Petitioner English, a laboratory technician at a nuclear
facility operated by respondent General Electric Company (GE),
complained to GE's management and to the Federal Government about
several perceived violations of nuclear safety standards at the
facility, including the failure of her coworkers to clean up
radioactive spills in the laboratory. Frustrated by GE's failure to
address her concerns, English on one occasion deliberately failed
to clean a work table contaminated with uranium during an earlier
shift. Instead, she outlined the contaminated areas with red tape
to make them conspicuous and, a few days later, called her
supervisor's attention to the fact that the marked-off areas still
had not been cleaned. Shortly after work was halted for inspection
and cleaning of the laboratory, GE charged English with a knowing
failure to clean up radioactive contamination, temporarily assigned
her to other work, and ultimately discharged her. She then filed a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor, alleging that GE's actions
violated § 210(a) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which
makes it unlawful for a nuclear industry employer to retaliate
against an employee for reporting safety violations. Although an
administrative law judge (ALJ) found a § 210(a) violation, the
Secretary dismissed the complaint as untimely under the 30-day
limitations period provided by § 210(b)(1). Subsequently, English
filed a diversity action seeking compensatory and punitive damages
from GE in the District Court, raising,
inter alia, a
state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
While rejecting GE's argument that the latter claim fell within a
field -- nuclear safety -- that had been completely preempted by
the Federal Government, the court nevertheless dismissed the claim
on the ground that it conflicted with three particular aspects of §
210 and was therefore preempted. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: English's state law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress is not preempted by federal law.
Pp.
496 U. S.
78-90.
(a) The claim is not barred on a field preemption theory. After
reviewing the relevant statutory provisions and legislative
history, the Court in
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n,
461 U. S. 190,
concluded that "the Federal Government has occupied the entire
field of nuclear safety concerns,"
Page 496 U. S. 73
id. at
461 U. S. 212,
and expressed the view that Congress intended that only the
"Government should regulate the radiological safety aspects
involved in the construction and operation of a nuclear plant,"
id. at
461 U. S. 205.
English's action, however, does not fall within the boundaries of
the preempted field as so defined, since the state tort law at
issue is not motivated by safety concerns,
see id. at
461 U. S. 213,
and since the claim's actual effect on the nuclear safety decisions
made by those who build and run nuclear facilities is not
sufficiently direct and substantial,
cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U. S. 238. It
is thus not surprising that there is no evidence of the necessary
"clear and manifest" intent by Congress to preempt such claims. Pp.
496 U. S.
80-86.
(b) English's claim does not conflict with particular aspects of
§ 210. First, neither the text nor the legislative history of §
210(g) -- which provides that "Subsection (a) of this section [the
prohibition on employer retaliation] shall not apply" where an
employee "deliberately causes a violation of any requirement of
this Act or the Atomic Energy Act" -- reflects a congressional
desire to preclude
all relief, including state remedies,
to a whistleblower who deliberately commits a safety violation.
Even if that were Congress' intent, the federal interest would be
served by preempting recovery by
violators of safety
standards. Here, the ALJ found that English did not deliberately
commit a violation. Second, absent some specific suggestion in the
text or legislative history, the failure of § 210 to provide
general authorization for the Secretary to award punitive damages
for § 210(a) violations does not imply a congressional intent to
bar a state action, like English's, that permits such an award.
Third, the expeditious timeframes provided for the processing of §
210 claims do not reflect a congressional decision that, in order
to encourage the reporting of safety violations and retaliatory
behavior, no whistleblower should be able to recover under any
other law after the time for filing under § 210 has expired. Since
many retaliatory incidents are a response to safety complaints made
to the Federal Government, the Government is already aware of these
safety violations even if employees do not invoke § 210's remedial
provisions. Moreover, the suggestion that employees will forgo
their § 210 options and rely solely on state remedies is simply too
speculative a basis on which to rest a preemption finding.
496 U. S.
87-90.
871 F.2d 22 (CA 1989), reversed and remanded.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 496 U. S. 74
Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the particular context of this case, we must decide whether
federal law preempts a state law cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The suit is brought by an
employee of a nuclear fuels production facility against her
employer and arises out of actions by the employer allegedly taken
in retaliation for the employee's nuclear safety complaints.
I
Petitioner Vera M. English was employed from 1972 to 1984 as a
laboratory technician at the nuclear fuels production facility
operated by respondent General Electric Company (GE) in Wilmington,
N.C. In February 1984, petitioner complained to GE's management and
to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) about several perceived
violations of nuclear safety standards at the facility,
including
Page 496 U. S. 75
the failure of her coworkers to clean up radioactive material
spills in the laboratory.
Frustrated by the company's failure to address her concerns,
petitioner on one occasion deliberately failed to clean a work
table contaminated with a uranium solution during a preceding
shift. Instead, she outlined the contaminated areas with red tape
so as to make them conspicuous. A few days later, petitioner called
her supervisor's attention to the marked-off areas, which still had
not been cleaned. As a result, work was halted while the laboratory
was inspected and cleaned.
Shortly after this episode, GE charged petitioner with a knowing
failure to clean up radioactive contamination, and temporarily
assigned her to other work. On April 30, 1984, GE's management
informed petitioner that she would be laid off unless within 90
days she successfully bid for a position in an area of the facility
where she would not be exposed to nuclear materials. On May 15,
petitioner was notified of the company's final decision affirming
the disciplinary action taken against her. Petitioner did not find
another position by July 30, and her employment was terminated.
[
Footnote 1]
In August, petitioner filed a complaint with the Secretary of
Labor charging GE with violating § 210(a) of the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, 92 Stat. 2951,
as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 5851(a), which makes it unlawful for an employer in the
nuclear industry to
"discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any
employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because the employee . . ."
"(1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence
or cause to be commenced a proceeding under this chapter or the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
Page 496 U. S. 76
amended, or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement
of any requirement imposed under this chapter or the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended;"
"(2) testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding
or;"
"(3) assisted or participated or is about to assist or
participate in any manner in such a proceeding . . . or in any
other action to carry out the purposes of this chapter or the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. [
Footnote 2]"
In her charge, petitioner alleged that GE's actions constituted
unlawful employment discrimination in retaliation for her nuclear
safety complaints to GE's management and to the NRC. An
administrative law judge (ALJ) to whom the matter was referred
found that GE had violated § 210(a) when it transferred and then
discharged petitioner. The Secretary, however, dismissed the
complaint as untimely because it had not been filed, as required by
§ 210(b)(1), within 30 days after the May 15 notice of the
company's final decision. [
Footnote
3]
Page 496 U. S. 77
In March 1987, petitioner filed a diversity action against GE in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina. Petitioner in four counts raised two claims, one for
wrongful discharge and one for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. [
Footnote 4] With
respect to the latter, petitioner alleged that she was suffering
from severe depression and emotional harm as a result of GE's
"extreme and outrageous conduct." App. 20. Petitioner alleged that,
in addition to transferring and ultimately firing her, GE (1) had
removed her from the laboratory position under guard "as if she
were a criminal,"
id. at 14; (2) had assigned her to
degrading "makework" in her substitute assignment,
ibid.;
(3) had derided her as paranoid; (4) had barred her from working in
controlled areas; (5) had placed her under constant surveillance
during working hours; (6) had isolated her from coworkers, even
during lunch periods; and (7) had conspired to charge her
fraudulently with violations of safety and criminal laws.
Id. at 14-17. Petitioner sought punitive as well as
compensatory damages.
Although the District Court concluded that petitioner had stated
a valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
under North Carolina law, it nonetheless granted GE's motion to
dismiss.
683 F.
Supp. 1006, 1017-1018 (1988). The court did not accept GE's
argument that petitioner's claim fell within the field of nuclear
safety, a field that, according to GE, had been completely
preempted by the Federal Government. The court held, however, that
petitioner's claim was preempted because it conflicted with three
particular aspects of § 210: (1) a provision that bars recovery
under the section to any employee who "deliberately causes a
violation of any requirement of [the Energy Reorganization
Page 496 U. S. 78
Act,] or of the Atomic Energy Act," § 210(g); (2) the absence of
any provision generally authorizing the Secretary to award
exemplary or punitive damages; and (3) the provisions requiring
that a whistleblower invoking the statute file an administrative
complaint within 30 days after the violation occurs, and that the
Secretary resolve the complaint within 90 days after its filing.
See § 210(b)(1) and (b)(2)(A). In the court's view,
Congress enacted this scheme to foreclose all remedies to
whistleblowers who themselves violate nuclear safety requirements,
to limit exemplary damages awards against the nuclear industry, and
to guarantee speedy resolution of allegations of nuclear safety
violations -- goals the court found incompatible with the broader
remedies petitioner sought under state tort law.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's emotional distress claim on
the basis of the District Court's reasoning. 871 F.2d 22, 23
(1989). That court concluded that Congress had intended to
foreclose nuclear whistleblowers from pursuing state tort remedies,
and stated its belief that the District Court "correctly identified
and applied the relevant federal and state law."
Ibid.
Because of an apparent conflict with a decision of the First
Circuit,
see Norris v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.,
881 F.2d 1144 (1989), we granted certiorari. 493 U.S. 1055
(1990).
II
A
The sole question for our resolution is whether the Federal
Government has preempted petitioner's state law tort claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Our cases have
established that state law is preempted under the Supremacy Clause,
U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2, in three circumstances. First, Congress
can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments preempt
state law.
See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S.
85,
463 U. S. 95-98
(1983). Preemption
Page 496 U. S. 79
fundamentally is a question of congressional intent,
see
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.
S. 293,
485 U. S. 299
(1988), and when Congress has made its intent known through
explicit statutory language, the courts' task is an easy one.
Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law
is preempted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress
intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively. Such an
intent may be inferred from a "scheme of federal regulation . . .
so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the States to supplement it," or where an Act of
Congress "touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject."
Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218,
331 U. S. 230
(1947). Although this Court has not hesitated to draw an inference
of field preemption where it is supported by the federal statutory
and regulatory schemes, it has emphasized: "[W]here . . . the field
which Congress is said to have preempted" includes areas that have
"been traditionally occupied by the States," congressional intent
to supersede state laws must be "
clear and manifest.'"
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.
S. 519, 430 U. S. 525
(1977), quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
at 331 U. S.
230.
Finally, state law is preempted to the extent that it actually
conflicts with federal law. Thus, the Court has found preemption
where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both
state and federal requirements,
see, e.g., Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.
S. 132,
373 U. S.
142-143 (1963), or where state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."
Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U. S. 52,
312 U. S. 67
(1941).
See also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.
S. 725,
451 U. S. 747
(1981). [
Footnote 5]
Page 496 U. S. 80
It is undisputed that Congress has not explicitly preempted
petitioner's state law tort action by inserting specific preemptive
language into any of its enactments governing the nuclear industry.
The District Court and apparently the Court of Appeals did not rest
their decisions on a field preemption rationale either, but rather
on what they considered an actual tension between petitioner's
cause of action and the congressional goals reflected in § 210. In
this Court, respondent seeks to defend the judgment both on the
lower courts' rationale and on the alternative ground that
petitioner's tort claim is located within a field reserved for
federal regulation -- the field of nuclear safety. Before turning
to the specific aspects of § 210 on which the lower courts based
their decisions, we address the field preemption question.
B
This is not the first case in which the Court has had occasion
to consider the extent to which Congress has preempted the field of
nuclear safety. In
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n,
461 U. S. 190
(1983), the Court carefully analyzed the congressional enactments
relating to the nuclear industry in order to decide whether a
California law that conditioned the construction of a nuclear power
plant on a state agency's approval of the plant's nuclear waste
storage and disposal facilities fell within a preempted field.
Although we need not repeat all of that analysis here, we summarize
briefly the Court's discussion of the actions Congress has taken in
the nuclear realm and the conclusions it drew from these
actions.
Until 1954, the use, control, and ownership of all nuclear
technology remained a federal monopoly. The Atomic Energy Act of
1954, 68 Stat. 919,
as amended, 42 U.S.C.
Page 496 U. S. 81
§ 2011
et seq., stemmed from Congress' belief that the
national interest would be served if the Government encouraged the
private sector to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes under
a program of federal regulation and licensing. The Act implemented
this policy decision by opening the door to private construction,
ownership, and operation of commercial nuclear power reactors under
the strict supervision of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).
See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U. S. 59,
438 U. S. 63
(1978). The AEC was given exclusive authority to license the
transfer, delivery, receipt, acquisition, possession, and use of
all nuclear materials. As was observed in
Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U. S. 519,
435 U. S. 550
(1978), "[t]he [Federal Government's] prime area of concern in the
licensing context . . . [was] national security, public health, and
safety." With respect to these matters, no significant role was
contemplated for the States.
In 1959, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act in order to
"clarify the respective responsibilities . . . of the States and
the [Federal Government] with respect to the regulation of
byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials,"
42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(1), and generally to increase the States'
role. The 1959 amendments authorized the NRC, by agreements with
state governors, to discontinue the Federal Government's regulatory
authority over certain nuclear materials under specified
conditions. State regulatory programs adopted under the amendment
were required to be "coordinated and compatible" with those of the
NRC. § 2021(g).
In 1974, Congress passed the Energy Reorganization Act, 88 Stat.
1233, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801
et seq., which abolished the AEC
and transferred its regulatory and licensing authority to the NRC.
§ 5841(f). The 1974 Act also expanded the number and range of
safety responsibilities under the NRC's charge. As was observed in
Pacific Gas, the
Page 496 U. S. 82
NRC does not purport to exercise its authority based upon
economic considerations, but rather is concerned primarily with
public health and safety.
See 461 U.S. at
461 U. S. 207.
Finally, in 1978, Congress amended both the Atomic Energy Act and
the Energy Reorganization Act. Pub.L. No. 95-601, 92 Stat. 2947.
Among these amendments is § 210, 42 U.S.C. § 5851, which, as
discussed above, encourages employees to report safety violations
and provides a mechanism for protecting them against retaliation
for doing so.
After reviewing the relevant statutory provisions and
legislative history, the Court in
Pacific Gas concluded
that "the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of
nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded
to the States." 461 U.S. at
461 U. S. 212.
Although we ultimately determined that the California statute at
issue there did not fall within the preempted field, we made clear
our view that Congress intended that only "the Federal Government
should regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the
construction and operation of a nuclear plant."
Id. at
461 U. S. 205.
In the present dispute, respondent and petitioner disagree as to
whether petitioner's tort action falls within the boundaries of the
preempted field referred to in
Pacific Gas.
Respondent maintains that the preempted field of "nuclear
safety" is a large one, and that § 210 is an integral part of it.
Specifically, respondent contends that, because the Federal
Government is better able to promote nuclear safety if
whistleblowers pursue the federal remedy, the whole area marked off
by § 210 should be considered part of the preempted field
identified in
Pacific Gas. Accordingly, respondent argues
that all state law remedies for conduct that is covered by § 210
are preempted by Congress' decision to have the Federal Government
exclusively regulate the field of nuclear safety.
Petitioner and the United States as
amicus curiae, on
their part, contend that petitioner's claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress is not preempted because the
Page 496 U. S. 83
Court made clear in
Pacific Gas that state laws
supported by nonsafety rationales do not lie within the preempted
field. They argue that, since the state tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress is supported by a nonsafety
rationale -- namely, the State's "substantial interest in
protecting its citizens from the kind of abuse of which
[petitioner] complain[s],"
see Farmer v. Carpenters,
430 U. S. 290,
430 U. S. 302
(1977) -- petitioner's cause of action must be allowed to go
forward.
We think both arguments are somewhat wide of the mark. With
respect to respondent's contention, we find no "clear and manifest"
intent on the part of Congress, in enacting § 210, to preempt all
state tort laws that
traditionally have been available to
those persons who, like petitioner, allege outrageous conduct at
the hands of an employer. Indeed, acceptance of respondent's
argument would require us to conclude that Congress has displaced
not only state tort law, which is at issue in this case, but also
state
criminal law, to the extent that such criminal law
is applied to retaliatory conduct occurring at the site of a
nuclear employer. For example, if an employer were to retaliate
against a nuclear whistleblower by hiring thugs to assault the
employee on the job (conduct literally covered by § 210),
respondent's position would imply that the state criminal law
prohibiting such conduct is within the preempted field. We simply
cannot believe that Congress intended that result. Instead, we
think the District. Court was essentially correct in observing
that, while § 210 obviously bears some relation to the field of
nuclear safety, its "paramount" purpose was the protection of
employees. [
Footnote 6]
See 683 F.Supp., at 1013. Accordingly, we see no basis for
respondent's contention that all state law claims arising from
conduct covered by the section are necessarily included in the
preempted field.
Page 496 U. S. 84
Nor, however, can we accept petitioner's position, or the
reading of
Pacific Gas on which it is based. It is true
that the holding in that case was premised, in part, on the
conclusion that the California ban on nuclear construction was not
motivated by safety concerns. Indeed, the majority of the Court
suggested that a "state moratorium on nuclear construction grounded
in safety concerns falls squarely within the prohibited field." 461
U.S. at
461 U. S. 213.
In other words, the Court defined the preempted field, in part, by
reference to the motivation behind the state law. This approach to
defining the field had some support in the text of the 1959
amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, which provided, among other
things, that
"[n]othing in this section shall be construed to affect the
authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities
for purposes other than protection against radiation
hazards."
42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (emphasis added). But the Court did not
suggest that a finding of safety motivation was
necessary
to place a state law within the preempted field. On the contrary,
it took great pains to make clear that state regulation of matters
directly affecting the radiological safety of nuclear plant
construction and operation, "even if enacted out of nonsafety
concerns, would nevertheless [infringe upon] the NRC's exclusive
authority." 461 U.S. at
461 U. S. 212.
Thus, even as the Court suggested that part of the preempted field
is defined by reference to the purpose of the state law in
question, it made clear that another part of the field is defined
by the state law's actual effect on nuclear safety.
Because it is clear that the state tort law at issue here is not
motivated by safety concerns, the former portion of the field
argument is not relevant. [
Footnote
7] The real issue, then, is
Page 496 U. S. 85
whether petitioner's tort claim is so related to the
"radiological safety aspects involved in the . . . operation of a
nuclear [facility],"
see id. at
461 U. S. 205,
that it falls within the preempted field. In addressing this issue,
we must bear in mind that not every state law that in some remote
way may affect the nuclear safety decisions made by those who build
and run nuclear facilities can be said to fall within the preempted
field. We have no doubt, for instance, that the application of
state minimum wage and child labor laws to employees at nuclear
facilities would not be preempted, even though these laws could be
said to affect tangentially some of the resource allocation
decisions that might have a bearing on radiological safety.
Instead, for a state law to fall within the preempted zone, it must
have some direct and substantial effect on the decisions made by
those who build or operate nuclear facilities concerning
radiological safety levels. We recognize that the claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress at issue here may have
some effect on these decisions, because liability for claims like
petitioner's will attach additional consequences to retaliatory
conduct by employers. As employers find retaliation more costly,
they will be forced to deal with complaints by whistleblowers by
other means, including altering radiological safety policies.
Nevertheless, we believe that this effect is neither direct nor
substantial enough to place petitioner's claim in the preempted
field.
This result is strongly suggested by the decision in
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.
S. 238 (1984). The Court there held that a claim for
punitive damages in a state tort action arising out of the escape
of plutonium from a federally licensed nuclear facility did not
fall within the preempted field discussed in
Pacific Gas.
The Court reached this result notwithstanding
"the tension between the conclusion
Page 496 U. S. 86
that [radiological] safety regulation is the exclusive concern
of the federal law and the conclusion that a State may nevertheless
award damages [including punitive damages] based on its own law of
liability"
governing unsafe working conditions. 464 U.S. at
464 U. S. 256.
Although the decision in
Silkwood was based in substantial
part on legislative history suggesting that Congress did not intend
to include in the preempted field state tort remedies for
radiation-based injuries,
see 464 U.S. at
464 U. S.
251-256, we think it would be odd, if not irrational, to
conclude that Congress intended to include tort actions stemming
from retaliation against whistleblowers in the preempted field, but
intended not to include tort actions stemming from radiation damage
suffered as a result of actual safety violations. Potential
liability for the kind of claim at issue in
Silkwood will
affect radiological safety decisions more directly than will
potential liability under the kind of claim petitioner raises,
because the tort claim in
Silkwood attaches additional
consequences to safety violations themselves, rather than to
employer conduct that merely arises from allegations of safety
violations. Moreover, and related, the prospect of compensatory and
punitive damages for radiation-based injuries will undoubtedly
affect nuclear employers' primary decisions about radiological
safety in the construction and operation of nuclear power
facilities far more substantially than will liability under the
kind of claim petitioner asserts. It is thus not surprising that we
find no evidence of a "clear and manifest" intent on the part of
Congress to preempt tort claims like petitioner's.
Cf. Goodyear
Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U. S. 174,
486 U. S. 186
(1988) (increased workers' compensation award for injury caused by
a safety violation at a government-owned nuclear facility is
"incidental regulatory pressure" that Congress finds acceptable).
Accordingly, we conclude that petitioner's claim does not lie
within the preempted field of nuclear safety. [
Footnote 8]
Page 496 U. S. 87
C
We now turn to the question whether, as the lower courts
concluded, petitioner's claim conflicts with particular aspects of
§ 210. On its face, the section does no more than grant a federal
administrative remedy to employees in one industry against one type
of employer discrimination -- retaliation for whistleblowing.
Ordinarily, the mere existence of a federal regulatory or
enforcement scheme, even one as detailed as § 210, does not by
itself imply preemption of state remedies. The Court has
observed:
"Undoubtedly, every subject that merits congressional
legislation is, by definition, a subject of national concern. That
cannot mean, however, that every federal statute ousts all related
state law. . . . Instead, we must look for special features
warranting preemption."
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,
Inc., 471 U. S. 707,
471 U. S. 719
(1985). Here, the District Court identified three "special
features" of § 210 that it believed were incompatible with
petitioner's claim.
The District Court relied first on § 210(g), which provides that
"Subsection (a) of this section [the prohibition on employer
retaliation] shall not apply" where an employee "deliberately
causes a violation of any requirement of this Act or of the Atomic
Energy Act." According to the District Court and respondent, this
section reflects a congressional desire to preclude all relief,
including state remedies, to a whistleblower who deliberately
commits a safety violation referred
Page 496 U. S. 88
to in § 210(g). Permitting any state law claim based on
whistleblowing retaliation, the court reasoned, would frustrate
this congressional objective. We do not agree. As an initial
matter, we note that the text of § 210(g) specifically limits its
applicability to the remedy provided by § 210(a), and does not
suggest that it bars state law tort actions. Nor does the
legislative history of § 210 reveal a clear congressional purpose
to supplant state law causes of action that might afford broader
relief. Indeed, the only explanation for any of the statute's
remedial limitations is the Committee Report's statement that
employees who deliberately violate nuclear safety requirements
would be denied protection under § 210(g) "[i]n order to avoid
abuse of the protection afforded
under this section."
S.Rep. No. 95-848, p. 30 (1978) (emphasis added), U.S.Code Cong.
& Admin.News 1978, pp. 7303-04.
In any event, even if the District Court and respondent are
correct in concluding that Congress wanted those who deliberately
commit nuclear safety violations, as defined under § 210(g), to be
denied all remedies against employer retaliation, this federal
interest would be served by preempting state law only to the extent
that it afforded recovery
to such violators. See Norris v.
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1150 (CA1
1989). In the instant case, the ALJ found that petitioner had not
deliberately committed a safety violation within the meaning of §
210(g), App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a, and neither the Secretary nor
the lower courts have suggested otherwise. Thus, barring
petitioner's tort action would not even serve the federal interest
the lower courts and respondent have gleaned from their reading of
this section.
The District Court also relied on the absence in § 210 of
general authorization for the Secretary to award exemplary damages
against employers who engage in retaliatory conduct. The District
Court concluded, and respondent now argues, that this absence
implies a congressional intent to bar a state action, like
petitioner's, that permits such an award.
Page 496 U. S. 89
As the District Court put it, § 210 reflects
"an informed judgment [by Congress] that in no circumstances
should a nuclear whistler blower receive punitive damages when
fired or discriminated against because of his or her safety
complaints."
683 F.Supp., at 1014. We believe the District Court and
respondent have read too much into Congress' decision not to
authorize exemplary damages for most § 210 violations. First, even
with respect to actions brought under § 210, the District Court was
incorrect in stating that "in no circumstances" will a nuclear
whistleblower receive punitive damages; § 210(d) authorizes a
district court to award exemplary damages in enforcement
proceedings brought by the Secretary. Moreover, and more
importantly, we think the District Court failed to follow this
Court's teaching that "[o]rdinariiy, state causes of action are not
preempted solely because they impose liability over and above that
authorized by federal law."
California v. ARC America
Corp., 490 U. S. 93,
490 U. S. 105
(1989). Absent some specific suggestion in the text or legislative
history of § 210, which we are unable to find, we cannot conclude
that Congress intended to preempt all state actions that permit the
recovery of exemplary damages.
Finally, we address the District Court's holding that the
expeditious timeframes provided by Congress for the processing of §
210 claims reflect a congressional decision that no whistleblower
should be able to recover under any other law after the time for
filing under § 210 has expired. The District Court reasoned, and
respondent agrees, that if a state law remedy is available after
the time for filing a § 210 complaint has run, a whistleblower will
have less incentive to bring a § 210 complaint. As a result, the
argument runs, federal regulatory agencies will remain unaware of
some safety violations and retaliatory behavior, and will thus be
unable to ensure radiological safety at nuclear facilities. We
cannot deny that there is some force to this argument, but we
Page 496 U. S. 90
do not believe that the problem is as great as respondent
suggests.
First, many if not most retaliatory incidents come about as a
response to safety complaints that employees register with federal
regulatory agencies. The Federal Government thus is already aware
of these safety violations, whether or not the employee invokes the
remedial provisions of § 210. Also, we are not so sure as
respondent seems to be that employees will forgo their § 210
options and rely solely on state remedies for retaliation. Such a
prospect is simply too speculative a basis on which to rest a
finding of preemption. The Court has observed repeatedly that
preemption is ordinarily not to be implied absent an "actual
conflict."
See, e.g. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.
S. 501,
225 U. S. 533
(1912). The "teaching of this Court's decisions . . . enjoin[s]
seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where
none clearly exists."
Nuron Cement Co. v. Detroit,
362 U. S. 440,
362 U. S. 446
(1960).
III
We conclude that petitioner's claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress does not fall within the preempted field of
nuclear safety as that field has been defined in prior cases. Nor
does it conflict with any particular aspect of § 210. The contrary
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Although, technically, petitioner was placed on a layoff status
on July 30, and retained certain benefits and recall rights at that
point, as a practical matter she no longer was employed by GE after
that date.
[
Footnote 2]
If an employee believes that he has been discharged or otherwise
discriminated against in violation of the statute, he may file a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor within 30 days after the
violation occurs. § 210(b)(1). The Secretary then must investigate
the alleged violation, hold a public hearing, and, within 90 days
of receiving the complaint, issue an order that either provides or
denies relief. § 210(b)(2)(A). If a violation is found, the
Secretary may order reinstatement with back pay, award compensatory
damages, and require the violator to pay the employee's costs and
attorney's fees. § 210(b)(2)(B). Any person adversely affected by
an order of the Secretary may obtain judicial review in the
appropriate United States Court of Appeals, and either the
Secretary or the complainant may seek enforcement of the
Secretary's order in United States District Court. §§ 210(c) to
(e).
[
Footnote 3]
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed that decision but remanded the case for consideration of
petitioner's separate claim that she was subjected to a continuing
course of retaliatory harassment after the May 15 disciplinary
decision.
English v. Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957 (1988). Upon
remand, the ALJ concluded that that claim, also, should be
dismissed as time-barred. The ALJ's recommended decision on this
issue is still pending before the Secretary.
[
Footnote 4]
The District Court ruled that petitioner had not made out a
claim under state law for wrongful discharge. Because petitioner
has not appealed that ruling, the wrongful discharge claim is not
now before us.
[
Footnote 5]
By referring to these three categories, we should not be taken
to mean that they are rigidly distinct. Indeed, field preemption
may be understood as a species of conflict preemption: a state law
that falls within a preempted field conflicts with Congress' intent
(either express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation.
Nevertheless, because we previously have adverted to the
three-category framework, we invoke and apply it here.
[
Footnote 6]
In this regard, we note that the enforcement and implementation
of § 210 was entrusted by Congress not to the NRC -- the body
primarily responsible for nuclear safety regulation -- but to the
Department of Labor.
[
Footnote 7]
Two Justices thought that, since the California statute at issue
in
Pacific Gas was not motivated by safety concerns, there
was no reason for the majority to discuss this portion of the field
argument there either.
See 461 U.S. at
461 U. S.
223-224. Whether the suggestion of the majority in
Pacific Gas that legislative purpose is relevant to the
definition of the preempted field is part of the holding of that
case is not an issue before us today because, as discussed above,
even if safety motivation is relevant, petitioner's broad
suggestion that safety motivation is necessary to a finding that a
particular state law falls within the occupied field lacks
merit.
[
Footnote 8]
Respondent relies,
see Brief for Respondent 45-49, on
decisions construing the preemptive effect of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151
et seq., to argue
that petitioner's claim falls within the preempted field. We regard
this reliance as misplaced. To begin with, the NLRA, unlike
statutes governing the nuclear employment field, comprehensively
deals with labor-management relations from the inception of
organizational activity through the negotiation of a collective
bargaining agreement. Moreover, special factors support the
conclusion that preemption of state labor relations law is
warranted -- specifically, Congress' perception that the NLRA was
needed because state legislatures and courts were unable to provide
an informed and coherent labor policy.
See Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274,
403 U. S. 286
(1971).