Petitioner Miles, the mother and administratrix of the estate of
a seaman killed by a fellow crew member aboard the vessel of
respondents (collectively Apex), docked in an American port, sued
Apex in District Court, alleging negligence under the Jones Act for
failure to prevent the assault and breach of the warranty of
seaworthiness under general maritime law for hiring a crew member
unfit to serve. After the court ruled,
inter alia, that
the estate could not recover the son's lost future income, the jury
found that the ship was seaworthy, but that Apex was negligent.
Although it awarded damages on the negligence claim to Miles for
the loss of her son's support and services and to the estate for
pain and suffering, the jury found that Miles was not financially
dependent on her son, and was therefore not entitled to damages for
loss of society. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
negligence by Apex. As to the general maritime claim, the court
ruled that the vessel was unseaworthy as a matter of law, but held
that a nondependent parent may not recover for loss of society in a
general maritime wrongful death action and that general maritime
law does not permit a survival action for decedent's lost future
earnings.
Held:
1. There is a general maritime cause of action for the wrongful
death of a seaman. The reasoning of
Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375,
which created a general maritime wrongful death cause of action,
extends to suits for the death of true seamen despite the fact that
Moragne involved a longshoreman. Although true seamen,
unlike longshoremen, are covered under the Jones Act provision
creating a negligence cause of action against the seaman's employer
for wrongful death,
Moragne, supra, at
398 U. S. 396,
n. 12, recognized that that provision is preclusive only of state
remedies for death from unseaworthiness, and does not preempt a
general maritime wrongful death action. The Jones Act evinces no
general hostility to recovery under maritime law, since it does not
disturb seamen's general maritime claims for injuries resulting
from unseaworthiness, and does not preclude the recovery for
wrongful death due to unseaworthiness created by its companion
statute, the Death On the High Seas Act (DOHSA). Rather, the Jones
Act establishes a uniform system of seamen's tort law. As the Court
concluded in
Moragne, supra, at
398 U. S. 396,
n. 12, that case's extension of the DOHSA wrongful death action
from the high seas to territorial waters furthers, rather than
hinders, uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction.
There is also little question that
Moragne intended to
create a general maritime wrongful death action applicable beyond
the situation of longshoremen, since it expressly overruled
The
Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199,
which held that maritime law did not afford a cause of action for
the wrongful death of a seaman, and since each of the "anomalies"
to which the
Moragne cause of action was directed --
particularly the fact that recovery was theretofore available for
the wrongful death in territorial waters of a longshoreman, but not
a true seaman -- involved seamen. Pp.
498 U. S.
27-30.
2. Damages recoverable in a general maritime cause of action for
the wrongful death of a seaman do not include loss of society. This
case is controlled by the logic of
Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618,
436 U. S. 625,
which held that recovery for nonpecuniary loss, such as loss of
society, is foreclosed in a general maritime action for death on
the high seas because DOHSA, by its terms, limits recoverable
damages in suits for wrongful death on the high seas to
"
pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit
the suit is brought" (emphasis added).
Sea-Land Services, Inc.
v. Gaudet, 414 U. S. 573,
which allowed recovery for loss of society in a general maritime
wrongful death action, applies only in territorial waters and only
to longshoremen. The Jones Act, which applies to deaths of true
seamen as a result of negligence, allows recovery only for
pecuniary loss, and not for loss of society, in a wrongful death
action.
See Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland,
227 U. S. 59,
227 U. S. 69-71.
The Jones Act also precludes recovery for loss of society in this
case involving a general maritime claim for wrongful death
resulting from unseaworthiness, since it would be inconsistent with
this Court's place in the constitutional scheme to sanction more
expansive remedies for the judicially created unseaworthiness cause
of action, in which liability is without fault, than Congress has
allowed in cases of death resulting from negligence. This holding
restores a uniform rule applicable to all actions for the wrongful
death of a seaman, whether under DOHSA, the Jones Act, or general
maritime law. Pp.
498 U. S.
30-33.
3. A general maritime survival action cannot include recovery
for decedent's lost future earnings. Even if a seaman's personal
cause of action survives his death under general maritime law, the
income he would have earned but for his death is not recoverable,
because the Jones Act's survival provision limits recovery to
losses suffered during the decedent's lifetime.
See, e.g., Van
Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U. S. 342,
300 U. S. 347.
Since Congress has limited the survival right for seamen's
injuries
Page 498 U. S. 21
resulting from negligence, this Court is not free, under its
admiralty powers, to exceed those limits by creating more expansive
remedies in a general maritime action founded on strict liability.
Pp.
498 U. S.
33-36.
882 F.2d 976, affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
other Members joined, except SOUTER, J., who took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
We decide whether the parent of a seaman who died from injuries
incurred aboard respondents' vessel may recover under general
maritime law for loss of society, and whether a claim for the
seaman's lost future earnings survives his death.
I
Ludwick Torregano was a seaman aboard the vessel
M/V
Archon. On the evening of July 18, 1984, Clifford Melrose, a
fellow crew member, stabbed Torregano repeatedly, killing him. At
the time, the ship was docked in the harbor of Vancouver,
Washington.
Mercedel Miles, Torregano's mother and administratrix of his
estate, sued Apex Marine Corporation and Westchester Marine
Shipping Company, the vessel's operators, Archon Marine Company,
the charterer, and Aeron Marine Company, the Archon's owner
(collectively Apex), in United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana. Miles alleged negligence under the
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688, for failure to prevent the assault
on her son, and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness under
general maritime law for hiring a crew member unfit to serve. She
sought compensation for loss of support
Page 498 U. S. 22
and services and loss of society resulting from the death of her
son, punitive damages, and compensation to the estate for
Torregano's pain and suffering prior to his death and for his lost
future income.
At trial, the District Court granted Apex's motion to strike the
claim for punitive damages, ruled that the estate could not recover
Torregano's lost future income, and denied Miles' motion for a
directed verdict as to negligence and unseaworthiness. The court
instructed the jury that Miles could not recover damages for loss
of society if they found that she was not financially dependent on
her son.
The jury found that Apex was negligent and that Torregano was 7%
contributorily negligent in causing his death, but that the ship
was seaworthy. After discounting for Torregano's contributory
negligence, the jury awarded Miles $7,254 for the loss of support
and services of her son and awarded the estate $130,200 for
Torregano's pain and suffering. The jury also found that Miles was
not financially dependent on her son, and therefore not entitled to
damages for loss of society. The District Court denied both
parties' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and
entered judgment accordingly.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 882 F.2d 976
(1989). The court affirmed the judgment of negligence on the part
of Apex, but held that there was insufficient evidence to support
the contributory negligence finding.
Id. at 983-985. Miles
was therefore entitled to the full measure of $7,800 for loss of
support and services, and the estate entitled to $140,000 for
Torregano's pain and suffering. The court also found that Melrose's
extraordinarily violent disposition demonstrated that he was unfit,
and therefore that the Archon was unseaworthy as a matter of law.
Id. at 983. Because this ruling revived Miles' general
maritime claim, the court considered two questions concerning the
scope of damages under general maritime law. The court
reaffirmed
Page 498 U. S. 23
its prior decision in
Sistrunk v. Circle Bar Drilling
Co., 770 F.2d 455 (CA5 1985), holding that a nondependent
parent may not recover for loss of society in a general maritime
wrongful death action. 882 F.2d at 989. It also held that general
maritime law does not permit a survival action for decedent's lost
future earnings.
Id. at 987.
We granted Miles' petition for certiorari on these two issues,
494 U.S. 1003 (1990), and now affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
II
We rely primarily on
Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 398 U. S. 375
(1970). Edward Moragne was a longshoreman who had been killed
aboard a vessel in United States and Florida territorial waters.
His widow brought suit against the shipowner, seeking to recover
damages for wrongful death due to the unseaworthiness of the ship.
The District Court dismissed that portion of the complaint because
neither federal nor Florida statutes allowed a wrongful death
action sounding in unseaworthiness where death occurred in
territorial waters. General maritime law was also no help; in
The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199
(1886), this Court held that maritime law does not afford a cause
of action for wrongful death. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
This Court overruled
The Harrisburg. After questioning
whether
The Harrisburg was a proper statement of the law
even in 1886, the Court set aside that issue because a "development
of major significance ha[d] intervened."
Moragne, supra,
398 U.S. at
398 U. S. 388.
Specifically, the state legislatures and Congress had rejected
wholesale the rule against wrongful death. Every State in the Union
had enacted a wrongful death statute. In 1920, Congress enacted two
pieces of legislation creating a wrongful death action for most
maritime deaths. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688, through
incorporation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 35
Stat. 65,
as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 5159, created a
wrongful death action in favor of the personal
Page 498 U. S. 24
representative of a seaman killed in the course of employment.
The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 761
et
seq., 762, created a similar action for the representative of
anyone killed on the high seas.
These statutes established an unambiguous policy in abrogation
of those principles that underlay
The Harrisburg. Such a
policy is "to be given its appropriate weight not only in matters
of statutory construction but also in those of decisional law."
Moragne, supra, at 391. Admiralty is not created in a
vacuum; legislation has always served as an important source of
both common law and admiralty principles. 398 U.S. at
398 U. S. 391,
392, citing Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in Harvard
Legal Essays 213, 214, 226-227 (1934). The unanimous legislative
judgment behind the Jones Act, DOHSA, and the many state statutes
created a strong presumption in favor of a general maritime
wrongful death action.
But legislation sends other signals to which an admiralty court
must attend.
"The legislature does not, of course, merely enact general
policies. By the terms of a statute, it also indicates its
conception of the sphere within which the policy is to have
effect."
Moragne, supra, at
398 U. S. 392.
Congress, in the exercise of its legislative powers, is free to say
"this much and no more." An admiralty court is not free to go
beyond those limits. The Jones Act and DOHSA established a policy
in favor of maritime wrongful death recovery. The central issue in
Moragne was whether the limits of those statutes
proscribed a more general maritime cause of action. 398 U.S. at
398 U. S. 393.
The Court found no such proscription. Rather, the unfortunate
situation of Moragne's widow had been created by a change in the
maritime seascape that Congress could not have anticipated. At the
time Congress passed the Jones Act and DOHSA, federal courts
uniformly applied state wrongful death statutes for deaths
occurring in state territorial waters. Except in those rare cases
where state statutes
Page 498 U. S. 25
were also intended to apply on the high seas, however, there was
no recovery for wrongful death outside territorial waters.
See
Moragne, supra, at
398 U. S. 393,
and n. 10. DOHSA filled this void, creating a wrongful death action
for all persons killed on the high seas, sounding in both
negligence and unseaworthiness. Congress did not extend DOHSA to
territorial waters, because it believed state statutes sufficient
in those areas. 398 U.S. at
398 U. S.
397-398.
And so they were when DOHSA was passed. All state statutes
allowed for wrongful death recovery in negligence, and virtually
all DOHSA claims sounded in negligence. Unseaworthiness was "an
obscure and relatively little used remedy," largely because a
shipowner's duty at that time was only to use due diligence to
provide a seaworthy ship.
See G. Gilmore & C. Black,
The Law of Admiralty 383, 375 (2d ed.1975). Thus, although DOHSA
permitted actions in both negligence and unseaworthiness, it worked
essentially as did state wrongful death statutes. DOHSA created a
near uniform system of wrongful death recovery.
"The revolution in the law began with
Matanich
v. Southern S.S. Co., [
321 U.S.
96 (1944)]", in which this Court transformed the warranty of
seaworthiness into a strict liability obligation. Gilmore &
Black,
supra, at 384, 386. The shipowner became liable for
failure to supply a safe ship, irrespective of fault and
irrespective of the intervening negligence of crew members.
Matanich, supra, at
321 U. S. 100
("[T]he exercise of due diligence does not relieve the owner of his
obligation to the seaman to furnish adequate appliances. . . . If
the owner is liable for furnishing an unseaworthy appliance, even
when he is not negligent,
a fortiori his obligation is
unaffected by the fact that the negligence of the officers of the
vessel contributed to the unseaworthiness"). The Court reaffirmed
the rule two years later in
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U. S. 85,
328 U. S. 94-95
(1946) ("[Unseaworthiness] is essentially a species of liability
without fault"). As a consequence of this radical change,
unseaworthiness
Page 498 U. S. 26
"[became] the principal vehicle for recovery by seamen for
injury or death."
Moragne, 398 U.S. at
398 U. S. 399.
DOHSA claims now sounded largely in unseaworthiness.
"The resulting discrepancy between the remedies for deaths
covered by [DOHSA] and for deaths that happen to fall within a
state wrongful death statute not encompassing unseaworthiness could
not have been foreseen by Congress."
Ibid.
The emergence of unseaworthiness as a widely used theory of
liability made manifest certain anomalies in maritime law that had
not previously caused great hardship. First, in territorial waters,
general maritime law allowed a remedy for unseaworthiness resulting
in injury, but not for death. Second, DOHSA allowed a remedy for
death resulting from unseaworthiness on the high seas, but general
maritime law did not allow such recovery for a similar death in
territorial waters. Finally, in what
Moragne called the
"strangest" anomaly, in those States whose statutes allowed a claim
for wrongful death resulting from unseaworthiness, recovery was
available for the death of a longshoreman due to unseaworthiness,
but not for the death of a Jones Act seaman.
See Moragne,
supra, at 395-396. This was because wrongful death actions
under the Jones Act are limited to negligence, and the Jones Act
preempts state law remedies for the death or injury of a seaman.
See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.
S. 148,
379 U. S.
154-156 (1964).
The United States, as
amicus curiae, urged the
Moragne Court to eliminate these inconsistencies and
render maritime wrongful death law uniform by creating a general
maritime wrongful death action applicable in all waters. The
territorial limitations placed on wrongful death actions by DOHSA
did not bar such a solution. DOHSA was itself a manifestation of
congressional intent "to achieve
uniformity in the exercise of
admiralty jurisdiction.'" Moragne, supra, 398 U.S. at
398 U. S. 401,
quoting Gillespie, supra, 379 U.S. at 379 U. S. 155.
Nothing in that Act or in the Jones Act could be read to preclude
this Court from exercising
Page 498 U. S. 27
its admiralty power to remedy nonuniformities that could not
have been anticipated when those statutes were passed.
Moragne,
supra, 398 U.S. at
398 U. S.
399-400. The Court therefore overruled
The
Harrisburg and created a general maritime wrongful death cause
of action. This result was not only consistent with the general
policy of both 1920 Acts favoring wrongful death recovery, but also
effectuated
"the constitutionally based principle that federal admiralty law
should be 'a system of law coextensive with, and operating
uniformly in, the whole country.'"
Moragne, supra, 398 U.S. at
398 U. S. 402,
quoting
The
Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558,
88 U. S. 575
(1875).
III
We have described
Moragne at length because it
exemplifies the fundamental principles that guide our decision in
this case. We no longer live in an era when seamen and their loved
ones must look primarily to the courts as a source of substantive
legal protection from injury and death; Congress and the States
have legislated extensively in these areas. In this era, an
admiralty court should look primarily to these legislative
enactments for policy guidance. We may supplement these statutory
remedies where doing so would achieve the uniform vindication of
such policies consistent with our constitutional mandate, but we
must also keep strictly within the limits imposed by Congress.
Congress retains superior authority in these matters, and an
admiralty court must be vigilant not to overstep the
well-considered boundaries imposed by federal legislation. These
statutes both direct and delimit our actions.
Apex contends that
Moragne's holding, creating a
general maritime wrongful death action, does not apply in this case
because
Moragne was a longshoreman, whereas Torregano was
a true seaman. Apex is correct that
Moragne does not apply
on its facts, but we decline to limit
Moragne to its
facts.
Historically, a shipowner's duty of seaworthiness under general
maritime law ran to seamen in the ship's employ.
Page 498 U. S. 28
See Sieracki, 328 U.S. at
328 U. S. 90. In
Sieracki, we extended that duty to stevedores working
aboard ship but employed by an independent contractor.
Id.
at
328 U.S. 95. As this was
Moragne's situation, Moragne's widow was able to bring an action
for unseaworthiness under general maritime law. In a narrow sense,
Moragne extends only to suits upon the death of
longshoremen like Moragne, so-called
Sieracki seamen.
Torregano was a true seaman, employed aboard the Archon. Were we to
limit
Moragne to its facts, Miles would have no general
maritime wrongful death action. Indeed, were we to limit
Moragne to its facts, that case would no longer have any
applicability at all. In 1972, Congress amended the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 86 Stat. 1251,
as
amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, to bar any recovery from
shipowners for the death or injury of a longshoreman or harbor
worker resulting from breach of the duty of seaworthiness.
See 33 U.S.C. § 905(b);
American Export Lines, Inc. v.
Alvez, 446 U. S. 274,
446 U. S. 282,
n. 9 (1980). If Moragne's widow brought her action today, it would
be foreclosed by statute.
Apex asks us not to extend
Moragne to suits for the
death of true seamen. This limitation is warranted, they say,
because true seamen, unlike longshoremen, are covered under the
Jones Act. The Jones Act provides a cause of action against the
seaman's employer for wrongful death resulting from negligence that
Apex contends is preclusive of any recovery for death from
unseaworthiness.
See 46 U.S.C.App. § 688.
This Court first addressed the preclusive effect of the Jones
Act wrongful death provision in
Lindgren v. United States,
281 U. S. 38
(1930). Petitioner, who was not a wrongful death beneficiary under
the Jones Act, attempted to recover for the negligence of the
shipowner under a state wrongful death statute. The Court held that
the Jones Act preempted the state statute:
"[The Jones] Act is one of general application intended to bring
about the uniformity in the
Page 498 U. S. 29
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction required by the Constitution,
and necessarily supersedes the application of the death statutes of
the several States."
Id. at
281 U. S. 44.
The Court also concluded that the Jones Act, limited as it is to
recovery for negligence, would preclude recovery for the wrongful
death of a seaman resulting from the unseaworthiness of the vessel.
Id. at
281 U. S. 47-48.
In
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.
S. 148 (1964), the Court reaffirmed
Lindgren
and held that the Jones Act precludes recovery under a state
statute for the wrongful death of a seaman due to unseaworthiness.
Id. at
379 U. S.
154-156.
Neither
Lindgren nor
Gillespie considered the
effect of the Jones Act on a general maritime wrongful death
action. Indeed, no such action existed at the time those cases were
decided.
Moragne addressed the question explicitly. The
Court explained there that the preclusive effect of the Jones Act
established in
Lindgren and
Gillespie extends
only to state remedies, and not to a general maritime wrongful
death action.
See Moragne, 398 U.S. at
398 U. S. 396,
n. 12.
The Jones Act provides an action in negligence for the death or
injury of a seaman. It thereby overruled
The Osceola,
189 U. S. 158
(1903), which established that seamen could recover under general
maritime law for injuries resulting from unseaworthiness, but not
negligence. The Jones Act evinces no general hostility to recovery
under maritime law. It does not disturb seamen's general maritime
claims for injuries resulting from unseaworthiness,
Pacific
Steamship Co. v. Peterson, 278 U. S. 130,
278 U. S. 139
(1928), and it does not preclude the recovery for wrongful death
due to unseaworthiness created by its companion statute DOHSA.
Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.
S. 426,
355 U. S. 430,
n. 4 (1958). Rather, the Jones Act establishes a uniform system of
seamen's tort law parallel to that available to employees of
interstate railway carriers under FELA. As the Court concluded in
Moragne, the extension of the DOHSA wrongful death action
to territorial waters furthers, rather than hinders, uniformity
Page 498 U. S. 30
in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction.
Moragne,
supra, 398 U.S. at
398 U. S. 396,
n. 12.
There is also little question that
Moragne intended to
create a general maritime wrongful death action applicable beyond
the situation of longshoremen. For one thing,
Moragne
explicitly overruled
The Harrisburg. Moragne, supra, 398
U.S. at
398 U. S. 409.
The Harrisburg involved a true seaman.
The
Harrisburg, 119 U.S. at
119 U. S. 200.
In addition, all three of the "anomalies" to which the
Moragne cause of action was directed involved seamen. The
"strangest" anomaly -- that recovery was available for the wrongful
death in territorial waters of a longshoreman, but not a true
seaman -- could only be remedied if the
Moragne wrongful
death action extended to seamen. It would be strange indeed were we
to read
Moragne as not addressing a problem that in large
part motivated its result. If there has been any doubt about the
matter, we today make explicit that there is a general maritime
cause of action for the wrongful death of a seaman, adopting the
reasoning of the unanimous and carefully crafted opinion in
Moragne.
IV
Moragne did not set forth the scope of the damages
recoverable under the maritime wrongful death action. The Court
first considered that question in
Sea-Land Services, Inc. v.
Gaudet, 414 U. S. 573
(1974). Respondent brought a general maritime action to recover for
the wrongful death of her husband, a longshoreman. The Court held
that a dependent plaintiff in a maritime wrongful death action
could recover for the pecuniary losses of support, services, and
funeral expenses, as well as for the nonpecuniary loss of society
suffered as the result of the death.
Id. at
414 U. S. 591.
Gaudet involved the death of a longshoreman in territorial
waters. [
Footnote 1]
Page 498 U. S. 31
Consequently, the Court had no need to consider the preclusive
effect of DOHSA for deaths on the high seas, or the Jones Act for
deaths of true seamen.
We considered DOHSA in
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,
436 U. S. 618
(1978). That case involved death on the high seas and, like
Gaudet, presented the question of loss of society damages
in a maritime wrongful death action. The Court began by recognizing
that
Gaudet, although broadly written, applied only in
territorial waters, and therefore did not decide the precise
question presented.
Id. at
436 U. S.
622-623. Congress made the decision for us. DOHSA, by
its terms, limits recoverable damages in wrongful death suits to
"
pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit
the suit is brought." 46 U.S.C.App. § 762 (emphasis added). This
explicit limitation forecloses recovery for nonpecuniary loss, such
as loss of society in a general maritime action.
Respondents argued that admiralty courts have traditionally
undertaken to supplement maritime statutes. The Court's answer in
Higginbotham is fully consistent with those principles we
have here derived from
Moragne: Congress has spoken
directly to the question of recoverable damages on the high seas,
and
"when it does speak directly to a question, the courts are not
free to 'supplement' Congress' answer so thoroughly that the Act
becomes meaningless."
Higginbotham, supra, at
436 U. S. 625.
Moragne involved gap-filling in an area left open by
statute; supplementation was entirely appropriate. But in an
"area covered by the statute, it would be no more appropriate to
prescribe a different measure of damages than to prescribe a
different statute of limitations, or a different class of
beneficiaries."
Higginbotham, supra, at
436 U. S.
625.
The logic of
Higginbotham controls our decision here.
The holding of
Gaudet applies only in territorial waters,
and it applies only to longshoremen.
Gaudet did not
consider the
Page 498 U. S. 32
preclusive effect of the Jones Act for deaths of true seamen. We
do so now.
Unlike DOHSA, the Jones Act does not explicitly limit damages to
any particular form. Enacted in 1920, the Jones Act makes
applicable to seamen the substantive recovery provisions of the
older FELA.
See 46 U.S.C.App. § 688. FELA recites only
that employers shall be liable in "damages" for the injury or death
of one protected under the Act. 45 U.S.C. § 51. In
Michigan
Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59
(1913), however, the Court explained that the language of the FELA
wrongful death provision is essentially identical to that of Lord
Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict. ch. 93 (1846), the first wrongful
death statute. Lord Campbell's Act also did not limit explicitly
the "damages" to be recovered, but that Act and the many state
statutes that followed it consistently had been interpreted as
providing recovery only for pecuniary loss.
Vreeland,
supra, at
227 U. S. 69-71.
The Court so construed FELA.
Ibid.
When Congress passed the Jones Act, the
Vreeland gloss
on FELA, and the hoary tradition behind it, were well established.
Incorporating FELA unaltered into the Jones Act, Congress must have
intended to incorporate the pecuniary limitation on damages as
well. We assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it
passes legislation.
See Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U. S. 677,
441 U. S.
696-697 (1979). There is no recovery for loss of society
in a Jones Act wrongful death action.
The Jones Act also precludes recovery for loss of society in
this case. The Jones Act applies when a seaman has been killed as a
result of negligence, and it limits recovery to pecuniary loss. The
general maritime claim here alleged that Torregano had been killed
as a result of the unseaworthiness of the vessel. It would be
inconsistent with our place in the constitutional scheme were we to
sanction more expansive remedies in a judicially created cause of
action in which liability is without fault than Congress has
allowed in cases of
Page 498 U. S. 33
death resulting from negligence. We must conclude that there is
no recovery for loss of society in a general maritime action for
the wrongful death of a Jones Act seaman.
Our decision also remedies an anomaly we created in
Higginbotham. Respondents in that case warned that the
elimination of loss of society damages for wrongful deaths on the
high seas would create an unwarranted inconsistency between deaths
in territorial waters, where loss of society was available under
Gaudet, and deaths on the high seas. We recognized the
value of uniformity, but concluded that a concern for consistency
could not override the statute.
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at
436 U. S. 624.
Today we restore a uniform rule applicable to all actions for the
wrongful death of a seaman, whether under DOHSA, the Jones Act, or
general maritime law.
V
We next must decide whether, in a general maritime action
surviving the death of a seaman, the estate can recover decedent's
lost future earnings. Under traditional maritime law, as under
common law, there is no right of survival; a seaman's personal
cause of action does not survive the seaman's death.
Cortes v.
Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.
S. 367,
287 U. S. 371
(1932);
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U. S. 354,
358 U. S. 373
(1959);
Gillespie, 379 U.S. at
379 U. S. 157.
Congress and the States have changed the rule in many instances.
The Jones Act, through its incorporation of FELA, provides that a
seaman's right of action for injuries due to negligence survives to
the seaman's personal representative.
See 45 U.S.C. § 59;
Gillespie, supra, at
379 U. S. 157.
Most States have survival statutes applicable to tort actions
generally,
see 1 S. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death
2d § 3.2, (1975 and Supp.1989), 2
id. §§ 14.1, 14.3, App.
A., and admiralty courts have applied these state statutes in many
instances to preserve suits for injury at sea.
See, e.g., Just
v. Chambers, 312 U. S. 383,
312 U. S. 391
(1941).
See also Kernan v.
American
Page 498 U. S. 34
Dredging Co., 355 U. S. 426,
355 U. S. 430,
n. 4 (1958);
Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.
S. 731,
365 U. S. 739
(1961);
Gillespie, supra, 379 U.S. at
379 U. S. 157;
Comment, Application of State Survival Statutes in Maritime Causes,
60 Colum.L.Rev. 534, 535, n. 11 (1960); Nagy, The General Maritime
Law Survival Action: What are the Elements of Recoverable Damages?,
9 U.Haw.L.Rev. 5, 27 (1987). Where these state statutes do not
apply, [
Footnote 2] however, or
where there is no state survival statute, there is no survival of
unseaworthiness claims absent a change in the traditional maritime
rule.
Several Courts of Appeals have relied on
Moragne to
hold that there is a general maritime right of survival.
See
Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr., & Assocs., Inc., 466 F.2d
903, 909 (CA8 1972);
Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794,
799-800 (CA1 1974);
Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 523 F.2d
793, 795 (CA5 1975);
Evich v. Connelly, 759 F.2d 1432,
1434 (CA9 1985). As we have noted,
Moragne found that
congressional and state abrogation of the maritime rule against
wrongful death actions demonstrated a strong policy judgment, to
which the Court deferred.
Moragne, 398 U.S. at
398 U. S.
388-393. Following this reasoning, the lower courts have
looked to the Jones Act and the many state survival statutes, and
concluded that these enactments dictate a change in the general
maritime rule against survival.
See, e.g., Spiller, supra,
at 909;
Barbe, supra, at 799-800, and n. 6.
Miles argues that we should follow the Courts of Appeals and
recognize a general maritime survival right. Apex urges us to
reaffirm the traditional maritime rule and overrule these
decisions. We decline to address the issue, because its resolution
is unnecessary to our decision on the narrow question presented:
whether the income decedent would have earned but for his death is
recoverable. We hold that it is not.
Page 498 U. S. 35
Recovery of lost future income in a survival suit will, in many
instances, be duplicative of recovery by dependents for loss of
support in a wrongful death action; the support dependents lose as
a result of a seaman's death would have come from the seaman's
future earnings. Perhaps for this reason, there is little
legislative support for such recovery in survival. In only a few
States can an estate recover in a survival action for income
decedent would have received but for death. [
Footnote 3] At the federal level, DOHSA contains
no survival provision. The Jones Act incorporates FELA's survival
provision, but, as in most States, recovery is limited to losses
suffered during the decedent's lifetime.
See 45 U.S.C. §
59;
Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.
S. 342,
300 U. S. 347
(1937);
St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Craft,
237 U. S. 648,
237 U. S. 658
(1915).
This state and federal legislation hardly constitutes the kind
of "wholesale" and "unanimous" policy judgment that prompted the
Court to create a new cause of action in
Moragne. See Moragne,
supra, 398 U.S. at
398 U. S. 388,
389. To the contrary, the considered judgment of a large majority
of American legislatures is that lost future income is not
recoverable in a survival action. Were we to recognize a right to
such recovery under maritime law, we would be adopting a distinctly
minority view.
This fact alone would not necessarily deter us if recovery of
lost future income were more consistent with the general principles
of maritime tort law. There are indeed strong
Page 498 U. S. 36
policy arguments for allowing such recovery.
See, e.g.,
R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 176-181 (3d ed. 1986) (recovery
of lost future income provides efficient incentives to take care by
insuring that the tortfeasor will have to bear the total cost of
the victim's injury or death). Moreover, Miles reminds us that
admiralty courts have always shown a special solicitude for the
welfare of seamen and their families. "[C]ertainly it better
becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in
admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy."
Moragne,
supra, at
398 U. S. 387,
quoting Chief Justice Chase in
The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas.
909, 910 (No. 12,578) (CC Md.1865).
See also Gaudet, 414
U.S. at
414 U. S. 583.
We are not unmindful of these principles, but they are insufficient
in this case. We sail in occupied waters. Maritime tort law is now
dominated by federal statute, and we are not free to expand
remedies at will simply because it might work to the benefit of
seamen and those dependent upon them.
Congress has placed limits on recovery in survival actions that
we cannot exceed. Because this case involves the death of a seaman,
we must look to the Jones Act.
The Jones Act/FELA survival provision limits recovery to losses
suffered during the decedent's lifetime.
See 45 U.S.C. §
59. This was the established rule under FELA when Congress passed
the Jones Act, incorporating FELA,
see St. Louis, I.M. &
S.R. Co., supra, 237 U.S. at
237 U. S. 658,
and it is the rule under the Jones Act.
See Van Beeck,
supra, 300 U.S. at
300 U. S. 347.
Congress has limited the survival right for seamen's injuries
resulting from negligence. As with loss of society in wrongful
death actions, this forecloses more expansive remedies in a general
maritime action founded on strict liability. We will not create,
under our admiralty powers, a remedy disfavored by a clear majority
of the States and that goes well beyond the limits of Congress'
ordered system of recovery for seamen's injury and death. Because
Torregano's estate cannot recover for his lost future income under
the Jones Act, it cannot do so under general maritime law.
Page 498 U. S. 37
VI
Cognizant of the constitutional relationship between the courts
and Congress, we today act in accordance with the uniform plan of
maritime tort law Congress created in DOHSA and the Jones Act. We
hold that there is a general maritime cause of action for the
wrongful death of a seaman, but that damages recoverable in such an
action do not include loss of society. We also hold that a general
maritime survival action cannot include recovery for decedent's
lost future earnings. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is
Affirmed.
Justice SOUTER took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
[
Footnote 1]
As with
Moragne, the 1972 amendments to LHWCA have
rendered
Gaudet inapplicable on its facts.
See
supra, at 323; 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). Suit in
Gaudet was
filed before 1972.
Gaudet v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 463
F.2d 1331, 1332 (CA5 1972).
[
Footnote 2]
In
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.
S. 207,
477 U. S. 215,
n. 1 (1986), we declined to approve or disapprove the practice of
some courts of applying state survival statutes to cases involving
death on the high seas.
[
Footnote 3]
See Mich.Comp.Laws §§ 600.2921, 600.2922 (1986);
Olivier v. Houghton County St. R. Co., 134 Mich. 367,
368-370, 96 N.W. 434, 435 (1903); 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 8302 (1988);
Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 307-308, 282 A.2d 206,
229 (1971); Wash.Rev.Code § 4.20.060 (1989);
Balmer v.
Dilley, 81 Wash. 2d
367, 370,
502 P.2d
456, 458 (1972).
See generally 2 S. Speiser, Recovery
for Wrongful Death 2d § 14.7, App. A (1975 and Supp.1989). Speiser
explains that many states do not allow any recovery of lost
earnings in survival, and that, among those that do, recovery is
generally limited to earnings lost from the time of injury to the
time of death.
Ibid.