A deed executed on 30 May, 1800, but not acknowledged until 14
June following, is to be considered as made 30 May, and was not
within the provisions of the act of Congress for the establishment
of a uniform system of bankruptcy, passed 4 April, 1800, which came
into effect on 1 June, 1800, a commission of bankruptcy having
issued against the grantor on 12 July, 1800.
It is a well established doctrine of the common law that a deed
becomes complete when sealed and delivered. It then becomes the act
of the person who executes it, and whatever its operation may be,
it is his deed. The very act of livery which puts the paper into
the possession of the party for whose benefit it is made seems to
require the construction that it has become a deed.
Page 5 U. S. 250
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This is a writ of error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of
the Fourth Circuit, sitting at Baltimore, in the following
case.
On 30 May, 1800, William Robb, who was then a merchant carrying
on trade and merchandise in the State of Maryland, signed, sealed,
and delivered to Gabriel Wood an instrument of writing purporting
to convey to the said Gabriel his real and personal estate in trust
to secure him from certain notes and acceptances made by him on
account of the said Robb, and afterwards in trust for other
creditors in the deed mentioned. This deed was acknowledged on 14
June, and was then enrolled according to the laws of Maryland.
On 12 July, 1800, a commission of bankruptcy was sued out
founded on the execution of the deed above mentioned, and the said
William Robb being declared a bankrupt, his effects were assigned
to William Owings and Job Smith, who brought this suit against
Gabriel Wood to recover the money received by him under the deed
aforementioned.
Judgment was confessed by the defendant below, subject to the
opinion of the court on a case stated, of which the foregoing were
the material facts.
The court gave judgment in favor of the assignees, to which
judgment a writ of error was sued out by the present plaintiff.
The only question made by the counsel was whether the deed
stated in the case was an act of bankruptcy.
On 4 April, 1800, Congress passed an act to establish an uniform
system of bankruptcy throughout
Page 5 U. S. 251
the United States, which declares, among other things, that any
merchant who shall, after 1 June next succeeding the passage of the
act, with intent unlawfully to delay or defraud his creditors, make
or cause to be made any fraudulent conveyance of his lands or
chattels, shall be deemed and adjudged a bankrupt.
It was admitted in the argument that this deed, if executed
after the first day of June, would have been an act of bankruptcy,
but that being sealed and delivered on 30 May, it was not within
the act, which only comprehends conveyances made after 1 June.
For the defendants in error it was contended that by the laws of
Maryland, a deed is not complete until it is acknowledged, and
therefore this conveyance was made on 14 June, when it was
acknowledged, and not on 30 May, when it was sealed and
delivered.
The Maryland act alluded to was passed in 1766, and declares
"That after the first day of May next, no estate of inheritance
or freehold, or any declaration or limitation of use, or any estate
for above seven years, shall pass or take effect except the deed or
conveyance by which the same shall be intended to pass or take
effect shall be acknowledged in the provincial court or before one
of the justices thereof in the county court, or before two justices
of the same county were the lands, tenements, or hereditaments
conveyed by such deed or conveyance do lie, and be also enrolled,
&c., within six months after the date of such deed or
conveyance."
The fifth section gives the conveyance so acknowledged and
enrolled, in relation to the date thereof.
It is well established doctrine of the common law that a deed
becomes complete when sealed and delivered. It then becomes the act
of the person who has executed it, and whatever its operation may
be, it is his deed. The very act of livery which puts the paper
into the possession of the party for whose benefit it is made seems
to require the construction that it has become a deed.
Page 5 U. S. 252
The question now made to the Court is whether the act of the
Legislature of Maryland has annexed other requisites to an
instrument of writing conveying lands without the performance of
which not only the passing of the estate intended to be conveyed is
arrested but the instrument itself is prevented from becoming the
deed of the person who has executed it.
Upon the most mature consideration of the subject, the opinion
of the Court is that the words used in the act of Maryland, which
have been recited, consider the instrument as a deed, although
inoperative until acknowledged and enrolled.
The words do not apply to the instrument, but to the estate that
instrument is intended to convey.
Since then the bankrupt law of the United States does not affect
deeds made prior to 1 June, 1800, and this deed was made on 30 May,
1800, the Court is of opinion that the rights vested by the deed
(whatever they might be) are not divested in favor of the assignees
of the bankrupt, and therefore that they ought not to have
recovered in this case.
Judgment reversed and judgment of non pros. to be
entered.