The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA
or Act), 7 U.S.C. § 136
et seq., was primarily a pesticide
licensing and labeling law until 1972, when it was transformed by
Congress into a comprehensive regulatory statute. Among other
things, the 1972 amendments significantly strengthened the
preexisting registration and labeling standards, specified that
FIFRA regulates pesticide use, as well as sales and labeling, and
granted increased enforcement authority to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). Regarding state and local authorities,
FIFRA, as amended, includes provisions requiring pesticide
manufacturers to produce records for inspection "upon request of
any officer or employee . . . of any State or political
subdivision," § 136f(b); directing the EPA to cooperate with "any
appropriate agency of any state or any political subdivision
thereof . . . in securing uniformity of regulations," § 136t(b);
and specifying that "[a] State" may regulate pesticide sale or use
so long as such regulation does not permit a sale or use prohibited
by the Act, § 136v(a). Pursuant to its statutory police power,
petitioner town adopted an ordinance that,
inter alia,
requires a permit for certain applications of pesticides to private
lands. After the town issued a decision unfavorable to respondent
Mortier on his application for a permit to spray a portion of his
land, he brought a declaratory judgment action in county court,
claiming, among other things, that the ordinance was preempted by
FIFRA. The court granted summary judgment for Mortier, and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, finding preemption on the ground
that the Act's text and legislative history demonstrate a clearly
manifest congressional intent to prohibit any regulation of
pesticides by local governmental units.
Held: FIFRA does not preempt local governmental
regulation of pesticide use. Pp.
501 U. S.
604-616.
(a) When considering preemption, this Court starts with the
assumption that the States' historic powers are not superseded by
federal law unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress. That purpose may be expressed in the terms of the statute
itself. Absent explicit preemptive language, congressional intent
to supersede state law may nonetheless be implicit if, for example,
the federal Act touches a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be
Page 501 U. S. 598
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject. Even where Congress has not chosen to occupy a particular
field, preemption may occur to the extent that state and federal
law actually conflict, as when compliance with both is a physical
impossibility, or when the state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of Congress' purposes and objectives. Pp.
501 U. S.
604-605.
(b) FIFRA nowhere expressly supersedes local regulation. Neither
the Act's language nor the legislative history relied on by the
court below, whether read together or separately, suffices to
establish preemption. The fact that § 136v(a) expressly refers only
to "[a] State" as having the authority to regulate pesticide use,
and the Act's failure to include political subdivisions in its §
136(aa) definition of "State," are wholly inadequate to demonstrate
the requisite clear and manifest congressional intent. Mere silence
is insufficient in this context.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U. S. 218,
331 U. S. 230.
And the exclusion of local governments cannot be inferred from the
express authorization to "State[s]," because that term is not
self-limiting; political subdivisions are merely subordinate
components of the very entity the statute empowers.
Cf., e.g.,
Sailors v. Board of Education of Kent County, 387 U.
S. 105,
387 U. S. 108.
Indeed, the more plausible reading of the express authorization
leaves the allocation of regulatory authority to the absolute
discretion of the States themselves, including the options of
specific redelegation or leaving local regulation of pesticides in
the hands of local authorities under existing state laws. Nor is
there any merit to Mortier's contention that the express references
in §§ 136t(b) and 136f(b) to "political subdivision[s]" show that
Congress made a clear distinction between nonregulatory authority,
which may be exercised by such subdivisions, and the regulatory
authority reserved to the "State[s]" in § 136v(a). Furthermore, the
legislative history is, at best, ambiguous, reflecting a
disagreement between the responsible congressional committees as to
whether the provision that would become § 136v preempted local
regulation. Pp.
501 U. S.
606-610.
(c) FIFRA also fails to provide any clear and manifest
indication that Congress sought to supplant local authority over
pesticide regulation impliedly. The argument that the 1972
amendments transformed the Act into a
Page 501 U. S. 599
comprehensive statute that occupied the entire pesticide
regulation field, and that certain provisions, including § 136v(a),
reopened certain portions of the field to the States, but not to
political subdivisions, is unpersuasive. Section 136v itself
undercuts any inference of field preemption, since § 136v(b)
prohibits States from enacting or imposing labeling or packaging
requirements that conflict with those required under FIFRA. This
language would be pure surplusage if Congress had already occupied
the entire field. Nor does FIFRA otherwise imply preemption. While
the 1972 amendments turned the Act into a comprehensive regulatory
statute, substantial portions of the field are still left vacant,
including the area at issue in this case. FIFRA nowhere seeks to
establish an affirmative permit scheme for the actual use of
pesticides or to occupy the field of local use permitting. Thus,
the specific grant of authority in § 136v(a) must be read not as an
exclusion of municipalities, but as an act ensuring that the States
could continue to regulate use and sales even where, such as with
regard to the banning of mislabeled products, a narrow preemptive
overlap might occur. Pp.
501 U. S.
611-614.
(d) There is no actual conflict either between FIFRA or the
ordinance at issue or between the Act and local regulation
generally. Compliance with both the ordinance and FIFRA is not a
physical impossibility. Moreover, Mortier's assertions that the
ordinance stands as an obstacle to the Act's goals of promoting
pesticide regulation that is coordinated solely at the federal and
state levels, that rests upon some degree of technical expertise,
and that does not unduly burden interstate commerce are based on
little more than snippets of legislative history and policy
speculations, and are unpersuasive. As is evidenced by § 136t(b),
FIFRA implies a regulatory partnership between federal, state,
and local governments. There is no indication that any
coordination which the statute seeks to promote extends beyond the
matters with which it expressly deals, or does so strongly enough
to compel the conclusion that an independently enacted ordinance
that falls outside the statute's reach frustrates its purpose. Nor
is there any indication in FIFRA that Congress felt that local
ordinances necessarily rest on insufficient expertise and burden
commerce. Pp.
501 U. S.
614-616.
154 Wis.2d 18,
452 N.W.2d
555 (1990), reversed and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR,
KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment,
post, p.
501 U. S.
616.
Page 501 U. S. 600
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to consider whether the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, (FIFRA), 61 Stat. 163,
as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 136
et seq. preempts the regulation
of pesticides by local governments. We hold that it does not.
Page 501 U. S. 601
I
A
FIFRA was enacted in 1947 to replace the Federal Government's
first effort at pesticide regulation, the Insecticide Act of 1910,
36 Stat. 331. 61 Stat. 163. Like its predecessor, FIFRA as
originally adopted "was primarily a licensing and labeling
statute."
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.
S. 986,
467 U. S. 991
(1984). In 1972, growing environmental and safety concerns led
Congress to undertake a comprehensive revision of FIFRA through the
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act. 86 Stat. 973. The 1972
amendments significantly strengthened FIFRA's registration and
labeling standards. 7 U.S.C. § 136a. To help make certain that
pesticides would be applied in accordance with these standards, the
revisions further insured that FIFRA
"regulated the use, as well as the sale and labeling, of
pesticides; regulated pesticides produced and sold in both
intrastate and interstate commerce; [and] provided for review,
cancellation, and suspension of registration."
Ruckleshaus, supra, at
467 U. S.
991-992. An additional change was the grant of increased
enforcement authority to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
which had been charged with federal oversight of pesticides since
1970.
See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed.Reg.
15623 (1970), 5 U.S.C.App. p. 1343. In this fashion, the 1972
amendments "transformed FIFRA from a labeling law into a
comprehensive regulatory statute." 467 U.S. at
467 U. S.
991.
As amended, FIFRA specifies several roles for state and local
authorities. The statute, for example, authorizes the EPA
Administrator to enter into cooperative agreements with the States
to enforce FIFRA provisions. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136u, 136w-1. As part of
the enforcement scheme, FIFRA requires manufacturers to produce
records for inspection
"upon request of any officer or employee of the Environmental
Protection Agency or of any State or political subdivision, duly
designated by the Administrator."
§ 136f(b).
Page 501 U. S. 602
FIFRA further directs the EPA Administrator to cooperate with
"any appropriate agency of any State or any political subdivision
thereof." § 136t(b). Of particular relevance to this case, § 24(a)
specifies that States may regulate the sale or use of pesticides so
long as the state regulation does not permit a sale or use
prohibited by the Act. § 136v(a).
B
Petitioner, the town of Casey, is a small rural community
located in Washburn County, Wisconsin, several miles northwest of
Spooner, on the road to Superior. [
Footnote 1] In 1985, the town adopted Ordinance 85-1,
which regulates the use of pesticides. The ordinance expressly
borrows statutory definitions from both Wisconsin laws and FIFRA,
and was enacted under Wis.Stat. §§ 61.34(1), (5) (1989-1990), which
accords village boards with general police, health, and taxing
powers. [
Footnote 2]
The ordinance requires a permit for the application of any
pesticide to public lands, to private lands subject to public
Page 501 U. S. 603
use, or for the aerial application of any pesticide to private
lands. Ord. § 1.2, 2 App. to Pet. for Cert. 6. A permit applicant
must file a form including information about the proposed pesticide
use not less than 60 days before the desired use. § 1.3(2),
id. at 7. The town board may
"deny the permit, grant the permit, or grant the permit with . .
. any reasonable conditions on a permitted application related to
the protection of the health, safety and welfare of the residents
of the Town of Casey."
§ 1.3(3),
id. at 11-12. After an initial decision, the
applicant or any town resident may obtain a hearing to provide
additional information regarding the proposed application. §§
1.3(4), (5),
id. at 12-14. When a permit is granted, or
granted with conditions, the ordinance further requires the
permittee to post placards giving notice of the pesticide use and
of any label information prescribing a safe reentry time. § 1.3(7),
id. at 14-16. Persons found guilty of violating the
ordinance are subject to fines of up to $5,000 for each violation.
§ 1.3(7)(c),
id. at 16.
Respondent Ralph Mortier applied for a permit for aerial
spraying of a portion of his land. The town granted him a permit,
but precluded any aerial spraying and restricted the lands on which
ground spraying would be allowed. Mortier, in conjunction with
respondent Wisconsin Forestry/Rights-of-Way/Turf Coalition,
[
Footnote 3] brought a
declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Washburn
County against the town of Casey and named board members, claiming
that the town of Casey's ordinance is preempted by state and
federal law. The Wisconsin Public Intervenor, an assistant attorney
general charged under state law with the protection of
environmental public rights, Wis.Stat. §§ 165.07, 165.075
(1989-1990), was admitted without objection as a party defendant.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Circuit Court ruled in
favor of Mortier, holding that the town's
Page 501 U. S. 604
ordinance was preempted both by FIFRA and by state statute, §§
94.67-94.71; 2 App. to Pet. for Cert. 14.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed in a 4-to-3 decision.
Mortier v. Casey, 154 Wis.2d 18,
452
N.W.2d 555 (1990). Declining to address the issue of state law
preemption, the court concluded that FIFRA preempted the town of
Casey's ordinance because the statute's text and legislative
history demonstrated a clearly manifest congressional intent to
prohibit "any regulation of pesticides by local units of
government."
Id. at 20, n. 2, and 30, 452 N.W.2d at 555,
n. 2, 560. The court's decision accorded with the judgments of two
Federal Courts of Appeals.
Professional Lawn Care Association
v. Milford, 909 F.2d 929 (CA6 1990);
Maryland Pest Control
Association v. Montgomery County, 822 F.2d 55 (CA4 1987),
summarily aff'g 646 F.
Supp. 109 (D.Md.1986). Two separate dissents concluded that
neither FIFRA's language nor its legislative history expressed an
intent to preempt local regulation.
Casey, supra, 154
Wis.2d at 33, 452 N.W.2d at 561 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); 154
Wis.2d at 45, 452 N.W.2d at 566 (Steinmetz, J. dissenting). The
dissenters' conclusion in part relied on decisions reached by two
State Supreme Courts.
Central Maine Power Co. v.
Lebanon, 571 A.2d
1189 (Me.1990);
People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of
Mendocino, 36 Cal. 3d
476,
204 Cal. Rptr.
897,
683 P.2d 1150
(1984). Given the importance of the issue and the conflict of
authority, we granted certiorari. 498 U.S. 1045 (1991). We now
reverse.
II
Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S.Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, state
laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of congress,
made in pursuance of the constitution" are invalid.
Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,
22 U. S. 211
(1824) (Marshall, C.J.). The ways in which federal law may preempt
state law are well established, and in the first instance turn on
congressional intent.
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,
498 U. S. 133
(1990). Congress' intent to supplant state authority in a
Page 501 U. S. 605
particular field may be expressed in the terms of the statute.
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.
S. 519,
430 U. S. 525
(1977). Absent explicit preemptive language, Congress' intent to
supersede state law in a given area may nonetheless be implicit if
a scheme of federal regulation is "so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it," if
"the Act of Congress . . . touch[es] a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject,"
or if the goals "sought to be obtained" and the "obligations
imposed" reveal a purpose to preclude state authority.
Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218,
331 U. S. 230
(1947).
See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation and Development Commission,
461 U. S. 190,
461 U. S.
203-204 (1983). When considering preemption,
"we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
Rice, supra, 331 U.S. at
331 U. S.
230.
Even when Congress has not chosen to occupy a particular field,
preemption may occur to the extent that state and federal law
actually conflict. Such a conflict arises when "compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,"
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U. S. 132,
373 U. S.
142-143 (1963), or when a state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress,"
Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U. S. 52
(1941).
It is, finally, axiomatic that, "for the purposes of the
Supremacy Clause, the constitutionality of local ordinances is
analyzed in the same way as that of statewide laws."
Hillsborough v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.,
471 U. S. 707,
471 U. S. 713
(1985).
See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
Inc., 411 U. S. 624
(1973).
Page 501 U. S. 606
III
Applying these principles, we conclude that FIFRA does not
preempt the town's ordinance either explicitly, implicitly, or by
virtue of an actual conflict.
A
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized, FIFRA nowhere
expressly supersedes local regulation of pesticide use. The court,
however, purported to find statutory language "which is indicative"
of preemptive intent in the statute's provision delineating the
"Authority of States." 7 U.S.C. § 136v. The key portions of that
provision state:
"(a) . . . A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally
registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the
extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by
this subchapter."
"(b) . . . Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any
requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different
from those required under this subchapter."
Also significant, in the court's eyes, was FIFRA's failure to
specify political subdivisions in defining "State" as
"a State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, and American Samoa."
7 U.S.C. § 136(aa).
It is not clear to the State Supreme Court, however,
"that the statutory language [§§ 136v and 136(aa)] alone
evince[d] congress' manifest intent to deprive political
subdivisions of authority to regulate pesticides."
Casey, 154 Wis.2d at 25, 452 N.W.2d at 557-558. It was
nevertheless "possible" to infer from the statutory language alone
that pesticide regulation by local entities was preempted; and,
when coupled with its legislative history, that language
"unmistakably demonstrates the intent of Congress to preempt local
ordinances such as that adopted by the Town of Casey."
Id.
at 28, 452 N.W.2d at 559. The court's holding thus
Page 501 U. S. 607
rested on both §§ 136v and 136(aa) and their legislative
history; neither the language nor the legislative history would
have sufficed alone. There was no suggestion that, absent the two
critical sections, FIFRA was a sufficiently comprehensive statute
to justify an inference that Congress had occupied the field to the
exclusion of the States. Nor have the respondents argued in this
Court to that effect. On the other hand, it is sufficiently clear
that, under the opinion announced by the court below, the State
would have been precluded from permitting local authorities to
regulate pesticides.
We agree that neither the language of the statute nor its
legislative history, standing alone, would suffice to preempt local
regulation. But it is also our view that, even when considered
together, the language and the legislative materials relied on
below are insufficient to demonstrate the necessary congressional
intent to preempt. As for the statutory language, it is wholly
inadequate to convey an express preemptive intent on its own.
Section 136v plainly authorizes the "States" to regulate
pesticides, and just as plainly is silent with reference to local
governments. Mere silence, in this context, cannot suffice to
establish a "clear and manifest purpose" to preempt local
authority.
Rice, 331 U.S. at
331 U. S. 230.
Even if FIFRA's express grant of regulatory authority to the States
could not be read as applying to municipalities, it would not
follow that municipalities were left with no regulatory authority.
Rather, it would mean that localities could not claim the
regulatory authority explicitly conferred upon the States that
might otherwise have been preempted through actual conflicts with
Federal law. At a minimum, localities would still be free to
regulate subject to the usual principles of preemption.
Properly read, the statutory language tilts in favor of local
regulation. The principle is well settled that local
""governmental units are
created as convenient agencies for
exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may
be
Page 501 U. S.
608
entrusted to them' . . . in [its] absolute
discretion.""
Sailors v. Board of Education of Kent County,
387 U. S. 105,
387 U. S. 108
(1967), quoting
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.
S. 533,
377 U.S.
575 (1964), quoting
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,
207 U. S. 161,
207 U. S. 178
(1907). The exclusion of political subdivisions cannot be inferred
from the express authorization to the "State[s]," because political
subdivisions are components of the very entity the statute
empowers. Indeed, the more plausible reading of FIFRA's
authorization to the States leaves the allocation of regulatory
authority to the "absolute discretion" of the States themselves,
including the option of leaving local regulation of pesticides in
the hands of local authorities.
Certainly no other textual basis for preemption exists. Mortier,
building upon the decision below, contends that other provisions
show that Congress made a clear distinction between nonregulatory
authority, which it delegated to the States or their political
subdivisions, and regulatory authority, which it expressly
delegated to the "State[s]" alone. The provisions on which he
relies, however, undercut his contention. Section 136t(b), for
example, mandates that the EPA Administrator cooperate with "any
appropriate agency of any State or any political subdivision
thereof, in carrying out the provisions of this subchapter." As an
initial matter, the section does not limit "the provisions of the
subchapter" which localities are authorized to carry out to
"nonregulatory" provisions. Moreover, to read this provision as
preempting localities would also require the anomalous result of
preempting the actions of any agency to the extent it exercised
state-delegated powers that included pesticide regulation.
Likewise, § 136f(b) requires manufacturers to produce records for
the inspection upon the request of any employee of the EPA "or of
any State or political subdivision, duly designated by the
Administrator." Section 136u(a)(1), however, authorizes the
Administrator to "delegate to any State . . . the authority to
cooperate in the enforcement of this [Act] through the use of its
personnel." If the use of "State"
Page 501 U. S. 609
in FIFRA impliedly excludes subdivisions, it is unclear why the
one provision would allow the designation of local officials for
enforcement purposes, while the other would prohibit local
enforcement authority altogether.
Mortier, like the court below and other courts that have found
preemption, attempts to compensate for the statute's textual
inadequacies by stressing the legislative history.
Casey,
154 Wis.2d at 25-28, 452 N.W.2d at 558-559;
Professional Lawn
Care Association, 909 F.2d at 933-934. The evidence from this
source, which centers on the meaning of what would become § 136v,
is, at best, ambiguous. The House Agriculture Committee Report
accompanying the proposed FIFRA amendments stated that it had
"rejected a proposal which would have permitted political
subdivisions to further regulate pesticides on the grounds that the
50 States and the Federal Government should provide an adequate
number of regulatory jurisdictions."
H.R.Rep. No. 92-511, p. 16 (1971). While this statement
indicates an unwillingness by Congress to grant political
subdivisions regulatory authority, it does not demonstrate an
intent to prevent the States from delegating such authority to its
subdivisions, and still less does it show a desire to prohibit
local regulation altogether. At least one other statement, however,
concededly goes further. The Senate Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry Report states outright that it
"considered the decision of the House Committee to deprive
political subdivisions of States and other local authorities of any
authority or jurisdiction over pesticides, and concurs with the
decision of the House of Representatives."
S.Rep. No. 92-838, p. 16 (1972), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News
1972, pp. 3993, 4008.
But other Members of Congress clearly disagreed. The Senate
Commerce Committee, which also had jurisdiction over the bill,
observed that,
"[w]hile the [Senate] Agriculture Committee bill does not
specifically prohibit local governments from regulating pesticides,
the report of that committee states explicitly that local
governments cannot regulate
Page 501 U. S. 610
pesticides in any manner. Many local governments now regulate
pesticides to meet their own specific needs, which they are often
better able to perceive than are State and Federal regulators."
S.Rep. No. 92-970, p. 27 (1972), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News
1972, p. 4111. To counter the language in the Agriculture and
Forestry Committee Report, the Commerce Committee proposed an
amendment expressly authorizing local regulation among numerous
other, unrelated proposals. This amendment was rejected after
negotiations between the two Committees.
See 118 Cong.Rec.
32251 (1972); H.R.Conf. Rep. No. 92-1540, p. 33 (1972), U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1972, p. 3993.
As a result, matters were left with the two principal Committees
responsible for the bill in disagreement over whether it preempted
pesticide regulation by political subdivisions. It is important to
note, moreover, that even this disagreement was confined to the
preemptive effect of FIFRA's authorization of regulatory power to
the States in § 136v. None of the Committees mentioned asserted
that FIFRA preempted the field of pesticide regulation. Like
FIFRA's text, the legislative history thus falls far short of
establishing that preemption of local pesticide regulation was the
"clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
Rice, 331 U.S.
at
331 U. S. 230.
We thus agree with the submission in the
amicus brief of
the United States expressing the views of the Environmental
Protection Agency, the agency charged with enforcing FIFRA.
[
Footnote 4]
Page 501 U. S. 611
B
Likewise, FIFRA fails to provide any clear and manifest
indication that Congress sought to supplant local authority
Page 501 U. S. 612
over pesticide regulation impliedly. In particular, we reject
the position of some courts, but not the court below, that the 1972
amendments transformed FIFRA into a comprehensive statute that
occupied the field of pesticide regulation, and that certain
provisions opened specific portions of the field to state
regulation and much smaller portions to local regulation.
See
Professional Lawn Care, 909 F.2d at 933-934;
Maryland Pest
Control, 646 F.Supp. at 110-111;
see also, Brief for
National Pest Control Association
et al. as
Amici
Curiae 6-16; Brief for Washington Legal Foundation as
Amicus Curiae 18. On this assumption, it has been argued,
§ 136v(a) could be viewed as opening the field of general pesticide
regulation to the States, yet leaving it closed to political
subdivisions.
This reasoning is unpersuasive. As an initial matter, it would
still have to be shown under ordinary canons of construction that
FIFRA's delegation of authority to "State[s]" would not therefore
allow the States in turn to redelegate some of this authority to
their political subdivisions, either specifically or by leaving
undisturbed their existing statutes that would otherwise provide
local government with ample authority to regulate. We have already
noted that § 136v(a) can be plausibly read to contemplate precisely
such redelegation. The term "State" is not self-limiting, since
political subdivisions are merely subordinate components of the
whole. The scattered mention of political subdivisions elsewhere in
FIFRA does not require their exclusion here. The legislative
history is complex and ambiguous.
More importantly, field preemption cannot be inferred. In the
first place, § 136v itself undercuts such an inference.
Page 501 U. S. 613
The provision immediately following the statute's grant of
regulatory authority to the States declares that
"[s]uch State shall not impose or continue in effect any
requirements for labeling and packaging in addition to or different
from those required under"
FIFRA. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). This language would be pure
surplusage if Congress had intended to occupy the entire field of
pesticide regulation. Taking such preemption as the premise, §
136v(a) would thus grant States the authority to regulate the "sale
or use" of pesticides, while § 136v(b) would superfluously add that
States did not have the authority to regulate "labeling or
packaging," an addition that would have been doubly superfluous,
given FIFRA's historic focus on labeling to begin with.
See
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at
467 U. S. 991.
Nor does FIFRA otherwise imply preemption. While the 1972
amendments turned FIFRA into a "comprehensive regulatory statute,"
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at
467 U. S. 991,
the resulting scheme was not "so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it."
Rice, 331 U.S. at
331 U. S. 230.
To the contrary, the statute leaves ample room for States and
localities to supplement federal efforts even absent the express
regulatory authorization of § 136v(a). FIFRA addresses numerous
aspects of pesticide control in considerable detail, in particular:
registration and classification, § 136a; applicator certification,
§ 136b; inspection of pesticide production facilities, §§ 136e and
136g; and the possible ban and seizure of pesticides that are
misbranded or otherwise fail to meet federal requirements, § 136k.
These provisions reflect the general goal of the 1972 amendments to
strengthen existing labeling requirements and insure that these
requirements were followed in practice. § 136k.
See
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at
467 U. S. 991-992. FIFRA nonetheless leaves substantial
portions of the field vacant, including the area at issue in this
case. FIFRA nowhere seeks to establish an affirmative permit scheme
for the actual use of pesticides. It certainly does not equate
registration
Page 501 U. S. 614
and labeling requirements with a general approval to apply
pesticides throughout the Nation without regard to regional and
local factors like climate, population, geography, and water
supply. Whatever else FIFRA may supplant, it does not occupy the
field of pesticide regulation in general or the area of local use
permitting in particular.
In contrast to other implicitly preempted fields, the 1972
enhancement of FIFRA does not mean that the use of pesticides can
occur
"'only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in
the hands of federally certified personnel and under an intricate
system of federal commands.'"
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. at
411 U. S. 634,
quoting
Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.
S. 292,
322 U. S. 303
(1944) (Jackson, J., concurring). The specific grant of authority
in § 136v(a) consequently does not serve to hand back to the States
powers that the statute had impliedly usurped. Rather, it acts to
ensure that the States could continue to regulate use and sales
even where, such as with regard to the banning of mislabeled
products, a narrow preemptive overlap might occur. As noted in our
discussion of express preemption, it is doubtful that Congress
intended to exclude localities from the scope of § 136v(a)'s
authorization, but however this may be, the type of local
regulation at issue here would not fall within any impliedly
preempted field.
C
Finally, like the EPA, we discern no actual conflict either
between FIFRA and the ordinance before us or between FIFRA and
local regulation generally. Mortier does not rely, nor could he, on
the theory that compliance with the ordinance and FIFRA is a
"physical impossibility."
Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, 373 U.S. at
373 U. S.
142-143. Instead, he urges that the town's ordinance
stands as an obstacle to the statute's goals of promoting pesticide
regulation that is coordinated solely on the federal and state
levels, that rests upon some degree of technical expertise, and
that does not
Page 501 U. S. 615
unduly burden interstate commerce. Each one of these assertions
rests on little more than snippets of legislative history and
policy speculations. None of them is convincing.
To begin with, FIFRA does not suggest a goal of regulatory
coordination that sweeps either as exclusively or as broadly as
Mortier contends. The statute gives no indication that Congress was
sufficiently concerned about this goal to require preemption of
local use ordinances simply because they were enacted locally.
Mortier suggests otherwise, quoting legislative history which
states that FIFRA establishes "a coordinated Federal-State
administrative system to carry out the new program," and raising
the specter of gypsy moth hoards safely navigating through
thousands of contradictory and ineffective municipal regulations.
H.R.Rep. No. 92-511 at 1-2. As we have made plain, the statute does
not expressly or impliedly preclude regulatory action by political
subdivisions with regard to local use. To the contrary, FIFRA
implies a regulatory partnership between federal, state, and local
governments. Section 136t(b) expressly states that the
Administrator
"shall cooperate with . . . any appropriate agency of any State
or any political subdivision thereof, in carrying out the
provisions of this [Act] and in securing uniformity of
regulations."
Nor does FIFRA suggest that any goal of coordination precludes
local use ordinances because they were enacted independent of
specific state or federal oversight. As we have also made plain,
local use permit regulations -- unlike labeling or certification --
do not fall within an area that FIFRA's "program" preempts, or even
plainly addresses. There is no indication that any coordination
which the statute seeks to promote extends beyond the matters with
which it deals, or does so strongly enough to compel the conclusion
that an independently enacted ordinance that falls outside the
statute's reach frustrates its purpose.
FIFRA provides even less indication that local ordinances must
yield to statutory purposes of promoting technical
Page 501 U. S. 616
expertise or maintaining unfettered interstate commerce. Once
more, isolated passages of legislative history that were themselves
insufficient to establish a preemptive congressional intent do not
by themselves establish legislative goals with preemptive effect.
See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 92-838, at 16, U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin.News 1972, p. 4007. Mortier nonetheless asserts that local
ordinances necessarily rest on insufficient expertise and burden
commerce by allowing, among other things, large-scale crop
infestation. As with the specter of the gypsy moth, Congress is
free to find that local regulation does wreak such havoc and enact
legislation with the purpose of preventing it. We are satisfied,
however, that Congress has not done so yet.
IV
We hold that FIFRA does not preempt the town of Casey's
ordinance regulating the use of pesticides. The judgment of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The town has a population of from 400 to 500 persons, large
enough to enact the ordinance at issue in this case.
See
Washburn County Directory 1982-83, Brief for Respondents 4, n. 4;
Tr. Oral Arg. 12.
[
Footnote 2]
Section 61.34(1) provides:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, the village board shall
have the management and control of the village property, finances,
highways, streets, navigable waters, and the public service, and
shall have power to act for the government and good order of the
village, for its commercial benefit and for the health, safety,
welfare, and convenience of the public, and may carry its powers
into effect by license, regulation, suppression, borrowing,
taxation, special assessment, appropriation, fine, imprisonment,
and other necessary or convenient means. The powers hereby
conferred shall be in addition to all other grants and shall be
limited only by express language."
Section 61.34(5) provides:
"For the purpose of giving to villages the largest measure of
self-government in accordance with the spirit of article XI,
section 3, of the [Wisconsin] constitution it is hereby declared
that this chapter shall be liberally construed in favor of the
rights, powers and privileges of villages to promote the general
welfare, peace, good order and prosperity of such villages and the
inhabitants thereof."
[
Footnote 3]
The coalition is an unincorporated, nonprofit association of
individual businesses and other associations whose members use
pesticides.
[
Footnote 4]
JUSTICE SCALIA's foray into legislative history runs into
several problems. For one, his concurrence argues that the House
Agriculture Committee made it clear that it wanted localities "out
of the picture," because its report specifies as grounds for
rejecting a proposal
permitting the localities to regulate
pesticides the observation that the Federal Government and the 50
States provided an adequate number of regulatory jurisdictions.
Post at
501 U. S. 617.
But the only way to infer that the Committee opposed not only a
direct grant of regulatory authority upon localities but also state
delegation of authority to regulate would be to suppose that the
term "regulatory jurisdictions" meant regulatory for the purposes
of exercising any authority at all as opposed to exercising
authority derived from a direct Federal grant. H.R.Rep. No. 92-511,
p. 16 (1971). The language of the Report does not answer this
question one way or another.
The concurrence further contends that the Senate Agriculture
Committee unequivocally expressed its view that § 136v should be
read to deprive localities of regulatory authority over pesticides.
This may be true, but it is hardly dispositive. Even if § 136v were
sufficiently ambiguous to justify reliance on legislative history,
the meaning a committee puts forward must, at a minimum, be within
the realm of meanings that the provision, fairly read, could bear.
Here the Report clearly states that § 136v should be read as a
prohibition, but it is just as clear that the provision is written
exclusively in terms of a grant. No matter how clearly its report
purports to do so, a committee of Congress cannot take language
that could only cover "flies" or "mosquitoes" and tell the courts
that it really covers "ducks."
Finally, the concurrence suggests that the Senate Commerce
Committee report reconfirmed the views of the two agriculture
committees that § 136v prohibited local pesticide regulation.
Post at 618-620. But the Commerce Committee at no point
states, clearly or otherwise, that it agrees that the section
before it does this. Rather, the Report states that,
"while the Agriculture Committee bill does not specifically
prohibit local governments from regulating,
the report of that
committee states explicitly that local governments cannot
regulate in any matter."
S.Rep. No. 90-970, p. 27 (1972) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News
1972, p. 4111 (emphasis added). The Commerce Committee, indeed,
went on to assert its policy differences with its Agriculture
counterpart. It did this by attempting to strike at the root of the
problem through changing the language of the provision itself. Far
from showing agreement with its rival, the Commerce Committee's
words and actions show a body that first, conceded
no
ground on the meaning of the disputed language and then second,
raised the stakes by seeking to insure that the language could go
only
its way. On both the existence and the desirability
of a prohibition on local regulation, there can be no doubt that
the Commerce and Agriculture Committees stood on the opposite sides
of the Senate debate.
As for the propriety of using legislative history at all, common
sense suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional
information, rather than ignoring it. As Chief Justice Marshall put
it, "[w]here the mind labours to discover the design of the
legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived."
Fisher v.
Blight, 2 Cranch 358,
6 U. S. 386
(1805). Legislative history materials are not generally so
misleading that jurists should never employ them in a good faith
effort to discern legislative intent. Our precedents demonstrate
that the Court's practice of utilizing legislative history reaches
well into its past.
See, e.g., 31 U. S.
Parker, 6 Pet. 680,
31 U. S.
687-690 (1832). We suspect that the practice will
likewise reach well into the future.
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that FIFRA does not preempt local
regulation, because I agree that the terms of the statute do not
alone manifest a preemption of the entire field of pesticide
regulation.
Ante at
501 U. S.
611-614. If there were field preemption, 7 U.S.C. § 136v
would be understood not as restricting certain types of state
regulation (for which purpose, it makes little sense to restrict
States, but not their subdivisions), but as authorizing certain
types of state regulation (for which purpose, it makes eminent
sense to authorize States, but not their subdivisions). But the
field preemption question is certainly a close one. Congress'
selective use of "State" and "State and political subdivisions
thereof" would suggest the authorizing, rather than restricting,
meaning of § 136v, were it not for the inconsistent usage pointed
to in
501 U. S.
Page 501 U. S. 617
As the Court today recognizes,
see ante at
501 U. S.
606-607, the Wisconsin Justices agreed with me on this
point, and would have come out the way that I and the Court do
but for the Committee Reports contained in FIFRA's
legislative history. I think they were entirely right about the
tenor of those reports. Their only mistake was failing to recognize
how unreliable Committee Reports are -- not only as a genuine
indicator of congressional intent, but as a safe predictor of
judicial construction. We use them when it is convenient, and
ignore them when it is not.
Consider how the case would have been resolved if the committee
reports were taken seriously: the bill to amend FIFRA (H.R. 10729)
was reported out of the House Committee on Agriculture on September
25, 1971. According to the accompanying Committee Report:
"The Committee rejected a proposal which would have permitted
political subdivisions to further regulate pesticides on the
grounds that the 50 States and the Federal Government should
provide an adequate number of regulatory jurisdictions."
H.R.Rep. No. 92-511, p. 16 (1971).
Had the
grounds for the rejection not been specified,
it would be possible to entertain the Court's speculation,
ante at
501 U. S. 609,
that the Committee might have been opposing only
direct
conferral upon localities of authority to regulate, in contrast to
state
delegation of authority to regulate. But once it is
specified that an excessive number of regulatory jurisdictions is
the problem -- that "50 States and the Federal Government" are
enough -- then it becomes clear that the Committee wanted
localities out of the picture, and thought that its bill placed
them there.
The House Agriculture Committee's bill was passed by the full
House on November 9, 1971, and, upon transmittal to the Senate, was
referred to the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, which
reported it out on June 7, 1972. The accompanying Committee Report
both clearly confirms the
Page 501 U. S. 618
foregoing interpretation of the House Committee Report and
clearly endorses the disposition that interpretation produces.
"[We have] considered the decision of the House Committee to
deprive political subdivisions of States and other local
authorities of any authority or jurisdiction over pesticides and
concurs with the decision of the House of Representatives. Clearly,
the fifty States and the Federal Government provide sufficient
jurisdictions to properly regulate pesticides. Moreover, few, if
any, local authorities whether towns, counties, villages, or
municipalities have the financial wherewithal to provide necessary
expert regulation comparable with that provided by the State and
Federal Governments. On this basis and on the basis that permitting
such regulation would be an extreme burden on interstate commerce,
it is the intent that section [136v], by not providing any
authority to political subdivisions and other local authorities of
or in the States, should be understood as depriving such local
authorities and political subdivisions of any and all jurisdiction
and authority over pesticides and the regulation of
pesticides."
S.Rep. No. 92-838, pp. 16-17 (1972), U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin.News 1972, p. 4008 (emphasis added). Clearer committee
language "directing" the courts how to interpret a statute of
Congress could not be found, and if such a direction had any
binding effect, the question of interpretation in this case would
be no question at all.
But there is still more. After the Senate Agriculture Committee
reported the bill to the floor, it was re-referred to the Committee
on Commerce, which reported it out on July 19, 1972. The report of
that Committee, plus the accompanying proposals for amendment of
H.R. 10729,
reconfirmed the interpretation of the Senate
and House Agriculture committees. The Report said:
Page 501 U. S. 619
"While the Agriculture Committee bill does not specifically
prohibit local governments from regulating pesticides, the report
of that committee states explicitly that local governments cannot
regulate pesticides in any manner. Many local governments now
regulate pesticides to meet their own specific needs, which they
are often better able to perceive than are State and Federal
regulators."
S.Rep. No. 92-970, p. 27 (1972), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News
1972, p. 4111. The Court claims that this passage, plus the
amendment that it explains, show that
"the two principal committees responsible for the bill [were] in
disagreement over whether it preempted pesticide regulation by
political subdivisions."
Ante at
501 U. S. 610.
I confess that I am less practiced than others in the science of
construing legislative history, but it seems to me that quite the
opposite is the case. The Senate Commerce Committee Report does not
offer a different
interpretation of the preemptive effect
of H.R. 10729. To the contrary, it acknowledges that the report of
the originating committee "states explicitly that local governments
cannot regulate pesticides in any manner," and then proceeds to a
statement ("Many local governments now regulate pesticides, etc.")
which questions not the
existence, but the
desirability, of that restriction on local regulatory
power. And since it agreed with the interpretation, but did not
agree with the policy, the Senate Commerce Committee proposed an
amendment to H.R. 10729 whose purpose, according to its report, was
to
"giv[e] local governments the authority to regulate the sale or
use of a pesticide beyond the requirements imposed by State and
Federal authorities."
S.Rep. No. 92-970 at 27, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972,
p. 4111. In a supplemental Report, the Senate Agriculture Committee
opposed the Commerce Committee's amendment, which it said would
"giv[e] local governments the authority to regulate the sale or use
of a pesticide," thereby "vitiat[ing]" the earlier Agriculture
Committee Report. S.Rep. No. 92-838, pt. 2, at 46-47 (1972),
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, p. 4066. This legislative
history clearly demonstrates, I think, not (as the
Page 501 U. S. 620
Court would have it) that the two principal Senate committees
disagreed about whether H.R. 10729 preempted local regulation, but
that they were in complete accord that it
did, and in
disagreement over whether it
ought to.
Of course, that does not necessarily say anything about what
Congress as a whole thought. Assuming that all the members of the
three committees in question (as opposed to just the relevant
subcommittees) actually adverted to the interpretive point at issue
here -- which is probably an unrealistic assumption -- and assuming
further that they were in
unanimous agreement on the
point, they would still represent less than two-fifths of the
Senate, and less than one-tenth of the House. It is most unlikely
that many Members of either chamber read the pertinent portions of
the Committee Reports before voting on the bill -- assuming (we
cannot be sure) that the Reports were available before the vote.
Those pertinent portions, though they dominate our discussion
today, constituted less than a quarter-page of the 82-page House
Agriculture Committee Report, and less than a half-page each of the
74-page Senate Agriculture Committee Report, the 46-page Senate
Commerce Committee Report, and the 73-page Senate Agriculture
Committee Supplemental Report. Those Reports, in turn, were a
minuscule portion of the total number of reports that the Members
of Congress were receiving (and presumably even writing) during the
period in question. In the Senate, at least, there was a vote on an
amendment (the Commerce Committee proposal) that would have changed
the result of the supposed interpretation. But the full Senate
could have rejected that
either because a majority of its
Members disagreed with the Commerce Committee's proposed policy;
or because they disagreed with the Commerce Committee's
and the Agriculture Committee's interpretation (and thus thought
the amendment superfluous);
or because they were
blissfully ignorant of the entire dispute, and simply thought that
the
Page 501 U. S. 621
Commerce Committee, by asking for recommittal and proposing 15
amendments, was being a troublemaker;
or because three
different minorities (enough to make a majority) had each of these
respective reasons. We have no way of knowing; indeed, we have no
way of knowing that they had any
rational motive at
all.
All we know for sure is that the full Senate adopted the text
that we have before us here, as did the full House, pursuant to the
procedures prescribed by the Constitution; and that that text,
having been transmitted to the President and approved by him, again
pursuant to the procedures prescribed by the Constitution, became
law. On the important question before us today, whether that law
denies local communities throughout the Nation significant powers
of self-protection, we should try to give the text its fair
meaning, whatever various committees might have had to say --
thereby affirming the proposition that we are a Government of laws,
not of committee reports. That is, at least, the way I prefer to
proceed.
If I believed, however, that the meaning of a statute is to be
determined by committee reports, I would have to conclude that a
meaning opposite to our judgment has been commanded three times
over -- not only by one committee in each house, but by
two committees in one of them. Today's decision reveals
that, in their judicial application, committee reports are a
forensic, rather than an interpretive, device, to be invoked when
they support the decision and ignored when they do not. To my mind
that is infinitely better than honestly giving them dispositive
effect. But it would be better still to stop confusing the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, and not to use committee reports at
all.
* * * *
The Court responds to this concurrence in a footnote,
ante at
501 U. S.
610-612 n. 4, asserting that the legislative history
is
Page 501 U. S. 622
really ambiguous. I leave it to the reader to judge. I must
reply, however, to the Court's assertion that the "practice of
utilizing legislative history reaches well into [our] past,"
ante at
501 U. S. 612
n. 4, for which proposition it cites an opinion written by none
other than John Marshall himself,
Wallace v.
Parker, 6 Pet. 680 (1832). What the Court neglects
to explain is that what it means by "the practice of utilizing
legislative history" is
not the practice of utilizing
legislative history for the purpose of giving authoritative content
to the meaning of a statutory text -- which is the only practice I
object to. Marshall used factual statements in the report of an
Ohio legislative committee "as part of the record" in the case,
id. at
31 U. S. 689,
31 U. S. 690,
assuming that that was permissible "under the laws of Ohio,"
ibid. I do not object to such use. But that is quite
different from the recent practice of relying upon legislative
material to provide an authoritative interpretation of a statutory
text. That would have shocked John Marshall. As late as 1897, we
stated quite clearly that there is
"a general acquiescence in the doctrine that debates in Congress
are not appropriate sources of information from which to discover
the meaning of the language of a statute passed by that body."
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn.,
166 U. S. 290,
166 U. S. 318.
And even as late as 1953, the practice of using legislative history
in that fashion was novel enough that Justice Jackson could dismiss
it as a "psychoanalysis of Congress," and a "weird endeavor."
United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345 U.
S. 295,
345 U. S. 319
(Jackson, J., concurring). It is, in short, almost entirely a
phenomenon of this century -- and in its extensive use a very
recent phenomenon.
See, e.g., Carro & Brann, Use of
Legislative Histories by the United States Supreme Court: A
Statistical Analysis, 9 J.Legis. 282 (1982); Wald, Some
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 Iowa L.Rev.195, 196-197 (1983).
I am depressed if the Court is predicting that the use of
legislative history for the purpose I have criticized "will . .
.
Page 501 U. S. 623
reach well into the future." But if it is, and its prediction of
the future is as accurate as its perception that it is continuing a
"practice . . . reach[ing] well into [our] past," I may have
nothing to fear.