Pro se petitioner Demos filed petitions for a writ of
certiorari, a writ of habeas corpus, and a writ of mandamus, all
seeking relief from a single lower court order. He has made 32
in forma pauperis filings in this Court since the October,
1988, Term began.
Held:
1. Demos' petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
2. Demos is denied leave to proceed
in forma pauperis
in the instant, and all future, petitions for extraordinary relief.
His method of seeking relief here -- filing three petitions for
relief from a single order below -- could only be calculated to
disrupt the orderly consideration of cases. The Clerk is directed
not to accept any further petitions from Demos for extraordinary
relief unless he pays the docketing fee required by this Court's
Rule 38(a) and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule
33.
No. 90-7226, certiorari denied; Nos. 90-7225 and 90-7296, motion
for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, No.
90-7226, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, No. 90-7225, and a
petition for a writ of mandamus, No. 90-7296, all seeking relief
from a single order of a lower court, which in turn denied
petitioner leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and barred
petitioner from making further
in forma pauperis filings
seeking certain extraordinary writs. We deny the petition for a
writ of certiorari in No. 90-7226.
Petitioner has made 32
in forma pauperis filings in
this Court since the beginning of the October, 1988, Term, many of
which challenge sanctions imposed by lower courts in response to
petitioner's frivolous filings. Petitioner's method
Page 500 U. S. 17
of seeking relief here -- filing three petitions for relief from
a single order of a lower court -- could only be calculated to
disrupt the orderly consideration of cases. Petitioner has abused
the system, and we find it appropriate to deny leave to proceed
in forma pauperis to petitioner in these two petitions for
extraordinary relief, Nos. 90-7225 and 90-7296, and in all future
petitions for extraordinary relief.
See In re Sindram,
498 U. S. 177
(1991);
In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180
(1989).
If petitioner wishes to have one or both of these petitions
considered on its merits, he must pay the docketing fee required by
Rule 38(a) and submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the
Rules of this Court before May 20, 1991. The Clerk is directed not
to accept any further petitions from petitioner for extraordinary
writs unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and
submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33. Petitioner remains
free under the present order to file
in forma pauperis
requests for relief other than an extraordinary writ, if he
qualifies under this Court's Rule 39 and does not similarly abuse
that privilege.
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 92-7226,
Demos v. United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Washington, et al., on
petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and No. 92-7296,
In re
Demos, on petition for writ of mandamus.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS
join, dissenting.
Today, this Court blacklists another indigent
pro se
litigant. The order issued today, which bars future
in forma
pauperis filings for extraordinary wits by John Demos and
hints that restrictions on other filings by Demos might be
forthcoming, marks the third such proscription the Court has
initiated in the last two years.
See In re Sindram,
498 U. S. 177
(1991);
In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180
(1989). Yet, as in
Sindram and
McDonald, the
Court fails to identify any statute or rule giving it the
extraordinary authority to impose a permanent ban on an indigent
litigant's
in forma pauperis filings. Nor does the Court
satisfactorily explain why it has
Page 500 U. S. 18
singled out an indigent litigant for having lodged frivolous
filings when paying litigants often are guilty of the same sin.
I continue to oppose this Court's unseemly practice of banning
in forma pauperis filings by indigent litigants.
See
In re Sindram, supra, at
498 U. S. 181
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting);
In re McDonald, supra, at
489 U. S. 185
(Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and
STEVENS, JJ.). As I have argued, the Court's assessment of the
disruption that an overly energetic litigant like Demos poses to
"the orderly consideration of cases,"
ante at
500 U. S. 17, is
greatly exaggerated.
Se In re Sindram, supra, at
498 U. S. 181
(dissenting opinion). The Court is sorely mistaken if it believes
that the solution to the problem of a crowded docket is to crack
down on a litigant like Demos.
Two years ago, Justice Brennan sagely warned that, in
"needlessly depart[ing] from its generous tradition" of leaving its
doors open to all classes of litigants, the Court "sets sail on a
journey whose landing point is uncertain."
In re McDonald,
supra, at
489 U. S. 188
(dissenting opinion). The journey's ominous destination is becoming
apparent. The Court appears resolved to close its does to
increasing numbers of indigent litigants -- and for increasingly
less justifiable reasons.* I fear that the Court's action today
portends even
Page 500 U. S. 19
more Draconian restrictions on the access of indigent litigants
to this Court.
In closing its doors today to another indigent litigant, the
Court moves ever closer to the day when it leaves an indigent
litigant with a meritorious claim out in the cold. And with each
barrier that it places in the way of indigent litigants, and with
each instance in which it castigates such litigants for having
"abused the system,"
ante at
500 U. S. 17,
the Court can only reinforce in the hears and minds of our
society's less fortunate members the unsettling message that their
pleas are not welcome here.
I dissent.
* Indeed, the ban the Court imposes on Demos'
in forma
pauperis filings for extraordinary writs seems particularly
unjustifiable. The Court makes much of the fact that Demos has made
32
in forma pauperis filings since 1988. Yet, according to
the records of the Clerk of the Court, only
four of those
filings have been for extraordinary writs, the sole subject of the
ban announced today. It cannot be seriously contended that these
four filings in the last three years have so disrupted the orderly
administration of this Court's business as to require barring any
such future filings. More likely, the Court's ban on Demos'
in
forma pauperis requests for extraordinary writs is but a
poorly disguised penalty for his more numerous petitions for
certiorari.
See also In re Sindram, 498 U.
S. 177,
498 U. S. 183
(1991) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting, joined by MARSHALL, J. (noting
that Court's ban upon petitioner's
in forma pauperis
filings for extraordinary relief "appears to be nothing more than
an alternative for punishing [petitioner] for the frequency with
which he has filed petitions for certiorari and petitions for
rehearing").