Respondent Wilander, a paint foreman injured at work while
assigned to a "paint boat" chartered by petitioner McDermott
International, sued McDermott under the Jones Act. The Act provides
a cause of action in negligence for "any seaman" injured "in the
course of his employment," but does not define "seaman." McDermott
moved for summary judgment, alleging that, as a matter of law,
Wilander was not a "seaman." The District Court denied the motion,
and the jury entered an award for Wilander, finding,
inter
alia, that the performance of his duties contributed to his
vessel's function or to the accomplishment of its mission, and
therefore satisfied the Fifth Circuit's test for seaman status. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed, refusing to abandon its test in favor of
the Seventh Circuit's more stringent standard, which, in effect,
requires that a "seaman" aid in the navigation of the vessel.
Held: One need not aid in the navigation of a vessel in
order to qualify as a "seaman" under the Jones Act. Pp.
498 U. S.
341-357.
(a) In the absence of contrary indication, it may be assumed
that the Jones Act's failure to define "seaman" indicates a
congressional intent that the word have its established meaning
under general maritime law at the time of the Act's passage. Pp.
498 U. S.
341-342.
(b) At the time of its passage in 1920, the Jones Act
established no requirement that a seaman aid in navigation.
Although certain early cases had imposed such a requirement, a
review of later cases demonstrates that, by 1920, general maritime
law had abandoned that requirement in favor of a rule requiring
only that a seaman be employed on board a vessel in furtherance of
its purpose. Pp.
498 U. S.
343-346.
(c) The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)
-- which was enacted in 1927 and provides recovery for injury to a
broad range of land-based maritime workers, but explicitly excludes
from its coverage "a master or member of a crew of any vessel" --
does not change the rule that a seaman need not aid in navigation.
That Act and the Jones Act are mutually exclusive, such that a
"seaman" under the Jones Act is the same as a "master or member of
a crew of any vessel."
Swanson v. Marra Brothers, Inc.,
328 U. S. 1,
328 U. S. 7.
Although the LHWCA exception thus refines the Jones Act term
"seaman," restricting
Page 498 U. S. 338
it to sea-based maritime employees, it does not indicate that
members of a crew are required to navigate. Pp.
498 U. S.
346-348.
(d) The conflict addressed here has as its source this Court's
inconsistent use of an aid in navigation requirement in LHWCA and
Jones Act cases. That requirement slipped into the Court's case law
in
South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett,
309 U. S. 251,
309 U. S. 260,
an LHWCA case decided before the Court recognized in
Swanson,
supra, that the two Acts are mutually exclusive. Although the
Court subsequently ruled in another pre-
Swanson LHWCA
case,
Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.
S. 565, that the
Bassett aid in navigation test
was not to be read restrictively, and that navigation under the
test embraces duties of a "member of a crew" that are essential to
the operation and welfare of his vessel, a series of
post-
Swanson Jones Act cases either asserted an aid in
navigation requirement or relied on
Bassett even though
they afforded seaman status to claimants working on board vessels
whose jobs had no connection to navigation,
see, e.g., Butler
v. Whiteman, 356 U. S. 271.
Such cases have engendered confusion and have led the lower courts
to a myriad of standards and lack of uniformity in administering
the elements of seaman status. Pp.
498 U. S.
348-353.
(e) The time has come to jettison the aid in navigation
language. The better rule -- the rule that best explains the
Court's case law and is consistent with the pre-Jones Act
interpretation of "seaman" and Congress' land-based/sea-based
distinction in the two Acts -- is to define "master or member of a
crew" under the LHWCA, and therefore "seaman" under the Jones Act,
not in terms of the employee's particular job, but solely in terms
of the employee's connection to a vessel in navigation. A necessary
element of the connection is that a seaman perform the work of a
vessel,
i.e., that the employee's duties contribute to the
function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission. Pp.
498 U. S.
353-355.
(f) The question of who is a "seaman" under the Jones Act is
better characterized as a mixed question of law and fact than as a
pure question of fact for the jury. It is for the court to define
the proper legal standard and for the jury to find the facts and
apply that standard. The narrow question presented here -- whether
Wilander should be precluded from seaman status because he did not
perform transportation-related functions on board the vessel -- is
a question of law that must be answered in the negative. Pp.
498 U. S.
355-357.
887 F.2d 88 (CA5 1989), affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 498 U. S. 339
Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether one must aid in the
navigation of a vessel in order to qualify as a "seaman" under the
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688.
I
Jon Wilander worked for McDermott International as a paint
foreman. His duties consisted primarily of supervising the
sandblasting and painting of various fixtures and piping located on
oil drilling platforms in the Persian Gulf. On July 4, 1983,
Wilander was inspecting a pipe on one such platform when a bolt
serving as a plug in the pipe blew out under pressure, striking,
Wilander in the head. At the time, Wilander was assigned to the
American-flag vessel M/V
Gates Tide, a "paint boat"
chartered to McDermott that contained equipment used in
sandblasting and painting the platforms.
Wilander sued McDermott in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana, seeking recovery under the Jones
Act for McDermott's negligence related to the accident. McDermott
moved for summary judgment, alleging that, as a matter of law,
Wilander was not a "seaman" under the Jones Act, and therefore not
entitled to recovery. The District Court denied the motion. App.
19. In a bifurcated trial, the jury first determined Wilander's
status as a seaman. By special interrogatory, the jury found that
Wilander was either permanently assigned to, or performed a
substantial amount of work aboard, the
Gates Tide, and
that the performance of his duties contributed to the
Page 498 U. S. 340
function of the
Gates Tide or to the accomplishment of
its mission, thereby satisfying the test for seaman status
established in
Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (CA5
1959). App. to Pet. for Cert. 16-17. The District Court denied
McDermott's motion for judgment based on the jury findings.
Id. at 10-16.
The case then proceeded to trial on the issues of liability and
damages. The jury found that McDermott's negligence was the primary
cause of Wilander's injuries, but that Wilander had been 25%
contributorily negligent. The jury awarded Wilander $337,500. The
District Court denied McDermott's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict,
id. at 19-21, and both
parties appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the determination of seaman status, finding sufficient
evidence to support the jury's finding under the
Robison
test. 887 F.2d 88, 90 (1989). McDermott asked the court to reject
the
Robison requirement that a seaman "contribut[e] to the
function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission,"
Robison, supra, at 779, in favor of the more stringent
requirement of
Johnson v. John F. Beasley Construction
Co., 742 F.2d 1054 (CA7 1984). In that case, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit -- relying on cases from this Court
requiring that a seaman aid in the navigation of a vessel -- held
that seaman status under the Jones Act may be conferred only on
employees who make "a significant contribution to the maintenance,
operation, or welfare of the
transportation function of
the vessel."
Id. at 1063 (emphasis added).
The Fifth Circuit here concluded that Wilander would not meet
the requirements of the
Johnson test, but reaffirmed the
rule in
Robison and held that Wilander was a "seaman"
under the Jones Act. 887 F.2d at 90-91. We granted certiorari, 496
U.S. 935 (1990), to resolve the conflict between the
Robison and
Johnson tests on the issue of the
transportation/navigation function requirement, and now affirm.
Page 498 U. S. 341
II
A
In 1903, in
The Osceola, 189 U.
S. 158, this Court summarized the state of seamen's
remedies under general maritime law. Writing for the Court, Justice
Brown reviewed the leading English and American authorities and
declared the law settled on several propositions:
"1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman
falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship, to the
extent of his maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least so
long as the voyage is continued."
"2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and
American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by
seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship. . . .
"
"3. That all the members of the crew . . . are, as between
themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot recover for
injuries sustained through the negligence of another member of the
crew beyond the expense of their maintenance and cure."
"4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for
the negligence of the master, or any member of the crew. . . ."
Id. at
189 U. S. 175.
The Osceola affirmed a seaman's general maritime right to
maintenance and cure, wages, and to recover for unseaworthiness,
but excluded seamen from the general maritime negligence
remedy.
Congress twice attempted to overrule
The Osceola and
create a negligence action for seamen. The Merchant Marine Act of
1915, 38 Stat. 1164, dealt with proposition 3 of
The
Osceola, the fellow servant doctrine. Section 20 of the 1915
Act provided:
"That in any suit to recover damages for any injury sustained on
board vessel or in its service seamen having command shall not be
held to be fellow-servants with those under their authority."
38 Stat. 1185. The change was ineffective.
Page 498 U. S. 342
Petitioner in
Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.,
247 U. S. 372
(1918), a fireman on board the steamship
J.L. Luckenbach,
attempted to recover from the ship's owner for injuries resulting
from the alleged negligence of a superior officer. The Court
explained that the 1915 Act was "irrelevant."
Id. at
247 U. S. 384.
The Act successfully established that the superior officer was not
Chelentis' fellow servant, but Congress had overlooked
The
Osceola's fourth proposition. The superior officer was no
longer a fellow servant, but he was still a member of the crew.
Under proposition four, there was no recovery for negligence. 247
U.S. at
247 U. S.
384.
Congress tried a different tack in 1920. It passed the Jones
Act, which provides a cause of action in negligence for "any
seaman" injured "in the course of his employment." 46 U.S.C.App. §
688. The Act thereby removes the bar to negligence articulated in
The Osceola.
The Jones Act does not define "seaman." Neither does
The
Osceola; it simply uses the term as had other admiralty
courts. We assume that the Jones Act uses "seaman" in the same way.
For one thing, the Jones Act provides what
The Osceola
precludes.
"The only purpose of the Jones Act was to remove the bar created
by
The Osceola, so that seamen would have the same rights
to recover for negligence as other tort victims."
G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 328-329 (2d ed.
1975).
See also Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.
S. 155,
293 U. S. 159
(1934). The Jones Act, responding directly to
The Osceola,
adopts without further elaboration the term used in
The
Osceola. Moreover, "seaman" is a maritime term of art. In the
absence of contrary indication, we assume that, when a statute uses
such a term, Congress intended it to have its established meaning.
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.
S. 246,
342 U. S. 263
(1952);
Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.
S. 650,
370 U. S. 658
(1962). Our first task, therefore, is to determine who was a seaman
under the general maritime law when Congress passed the Jones
Act.
Page 498 U. S. 343
B
Since the first Judiciary Act, federal courts have determined
who is eligible for various seamen's benefits under general
maritime law. Prior to the Jones Act, these benefits included the
tort remedies outlined in
The Osceola and a lien against
the ship for wages.
See generally Gilmore & Black,
supra, at 35-36, 281;
The John G. Stevens,
170 U. S. 113,
170 U. S. 119
(1898);
The Osceola, supra, 189 U.S. at
189 U. S. 175.
Certain early cases limited seaman status to those who aided in the
navigation of the ship. The narrow rule was that a seaman --
sometimes referred to as a mariner -- must actually navigate:
"[T]he persons engaged on board of her must have been possessed
of some skill in navigation. They must have been able to 'hand,
reef and steer,' the ordinary test of seamanship."
The Canton, 5 F. Cas. 29, 30 (No. 2,388) (D.Mass.1858).
See also Gurney v. Crockett, 11 F. Cas. 123, 124 (No.
5,874) (SDNY 1849).
Notwithstanding the aid in navigation doctrine, federal courts
throughout the last century consistently awarded seamen's benefits
to those whose work on board ship did not direct the vessel.
Firemen, engineers, carpenters, and cooks all were considered
seamen.
See, e.g., Wilson v. The Ohio, 30 F. Cas. 149 (No.
17,825) (ED Pa. 1834) (firemen);
Allen v. Hallet, 1 F.
Cas. 472 (No. 223) (SDNY 1849) (cook);
Sageman v. The
Brandywine, 21 F. Cas. 149 (No. 12,216) (D.Mich.1852) (female
cook);
The Sultana, 23 F. Cas. 379 (No. 13,602)
(D.Mich.1857) (clerk).
See generally M. Norris, The Law of
Seamen § 2.3 (4th ed. 1985); Engerrand & Bale, Seaman Status
Reconsidered, 24 S.Tex.L.J. 431, 432-433 (1983).
Some courts attempted to classify these seamen under a broad
conception of aid in navigation that included those who aided in
navigation indirectly by supporting those responsible for moving
the vessel:
"[T]he services rendered must be necessary, or, at least,
contribute to the preservation of the vessel, or of those whose
labour and skill are employed to navigate
Page 498 U. S. 344
her."
Trainer v. The Superior, 24 F. Cas. 130, 131 (No. 14,
136) (ED Pa.1834). This fiction worked for cooks and carpenters --
who fed those who navigated and kept the ship in repair -- but what
of a cooper whose job it was to make barrels to aid in whaling? As
early as 1832, Justice Story, sitting on circuit, held that "[a]
cooper' is a seaman in contemplation of law, although he has
peculiar duties on board of the ship." United States v.
Thompson, 28 F. Cas. 102 (No. 16,492) (CCD Mass.1832). Justice
Story made no reference to navigation in declaring it established
that:
"A cook and steward are seamen in the sense of the maritime law,
although they have peculiar duties assigned them. So a pilot, a
surgeon, a shipcarpenter, and a boatswain, are deemed seamen,
entitled to sue in the admiralty."
Ibid.
By the middle of the 19th century, the leading admiralty
treatise noted the wide variety of those eligible for seamen's
benefits:
"Masters, mates, sailors, surveyors, carpenters, coopers,
stewards, cooks, cabin boys, kitchen boys, engineers, pilots,
firemen, deck hands, waiters, -- women as well as men -- are
mariners."
E. Benedict, The American Admiralty § 278, p. 158 (1850).
Benedict concluded that American admiralty courts did not require
that seamen have a connection to navigation.
"The term mariner includes all persons employed on board ships
and vessels during the voyage to assist in their navigation and
preservation,
or to promote the purposes of the
voyage."
Ibid. (emphasis added). Moreover, Benedict explained,
this was the better rule; admiralty courts throughout the world had
long recognized that seamen's benefits were properly extended to
all those who worked on board vessels in furtherance of the myriad
purposes for which ships set to sea:
"It is universally conceded that the general principles of law
must be applied to new kinds of property, as they spring into
existence in the progress of society, according to their nature and
incidents, and the common sense of the community. In the early
periods of maritime
Page 498 U. S. 345
commerce, when the oar was the great agent of propulsion,
vessels were entirely unlike those of modern times -- and each
nation and period has had its peculiar agents of commerce and
navigation adapted to its own wants and its own waters, and the
names and descriptions of ships and vessels are without number.
Under the class of mariners in the armed ship are embraced the
officers and privates of a little army. In the whale ship, the
sealing vessel -- the codfishing and herring fishing vessel -- the
lumber vessel -- the freighting vessel -- the passenger vessel --
there are other functions besides these of mere navigation, and
they are performed by men who know nothing of seamanship -- and in
the great invention of modern times, the steamboat, an entirely new
set of operatives, are employed, yet at all times and in all
countries, all the persons who have been necessarily or properly
employed in a vessel as co-labourers to the great purpose of the
voyage, have, by the law, been clothed with the legal rights of
mariners -- no matter what might be their sex, character, station
or profession."
Id. § 241, pp. 133-134.
By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, federal courts
abandoned the navigation test altogether, including in the class of
seamen those who worked on board and maintained allegiance to the
ship, but who performed more specialized functions having no
relation to navigation. The crucial element in these cases was
something akin to Benedict's "great purpose of the voyage." Thus,
in holding that a fisherman, a chambermaid, and a waiter were all
entitled to seamen's benefits, then-Judge Brown, later the author
of
The Osceola, eschewed reference to navigation:
"[A]ll hands employed upon a vessel, except the master, are
entitled to a [seaman's lien for wages] if their services are in
furtherance of the main object of the enterprise in which she is
engaged."
The Minna, 11 F. 759, 760 (ED Mich.1882). Judge Learned
Hand rejected a navigation test explicitly in awarding seamen's
Page 498 U. S. 346
benefits to a bartender:
"As I can see in principle no reason why there should be an
artificial limitation of rights to those engaged in the navigation
of the ship, to the exclusion of others who equally further the
purposes of her voyage, . . . I shall decide that the libelant has
a lien for his wages as bartender."
The J.S. Warden, 175 F. 314, 315 (SDNY 1910). In
Miller v. The Maggie P., 32 F. 300, 301 (ED Mo.1887), the
court explained that the rule that maritime employment must be tied
to navigation had been "pronounced to be inadmissible and
indecisive by later decisions."
See also The Ocean Spray,
18 F. Cas. 558, 560-561 (No. 10,412) (D Ore. 1876) (sealers and
interpreters; citing Benedict,
supra);
The Carrier
Dove, 97 F. 111, 112 (CA1 1899) (fisherman);
United States
v. Atlantic Transport Co., 188 F. 42 (CA2 1911) (horseman);
The Virginia Belle, 204 F. 692, 693-694 (ED Va.1913)
(engineer who assisted in fishing);
The Baron Napier, 249
F. 126 (CA4 1918) (muleteer).
See generally Norris, The
Law of Seamen § 2.3; Engerrand & Bale, 24 S.Tex.L.J., at
434-435, and nn. 29-30. An 1883 treatise declared, "[a]ll persons
employed on a vessel to assist in the main purpose of the voyage
are mariners, and included under the name of seamen." M. Cohen,
Admiralty 239.
We believe it settled at the time of
The Osceola and
the passage of the Jones Act that general maritime law did not
require that a seaman aid in navigation. It was only necessary that
a person be employed on board a vessel in furtherance of its
purpose. We conclude therefore that, at the time of its passage,
the Jones Act established no requirement that a seaman aid in
navigation. Our voyage is not over, however.
C
As had the lower federal courts before the Jones Act, this Court
continued to construe "seaman" broadly after the Jones Act. In
International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S.
50 (1926), the Court held that a stevedore is a "seaman"
covered under the Act when engaged in maritime employment.
Page 498 U. S. 347
Haverty was a longshore worker injured while stowing freight in
the hold of a docked vessel. The Court recognized that "as the word
is commonly used, stevedores are not
seamen.'" Id. at
272 U. S.
52.
"But words are flexible. . . . We cannot believe that Congress
willingly would have allowed the protection to men engaged upon the
same maritime duties to vary with the accident of their being
employed by a stevedore rather than by the ship."
Ibid.
Congress would, and did, however. Within six months of the
decision in
Haverty, Congress passed the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 44 Stat. (part 2) 1424,
as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950. The Act provides
recovery for injury to a broad range of land-based maritime
workers, but explicitly excludes from its coverage "a master or
member of a crew of any vessel." 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G). This Court
recognized the distinction, albeit belatedly, in
Swanson v.
Marra Brothers, Inc., 328 U. S. 1 (1946),
concluding that the Jones Act and the LHWCA are mutually exclusive.
The LHWCA provides relief for land-based maritime workers, and the
Jones Act is restricted to "a master or member of a crew of any
vessel:"
"We must take it that the effect of these provisions of the
[LHWCA] is to confine the benefits of the Jones Act to the members
of the crew of a vessel plying in navigable waters and to
substitute for the right of recovery recognized by the
Haverty case only such rights to compensation as are given
by the [LHWCA]."
Id. at 7. "[M]aster or member of a crew" is a
refinement of the term "seaman" in the Jones Act; it excludes from
LHWCA coverage those properly covered under the Jones Act. Thus, it
is odd but true that the key requirement for Jones Act coverage now
appears in another statute.
With the passage of the LHWCA, Congress established a clear
distinction between land-based and sea-based maritime workers. The
latter, who owe their allegiance to a vessel and not solely to a
land-based employer, are seamen. Ironically, on the same day that
the Court decided
Swanson, it
Page 498 U. S. 348
handed down
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S.
85 (1946). With reasoning remarkably similar to that in
Haverty, the Court extended to a stevedore the traditional
seamen's remedy of unseaworthiness in those cases where the
stevedore "is doing a seaman's work and incurring a seaman's
hazards."
Id. at
328 U. S. 99. It
took Congress a bit longer to react this time. In 1972, Congress
amended the LHWCA to bar longshore and harbor workers from recovery
for breach of the duty of seaworthiness.
See 86 Stat.
1263, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b);
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,
498 U. S. 19,
498 U. S. 28
(1990). Whether under the Jones Act or general maritime law, seamen
do not include land-based workers.
The LHWCA does not change the rule that a seaman need not aid in
navigation. "Member of a crew" and "seaman" are closely related
terms. Indeed, the two were often used interchangeably in general
maritime cases.
See, e.g., The Osceola, 189 U.S. at
189 U. S. 175;
The Buena Ventura, 243 F. 797, 799 (SDNY 1916). There is
nothing in these cases, or the LHWCA, to indicate that members of a
crew are required to navigate. The "member of a crew" exception in
the LHWCA overrules
Haverty; "master or member of a crew"
restates who a "seaman" under the Jones Act is supposed to be: a
sea-based maritime employee.
III
The source of the conflict we resolve today is this Court's
inconsistent use of an aid in navigation requirement. The
inconsistency arose during the 19 years that passed between the
enactment of the LHWCA in 1927 and the decision in
Swanson
in 1946 -- 19 years during which the Court did not recognize the
mutual exclusivity of the LHWCA and the Jones Act. Thus,
Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U. S. 635,
281 U. S. 639
(1930), and
Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.
S. 234,
282 U. S. 238
(1931), decided after passage of the LHWCA but before
Swanson, reiterated the
Haverty rule that
stevedores are covered under the Jones Act. In
Warner v.
Goltra, 293
Page 498 U. S. 349
U.S. 155 (1934), the Court held that the master of a vessel is a
"seaman" under the Act. In so holding, the Court relied on the
salutary principle that statutory language "must be read in the
light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained."
Id. at
293 U. S. 158.
As the Jones Act is a remedial statute, there is no reason that the
master of a vessel who suffers a maritime injury should be any less
protected than a crew member.
Id. at
293 U. S. 162.
All of this was unnecessary, of course. Had the Court recognized,
as it did subsequently in
Swanson, that the LHWCA further
defines Jones Act coverage, the answer was to be found in the plain
language of "master or member of a crew of any vessel."
Warner is important for our purposes because it is the
Court's first look at the term "seaman" in the Jones Act as it
applies to sea-based employees. The Court adopted a definition of
"seaman" consistent with that of the lower federal courts in the
later pre-Jones Act cases:
"[A] seaman is a mariner of any degree, who lives his life upon
the sea. It is enough that what he does affects 'the operation and
welfare of the ship when she is upon a voyage.'
The Buena
Ventura, 243 Fed. 797, 799, where a wireless operator was
brought within the term."
Warner, supra, at
293 U. S. 157.
There is no reference to navigation. The Court quoted
The Buena
Ventura again, specifically on the point of the expanded
definition of "seaman:"
"The word 'seaman' undoubtedly once meant a person who could
'hand, reef and steer,' a mariner in the true sense of the word.
But as the necessities of ships increased, so the word 'seaman'
enlarged its meaning."
The Buena Ventura, supra, at 799, quoted in
Warner,
supra, 293 U.S. at
293 U. S. 157,
n. 1.
Warner plainly rejected an aid in navigation
requirement under the Jones Act.
The confusion began with
South Chicago Coal & Dock Co.
v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251
(1940). Decedent was drowned while working as a deckhand on board a
lighter used to fuel steamboats and other marine equipment. His
primary duty was to move coal from the boat to other vessels being
fueled.
Page 498 U. S. 350
Petitioner maintained that decedent's widow was not entitled to
recovery under the LHWCA because decedent was a "member of the
crew" of the lighter. In holding that decedent's widow was entitled
to LHWCA coverage, the Court explained that the "member of a crew"
exception was meant to exclude only "those employees on the vessel
who are naturally and primarily on board to aid in her navigation."
Id. at
309 U. S. 260.
Without defining further precisely what aiding in navigation
entailed, the Court seemed to be harkening back to an earlier,
discarded notion of seaman status.
But the Court was
not defining "seaman" under the Jones
Act; it was construing "member of a crew" under the LHWCA.
Bassett was decided before
Swanson, at a time
when the Court viewed "seaman" as a broader term than "member of a
crew." The
Bassett Court stated explicitly that it did not
equate "member of a crew" under the LHWCA with "seaman" under the
Jones Act:
"[The LHWCA], as we have seen, was to provide compensation for a
class of employees at work on a vessel in navigable waters who,
although they might be classed as seamen (
International
Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, [
272 U.S.
50 (1926)]), were still regarded as distinct from members of a
'crew.'"
Bassett, supra, at
309 U. S. 260.
Bassett did not impose an aid in navigation requirement
for seaman status under the Jones Act.
The Court emphasized this point a year later in a one-sentence
summary reversal order in
Cantey v. McLain Line, Inc., 312
U.S. 667 (1941).
Cantey was a Jones Act case. In ruling
that claimant was not entitled to Jones Act relief, the District
Court found the facts of the case indistinguishable from those of
Diomede v. Lowe, 87 F.2d 296 (CA2),
cert. denied,
301 U.S. 682 (1937).
Cantey v. McLain Line, Inc., 32 F.
Supp. 1023 (SDNY),
aff'd, 114 F.2d 1017 (CA2 1940).
Diomede had held that a maritime worker was entitled to
LHWCA coverage because he was not a "member of a crew."
Diomede, supra, at 298. The District Court in
Cantey concluded that because, following
Diomede,
claimant
Page 498 U. S. 351
was not a "member of a crew" under the LHWCA, he was not a
"seaman" under the Jones Act.
Cantey, supra, at 1023. The
court was six years too early in recognizing the mutual exclusivity
of the Jones Act and the LHWCA, and this Court consequently
reversed. One of the cases cited in
Bassett for the
proposition that a "member of a crew" under the LHWCA must aid in
navigation is
Diomede. See Bassett, supra, 309 U.S. at
309 U. S. 260.
All of this should have made it clear that the aid in navigation
test had no necessary connection to the Jones Act. But it did not.
In
Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U. S. 565
(1944), another pre-
Swanson case, the Court once again
addressed the "member of a crew" exception to the LHWCA. Decedent
lived on board a barge with no motive power and confined to waters
within a 30 mile radius of Philadelphia. His duties included taking
general care of the barge. The Court held that decedent was a
"member of a crew."
The Court's concerns were very different in
Norton than
they had been in
Bassett. Certain maritime unions,
appearing as
amici curiae, emphasized that the liability
of an employer under the LHWCA is exclusive. This means that those
covered under the LHWCA because not "members of a crew" are not
entitled to the superior remedies available to seamen under the
Jones Act and general maritime law.
See Norton, supra, at
321 U. S.
570-571. Cognizant of its obligation not to narrow
unduly the class for whom Congress provided recovery under the
Jones Act, the Court explained that the
Bassett aid in
navigation test was not to be read restrictively:
"We said in the
Bassett case that the term 'crew'
embraced those 'who are naturally and primarily on board' the
vessel 'to aid in her navigation.'
Id., [309 U.S.], p.
309 U. S. 260. But
navigation is not limited to 'putting over the helm.' It also
embraces duties essential for other purposes of the vessel.
Certainly members of the crew are not confined to those who can
'hand, reef and steer.' Judge Hough pointed out in
The Buena
Ventura, 243 F. 797, 799, that
Page 498 U. S. 352
'everyone is entitled to the privilege of a seaman who, like
seamen, at all times contributes to the labors about the operation
and welfare of the ship when she is upon a voyage.'
And see The
Minna, 11 F. 759;
Disbrow v. Walsh Bros., 36 F. 607,
608 (bargeman). We think that 'crew' must have at least as broad a
meaning under the Act."
Norton, supra, at
321 U. S.
571-572.
The Court here expressed a view very close to the
Swanson holding that "member of a crew" under the LHWCA is
the same as "seaman" under the Jones Act.
Norton adopted a
conception of "member of a crew" consistent with the established
view of "seaman" in pre-Jones Act cases, and consistent with the
definition of "seaman" the Court announced in
Warner. It
is a conception far broader than that announced in
Bassett, despite
Norton's ostensible
interpretation of that case.
With
Norton, we again reversed course, steering back
toward the
Warner and the pre-Jones Act definition of
"seaman." Unfortunately, the opinion carried with it the outmoded
aid in navigation language. Of course,
Norton was a
pre-
Swanson, pure LHWCA case.
Our Jones Act cases of the late 1950s were not. In a series of
brief decisions, the Court afforded seaman status to claimants
working on board vessels whose jobs had not even an indirect
connection to the movement of the vessel. Despite their results,
these cases either assert an aid in navigation requirement or rely
on
Bassett. See Gianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U.S.
879 (1955) (summary reversal order) (citing
Bassett;
seaman status for a driller on board a submersible drilling barge);
Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.
S. 370,
352 U. S. 374
(1957) (handyman on dredge anchored to shore met the aid in
navigation test);
Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co.,
356 U. S. 252,
356 U. S. 253
(1958) (per curiam) (citing
Bassett; pile driver on
submersible radar installation);
Butler v. Whiteman,
356 U. S. 271
(1958) (per curiam ) (citing
Bassett; handyman on tug).
These decisions, to the extent that they
Page 498 U. S. 353
do not make seaman status contingent upon the seaman's job on
board the vessel, are consistent with the
Warner and
pre-Jones Act definition of "seaman." And they do not conflict with
the pre-
Swanson LHWCA cases,
Bassett and
Norton, because those cases do not concern the Jones Act.
These late-1950s Jones Act cases are befuddling, however, at least
in part because they tie "seaman" under the Jones Act to "member of
a crew" under the LHWCA, while ostensibly retaining the
Bassett aid in navigation requirement.
Following
Butler, we accepted no more of these cases,
relegating to the lower courts the task of making some sense of the
confusion left in our wake. Our wayward case law has led the lower
courts to a "myriad of standards and lack of uniformity in
administering the elements of seaman status." Engerrand & Bale,
24 S.Tex.L.J., at 494. The Seventh Circuit expressed its
frustration well:
"Diderot may very well have had the previous Supreme Court cases
in mind when he wrote, 'We have made a labyrinth and got lost in
it. We must find our way out.'"
Johnson, 742 F.2d at 1060. One of the problems that
this Court's Jones Act cases present to the lower courts is that
the sundry jobs performed by the seamen in the cases of the late
1950s will not lie with any rational conception of aid in
navigation.
IV
We think the time has come to jettison the aid in navigation
language. That language, which had long been rejected by admiralty
courts under general maritime law, and by this Court in
Warner, a Jones Act case, slipped back in through an
interpretation of the LHWCA at a time when the LHWCA had nothing to
do with the Jones Act.
We now recognize that the LHWCA is one of a pair of mutually
exclusive remedial statutes that distinguish between land-based and
sea-based maritime employees. The LHWCA restricted the definition
of "seaman" in the Jones Act only to the extent that "seaman" had
been taken to include
Page 498 U. S. 354
land-based employees. There is no indication in the Jones Act,
the LHWCA, or elsewhere, that Congress has excluded from Jones Act
remedies those traditional seamen who owe allegiance to a vessel at
sea, but who do not aid in navigation.
In his dissent in
Sieracki, Chief Justice Stone
chastised the Court for failing to recognize the distinct nature of
land-based and sea-based employment. Traditional seamen's remedies,
he explained, have been
"universally recognized as . . . growing out of the status of
the seaman and his peculiar relationship to the vessel, and as a
feature of the maritime law compensating or offsetting the special
hazards and disadvantages to which they who go down to sea in ships
are subjected."
328 U.S. at
328 U. S. 104.
It is this distinction that Congress recognized in the LHWCA and
the Jones Act.
See id. at
328 U. S. 106;
Swanson v. Marra Brothers, Inc., 328 U. S.
1 (1946). It also explains why all those with that
"peculiar relationship to the vessel" are covered under the Jones
Act, regardless of the particular job they perform.
We believe the better rule is to define "master or member of a
crew" under the LHWCA, and therefore "seaman" under the Jones Act,
solely in terms of the employee's connection to a vessel in
navigation. This rule best explains our case law, and is consistent
with the pre-Jones Act interpretation of "seaman" and Congress'
land-based/sea-based distinction. All who work at sea in the
service of a ship face those particular perils to which the
protection of maritime law, statutory as well as decisional, is
directed.
See generally Robertson, A New Approach to
Determining Seaman Status, 64 Texas L.Rev. 79 (1985). It is not the
employee's particular job that is determinative, but the employee's
connection to a vessel.
Shortly after
Butler, our last decision in this area,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit attempted to decipher
this Court's seaman status cases.
See Offshore Co. v.
Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (CA5 1959). The Fifth Circuit
correctly
Page 498 U. S. 355
determined that, regardless of its language, this Court was no
longer requiring that seamen aid in navigation.
Id. at
776. As part of its test for seaman status,
Robison
requires that a seaman's duties "contribut[e] to the function of
the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission."
Id.
at 779.
The key to seaman status is employment-related connection to a
vessel in navigation. We are not called upon here to define this
connection in all details, but we hold that a necessary element of
the connection is that a seaman perform the work of a vessel.
See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lawson, 94 F.2d 190, 192 (CA5
1938) ("There is implied a definite and permanent connection with
the vessel, an obligation to forward her enterprise"), cited
approvingly in
Norton, 321 U.S. at
321 U. S. 573. In
this regard, we believe the requirement that an employee's duties
must "contribut[e] to the function of the vessel or to the
accomplishment of its mission" captures well an important
requirement of seaman status. It is not necessary that a seaman aid
in navigation or contribute to the transportation of the vessel,
but a seaman must be doing the ship's work.
V
Jon Wilander was injured while assigned to the
Gates
Tide as a paint foreman. He did not aid in the navigation or
transportation of the vessel. The jury found, however, that
Wilander contributed to the more general function or mission of the
Gates Tide, and subsequently found that he was a "seaman"
under the Jones Act. McDermott argues that the question should not
have been given to the jury. The company contends that, as a matter
of law, Wilander is not entitled to Jones Act protection because he
did not aid in navigation by furthering the transportation of the
Gates Tide.
We have said that seaman status under the Jones Act is a
question of fact for the jury. In
Bassett, an LHWCA case,
the Court held that Congress had given to the deputy commissioner,
an administrative officer, the authority to determine who is a
"member of a crew" under the LHWCA. 309
Page 498 U. S. 356
U.S. at
309 U. S.
257-258. If there is evidence to support the deputy
commissioner's finding, it is conclusive.
Ibid. In
Senko, we applied the same rule to findings by the jury in
Jones Act cases. 352 U.S. at
352 U. S. 374.
"[A] jury's decision is final if it has a reasonable basis."
Ibid. We are not asked here to reconsider this rule, but
we note that the question of who is a "member of crew," and
therefore who is a "seaman," is better characterized as a mixed
question of law and fact. When the underlying facts are
established, and the rule of law is undisputed, the issue is
whether the facts meet the statutory standard.
See
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273,
456 U. S. 289,
n. 19 (1982) (defining a mixed question).
It is for the court to define the statutory standard. "Member of
a crew" and "seaman" are statutory terms; their interpretation is a
question of law. The jury finds the facts and, in these cases,
applies the legal standard, but the court must not abdicate its
duty to determine if there is a reasonable basis to support the
jury's conclusion. If reasonable persons, applying the proper legal
standard, could differ as to whether the employee was a "member of
a crew," it is a question for the jury.
See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242,
477 U. S.
250-251 (1986). In many cases, this will be true. The
inquiry into seaman status is of necessity fact-specific; it will
depend on the nature of the vessel and the employee's precise
relation to it.
See Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co.,
342 U. S. 187,
342 U. S. 190
(1952) ("The many cases turning upon the question whether an
individual was a "seaman" demonstrate that the matter depends
largely on the facts of the particular case and the activity in
which he was engaged at the time of injury"). Nonetheless, summary
judgment or a directed verdict is mandated where the facts and the
law will reasonably support only one conclusion.
Anderson,
supra, 477 U.S. at
477 U. S. 248,
477 U. S.
250-251.
The question presented here is narrow. We are not asked to
determine if the jury could reasonably have found that Wilander had
a sufficient connection to the
Gates Tide to be a
Page 498 U. S. 357
"seaman" under the Jones Act. We are not even asked whether the
jury reasonably found that Wilander advanced the function or
mission of the
Gates Tide. We are asked only if Wilander
should be precluded from seaman status because he did not perform
transportation-related functions on board the
Gates Tide.
Our answer is no. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is
Affirmed.