Having stopped respondent Jimeno's car for a traffic infraction,
police officer Trujillo, who had been following the car after
overhearing Jimeno arranging what appeared to be a drug
transaction, declared that he had reason to believe that Jimeno was
carrying narcotics in the car, and asked permission to search it.
Jimeno consented, and Trujillo found cocaine inside a folded paper
bag on the car's floorboard. Jimeno was charged with possession
with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of Florida law, but
the state trial court granted his motion to suppress the cocaine on
the ground that his consent to search the car did not carry with it
specific consent to open the bag and examine its contents. The
Florida District Court of Appeal and Supreme Court affirmed.
Held: A criminal suspect's Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches is not violated when, after he
gives police permission to search his car, they open a closed
container found within the car that might reasonably hold the
object of the search. The Amendment is satisfied when, under the
circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for the police to
believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted them to
open the particular container. Here, the authorization to search
extended beyond the car's interior surfaces to the bag, since
Jimeno did not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the
search, and was aware that Trujillo would be looking for narcotics
in the car, and since a reasonable person may be expected to know
that narcotics are generally carried in some form of container.
There is no basis for adding to the Fourth Amendment's basic test
of objective reasonableness a requirement that, if police wish to
search closed containers within a car, they must separately request
permission to search each container. Pp.
500 U. S.
250-252.
564 So. 2d
1083 (Fla.1990), reversed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ.,
joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS,
J., joined,
post, p.
500 U. S.
252.
Page 500 U. S. 249
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we decide whether a criminal suspect's Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches is violated
when, after he gives a police officer permission to search his
automobile, the officer opens a closed container found within the
car that might reasonably hold the object of the search. We find
that it is not. The Fourth Amendment is satisfied when, under the
circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for the officer to
believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted him to
open a particular container within the automobile.
This case began when a Dade County police officer, Frank
Trujillo, overheard respondent, Enio Jimeno, arranging what
appeared to be a drug transaction over a public telephone.
Believing that respondent might be involved in illegal drug
trafficking, Officer Trujillo followed his car. The officer
observed respondent make a right turn at a red light without
stopping. He then pulled respondent over to the side of the road in
order to issue him a traffic citation. Officer Trujillo told
respondent that he had been stopped for committing a traffic
infraction. The officer went on to say that he had reason to
believe that respondent was carrying narcotics in his car, and
asked permission to search the car. He explained that respondent
did not have to consent to a search of the car. Respondent stated
that he had nothing to hide, and gave Trujillo
Page 500 U. S. 250
permission to search the automobile. After two passengers
stepped out of respondent's car, Officer Trujillo went to the
passenger side, opened the door, and saw a folded, brown paper bag
on the floorboard. The officer picked up the bag, opened it, and
found a kilogram of cocaine inside.
Respondent was charged with possession with intent to distribute
cocaine in violation of Florida law. Before trial, he moved to
suppress the cocaine found in the bag on the ground that his
consent to search the car did not extend to the closed paper bag
inside of the car. The trial court granted the motion. It found
that, although respondent "could have assumed that the officer
would have searched the bag" at the time he gave his consent, his
mere consent to search the car did not carry with it specific
consent to open the bag and examine its contents. No. 88-23967
(Cir.Ct.Dade Cty., Fla., Mar. 21, 1989); App. to Pet. for Cert.
A-6.
The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's
decision to suppress the evidence of the cocaine. 550 So. 2d 1176
(Fla. 3d DCA 1989). In doing so, the court established a
per
se rule that "consent to a general search for narcotics does
not extend to
sealed containers within the general area agreed
to by the defendant.'" Ibid. (citation omitted). The
Florida Supreme Court affirmed, relying upon its decision in
State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464
(1989) aff'd on other grounds, 495 U. S. 495 U.S. 1
(1990). 564 So. 2d
1083 (1990). We granted certiorari to determine whether consent
to search a vehicle may extend to closed containers found inside
the vehicle. 498 U.S. 997 (1990), and we now reverse the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Florida.
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347,
389 U. S. 360
(1967). The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated
searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are
unreasonable.
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.
S. 177 (1990). Thus, we have long approved consensual
searches because it
Page 500 U. S. 251
is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once
they have been permitted to do so.
Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218,
412 U. S. 219
(1973). The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent
under the Fourth Amendment is that of "objective" reasonableness --
what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the
exchange between the officer and the suspect?
Illinois v.
Rodriguez, supra, at
497 U. S.
183-189;
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.
S. 491,
460 U. S.
501-502 (1983) (opinion of WHITE, J.);
id. at
460 U. S. 514
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). The question before us, then, is
whether it is reasonable for an officer to consider a suspect's
general consent to a search of his car to include consent to
examine a paper bag lying on the floor of the car. We think that it
is.
The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed
object.
United States v. Ross, 456 U.
S. 798 (1982). In this case, the terms of the search's
authorization were simple. Respondent granted Officer Trujillo
permission to search his car, and did not place any explicit
limitation on the scope of the search. Trujillo had informed
respondent that he believed respondent was carrying narcotics, and
that he would be looking for narcotics in the car. We think that it
was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the
general consent to search respondent's car included consent to
search containers within that car which might bear drugs. A
reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are
generally carried in some form of a container. "Contraband goods
rarely are strewn across the trunk or floor of a car."
Id.
at
456 U. S. 820.
The authorization to search in this case, therefore, extended
beyond the surfaces of the car's interior to the paper bag lying on
the car's floor.
The facts of this case are therefore different from those in
State v. Wells, supra, on which the Supreme Court of
Florida relied in affirming the suppression order in this case.
There, the Supreme Court of Florida held that consent to search the
trunk of a car did not include authorization to pry open a locked
briefcase found inside the trunk. It is very likely
Page 500 U. S. 252
unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the
search of his trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked
briefcase within the trunk, but it is otherwise with respect to a
closed paper bag.
Respondent argues, and the Florida trial court agreed with him,
that, if the police wish to search closed containers within a car,
they must separately request permission to search each container.
But we see no basis for adding this sort of superstructure to the
Fourth Amendment's basic test of objective reasonableness.
Cf.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213
(1983). A suspect may, of course, delimit as he chooses the scope
of the search to which he consents. But if his consent would
reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container, the
Fourth Amendment provides no grounds for requiring a more explicit
authorization.
"[T]he community has a real interest in encouraging consent, for
the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution
and prosecution of crime, evidence that may ensure that a wholly
innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal
offense."
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, at
412 U. S.
243.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is accordingly
reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins,
dissenting.
The question in this case is whether an individual's general
consent to a search of the interior of his car for narcotics should
reasonably be understood as consent to a search of closed
containers inside the car. Nothing in today's opinion dispels my
belief that the two are not one and the same from the consenting
individual's standpoint. Consequently, an individual's consent to a
search of the interior of his car should not be understood to
authorize a search of closed containers inside the car. I
dissent.
Page 500 U. S. 253
In my view, analysis of this question must start by identifying
the differing expectations of privacy that attach to cars and
closed containers. It is well established that an individual has
but a limited expectation of privacy in the interior of his car. A
car ordinarily is not used as a residence or repository for one's
personal effects, and its passengers and contents are generally
exposed to public view.
See Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U. S. 583,
417 U. S. 590
(1974) (plurality opinion). Moreover, cars "are subjected to
pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls,"
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.
S. 364,
428 U. S. 368
(1976), and may be seized by the police when necessary to protect
public safety or to facilitate the flow of traffic,
see
id. at
428 U. S.
368-369.
In contrast, it is equally well established that an individual
has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed
container.
See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick,
433 U. S. 1,
433 U. S. 13
(1977). Luggage, handbags, paper bags, and other containers are
common repositories for one's papers and effects, and the
protection of these items from state intrusion lies at the heart of
the Fourth Amendment. U.S.Const., Amdt. 4 ("The right of the people
to be secure in their . . . papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated"). By
placing his possessions inside a container, an individual manifests
an intent that his possessions be "preserve[d] as private,"
United States v. Katz, 389 U. S. 347,
389 U. S. 351
(1967), and thus kept "free from public examination,"
United
States v. Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. at
433 U. S. 11.
The distinct privacy expectations that a person has in a car, as
opposed to a closed container, do not merge when the individual
uses his car to transport the container. In this situation, the
individual still retains a heightened expectation of privacy in the
container.
See Robbins v. California, 453 U.
S. 420,
453 U. S. 425
(1981) (plurality opinion);
Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U. S. 753,
442 U. S.
763-764 (1979). Nor does an individual's heightened
expectation of privacy turn on the type of container
Page 500 U. S. 254
in which he stores his possessions. Notwithstanding the
majority's suggestion to the contrary,
see ante at ___,
this Court has soundly rejected any distinction between "worthy"
containers, like locked briefcases, and "unworthy" containers, like
paper bags.
"Even though such a distinction perhaps could evolve in a series
of cases in which paper bags, locked trunks, lunch buckets, and
orange crates were placed on one side of the line or the other, the
central purpose of the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a
distinction. For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is
absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most
majestic mansion, so also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush
and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf
claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official
inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attache
case."
United States v. Ross, 456 U.
S. 798,
456 U. S. 822
(1982) (footnotes omitted).
Because an individual's expectation of privacy in a container is
distinct from, and far greater than, his expectation of privacy in
the interior of his car, it follows that an individual's consent to
a search of the interior of his car cannot necessarily be
understood as extending to containers in the car. At the very
least, general consent to search the car is ambiguous with respect
to containers found inside the car. In my view, the independent and
divisible nature of the privacy interests in cars and containers
mandates that a police officer who wishes to search a suspicious
container found during a consensual automobile search obtain
additional consent to search the container. If the driver intended
to authorize search of the container, he will say so; if not, then
he will say no.
* The only
objection that the police could have to such a
Page 500 U. S. 255
rule is that it would prevent them from exploiting the ignorance
of a citizen who simply did not anticipate that his consent to
search the car would be understood to authorize the police to
rummage through his packages.
According to the majority, it nonetheless is reasonable for a
police officer to construe generalized consent to search an
automobile for narcotics as extending to closed containers, because
"[a] reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are
generally carried in some form of a container."
Ante at
___. This is an interesting contention. By the same logic, a person
who consents to a search of the car from the driver's seat could
also be deemed to consent to a search of his person, or indeed of
his body cavities, since a reasonable person may be expected to
know that drug couriers frequently store their contraband on their
persons or in their body cavities. I suppose (and hope) that even
the majority would reject this conclusion, for a person who
consents to the search of his car for drugs certainly does not
consent to a search of things
other than his car for
drugs. But this example illustrates that, if there is a reason for
not treating a closed container as something "other than" the car
in which it sits, the reason cannot be based on intuitions about
where people carry drugs. The majority, however, never identifies a
reason for conflating the distinct privacy expectations that a
person has in a car and in closed containers.
The majority also argues that the police should not be required
to secure specific consent to search a closed container, because
"
[t]he community has a real interest in encouraging consent.'"
Ante at 500 U. S. 252,
quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.
S. 218, 412 U. S. 243
(1973). I find this rationalization equally unsatisfactory. If
anything, a rule that permits the police to construe a consent to
search more broadly than it may have been intended would discourage
individuals from consenting to searches of their cars. Apparently,
the majority's real concern is that, if the police were required to
ask for additional consent to search a closed container found
during the
Page 500 U. S. 256
consensual search of an automobile, an individual who did not
mean to authorize such additional searching would have an
opportunity to say no. In essence, then, the majority is claiming
that "the community has a real interest" not in encouraging
citizens to
consent to investigatory efforts of their law
enforcement agents, but rather in encouraging individuals to be
duped by them. This is not the community that the Fourth
Amendment contemplates.
Almost 20 years ago, this Court held that an individual could
validly "consent" to a search -- or, in other words, waive his
right to be free from an otherwise unlawful search -- without being
told that he had the right to withhold his consent.
See
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra. In
Schneckloth, as
in this case, the Court cited the practical interests in
efficacious law enforcement as the basis for not requiring the
police to take meaningful steps to establish the basis of an
individual's consent. I dissented in
Schneckloth, and what
I wrote in that case applies with equal force here.
"I must conclude, with some reluctance, that, when the Court
speaks of practicality, what it really is talking of is the
continued ability of the police to capitalize on the ignorance of
citizens so as to accomplish by subterfuge what they could not
achieve by relying only on the knowing relinquishment of
constitutional rights. Of course it would be 'practical' for the
police to ignore the commands of the Fourth Amendment, if, by
practicality, we mean that more criminals will be apprehended, even
though the constitutional rights of innocent people go by the
board. But such a practical advantage is achieved only at the cost
of permitting the police to disregard the limitations that the
Constitution places on their behavior, a cost that a constitutional
democracy cannot long absorb."
412 U.S. at
412 U. S.
288.
I dissent.
* Alternatively, the police could obtain such consent in advance
by asking the individual for permission to search both the car and
any closed containers found inside.