Petitioner Irwin filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), claiming that he had been unlawfully
fired by respondent Veterans Administration on the basis of his
race and disability. The EEOC dismissed the complaint on March 19,
1987, mailing copies of a right-to-sue letter to both Irwin and his
attorney. Irwin received the letter on April 7. His attorney
received actual notice of the letter on April 10, having been out
of the country when it was delivered to his office on March 23.
Forty-four days after his attorney's office received the letter and
twenty-nine days after Irwin received his copy, he filed an action
in the District Court, alleging,
inter alia, a violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the complaint
was not filed within the time specified by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c),
which provides that a complaint against the Federal Government must
be filed within 30 days "of receipt of notice of final action
taken" by the EEOC. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a
notice of final action is "received" when the EEOC delivers its
notice to a claimant or his attorney's offices, whichever comes
first, and that the 30-day span operates as an absolute
jurisdictional limit.
Held:
1. Irwin's complaint was untimely. Section 2000e-16(c) requires
that the EEOC's letter be "received," but does not specify that
receipt must be by the claimant, rather than by his representative.
Congress may depart from the common and established practice of
providing notification through counsel only if it does so
expressly. Irwin's argument that there is a material difference
between receipt by an attorney and receipt by his office for
purposes of § 2000e-16(c) is rejected. Lower courts have
consistently held that notice to an attorney's office which is
acknowledged by a representative of that office qualifies as notice
to the client, and the practical effect of a contrary rule would be
to create uncertainty by encouraging factual disputes about when
actual notice was received. Pp.
498 U. S.
92-93.
2. Statutes of limitations in actions against the Government are
subject to the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling
applicable to suits
Page 498 U. S. 90
against private defendants. Applying the same rule amounts to
little, if any, broadening of a congressional waiver of sovereign
immunity. Pp.
498 U. S.
93-96.
3. Irwin's failure to file may not be excused under equitable
tolling principles. Federal courts have typically extended
equitable relief only sparingly in suits against private litigants,
allowing tolling where the claimant has actively pursued his
judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading or where he has
been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing
the filing deadline to pass. Such equitable tolling principles do
not extend to Irwin's claim that his untimely filing should be
excused because his attorney was out of the office when the notice
was received and he filed within 30 days of the date he personally
received notice, which is at best a garden variety claim of
excusable neglect. P.
498 U. S. 96
874 F.2d 1092 (CA5 1989), affirmed.
REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. WHITE, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
in which MARSHALL, J., joined,
post, p.
498 U. S. 97.
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part,
post, p.
498 U. S. 101.
SOUTER, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
In April 1986, petitioner, Shirley Irwin, was fired from his job
by respondent Veteran's Administration (VA). Irwin contacted an
equal employment opportunity
Page 498 U. S. 91
counselor and filed a complaint with the EEOC, alleging that the
VA had unlawfully discharged him on the basis of his race and
physical disability. The EEOC dismissed Irwin's complaint by a
letter dated March 19, 1987. The letter, which was sent to both
Irwin and his attorney, expressly informed them that Irwin had the
right to file a civil action under Title VII, 78 Stat. 253,
as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., within 30 days of
receipt of the EEOC notice. According to Irwin, he did not receive
the EEOC's letter until April 7, 1987, and the letter to his
attorney arrived at the attorney's office on March 23, 1987, while
the attorney was out of the country. The attorney did not learn of
the EEOC's action until his return on April 10, 1987.
Irwin filed a complaint in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas on May 6, 1987, 44 days after the
EEOC notice was received at his attorney's office, but 29 days
after the date on which he claimed he received the letter. The
complaint alleged that the VA discriminated against him because of
his race, age, and handicap, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., 81 Stat. 602,
as amended, 29 U.S.C. §
621
et seq., 87 Stat. 390,
as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 791
et seq., and the First and Fifth Amendments.
Respondent VA moved to dismiss, asserting,
inter alia,
that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because the complaint
was not filed within 30 days of the EEOC's decision, as specified
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). The District Court granted the
motion.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 874 F.2d
1092 (1989). The court held that the 30-day period begins to run on
the date that the EEOC right-to-sue letter is delivered to the
offices of formally designated counsel or to the claimant, even if
counsel himself did not actually receive notice until later.
Id. at 1094. The Court of Appeals further determined that
the 30-day span allotted under § 2000e-16(c)
Page 498 U. S. 92
operates as an absolute jurisdictional limit.
Id. at
1095. Accordingly, it reasoned that the District Court could not
excuse Irwin's late filing, because federal courts lacked
jurisdiction over his untimely claim.
Ibid. That holding
is in direct conflict with the decisions of four other Courts of
Appeals. [
Footnote 1]
We granted certiorari to determine when the 30-day period under
§ 2000e-16(c) begins to run and to resolve the Circuit conflict
over whether late-filed claims are jurisdictionally barred.
Section 2000e-16(c) provides that an employment discrimination
complaint against the Federal Government under Title VII must be
filed "[w]ithin thirty days of receipt of notice of final action
taken" by the EEOC. The Court of Appeals determined that a notice
of final action is "received" when the EEOC delivers its notice to
a claimant or the claimant's attorney, whichever comes first.
Id. at 1094. Petitioner argues that the clock does not
begin until the claimant himself has notice of his right to
sue.
We conclude that Irwin's complaint filed in the District Court
was untimely. As the Court of Appeals observed, § 2000e-16(c)
requires only that the EEOC notification letter be "received"; it
does not specify receipt by the claimant, rather than by the
claimant's designated representative. There is no question but that
petitioner appeared by his attorney in the EEOC proceeding. Under
our system of representative litigation,
"each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and
is considered to have 'notice of all facts, notice of which can be
charged upon the attorney.'"
Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.
S. 626,
370 U. S. 634
(1962) (quoting
Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.
S. 320,
101 U. S. 326
(1880)). Congress has endorsed this sensible practice in the
analogous provisions of
Page 498 U. S. 93
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that
"[w]henever under these rules service is required or permitted
to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the service
shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is
ordered by the court."
Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 5(b). To read the term "receipt" to mean only
"actual receipt by the claimant" would render the practice of
notification through counsel a meaningless exercise. If Congress
intends to depart from the common and established practice of
providing notification through counsel, it must do so expressly.
See Decker v. Anheuser-Busch, 632 F.2d 1221, 1224 (CA5
1980).
We also reject Irwin's contention that there is a material
difference between receipt by an attorney and receipt by that
attorney's office for purposes of § 2000e-16(c). The lower federal
courts have consistently held that notice to an attorney's office
which is acknowledged by a representative of that office qualifies
as notice to the client.
See Ringgold v. National Maintenance
Corp., 796 F.2d 769 (CA5 1986);
Josiah-Faeduwor v.
Communications Satellite Corp., 251 U.S.App. D.C. 346, 785
F.2d 344 (1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b) also permits
notice to a litigant to be made by delivery of papers to the
litigant's attorney's office. The practical effect of a contrary
rule would be to encourage factual disputes about when actual
notice was received, and thereby create uncertainty in an area of
the law where certainty is much to be desired.
The fact that petitioner did not strictly comply with §
2000e-16(c)'s filing deadline does not, however, end our inquiry.
Petitioner contends that, even if he failed to timely file, his
error may be excused under equitable tolling principles. The Court
of Appeals rejected this argument on the ground that the filing
period contained in § 2000e-16(c) is jurisdictional, and therefore
the District Court lacked authority to consider his equitable
claims. The court reasoned that § 2000e-16(c) applies to suits
against the Federal Government,
Page 498 U. S. 94
and thus is a condition of Congress' waiver of sovereign
immunity. Since waivers of sovereign immunity are traditionally
construed narrowly, the court determined that strict compliance
with § 2000e-16(c) is a necessary predicate to a Title VII
suit.
Respondent correctly observes that § 2000e-16(c) is a condition
to its waiver of sovereign immunity, and thus must be strictly
construed.
See Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.
S. 310 (1986). But our previous cases dealing with the
effect of time limits in suits against the Government have not been
entirely consistent, even though the cases may be distinguished on
their facts. In
United States v. Locke, 471 U. S.
84,
471 U. S. 94, n.
10 (1985), we stated that we were leaving open the general question
of whether principles of equitable tolling, waiver, and estoppel
apply against the Government when it involves a statutory filing
deadline. But, as Justice WHITE points out in his concurring
opinion, nearly thirty years earlier, in
Soriano v. United
States, 352 U. S. 270
(1957), we held the petitioner's claim to be jurisdictionally
barred, saying that "Congress was entitled to assume that the
limitation period it prescribed meant just that and no more." 352
U.S. at
352 U. S. 276.
More recently, in
Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.
S. 467,
476 U. S. 479
(1986), we explained that
"we must be careful not to 'assume the authority to narrow the
waiver that Congress intended,' or construe the waiver 'unduly
restrictively.'"
(citation omitted).
Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) provides in relevant part:
"Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken
by . . . the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission . . . an
employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final
disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final
action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in
section 2000e-5 of this title. . . ."
The phraseology of this particular statutory time limit is
probably very similar to some other statutory limitations on
Page 498 U. S. 95
suits against the Government, but probably not to all of them.
In the present statute, Congress said that "within thirty days . .
. an employee . . . may file a civil action . . . ." In
Soriano, supra, Congress provided that "every claim . . .
shall be barred unless the petition . . . is filed . . . within six
years . . . ." An argument can undoubtedly be made that the latter
language is more stringent than the former, but we are not
persuaded that the difference between them is enough to manifest a
different congressional intent with respect to the availability of
equitable tolling. Thus a continuing effort on our part to decide
each case on an
ad hoc basis, as we appear to have done in
the past, would have the disadvantage of continuing
unpredictability without the corresponding advantage of greater
fidelity to the intent of Congress. We think that this case affords
us an opportunity to adopt a more general rule to govern the
applicability of equitable tolling in suits against the
Government.
Time requirements in lawsuits between private litigants are
customarily subject to "equitable tolling,"
Hallstrom v.
Tillamook County, 493 U.S. ___, ___ (1989). Indeed, we have
held that the statutory time limits applicable to lawsuits against
private employers under Title VII are subject to equitable tolling.
[
Footnote 2]
A waiver of sovereign immunity "
cannot be implied, but must
be unequivocally expressed.'" United States v. Mitchell,
445 U. S. 535,
445 U. S. 538
(1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U. S.
1, 395 U. S. 4
(1969)). Once Congress has made such a waiver, we think that making
the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the
Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private suits,
amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver.
Such a principle is likely to be a realistic assessment of
legislative intent, as well as a practically useful principle of
interpretation. We therefore hold that the same rebuttable
presumption of equitable
Page 498 U. S. 96
tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should
also apply to suits against the United States. Congress, of course,
may provide otherwise if it wishes to do so.
But an examination of the cases in which we have applied the
equitable tolling doctrine as between private litigants affords
petitioner little help. Federal courts have typically extended
equitable relief only sparingly. We have allowed equitable tolling
in situations where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial
remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory
period, [
Footnote 3] or where
the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's
misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass. [
Footnote 4] We have generally been much
less forgiving in receiving late filings where the claimant failed
to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights.
Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.
S. 147,
466 U. S. 151
(1984). Because the time limits imposed by Congress in a suit
against the Government involve a waiver of sovereign immunity, it
is evident that no more favorable tolling doctrine may be employed
against the Government than is employed in suits between private
litigants.
Petitioner urges that his failure to file in a timely manner
should be excused because his lawyer was absent from his office at
the time that the EEOC notice was received, and that he thereafter
filed within 30 days of the day on which he personally received
notice. But the principles of equitable tolling described above do
not extend to what is, at best, a garden variety claim of excusable
neglect.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.
Page 498 U. S. 97
Justice SOUTER took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
[
Footnote 1]
See Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107 (CA10 1984);
Milam v. U.S. Postal Service, 674 F.2d 860 (CA11 1982);
Saltz v. Lehman, 217 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 672 F.2d 207
(1982); and
Boddy v. Dean, 821 F.2d 346-350 (CA6
1987).
[
Footnote 2]
See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 455 U.
S. 385,
455 U. S. 394
(1982);
Crown, Cork & Seal, Co. v. Parker,
462 U. S. 345,
462 U. S. 349
n. 3 (1983).
[
Footnote 3]
See Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U.
S. 424 (1965) (plaintiff timely filed complaint in wrong
court);
Herb v. Pitcairn, 325 U. S.
77 (1945) (same);
American Pipe & Construction
Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538
(1974) (plaintiff's timely filing of an individual action tolled
the limitations period in a related class action claim).
[
Footnote 4]
See Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal,
359 U. S. 231
(1959) (adversary's misrepresentation caused plaintiff to let
filing period lapse);
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.
S. 392 (1946) (same).
Justice WHITE, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment.
Although I agree with the Court that the 30-day period under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) begins to run when the notice from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission is delivered either to the
claimant or the claimant's attorney, I do not join the portion of
the opinion holding that the 30-day time period is subject to
equitable tolling,
see ante at
498 U. S.
93-96.
As the Court recognizes,
see ante at
498 U. S. 94,
statutory deadlines for suits against the Government, such as the
one in this case, are conditions on the Government's waiver of
sovereign immunity.
See, e.g., United States v. Mottaz,
476 U. S. 834,
476 U. S. 841
(1986);
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.
S. 111,
444 U. S.
117-118 (1979). As such, they must be "
strictly
observed, and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.'"
Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156,
453 U. S. 161
(1981) (quoting Soriano v. United States, 352 U.
S. 270, 352 U. S. 276
(1957)); see also Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.
S. 273, 461 U. S. 287
(1983). In my view, the Court has failed to "strictly observe" the
terms of the statute at issue in this case.
Congress did not expressly provide for equitable tolling of the
30-day filing deadline in § 2000e-16(c). The Court, however, holds
that, like statutes of limitations for suits between private
litigants, limitations periods for suits against the Government
will now
presumptively be subject to equitable tolling.
Ante at
498 U. S. 95-96.
That holding needlessly reverses at least one of this Court's prior
decisions, and is in tension with several others.
Because of the existence of sovereign immunity, we have
traditionally held that the Government's consent to be sued
"
cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed.'"
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.
S. 535, 445 U. S. 538
(1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U. S.
1, 395 U. S. 4
(1969)). That rule applies even where there is a contrary
presumption for suits
Page 498 U. S. 98
against private defendants. Our decision in
Library of
Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310
(1986), is instructive on this point. There, we held that the
Government was not liable under the federal provisions of Title VII
for interest. In reaching that conclusion, we reaffirmed the
longstanding rule that, despite consent to be sued, the Government
will not be liable for interest unless there is a separate explicit
waiver to that effect.
Id. at
478 U. S.
316-317. Although the statute in that case provided that
the Government was to be liable "the same as a private person" for
"costs," including a "reasonable attorney's fee," we stated
that
"we must construe waivers strictly in favor of the sovereign . .
. and not enlarge the waiver 'beyond what the language
requires.'"
Id. at
316 U. S. 318
(citations omitted). It seems to me that the Court in this case, by
holding that the time limit in § 2000e-16(c) is subject to
equitable tolling, has done exactly what
Shaw prescribes
-- it has enlarged the waiver in § 2000e-16(c) beyond what the
language of that section requires. [
Footnote 2/1]
Not only is the Court's holding inconsistent with our
traditional approach to cases involving sovereign immunity, it
directly overrules a prior decision by this Court,
Soriano v.
United States, 352 U. S. 270
(1957). The question in
Soriano was whether war tolled the
statute of limitations for claims against the Government filed in
the Court of Claims. In arguing for equitable tolling, the
plaintiff there relied on a case in which this Court had held that
war had tolled a limitations statute for purposes of private causes
of action.
Id. at
Page 498 U. S. 99
352 U. S. 275.
The Court was not persuaded, stating that "[t]hat case involved
private citizens, not the Government. It has no applicability to
claims against the sovereign."
Ibid. The Court
explained:
"To permit the application of the doctrine urged by petitioner
would impose the tolling of the statute in every time limit consent
Act passed by the Congress. . . . Strangely enough, Congress would
be required to provide expressly in each statute that the period of
limitation was not to be extended by war. But Congress was entitled
to assume that the limitation period it prescribed meant just that
period, and no more. With this intent in mind, Congress has passed
specific legislation each time it has seen fit to toll such
statutes of limitations because of war. And this Court has long
decided that limitations and conditions upon which the Government
consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions
thereto are not to be implied."
Id. at
352 U. S.
275-276 (footnote omitted). As in
Soriano, here
Congress "was entitled to assume that the limitation period it
prescribed [in § 2000e-16(c)] meant just that period, and no
more."
The Court deviates from the above cases because it believes that
our decisions concerning time requirements "have not been entirely
consistent."
Ante at
498 U. S. 94.
[
Footnote 2/2] Even if that belief
is well-founded, the doctrine of
stare decisis demands
that we attempt to reconcile our prior decisions rather than
Page 498 U. S. 100
hastily overrule some of them. [
Footnote 2/3] Such an attempt would reveal that
Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.
S. 467 (1986), cited by the Court for the alleged
inconsistency,
see ante at
498 U. S. 94, is
not irreconcilable with the cases discussed above. In
Bowen, we allowed equitable tolling against the Government
because, among other things, the statutory time period there, set
forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), expressly allowed tolling. Section
405(g) requires that a civil action be filed "within sixty days . .
.
or within such further time as the Secretary may allow."
See 476 U.S. at
476 U. S. 472,
n. 3 (emphasis added). We noted that the provision in that section
allowing the Secretary to extend the filing deadline expressed
Congress' "clear intention to allow tolling in some cases."
Id. at
476 U. S. 480.
Moreover, we observed that the regulations promulgated by the
Secretary governing extensions of time under that provision were
based on equitable concerns of fairness to claimants, further
"support[ing] our application of equitable tolling."
Id.
at
476 U. S. 480,
n. 12. The statute in this case, unlike the one in
Bowen,
does not manifest any "clear intention" by Congress to allow
tolling, and thus should be subject to the rule articulated in
Soriano, supra.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment, because I do not believe
that equitable tolling is available as a defense to the 30-day
filing requirement, and I would not reach the factual issue of
whether equitable tolling is supported by the circumstances of this
case.
Page 498 U. S. 101
[
Footnote 2/1]
The Court's failure to recognize the importance of sovereign
immunity in statutory construction also ignores
Brown v.
GSA, 425 U. S. 820
(1976). In that case, we held that Title VII provisions for federal
employees preempt other remedies for discrimination in federal
employment. We reached that conclusion despite our earlier holding
in
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.
S. 454 (1975), that Title VII provisions for private
employees did not preempt other discrimination remedies. We found
Johnson to be "inapposite" because, among other things,
"there were no problems of sovereign immunity in the context of the
Johnson case." 425 U.S. at
425 U. S.
833.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Court also asserts that allowing equitable tolling against
the Government "is likely to be a realistic assessment of
legislative intent."
Ante at
498 U. S. 95. It
is unclear, however, why that likelihood, rather than the opposite,
is true. The statute here, for example, was enacted in 1972, when
the presumption was, as set forth in
Soriano v. United
States, 352 U. S. 270
(1957), that statutes of limitations for suits against the
Government were not subject to equitable tolling. It is unlikely
that the 1972 Congress had in mind the Court's present departure
from that longstanding rule.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Stare decisis is "of fundamental importance to the rule
of law,"
Welch v. Texas Highways and Public Transp. Dept.,
483 U. S. 468,
483 U. S. 494
(1987), because, among other things, it promotes stability and
protects expectations.
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.
S. 254,
474 U. S.
265-266 (1986). Although always an important guiding
principle, it has "special force" in cases such as this one that
involve statutory interpretation, because Congress is in a position
to overrule our decision if it so chooses.
Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union 491 U. S. 164,
491 U. S.
172-173 (1989).
Justice STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with the Court's conclusion that the filing
deadline in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) is subject to equitable tolling
and that the petitioner has failed to establish a basis for tolling
in this case, I do not agree that the 30-day limitations period
began to run when petitioner's lawyer, rather than petitioner
himself, received notice from the EEOC of petitioner's right to
file a civil action.
The Court is entirely correct that notice to a litigant's
attorney is generally considered notice to the litigant after
litigation has been commenced.
See ante at
498 U. S. 92-93.
But the Court overlooks the fact that litigation is usually
commenced by service of process on the adverse party himself.
Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly require
service on the opposing litigant.
See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc.
4(d). This case involves a notice that is a condition precedent to
the commencement of formal litigation. I therefore believe that
Congress intended that this notice, like a summons and complaint,
be served on the adverse party, not his representative.
The Court contends that reading
"the term 'receipt' [in § 2000e-16(c)] to mean only 'actual
receipt by the claimant' would render the practice of notification
through counsel a meaningless exercise."
Ante at
498 U. S. 93. By
the same logic, however, reading "receipt," as the Court does, to
mean only "receipt by the claimant's representative" renders "a
meaningless exercise" the EEOC's practice of notifying the claimant
personally, a practice codified in EEOC regulations,
see
29 CFR § 1613.234(a) (1990). Actually, notifying both the claimant
and his representative makes sense regardless of which notice
begins the ticking of the limitations clock. Dual notification
ensures that all persons concerned with the progress of the action
are apprised of important developments.
Cf. ibid. (also
requiring notification of employing agency). However, a claimant's
representative before the
Page 498 U. S. 102
EEOC will not necessarily also represent the claimant in the
ensuing civil suit; indeed, the representative in the
administrative proceedings need not even be an attorney.
See 29 CFR § 1613.214(b) (1990). Notice to the claimant is
therefore the more logical trigger for the limitations countdown.
This construction is not only sensible in light of the notice
requirement's function in the statutory scheme, but is also
consistent with our previous admonitions that Title VII, a remedial
statute, should be construed in favor of those whom the legislation
was designed to protect.
See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 455 U. S. 385,
455 U. S.
397-398 (1982);
Love v. Pullman Co.,
404 U. S. 522,
404 U. S. 527
(1972).
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court's judgment. I
would instead reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand the case for resolution of the disputed factual issue of
when the petitioner himself actually received notice from the EEOC
of his right to file a civil action.