Following his California murder conviction, respondent raised a
Miranda claim for the first time on direct appeal, in
violation of a state procedural rule. In affirming the conviction,
the State Court of Appeal rejected the claim on the sole basis of
the procedural bar. After successive petitions for collateral
relief were denied without opinion by the State Superior Court and
Court of Appeal, respondent filed a habeas petition in the State
Supreme Court, which denied relief without opinion or explanation,
citing its decisions in
In re Swain and
In re
Waltreus. When the State Supreme Court denied, without opinion
or citation, a second habeas petition to it, respondent filed a
habeas petition raising the
Miranda claim in Federal
District Court. That court found that the state procedural default
barred federal review, but the Court of Appeals reversed this
determination. Relying on this Court's statement in
Harris v.
Reed, 489 U. S. 255,
489 U. S. 263,
that state procedural default bars federal review only when the
state court clearly and expressly states its reliance on that
ground, the court held that the State Supreme Court's "silent
denial" of respondent's second state habeas petition lifted the
procedural bar imposed on direct review.
Held: A state court's unexplained denial of a habeas
petition raising federal claims is not sufficient, for purposes of
federal review, to lift a procedural bar imposed on direct appeal.
Pp.
501 U. S.
801-806.
(a) The Court of Appeals erred in applying a presumption that,
when a state court denies a federal claim without explicit reliance
on state grounds, the merits of the federal claim are the basis for
the judgment. The
Harris presumption in favor of federal
review is to be applied only after it has been determined that "the
relevant state court decision . . . fairly appear[s] to rest
primarily on federal law or [is] interwoven with [federal] law."
Coleman v. Thompon, ante at
501 U. S. 740.
P.
501 U. S.
802.
(b) With respect to unexplained state court judgments, federal
habeas courts should apply the following presumption: where there
has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim,
later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the
same claim rest upon the same ground. If an earlier opinion "fairly
appear[s] to rest primarily upon federal law," it should be
presumed that no procedural default has been invoked by a
subsequent unexplained order that leaves the judgment
Page 501 U. S. 798
or its consequences in place. Similarly, where the last reasoned
opinion on the claim explicitly imposes a procedural default, it
should be presumed that a later decision rejecting the claim did
not silently disregard the bar and consider the merits. This
"look-through" presumption may be rebutted by strong evidence to
the contrary. Pp.
501 U. S.
803-804.
(c) The last
explained state court judgment on
respondent's
Miranda claim was that of the Court of Appeal
on direct review, which unequivocally rested upon a state
procedural default. None of the later judgments or orders was
informative on the reason for denying the
Miranda claim,
nor has respondent adduced strong evidence that one of them reached
the merits of that claim. Thus, federal court review is barred
unless respondent can establish "cause and prejudice" for his
default,
see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.
S. 478,
477 U. S. 493,
477 U. S.
495-496. On remand, the Court of Appeals must determine
whether he has done so. Pp.
501 U. S.
805-806.
904 F.2d 473, reversed and remanded.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ.,
joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
501 U. S. 806.
BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and
STEVENS, JJ., joined,
post, p.
501 U. S.
807.
Page 501 U. S. 799
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we decide whether the unexplained denial of a
petition for habeas corpus by a state court lifts a state
procedural bar imposed on direct appeal, so that a state prisoner
may then have his claim heard on the merits in a federal habeas
proceeding.
I
In 1975, respondent Nunnemaker was tried in California state
court for murder. He raised a defense of diminished capacity and
introduced psychiatric testimony in support. In response, the State
introduced -- without objection from respondent -- the testimony of
a psychiatrist based upon a custodial interview. The jury found
respondent guilty. He appealed, claiming for the first time that
the State's psychiatric testimony was inadmissible because the
interview had not been preceded by a
Miranda warning,
see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966). In addition, he alleged that his attorney's failure to
object to the psychiatric testimony amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel, and raised other claims not relevant
here.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. The sole
basis for its rejection of the
Miranda claim was the state
procedural rule that "an objection based upon a
Miranda
violation cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." App. 15.
See People v. Bennett, 60 Cal. App. 3d
112, 116, 131 Cal. Rptr. 305, 306-307 (1976);
In re Dennis
M., 70 Cal. 2d
444, 461-462, 450 P.2d 296, 306-307 (1969). The California
Supreme Court denied discretionary review on September 27,
1978.
Page 501 U. S. 800
In 1985, respondent filed a petition for collateral relief in
California Superior Court. The petition was denied without opinion.
Respondent then filed a similar petition for relief in the
California Court of Appeal, invoking that court's original
jurisdiction. That petition was also denied without opinion.
Finally, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
California Supreme Court, invoking the original jurisdiction of
that tribunal. That petition was denied on December 3, 1986, with
citation of
In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d
300,
304, 209 P.2d
793, 796 (1949), and
In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d
218, 225, 397 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1965). App. 82. No opinion or
other explanation accompanied these citations.
Respondent next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California. The court dismissed the petition without prejudice,
ruling that it was not clear whether respondent had exhausted his
state remedies with respect to all his claims. [
Footnote 1]
See Rose v. Lundy,
455 U. S. 509
(1982). Respondent then filed a second petition for habeas relief
in the California Supreme Court, again invoking that court's
original jurisdiction. That petition was denied, without opinion or
case citation, on April 7, 1988.
Respondent then filed a second petition for habeas relief in the
Northern District of California, raising the
Miranda claim
and the ineffectiveness claim. The court rejected the
ineffectiveness claim on the merits. As to the
Miranda
claim, the court found that respondent's state procedural default
barred federal review. Respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part. The court agreed that the
ineffective assistance claim was
Page 501 U. S. 801
meritless. However, relying upon our intervening opinion in
Harris v. Reed, 489 U. S. 255
(1989), the court held that the California Supreme Court's "silent
denial" of respondent's second state habeas petition to that court
lifted the procedural bar arising from the decision on direct
review. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that, because the
California Supreme Court did not "clearly and expressly state its
reliance on Nunnemaker's procedural default," the federal court
could not say that the Supreme Court's order "was based on a
procedural default, rather than on the underlying merits of
Nunnemaker's claims." 904 F.2d 473, 476 (1990). We granted
certiorari, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
II
The last state court to render a judgment on the
Miranda claim as of 1978, the California Court of Appeal,
expressly found a procedural default. When a state law default
prevents the state court from reaching the merits of a federal
claim, that claim can ordinarily not be reviewed in federal court.
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72,
433 U. S. 87-88
(1977);
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.
S. 478,
477 U. S.
485-492 (1986). Thus, had respondent proceeded to
federal habeas on the basis of the
Miranda claim upon
completing his direct review in 1978, federal review would have
been barred by the state law procedural default.
State procedural bars are not immortal, however; they may expire
because of later actions by state courts. If the last state court
to be presented with a particular federal claim reaches the merits,
it removes any bar to federal court review that might otherwise
have been available.
See Harris, supra at
489 U. S. 262.
We consider, therefore, whether the California Supreme Court's
unexplained order denying his second habeas petition to that court,
which according to the Ninth Circuit sought relief on the basis of
his
Miranda claim, constituted a "decision on the merits"
of that claim sufficient to lift the procedural bar imposed on
direct appeal.
Page 501 U. S. 802
The Ninth Circuit concluded that it did constitute a decision on
the merits by applying a presumption that, when a federal claim is
denied without explicit reliance on state grounds, the merits of
the federal claim are the basis for the judgment. Petitioner argues
that that was error, [
Footnote
2] and we agree. The Ninth Circuit thought itself to be
following our decision in
Harris v. Reed, supra at
489 U. S. 263.
As we have since made clear, however,
see Coleman v. Thompson,
ante p.
501 U. S. 722, the
Harris presumption is to be applied only after it has been
determined that "the relevant state court decision . . . fairly
appear[s] to rest primarily on federal law or [is] interwoven with
[federal] law."
Ante at
501 U. S.
740.
The consequent question presented by the present case,
therefore, is how federal courts in habeas proceedings are to
determine whether an unexplained order (by which we mean an order
whose text or accompanying opinion does not disclose the reason for
the judgment) rests primarily on federal law. The question is not
an easy one. In
Coleman itself, although the order was
unexplained, the nature of the disposition ("dismissed" rather than
"denied") and surrounding circumstances (in particular, the fact
that the State had rested its argument entirely upon a procedural
bar), indicated that the basis was procedural default. But such
clues
Page 501 U. S. 803
will not always, or even ordinarily, be available. Indeed,
sometimes the members of the court issuing an unexplained order
will not themselves have agreed upon its rationale, so that the
basis of the decision is not merely undiscoverable, but
nonexistent.
The problem we face arises, of course, because many formulary
orders are not meant to convey anything as to the reason for the
decision. Attributing a reason is therefore both difficult and
artificial. We think that the attribution necessary for federal
habeas purposes can be facilitated, and sound results more often
assured, by applying the following presumption: where there has
been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later
unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same
claim rest upon the same ground. If an earlier opinion "fairly
appear[s] to rest primarily upon federal law,"
Coleman,
ante at
501 U. S. 740,
we will presume that no procedural default has been invoked by a
subsequent unexplained order that leaves the judgment or its
consequences in place. Similarly where, as here, the last reasoned
opinion on the claim explicitly imposes a procedural default, we
will presume that a later decision rejecting the claim did not
silently disregard that bar and consider the merits. This approach
accords with the view of every Court of Appeals to consider the
matter, save the court below.
See Prihoda v. McCaughtry,
910 F.2d 1379, 1383 (CA7 1990) (dicta);
Harmon v. Barton,
894 F.2d 1268, 1272 (CA11 1990);
Evans v. Thompson, 881
F.2d 117, 123, n. 2 (CA4 1989);
Ellis v. Lynaugh, 873 F.2d
830, 838 (CA5 1989).
This presumption assists, as we have said, not only
administrability, but accuracy as well -- unlike the application of
Harris to unexplained orders, which achieves the former at
the expense of the latter. As applied to an unexplained order
leaving in effect a decision (or, in the case of habeas, the
consequences of a decision) that expressly relies upon procedural
bar, the
Harris presumption would interpret the order as
rejecting that bar and deciding the federal question
Page 501 U. S. 804
on the merits. That is simply a most improbable assessment of
what actually occurred. The maxim is that silence implies consent,
not the opposite -- and courts generally behave accordingly,
affirming without further discussion when they agree, not when they
disagree, with the reasons given below. The essence of unexplained
orders is that they say nothing. We think that a presumption which
gives them
no effect -- which simply "looks through" them
to the last reasoned decision -- most nearly reflects the role they
are ordinarily intended to play. [
Footnote 3]
Respondent poses various hypotheticals in which this presumption
would not produce a correct assessment of the state court
disposition. We need not consider them, because we do not suggest
that the presumption is irrebuttable; strong evidence can refute
it. It might be shown, for example, that, even though the last
reasoned state court opinion had relied upon a procedural default,
a retroactive change in law had eliminated that ground as a basis
of decision, and the court which issued the later unexplained order
had directed extensive briefing limited to the merits of the
federal claim. Or it might be shown that, even though the last
reasoned state court opinion had relied upon a federal ground, the
later appeal to the court that issued the unexplained order was
plainly out of time, and that the latter court did not ordinarily
waive such a procedural default without saying so.
Page 501 U. S. 805
While we acknowledge that making the presumption rebuttable will
make it less efficient than the categorical approach taken by the
Courts of Appeals that have adopted the "look-through" methodology,
see Prihoda, supra at 1383;
Harmon, supra at
1272;
Evans, supra at 123, n. 2;
Ellis, supra at
838, we think it will still simplify the vast majority of cases.
The details of state law need not be inquired into unless, if they
should be as the habeas petitioner asserts, they would constitute
strong evidence that the presumption, as applied, is wrong.
To decide the present case, therefore, we begin by asking which
is the last
explained state court judgment on the
Miranda claim. Obviously it is not the second denial of
habeas by the California Supreme Court; although that was the last
judgment, it said absolutely nothing about the reasons for the
denial. The first denial of habeas by that court, on December 3,
1986, did cite (without any elaboration) two state cases,
Swain and
Waltreus. The former holds that facts
relied upon in a habeas petition must be alleged with
particularity, and the latter that claims presented on direct
review ordinarily may not be relitigated on state habeas. Even if
we knew that the court intended to apply both of these cases to the
Miranda claim (as opposed to the other claims raised by
the same petition), that would be irrelevant to the point before us
here. Respondent had exhausted his
Miranda claim by
presenting it on direct appeal, and was not required to go to state
habeas at all,
see Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.
S. 346,
489 U. S.
349-350 (1989); state rules against that superfluous
recourse have no bearing upon his ability to raise the
Miranda claim in federal court. Thus, although the
California Supreme Court's denial of respondent's first habeas
petition to it was not utterly silent, neither was it informative
with respect to the question before us.
The prior denials of respondent's state habeas petitions by the
two lower California courts were silent; and, as discussed above,
the discretionary denial of review on direct appeal by
Page 501 U. S. 806
the California Supreme Court is not even a "judgment." Thus, the
last state opinion on the
Miranda claim is that of the
Court of Appeal on direct review, and that opinion unequivocally
rested upon a state procedural default. We look through the
subsequent unexplained denials to that opinion, unless respondent
has carried his burden of adducing strong evidence that one of the
subsequent courts reached the merits of the federal claim. He has
not done so. He claims to be able to show that California habeas
courts could have allowed him to relitigate his
Miranda
claim, in spite of the ordinary state rule barring relitigation of
claims raised on direct appeal.
See, e.g., Waltreus, 62
Cal. 2d at 225, 397 P.2d at 1005. But even if he established that,
to prove that they could do so is not to prove that they did do so
-- much less to prove that, having done so, they decided the
relitigated point on the merits, rather than on the basis of the
procedural default relied upon in 1978. Respondent has adduced
nothing to show that any California court actually reached the
merits of his federal claim. The presumption that the California
Supreme Court's last unexplained order did not reach the merits,
and that the bar of procedural default subsists, has not been
overcome. Federal court review of the claim is therefore barred
unless respondent can establish "cause and prejudice" for the
default,
see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at
477 U. S. 493,
477 U. S.
495-496. The District Court specifically found no cause
and prejudice, but, since the Court of Appeals had no occasion to
review that holding, we remand for that purpose.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
In fact, he had. The California Court of Appeal decision on
direct review shows that all claims, including the
Miranda
claim and the ineffectiveness claim, were presented to, and
specifically addressed by, that court.
See App. 15, 17.
The District Court's mistake on this point was apparently caused by
respondent's own statement "that none of his claims were
[
sic] raised by way of direct appeal."
Id. at
83.
[
Footnote 2]
Petitioner also argues that in California original habeas corpus
jurisdiction is discretionary, so that denial of a petition is not
a "judgment," and the last state court "judgment" to which we
should look is that of the Court of Appeal on direct review.
Respondent concedes that a discretionary denial of review cannot
lift a preexisting procedural bar, and the federal courts are in
accord.
See Goodwin v. Collins, 910 F.2d 185, 187 (CA5
1990);
Prihoda v. McCaughtry, 910 F.2d 1379, 1382-1383
(CA7 1990). Respondent denies, however, that California courts have
any discretion not to entertain habeas corpus petitions. The state
law on this question is not clear, and we shall assume for purposes
of this case that respondent is right. We also assume, since the
point has not been argued, that
Miranda claims such as
that raised by respondent are cognizable in federal habeas corpus.
See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U. S. 195,
492 U. S.
205-214 (1989) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring);
cf. Stone
v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465
(1976).
[
Footnote 3]
The only common circumstance in which the presumption is
unrealistic is that in which the later state decision rests upon a
prohibition against
further state review -- for example,
an unexplained denial of state habeas resting in fact upon a rule
(such as petitioner contends exists in California) preventing the
relitigation on state habeas of claims raised on direct appeal. In
that circumstance, even though the presumption does not posit the
real reason for the later denial, it does produce a result
("looking through" to the last reasoned decision) that is the
correct one for federal habeas courts. Since a later state decision
based upon ineligibility for further state review neither rests
upon procedural default nor lifts a preexisting procedural default,
its effect upon the availability of federal habeas is nil -- which
is precisely the effect accorded by the "look-through"
presumption.
JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court, but add these few
words. Had the Court of Appeals stated that, as a matter of state
law, the State Supreme Court's summary, unexplained denial of an
original petition for habeas corpus is a
Page 501 U. S. 807
ruling on the merits, the presumption the Court's opinion
articulates in this case would be rebutted unless we disagreed with
the Court of Appeals with respect to state law. The Court of
Appeals, however, did not so state, but, in effect, said that the
state court's order was ambiguous. Hence, the presumption
governs.
I also note that
Coleman v. Thompson, ante at
501 U. S. 739,
stated that the presumption of
Harris v. Reed,
489 U. S. 255
(1989),
"applies only when it fairly appears that a state court judgment
rested primarily on federal law or was interwoven with federal law,
that is, in those cases where a federal court has good reason to
question whether there is an independent and adequate state ground
for the decision."
In joining the Court's opinion in the case before us, I take it
that the opinion's bobtailed quotation from
Coleman, ante
at
501 U. S. 802,
is not intended to restrict the reach of the presumption.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE STEVENS
join, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in the dissent in
Coleman v.
Thompson, ante p.
501 U. S. 758,
I also dissent in this case.