedy because the
nominal and insolvent obligee in the mortgage lived in a different
state from those who, in combination with him, have transported the
mortgaged property within the bounds of a different
jurisdiction.
The difficulty arising from the conflicting claims of the Union
Bank can be settled by the court, as we have already shown in our
opinion in that case. In fact, this bill is itself in the nature of
an intervention, setting up the claim of complainants to property
already in possession of the court. And the court has it fully in
its power to compel the banks to interplead with one another as to
the priority of their lien or rights to the property or its
proceeds; as each of them has shown a right to a decree as against
the title of the respondents, they will be indifferent as to the
result unless the property shall produce more than sufficient to
pay both mortgages.
Page 53 U. S. 347
The decree of the district court is therefore
Reversed and the record remitted with directions to enter a
decree in favor of complainant, and cause such other proceedings as
to justice and equity may appertain.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the District Court of the United States for the District of
Texas, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is
now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this Court that the
decree of the said district court in this cause be and the same is
hereby reversed with costs, and that this cause be and the same is
hereby remanded to the said district court with directions to that
court to enter a decree in favor of the complainant and for such
further proceedings to be had therein as to law and justice may
appertain.