A fire erupted in the washer/dryer area of petitioner Sisson's
pleasure yacht while it was docked at a Lake Michigan marina,
destroying the yacht and damaging several neighboring vessels and
the marina. Respondents filed claims against Sisson for over
$275,000 in damages. Invoking a Limited Liability Act provision
that limits a vessel owner's liability for any damage done without
the owner's privity or knowledge to the value of the vessel and its
freight, Sisson filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive
relief in the Federal District Court to limit his liability to
$800, his yacht's salvage value after the fire. The court dismissed
the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, rejecting
Sisson's argument that it had,
inter alia, jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), which grants district courts maritime
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The District Court has jurisdiction over Sisson's
limitation claim pursuant to § 1333(1). Maritime jurisdiction is
appropriate when a potential hazard to maritime commerce arises out
of an activity that bears a substantial relationship to traditional
maritime activity.
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson,
457 U. S. 668,
457 U. S. 675,
n. 5. The first half of the test -- that there be a potential
hazard to maritime activity -- is met because the fire, which began
on a noncommercial vessel at a marina on a navigable waterway,
could have spread to nearby commercial vessels or made the marina
inaccessible to such vessels. Respondents' argument that the
potential effect on maritime commerce was minimal because no
commercial vessels were docked in the marina misunderstands the
nature of the inquiry, which determines an activity's potential
impact by examining its general character, not the actual effects
on maritime commerce nor the particular facts about the incident
that may have rendered it more or less likely to disrupt commercial
activity.
See Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland,
409 U. S. 249,
Foremost, supra. In determining, as to the second half of
the test, whether there is a substantial relationship between the
activity giving rise to the incident and traditional maritime
activity, the relevant activity in this case was the storage and
maintenance of a vessel at a marina on navigable waters. A vessel's
storage and maintenance is substantially related to a traditional
maritime activity. Respondents' contention that navigation is the
sole instance, rather
Page 497 U. S. 359
than an example, of an activity substantially related to
traditional maritime activity is incorrect. Were navigation the
only activity,
Foremost could have stated the
jurisdictional test much more clearly and economically. Moreover, a
narrow focus on navigation would not serve the federal policies
underlying the jurisdictional test, since the need for uniform
rules of maritime conduct and liability is not limited to
navigation, but extends at least to any other activities
traditionally undertaken by commercial or noncommercial vessels.
Pp.
497 U. S.
360-367.
867 F.2d 341, reversed and remanded.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and
KENNEDY, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment, in which WHITE, J., joined,
post, p.
497 U. S.
368.
Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We must decide whether 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), which grants federal
district courts jurisdiction over "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction," confers federal jurisdiction over
petitioner's limitation of liability suit brought in connection
with a fire on his vessel. We hold that it does. [
Footnote 1]
Page 497 U. S. 360
Everett Sisson was the owner of the
Ultorian, a 56-foot
pleasure yacht. On September 24, 1985, while the
Ultorian
was docked at a marina on Lake Michigan, a navigable waterway, a
fire erupted in the area of the vessel's washer/dryer unit. The
fire destroyed the
Ultorian and damaged several
neighboring vessels and the marina. In the wake of the fire,
respondents filed claims against Sisson for over $275,000 for
damages to the marina and the other vessels. Invoking the provision
of the Limited Liability Act that limits the liability of an owner
of a vessel for any damage done "without the privity or knowledge
of such owner" to the value of the vessel and its freight, 46
U.S.C. § 183(a) (1982 ed.), Sisson filed a petition for declaratory
and injunctive relief in federal District Court to limit his
liability to $800, the salvage value of the
Ultorian after
the fire. Sisson argued that the federal court had maritime
jurisdiction over his limitation of liability action pursuant to §
1333(1). The District Court disagreed, dismissing the petition for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
In re Complaint of
Sisson, 663 F.
Supp. 858 (ND Ill.1987). Sisson sought reconsideration on the
ground that the Limited Liability Act independently conferred
jurisdiction over the action. The District Court denied Sisson's
motion, both on the merits and on the basis of Sisson's failure to
raise the argument before the dismissal of the action.
In re
Complaint of Sisson, 668 F.
Supp. 1196 (ND Ill.1987). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed, holding that neither § 1333(1) nor the Limited
Liability Act conferred jurisdiction.
In re Complaint of
Sisson, 867 F.2d 341 (1989). We granted certiorari, 493 U.S.
1055 (1990), and now reverse.
Until recently, § 1333(1) jurisdiction over tort actions was
determined largely by the application of a "locality" test. As this
Court stated the test in
The Plymouth, 3
Wall. 20,
Page 497 U. S. 361
70 U. S. 36
(1866):
"Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board
a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of
admiralty cognizance."
See also Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland, 409 U. S. 249,
409 U. S.
253-254 (1972) (describing the locality test).
Executive Jet marked this Court's first clear departure
from the strict locality test. There, a jet aircraft struck a flock
of sea gulls while taking off, lost power, and crashed into the
navigable waters of Lake Erie, which lay just past the end of the
runway. The owner of the aircraft sued the city of Cleveland, the
owner of the airport, in federal court, arguing that § 1333(1)
conferred federal jurisdiction over the action. Noting "serious
difficulties with the locality test,"
id. at
409 U. S. 255,
we refused to enter into a debate over whether the tort occurred
where the plane had crashed and been destroyed (the navigable
waters of Lake Erie) or where it had struck the sea gulls (over
land),
id. at
409 U. S.
266-267. Rather, we held that jurisdiction was lacking
because "the wrong [did not] bear a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity."
Id. at
409 U. S.
268.
Although our holding in
Executive Jet was limited by
its terms to cases involving aviation torts, that case's
"thorough discussion of the theoretical and practical problems
inherent in broadly applying the traditional locality rule . . .
prompted several courts and commentators to construe
Executive
Jet as applying to determinations of federal admiralty
jurisdiction outside the context of aviation torts."
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.
S. 668,
457 U. S. 673
(1982). In
Foremost, we approved this broader
interpretation of
Executive Jet. 457 U.S. at
457 U. S. 673.
Foremost involved a collision, on what we assumed to be
navigable waters,
id. at
457 U. S. 670,
n. 2, between an 18-foot pleasure boat and a 16-foot recreational
fishing boat,
see Richardson v. Foremost Ins.
Co., 470 F.
Supp. 699, 700 (MD La.1979). Neither vessel had ever been
engaged in any commercial maritime activity. 457 U.S.
457 U. S.
670-671.
Page 497 U. S. 362
We began our application of
Executive Jet by rejecting
"petitioners' argument that a substantial relationship with
commercial maritime activity is necessary" to a finding of
maritime jurisdiction. 457 U.S. at
457 U. S. 674
(emphasis added). Although we recognized that protecting commercial
shipping is at the heart of admiralty jurisdiction, we also noted
that that interest
"cannot be adequately served if admiralty jurisdiction is
restricted to those individuals actually
engaged in
commercial maritime activity. This interest can be fully vindicated
only if all operators of vessels on navigable waters are subject to
uniform rules of conduct. The failure to recognize the breadth of
this federal interest ignores the potential effect of noncommercial
maritime activity on maritime commerce. . . . The potential
disruptive impact of a collision between boats on navigable waters,
when coupled with the traditional concern that admiralty law holds
for navigation, compels the conclusion that this collision between
two pleasure boats on navigable waters had a significant
relationship with maritime commerce."
Id. at
457 U. S.
674-675 (footnote omitted).
In a footnote to the above passage, we noted that "[n]ot every
accident in navigable waters that might disrupt maritime commerce
will support federal admiralty jurisdiction,"
id. at
457 U. S. 675,
n. 5 (citing
Executive Jet), but that, when a
"potential hazard to maritime commerce arises out of activity
that bears a substantial relationship to traditional maritime
activity, as does the navigation of boats in this case, admiralty
jurisdiction is appropriate."
457 U.S. at
457 U. S. 675,
n. 5.
This case involves a fire that began on a noncommercial vessel
at a marina located on a navigable waterway. Certainly, such a fire
has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce, as it can
spread to nearby commercial vessels or make the marina inaccessible
to such vessels. Indeed, fire is one of the most significant
hazards facing commercial vessels.
Page 497 U. S. 363
See, e.g., Southport Fisheries, Inc. v. Saskatchewan Govt.
Ins. Office, 161 F. Supp.
81, 83-84 (NC 1958).
Respondents' only argument to the contrary is that the potential
effect on maritime commerce in this case was minimal because no
commercial vessels happened to be docked at the marina when the
fire occurred. This argument misunderstands the nature of our
inquiry. We determine the potential impact of a given type of
incident by examining its general character. The jurisdictional
inquiry does not turn on the actual effects on maritime commerce of
the fire on Sisson's vessel; nor does it turn on the particular
facts of the incident in this case, such as the source of the fire
or the specific location of the yacht at the marina, that may have
rendered the fire on the
Ultorian more or less likely to
disrupt commercial activity. Rather, a court must assess the
general features of the type of incident involved to determine
whether such an incident is likely to disrupt commercial activity.
Here, the general features -- a fire on a vessel docked at a marina
on navigable waters -- plainly satisfy the requirement of potential
disruption to commercial maritime activity.
Our approach here comports with the way in which we
characterized the potential disruption of the types of incidents
involved in
Executive Jet and
Foremost. This
first aspect of the jurisdictional test was satisfied in
Executive Jet because "an aircraft sinking in the water
could create a hazard for the navigation of commercial vessels in
the vicinity."
Foremost, 457 U.S. at
457 U. S. 675,
n. 5. Likewise, in
Foremost, the Court noted "the
potential[ly] disruptive impact of a collision between boats on
navigable waters."
Id. at
457 U. S. 675.
Indeed, we supported our finding of potential disruptive there with
a description of the likely effects of a collision at the mouth of
the St. Lawrence Seaway,
ibid. an area heavily traveled by
commercial vessels, even though the place where the collision
actually had occurred apparently was "seldom, if ever, used for
commercial traffic,"
id. at
457 U. S. 670,
n. 2. Our
Page 497 U. S. 364
cases thus lead us to eschew the fact-specific jurisdictional
inquiry urged on us by respondents. [
Footnote 2]
We now turn to the second half of the
Foremost test,
under which the party seeking to invoke maritime jurisdiction must
show a substantial relationship between the activity giving rise to
the incident and traditional maritime activity. As a first step, we
must define the relevant activity in this case. Our cases have made
clear that the relevant "activity" is defined not by the particular
circumstances of the incident, but by the general conduct from
which the incident arose. In
Executive Jet, for example,
the relevant activity was not a plane sinking in Lake Erie, but air
travel generally. 409 U.S. at
409 U. S.
269-270.
See also Foremost, supra, at
457 U. S.
675-677 (relevant activity is navigation of vessels
generally). This
Page 497 U. S. 365
focus on the general character of the activity is, indeed,
suggested by the nature of the jurisdictional inquiry. Were courts
required to focus more particularly on the causes of the harm, they
would have to decide to some extent the merits of the causation
issue to answer the legally and analytically antecedent
jurisdictional question. Thus, in this case, we need not ascertain
the precise cause of the fire to determine what "activity" Sisson
was engaged in; rather, the relevant activity was the storage and
maintenance of a vessel at a marina on navigable waters. [
Footnote 3]
Our final inquiry, then, is whether the storage and maintenance
of a boat on a marina on navigable waters has a substantial
relationship to a "traditional maritime activity" within the
meaning of
Executive Jet and
Foremost. [
Footnote 4] Respondents
Page 497 U. S. 366
would have us hold that, at least in the context of
noncommercial activity, only navigation can be characterized as
substantially related to traditional maritime activity. We decline
to do so. In
Foremost, we identified navigation as an
example, rather than as the sole instance, of conduct that is
substantially related to traditional maritime activity.
See 457 U.S. at
457 U. S. 675,
n. 5. Indeed, had we intended to suggest
Page 497 U. S. 367
that navigation is the only activity that is sufficient to
confer jurisdiction, we could have stated the jurisdictional test
much more clearly and economically by stating that maritime
jurisdiction over torts is limited to torts in which the vessels
are in "navigation." Moreover, a narrow focus on navigation would
not serve the federal policies that underlie our jurisdictional
test. The fundamental interest giving rise to maritime jurisdiction
is "the protection of maritime commerce,"
id. at
457 U. S. 674,
and we have said that that interest cannot be fully vindicated
unless "all operators of vessels on navigable waters are subject to
uniform rules of conduct,"
id. at
457 U. S. 675.
The need for uniform rules of maritime conduct and liability is not
limited to navigation, but extends at least to any other activities
traditionally undertaken by vessels, commercial or
noncommercial.
Clearly, the storage and maintenance of a vessel at a marina on
navigable waters is substantially related to "traditional maritime
activity" given the broad perspective demanded by the second aspect
of the test. Docking a vessel at a marina on a navigable waterway
is a common, if not indispensable, maritime activity. At such a
marina, vessels are stored for an extended period, docked to obtain
fuel or supplies, and moved into and out of navigation. Indeed,
most maritime voyages begin and end with the docking of the craft
at a marina. We therefore conclude that, just as navigation,
storing and maintaining a vessel at a marina on a navigable
waterway is substantially related to traditional maritime
activity.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the District Court
has jurisdiction over Sisson's limitation claim pursuant to §
1333(1). Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals have
addressed the merits of that Sisson's claim, and we therefore
intimate no view on that matter. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Page 497 U. S. 368
[
Footnote 1]
Sisson has also argued throughout this litigation that the
Limited Liability Act, Rev.Stat. § 4281
et seq., 46 U.S.C.
§ 181
et seq. (1982 ed.), provides an independent basis
for federal jurisdiction. Respondents contend that the Act does not
create jurisdiction, but instead may be invoked only in cases
otherwise within the maritime jurisdiction of § 1333(1). We need
not decide which party is correct, for, even were we to agree that
the Limited Liability Act does not independently provide a basis
for this action,
§ 1333(1) is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Petitioner also
argues that the Admiralty Extension Act, 62 Stat. 496, 46 U.S.C. §
740, provide an independent basis for jurisdiction. We decline to
consider that argument because it was not raised below.
[
Footnote 2]
Justice SCALIA argues that we should abandon the requirement
that the incident have the potential for disrupting maritime
commerce. He argues that, "as a practical matter,
every
tort occurring on a vessel in navigable waters" should give rise to
maritime jurisdiction,
post at
497 U. S. 373
(emphasis added), no matter how divorced the incident from the
purposes that give rise to such jurisdiction. Justice SCALIA is
correct that his approach would be simpler to apply than the one
embraced by
Executive Jet and
Foremost, and that,
all things being equal, simpler jurisdictional formulae are to be
preferred. Such a preference, in fact, informs our refusal to
consider the particulars of the fire on the
Ultorian in
determining whether maritime jurisdiction lies.
See supra
at
497 U. S. 363.
But the demand for tidy rules can go too far, and when that demand
entirely divorces the jurisdictional inquiry from the purposes that
support the exercise of jurisdiction, it has gone too far. In
Foremost, the Court unanimously agreed that the purpose
underlying the existence of federal maritime jurisdiction is the
federal interest in the protection of maritime commerce, and that a
case must implicate that interest to give rise to such
jurisdiction.
Compare Foremost, supra, at
457 U. S. 674-675,
with id. at
457 U. S.
679-680 (Powell, J., dissenting). The only point of
debate in
Foremost was whether the Court was straying too
far from that purpose by requiring no more than that the wrong have
a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce and arise from
an activity with a substantial relationship to traditional maritime
activity. Justice SCALlA's view that
Foremost did not go
far enough is thus plainly inconsistent with the unanimous view of
the Court in
Foremost.
[
Footnote 3]
In this case, all of the instrumentalities involved in the
incident were engaged in a similar activity. The
Ultorian
and the other craft damaged by the fire were docked at a marina,
and the marina itself provided docking and related services. The
facts of
Executive Jet and
Foremost also reveal
that all the relevant entities were engaged in a common form of
activity.
See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland, 409 U. S. 249
(1972) (entities involved in the incident were engaged in
nonmaritime activity of facilitating air travel);
Foremost Ins.
Co. v. Richardson, 457 U. S. 668
(1982) (entities were both engaged in navigation). Different issues
may be raised by a case in which one of the instrumentalities is
engaged in a traditional maritime activity, but the other is not.
Our resolution of such issues awaits a case that squarely raises
them.
[
Footnote 4]
The Circuits have interpreted this aspect of the jurisdictional
inquiry variously. After
Executive Jet but before
Foremost, the Fifth Circuit adopted a four-factor test for
deciding whether an activity is substantially related to
traditional maritime activity. The factors are
"the functions and roles of the parties; the types of vehicles
and instrumentalities involved; the causation and the type of
injury; and traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law."
Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (1973). In other
Circuits, this test has continued to dominate the landscape even in
the wake of
Foremost. See, e.g., Drake v. Raymark Industries,
Inc., 772 F.2d 1007, 1015 (CA1 1985);
Guidry v.
Durkin, 834 F.2d 1465, 1471 (CA9 1987);
Lewis Charters,
Inc. v. Huckins Yacht Corp., 871 F.2d 1046, 1051 (CA11 1989).
The Fourth Circuit appears to follow
Kelly as well,
although how closely is unclear.
Compare Oman v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 764 F.2d 224, 230, and n. 3 (CA4 1985) (en banc)
(stating that "a thorough analysis of the nexus requirement should
include a consideration of
at least [the
Kelly
factors]") (emphasis added),
with Bubla v. Bradshaw, 795
F.2d 349, 351 (CA4 1986) (implicitly treating
Kelly
factors as exclusive). The precise state of the law in the Fifth
Circuit after
Foremost is also unclear.
Compare
Mollett v. Penrod Drilling Co., 826 F.2d 1419, 1426 (CA5 1987)
(
Mollett I) (applying, in addition to
Kelly
factors, "(1) the impact of the event on maritime shipping and
commerce, (2) the desirability of a uniform national rule to apply
to such matters, and (3) the need for admiralty
expertise' in
the trial and decision of the case"), with Mollett v. Penrod
Drilling Co., 872 F.2d 1221, 1224-1226 (CA5 1989) (Mollett
II) (applying the Kelly factors without explicit
mention of the extra factors identified in Mollett
I).
Other Circuits have adopted different approaches. The Seventh
Circuit in this case held that an activity must either be
commercial or involve navigation to satisfy the "traditional
maritime activity" standard.
In re Complaint of Sisson,
867 F.2d 341, 345 (1989). The Second Circuit directly applies our
language requiring a substantial relationship to traditional
maritime activity without applying any additional factors.
See
Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 844 (1983);
Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1147-1148 (1976).
Finally, the Sixth Circuit has criticized the Seventh Circuit's
analysis in this case as "an indefensibly narrow reading of
Foremost Insurance,"
In re Young, 872 F.2d 176,
178-179, n. 4 (1989), but has not set forth in concrete terms the
test it would apply,
cf. Petersen v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.
Co., 784 F.2d 732, 736 (1986).
The parties and various
amici suggest that we resolve
this dispute by adopting one of the Circuits' tests (or some other
test entirely). We believe that, at least in cases in which all of
the relevant entities are engaged in similar types of activity
(
cf. n. 3,
supra), the formula initially
suggested by
Executive Jet and more fully refined in
Foremost and in this case provides appropriate and
sufficient guidance to the federal courts. We therefore decline the
invitation to use this case to refine further the test we have
developed.
Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice WHITE joins, concurring in the
judgment.
I agree that the District Court has jurisdiction over this case
under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, [
Footnote
2/1] but I do not agree with the test the Court applies to
conclude that this is so. Prior to
Foremost Ins. Co. v.
Richardson, 457 U. S. 668
(1982), our clear case law extended admiralty jurisdiction to all
torts involving vessels on navigable waters.
Foremost
recited as applicable to such torts the test of "significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity," which had been
devised 10 years earlier for torts not involving vessels,
see
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,
409 U. S. 249,
409 U. S. 268
(1972). In my view, that test does not add any new substantive
requirement for vessel-related torts, but merely explains
why
all vessel-related torts (which
ipso facto have such
a "significant relationship"), but only some non-vessel-related
torts, come within § 1333. The Court's description of how one goes
about determining whether a vessel-related tort meets the
"significant relationship" test threatens to sow confusion in what
had been, except at the margins, a settled area of the law.
In
The Plymouth, 3
Wall. 20,
70 U. S. 36
(1866), we stated that
"[e]very species of tort, however occurring, and whether on
board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters,
is of admiralty cognizance."
Despite that passage, however, we held in
Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, supra, that a tort action
involving the crash of a jet aircraft in Lake Erie was not a "civil
case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction" within the meaning of §
1333, even assuming the accident could be regarded as having
"occurred" on navigable waters. We acknowledged the traditional
Page 497 U. S. 369
rule as set forth in
The Plymouth, but thought it
significant that this "strict locality" test "was established and
grew up in an era when it was difficult to conceive of a tortious
occurrence on navigable waters other than in connection with a
water-borne vessel." 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 254.
Whereas where vessels were involved the test tended properly to
capture only those cases that had been the traditional business of
the admiralty courts, in other contexts it had produced "perverse
and casuistic borderline situations" in which "the invocation of
admiralty jurisdiction seem[ed] almost absurd."
Id. at
409 U. S.
255:
"If a swimmer at a public beach is injured by another swimmer or
by a submerged object on the bottom, or if a piece of machinery
sustains water damage from being dropped into a harbor by a
land-based crane, a literal application of the locality test
invokes not only the jurisdiction of the federal courts, but the
full panoply of the substantive admiralty law as well. In cases
such as these, some courts have adhered to a mechanical application
of the strict locality rule and have sustained admiralty
jurisdiction despite the lack of any connection between the wrong
and traditional forms of maritime commerce and navigation."
Id. at
409 U. S.
255-256. We noted the general criticism of these cases,
and pointed out the particular difficulties that had arisen from
efforts to apply a "locality-alone" test to cases involving
airplane crashes. Accordingly, we interpreted § 1333 to require, in
the case of torts involving aircraft, not only that that the
Plymouth "locality" requirement be met but also that "the
wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime
activity,"
Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 268.
We concluded that wrongs in connection with "flights by land-based
aircraft between points within the continental United States,"
id. at
409 U. S. 274,
did not meet this test.
Our decision in
Executive Jet could be understood as
resting on the quite simple ground that the tort did not involve
a
Page 497 U. S. 370
vessel, which had traditionally been thought required by the
leading scholars in the field (notwithstanding the contrary dictum
in
The Plymouth).
See E. Benedict, The American
Admiralty: Its Jurisdiction and Practice 173 (1850); G. Robinson,
Handbook of Admiralty Law in the United States 42, 56, 88 (1939);
G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 23-24(2d ed. 1975).
At the very least, the opinion conveyed the strong implication that
a case involving a tort occurring "in connection with a water-borne
vessel," 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 254,
would be deemed within the admiralty jurisdiction without further
inquiry.
In
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, supra, however, a
case involving the collision of two pleasure boats on what we
presumed to be navigable waters, we read
Executive Jet for
the broader proposition that a "significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity" is required even for torts involving
vessels. "Because the
wrong' here," we said,
"involves the negligent operation of a vessel on navigable
waters, we believe that it has a sufficient nexus to traditional
maritime activity to sustain admiralty jurisdiction in the District
Court."
457 U.S. at
457 U. S. 674.
We then proceeded to consider and reject the petitioner's argument
that, outside the strictly commercial context,
"the need for uniform rules to govern conduct and liability
disappears, and 'federalism' concerns dictate that these torts be
litigated in the state courts."
Ibid. To the contrary, we concluded, traditional
admiralty concerns arise whenever the rules of navigation are
implicated in a particular suit; a pleasure boat's failure to
follow the "uniform rules of conduct" that govern navigation on
navigable waters could have a "potential disruptive impact" on
maritime commerce just as surely as could a similar transgression
by a commercial vessel.
Id. at
457 U. S.
675.
This discussion in
Foremost has caused many lower
courts to read the opinion as not only requiring a "significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity" in all cases,
i.e., even when a vessel is involved, but as requiring
more specifically
Page 497 U. S. 371
a particularized showing that the activity engaged in at the
time of the alleged tort, if generally engaged in to some
indeterminate extent, would have an actual effect on maritime
commerce.
See ante at
497 U. S. 365,
n. 3 (collecting cases). In my view the reading that imputes the
latter requirement is in error. We referred to "the potential
disruptive impact of a collision" merely to rebut the petitioner's
argument that jurisdiction in that particular case would not
further the general purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, since
navigation by pleasure craft could not affect maritime commerce. It
was enough in that case to answer that it could. But that response
cannot reasonably be converted into a holding that,
in every
case, such an answer must be available -- that no single
instance of admiralty tort jurisdiction can exist where there is no
potentially disruptive impact upon maritime commerce. No
jurisdictional rule susceptible of ready and general application
(and therefore no practical jurisdictional rule) can be so precise
as to pass such an "overbreadth" test. One can afford, and perhaps
cannot avoid, such case-by-case analysis for the few cases lying at
the margins -- when, for example, a plane falls into a lake -- but
it is folly to apply it to the generality of cases involving
vessels. [
Footnote 2/2] Today's
opinion, by engaging in an extended discussion of the degree to
which fire (the instrumentality by which the damage in this
particular case was caused) might disrupt commercial maritime
activity,
ante at
497 U. S. 362-364, reinforces this erroneous reading of
Foremost.
What today's opinion achieves for admiralty torts is reminiscent
of the state of the law with respect to admiralty contracts. The
general test, of course, must be whether the
Page 497 U. S. 372
contract "touch[es] rights and duties appertaining to commerce
and navigation," 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States 528 (1833). But instead of adopting, for
contracts as we had (until today) for torts, a general rule that
matters directly related to vessels were covered, we sought to draw
the line more finely, case-by-case. That body of law has long been
the object of criticism. The impossibility of drawing a principled
line with respect to what, in addition to the fact that the
contract relates to a vessel (which is by nature maritime) is
needed in order to make the contract itself "maritime," has brought
ridicule upon the enterprise. As one scholar noted in 1924, "[t]he
rules as to building and repairing vessels" -- the former having
been deemed nonmaritime,
See People's Ferry Co. of Boston
v. Beers, 20 How. 393 (1858), and the latter
maritime,
see New Bedford Dry Dock Co. v. Purdy,
258 U. S. 96 (1922)
-- "and the results obtained therefrom, are so humorous that they
deserve insertion in the laws of Gerolstein." Hough, Admiralty
Jurisdiction -- Of Late Years, 37 Harv.L.Rev. 529, 534 (1924).
[
Footnote 2/3] There is perhaps
more justification for this approach with respect to contracts,
since in that field the "vessel" test would not be further limited
by the "locality" test, as it is for torts. And I am not suggesting
an abandonment of our approach in that other field, which by now
has developed some rules, however irrational they may be. [
Footnote 2/4] But there is no reason for
expanding that approach to the tort field. I agree with, and apply
to today's opinion, the commentary
Page 497 U. S. 373
on an earlier judicial effort to do so:
"The decision . . . seems . . . unfortunate as increasing
complication and uncertainty in the law without, apparently,
securing any practical gain to compensate for these
disadvantages."
Note, Admiralty Jurisdiction Over Torts, 16 Harv.L.Rev. 210, 211
(1903), discussing
Campbell v. H. Hackfield & Co.,
Ltd. (D.Haw., Oct. 21, 1902),
aff'd, 125 F. 696
(1903).
The sensible rule to be drawn from our cases, including
Executive Jet and
Foremost, is that a tort
occurring on a vessel conducting normal maritime activities in
navigable waters -- that is, as a practical matter, every tort
occurring on a vessel in navigable waters -- falls within the
admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Foremost is
very clear that the
Executive Jet requirement that the
wrong bear a "significant relationship to traditional maritime
activity" applies across the board. But it is not conclusive as to
what is required to establish such a relationship in the case of
torts aboard vessels. The "wrong" in
Foremost not only
occurred on a vessel while it was engaged in traditional maritime
activity (navigating), but also consisted precisely of conducting
that activity in a tortious fashion -- and the discussion
emphasized the latter reality. But the holding of the case did not
establish (and could not, since the facts did not present the
question) that the former alone would not suffice. In the case of a
vessel, it traditionally had sufficed, and
Foremost gave
no indication that it was revolutionizing admiralty jurisdiction.
It is noteworthy, moreover, that a later case,
Offshore
Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.
S. 207 (1986), described the
Executive Jet
"relationship" requirement not with reference to the cause of the
injury, but with reference to the activity that was being engaged
in when the injury occurred:
"[A]dmiralty jurisdiction is appropriately invoked here under
traditional principles, because the accident occurred on the high
seas and in furtherance of an activity [transporting workers to a
drilling platform at sea] bearing a significant relationship to a
traditional maritime activity."
477 U.S. at
477 U. S.
218-219. I would
Page 497 U. S. 374
hold that a wrong which occurs (1) in navigable waters, (2) on a
vessel, (3) while that vessel is engaged in a traditional maritime
activity, bears a significant relationship to a traditional
maritime activity. A vessel engages in traditional maritime
activity for these purposes when it navigates, as in
Foremost, when it lies in dock, as in the present case,
and when it does anything else (
e.g., dropping anchor)
that vessels normally do in navigable waters. It would be more
straightforward to jettison the "traditional maritime activity"
analysis entirely, and to return (for vessels) to the simple
locality test -- which in that context, as we observed in
Executive Jet, "worked quite satisfactorily,"
Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 254.
But that would eliminate what
Foremost evidently sought to
achieve -- the elegance of a general test applicable to all torts.
That test will produce sensible results if interpreted in the
manner I have suggested.
This approach might leave within admiralty jurisdiction a few
unusual actions such as defamation for "a libel published and
circulated exclusively on shipboard," Hough, 37 Harv.L.Rev., at
531, [
Footnote 2/5] but there seems
to me little difference in principle between bringing such an issue
to the federal courts and bringing a slip-and-fall case. In any
event, exotic actions appear more frequently in the theoretical
musings of the "thoroughbred admiralty men,"
ibid., than
in the federal reports. The time expended on such rare freakish
cases will be saved many
Page 497 U. S. 375
times over by a clear jurisdictional rule that makes it
unnecessary to decide, in hundreds of other cases, what particular
activities aboard a vessel are "traditionally maritime" in nature,
and what effect a particular tort will have on maritime commerce.
The latter tests produce the sort of vague boundary that is to be
avoided in the area of subject matter jurisdiction wherever
possible.
"The boundary between judicial power and nullity should . . . ,
if possible, be a bright line, so that very little thought is
required to enable judges to keep inside it. If, on the contrary,
that boundary is vague and obscure, raising 'questions of penumbra,
of shadowy marches,' two bad consequences will ensue similar to
those on the traffic artery. Sometimes judges will be misled into
trying lengthy cases and laboriously reaching decisions which do
not bind anybody. At other times, judges will be so fearful of
exceeding the uncertain limits of their powers that they will
cautiously throw out disputes which they really have capacity to
settle, and thus justice which badly needs to be done will be
completely denied. Furthermore, an enormous amount of expensive
legal ability will be used up on jurisdictional issues when it
could be much better spent upon elucidating the merits of cases. In
short, a trial judge ought to be able to tell easily and fast what
belongs in his court and what has no business there."
Z. Chafee, The Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, Some Problems of
Equity 312 (1950) (quoting
Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403,
240 U. S. 426
(1916) (Holmes, J., concurring)).
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Like the Court, because I conclude that the claims sought to be
pursued against petitioner are maritime in nature, I do not reach
the question whether, if jurisdiction did not exist on that basis,
there would exist an independent basis for jurisdiction under the
provisions of the Limited Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 181
et
seq. (1982 ed.).
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Court describes this point as a "demand for tidy rules."
Ante at
497 U. S. 364,
n. 2. I think it is rather an aversion to chaos -- of the sort
represented by the conflicting lower court decisions that the Court
painstakingly describes,
ante at
497 U. S.
365-366, n. 4, but makes no effort to alleviate. The
Court's statement that
"the formula initially suggested by
Executive Jet and
more fully refined in
Foremost and in this case provides
appropriate and sufficient guidance,"
ante at
497 U. S. 366,
n. 4, is neither an accurate description of the past nor a
plausible prediction for the future.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Those music lovers are better than I who immediately recognize
Gerolstein as the fictitious European principality that is the
setting of Offenbach's once-popular operetta, La Grande-Duchesse de
Gerolstein.
[
Footnote 2/4]
As Professor Black has put it, in the field of maritime
contracts
"[t]he attempt to project some 'principle' is best left alone.
There is about as much 'principle' as there is in a list of
irregular verbs. Fortunately, the contracts involved tend to fall
into a not-too-great number of stereotypes, the proper placing of
which can be learned, like irregular verbs, and errors in grammar
thus avoided."
Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50
Colum. L.Rev. 259, 264 (1950) (footnote omitted).
[
Footnote 2/5]
It should not be thought that it will bring within admiralty
jurisdiction torts occurring in navigable waters aboard any craft
designed to carry people or cargo and to float. For a discussion of
what constitutes a "vessel,"
see generally G. Robinson,
Handbook of Admiralty Law in the United States § 8, pp. 42-50
(1939). The definition is not necessarily static.
"The modern law of England and America rule out of the admiralty
jurisdiction all vessels propelled by oars simply because they are
the smallest class and beneath the dignity of the court of
admiralty; but long within the historic period, and for at least
seven hundred years, the triremes and quadriremes of the Greek and
Roman navies were the largest and most powerful vessels
afloat."
The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S.
17,
191 U. S. 32-33
(1903).