The Clean Air Act was amended in 1970 to deal with a perceived
national air pollution emergency. The amendments required that the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
promulgate national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) within 30
days, and that each State thereafter submit a state implementation
plan (SIP) within nine months. Section 110(a)(2) of the Act
required the Administrator to approve a SIP within four months of
its submission if the SIP met various substantive requirements.
Section 110(a)(3) authorizes a State to propose a SIP revision, and
requires the Administrator to approve that revision if he
determines, among other things, that it "meets the requirements of
[§ 110(a)(2)]." In 1980, EPA approved Massachusetts' proposed SIP
governing certain emissions from automobile painting operations.
The SIP permitted petitioner General Motors Corporation (GMC) --
whose automobile plant's painting operation is a source of ozone --
to meet emissions limits in stages, but required full compliance by
December 31, 1985. In June, 1985, GMC sought an extension of that
deadline until summer, 1987. Massachusetts approved the revision
and submitted it to EPA on the day before the existing SIP's
deadline, but EPA did not reject it until September, 1988. In the
meantime, EPA sent GMC a notice of violation of the existing SIP
and filed an enforcement action in the District Court. In May,
1988, the District Court entered summary judgment for GMC, holding
that § 110(a)(3) imposed a 4-month time limit on EPA review of a
SIP revision, and that EPA was therefore barred from enforcing the
existing SIP from the end of the 4-month period until it finally
acted on the revision. Although agreeing that the Act imposed a
4-month deadline, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that
the failure to meet that deadline did not preclude EPA from
enforcing the existing SIP.
Held:
1. EPA is not required to act on a proposed SIP revision within
four months. Since § 110(a)(2)'s 4-month requirement was enacted as
one of a series of deadlines designed to assure quick
implementation of pollution control requirements, that section
refers only to the action required on the original SIP, and not to
a revision. Moreover, in the absence of an express requirement that
the Administrator process a proposed revision within four months,
this Court is not free to read such a
Page 496 U. S. 531
limitation into § 110(a)(3). That section incorporates only the
substantive, but not the procedural, requirements of § 110(a)(2).
Nor does § 110(g) -- which authorizes a State Governor, in certain
circumstances, temporarily to suspend a SIP for which the State has
submitted a proposed revision when the Administrator has not taken
action "within the required four-month period" -- impose a 4-month
limitation on EPA. That section does not
require the
Administrator to do anything, and its incorporation of the mistaken
presupposition that some "four-month period" is "required"
does not impose a general requirement on EPA. Pp.
496 U. S.
536-539.
2. Although subject to the Administrative Procedure Act's
requirement that agencies conclude matters "within a reasonable
time," EPA is not barred from bringing suit to enforce an existing
SIP if it unreasonably delays action on a proposed revision. This
Court will not infer an enforcement bar in the absence of a
specific provision in the Clean Air Act suggesting that Congress
intended to create one. In fact, that Act plainly states that EPA
may bring an enforcement action whenever a person is in violation
of any "applicable implementation plan" requirement, § 113(b)(2),
and there is little doubt that the existing SIP remains the
"applicable implementation plan" even after the State has submitted
a proposed revision.
See, e.g., Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 421 U. S. 60,
421 U. S. 92. It
is significant that Congress explicitly enacted an enforcement bar
elsewhere in the Act,
see § 113(d)(10), but failed to do
so in the section at issue, and that it provided other, less
drastic, remedies when EPA delays action on a SIP revision,
see §§ 304(a)(2), 113(b). Pp.
496 U. S.
539-542.
876 F.2d 1060, affirmed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 496 U. S. 532
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns a Clean Air Act enforcement action by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) against petitioner General
Motors Corporation (GMC). We are asked to decide whether the
4-month time limit on EPA review of an original state
implementation plan (SIP) also applies to its review of a SIP
revision, and whether, if EPA fails to complete its review of a SIP
revision in a timely manner, EPA is prevented from enforcing an
existing SIP.
I
What is known as the Clean Air Act, 77 Stat. 392, became law on
December 17, 1963. Twenty years ago, Congress enacted the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1676, a comprehensive national program
that made the States and the Federal Government partners in the
struggle against air pollution. The threats to human health were
regarded as urgent, and the 1970 Amendments were designed to result
in the expeditious establishment of programs to deal with the
problem. The amendments specified a detailed timetable for
Page 496 U. S. 533
federal and state action to accomplish this objective. They
required the EPA Administrator, within 30 days of the passage of
the amendments, to promulgate national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS). § 109(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1) (1982 ed.).
Within nine months thereafter, each State was to submit a SIP to
implement, maintain, and enforce the NAAQS. § 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a)(1) (1982 ed.). As the final step in this start-up phase
of the program, EPA was to act on a proposed SIP within four
months:
"The Administrator shall, within four months after the date
required for submission of a plan under paragraph (1), approve or
disapprove such plan or any portion thereof."
§ 110(a)(2), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (1982 ed.). The
Administrator was directed to approve the SIP if he determined that
it was adopted after reasonable notice and hearing and that it met
various substantive requirements, including emissions limitations,
devices for monitoring air quality data, and enforcement
mechanisms.
The integrated timetable established by the 1970 amendments
reflected the urgency of establishing air pollution controls. But
the amendments also recognized that local needs and control
strategies could evolve over time, and that SIP's would have to
change as well. The States therefore were authorized to propose SIP
revisions, and the EPA Administrator was directed to approve any
such proposed revision
"if he determines that it meets the requirements of paragraph
(2) and has been adopted by the State after reasonable notice and
public hearings."
§ 110(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(3)(A) (1982 ed.).
The 1970 Amendments also specified certain enforcement
mechanisms. The Act empowered EPA to order compliance with an
applicable implementation plan, § 113(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (1982
ed.), and to seek injunctive relief against a source violating the
plan or an EPA order, § 113(b), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)
(1982 ed.). In addition, Congress prescribed criminal penalties for
knowing violations of
Page 496 U. S. 534
plans and orders, § 113(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1982 ed.), and
authorized citizen suits for injunctions against violators, in the
absence of Government enforcement, § 304, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
7604(1982ed.).
Congress further amended the Clean Air Act by the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977. 91 Stat. 685. It added to the Act the concept
of a "nonattainment area" -- an area where air quality falls short
of the NAAQS. § 171(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2) (1982 ed.). The
deadline for attainment of the primary NAAQS in a nonattainment
area was December 31, 1982. § 172(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1)
(1982 ed.). Further extensions were permitted for "photochemical
oxidants" (ozone) or carbon monoxide, but only if the State
demonstrated that attainment was not possible before 1983 "despite
the implementation of all reasonably available measures," and that
attainment would be achieved "as expeditiously as practicable, but
not later than December 31, 1987." § 172(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. §
7502(a)(2) (1982 ed.).
II
A
The entire Commonwealth of Massachusetts is a nonattainment area
for NAAQS with respect to ozone.
See 40 CFR § 81.322, p.
126 (1989). Petitioner GMC owns and operates an automobile assembly
plant in Framingham, Mass. The plant's painting operation is a
source of volatile organic compounds that contribute to ozone. In
1980, EPA approved Massachusetts' proposed nonattainment area SIP
governing volatile organic compound emissions from automobile
painting operations. The SIP permitted GMC to meet emissions limits
in stages, but required full compliance by December 31, 1985. In
1981, EPA published a policy statement suggesting that new
technology in automobile painting operations might justify deferral
of industry compliance until 1986 or 1987. 46 Fed.Reg. 51386. Three
years later, in November, 1984, GMC sought an extension from
the
Page 496 U. S. 535
December 31, 1985, compliance date imposed by the existing SIP,
not for the new technology, but rather for additional time to
install emission controls on its existing lines. App. 38. In June,
1985, GMC proposed converting to the new technology, and requested
a summer, 1987, deadline.
Id. at 41. The Commonwealth
approved the revision and submitted the proposal to EPA on December
30, 1985, one day before the existing SIP compliance deadline.
Id. at 50.
GMC began construction of a new painting facility but continued
to operate its existing plant. On August 14, 1986, EPA sent GMC a
notice of violation, informing GMC that it was in violation of the
applicable SIP.
Id. at 75. Approximately one year later,
on August 17, 1987, respondent filed an enforcement action under §
113(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1982 ed.), alleging
violations of the existing SIP's 1985 deadline. On September 4,
1988, the agency made its final decision to reject the revision. 53
Fed.Reg. 36011.
B
The District Court construed § 110(a)(3) as imposing a 4-month
time limit on EPA review of a SIP revision, App. 123-124, and
concluded that, when EPA failed to complete its review within four
months, it was barred from enforcing the existing SIP during the
interval between the end of the 4-month period and the time EPA
finally acted on the revision,
id. at 125. Because EPA had
not issued a notice of noncompliance until well after the 4-month
period had elapsed, and, at the time of the court's ruling, had yet
to make a final decision on the Commonwealth's SIP revision,
summary judgment was entered for GMC.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed that
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. 876 F.2d
1060 (1989). The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court
that the Act imposed a 4-month deadline on EPA review of a SIP
revision, but concluded that the failure
Page 496 U. S. 536
to meet that deadline did not preclude EPA from enforcing the
existing SIP.
Reasoning that an enforcement bar was too drastic a remedy for
agency delay, the court concluded that the appropriate remedies for
agency inaction were those provided by the Act itself: a suit to
compel agency action under § 304(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2)
(1982 ed.), or a request pursuant to § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)
(1982 ed.), for reduction or elimination of penalties during the
period in which unreasonable agency delay resulted in prejudice.
876 F.2d at 1067-1068. We granted certiorari because of a
disagreement among the Circuits as to whether EPA is barred from
enforcing an existing SIP if the agency fails to take action on a
proposed SIP revision within four months. [
Footnote 1] 493 U.S. 991 (1989).
III
To assure that some form of pollution control requirements were
put in place quickly, the 1970 Amendments established a series of
deadlines. One of these was the requirement that EPA act on a
proposed SIP within four months after the State submits its plan. §
110(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (1982 ed.). Specifically, the
provision requires EPA to act within "four months after the date
required for submission of a plan." This seems to us to refer only
to the action required on the original SIP. Section 110(a)(2), by
its terms, therefore does not impose such a time restraint on EPA
review of a SIP
revision.
Petitioner nevertheless claims that § 110(a)(3) requires EPA to
act on a proposed SIP revision within four months. That provision
requires the Administrator to approve
"any revision of an implementation plan . . . if he determines
that it meets the requirements of paragraph (2) [§ 110(a)(2)] and
has been adopted by the State after reasonable notice and
Page 496 U. S. 537
public hearings."
Petitioner contends that the reference to § 110(a)(2) was
intended to incorporate both the substantive and the procedural
requirements of that provision. Brief for Petitioner 13.
We are not persuaded. The Administrator is to approve the
proposed revision if he determines that "it" -- that is, the
revision -- meets the substantive requirements imposed on a SIP by
§ 110(a)(2). There is no requirement that "he" -- that is, the
Administrator -- meet the deadline of that section. Petitioner's
reading, moreover, makes nonsense of the further requirement in §
110(a)(3) that the Administrator find that the proposed revision
"has been adopted by the State after reasonable notice and public
hearings." If, as petitioner contends, § 110(a)(3) incorporates the
procedural provisions of § 110(a)(2), it surely incorporates §
110(a)(2)'s requirement that the Administrator find that the SIP
was adopted after reasonable notice and hearing. The separate
mention in § 110(a)(3) of the notice and hearing requirement
demonstrates that it does not simply incorporate every direction of
§ 110(a)(2); and since § 110(a)(3) does not separately require the
Administrator to process a proposed revision within four months, we
are not free to read that limitation into the statute.
This suffices to dispose of petitioner's contention, but if
additional support is needed, it is available. The statute
elsewhere explicitly imposes upon the Administrator deadlines of
the kind that petitioner would insert into § 110(a)(3). Indeed, the
very next provision of the Act contains just such an express time
restraint on EPA approval of a SIP revision.
See §
110(a)(3)(B) (with respect to certain SIP revisions for
fuel-burning stationary sources, "[t]he Administrator shall approve
or disapprove any revision no later than three months after its
submission"). For other examples of explicit deadlines in the Clean
Air Act,
see § 110(c)(1) (6-month deadline for imposition
of federal implementation "plan (or revision thereof)"); §
113(d)(2) (90-day deadline for review of
Page 496 U. S. 538
state-issued delayed compliance order). Since the statutory
language does not expressly impose a 4-month deadline and Congress
expressly included other deadlines in the statute, it seems likely
that Congress acted intentionally in omitting the 4-month deadline
in § 110(a)(3)(A).
See Russello v. United States,
464 U. S. 16,
464 U. S. 23
(1983) ("
[W]here Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute, but omits it in another section of the same
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion,'" quoting
United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (CA5
1972)).
Petitioner's final contention is that § 110(g) imposes a 4-month
limitation on EPA's action on a proposed SIP revision. That section
provides:
"(1) In the case of any State which has adopted and submitted to
the Administrator a proposed plan revision which the State
determines -- "
"(A) meets the requirements of this section, and"
"(B) is necessary (i) to prevent the closing for one year or
more of any source of air pollution, and (ii) to prevent
substantial increases in unemployment which would result from such
closing, and which the Administrator has not approved or
disapproved under this section
within the required four-month
period, the Governor may issue a temporary emergency
suspension of the part of the applicable implementation plan for
such State which is proposed to be revised with respect to such
source. . . ."
"(2) A temporary emergency suspension issued by a Governor under
this subsection shall remain in effect for a maximum of four
months. . . ."
(Emphasis added.) According to petitioner, § 110(g), on its own
terms, "require[s]" the Administrator to process a proposed
revision within a "four-month period." Reply Brief for Petitioner
7.
This is petitioner's strongest claim, but we are constrained to
reject it. Section 110(g) does not, by its terms,
require
Page 496 U. S. 539
the Administrator to take any action. It merely authorizes the
Governor to suspend the existing SIP if certain action has
occurred. True, it
presupposes that some "four-month
period" is "required," but the incorporation of that mistaken
presupposition does not, of itself, create a general requirement
that the Administrator process all proposed revisions within four
months. [
Footnote 2] Whatever
may be the correct interpretation of § 110(g)'s "required
four-month period," we do not think this passing mention can be
inflated into a requirement that the Administrator process each and
every proposed revision within four months.
IV
Although the 4-month deadline does not apply, EPA remains
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA's) statutory
requirements of timeliness. The APA requires agencies to conclude
matters "within a reasonable time," 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), and provides
a remedy for agency action "unreasonably delayed," 5 U.S.C. §
706(1). The Government concedes, as we think it must, that its
action on a proposed SIP revision is subject to that mandate. Brief
for United States 19-20.
Petitioner's main claim is that any delay over four months is
categorically unreasonable because it violates EPA's statutory
Page 496 U. S. 540
duty to process a revision within that period. We have rejected
that claim above, but we nevertheless must consider petitioner's
alternative contention that EPA may not bring an action to enforce
an existing SIP if it unreasonably delays in acting on the proposed
revision. Without deciding whether the delay in this case was
unreasonable, we now address this claim. Because the statute does
not reveal any congressional intent to bar enforcement of an
existing SIP if EPA delays unreasonably in acting on a proposed SIP
revision, we agree with the Court of Appeals that such an
enforcement action is not barred.
The language of the Clean Air Act plainly states that EPA may
bring an action for penalties or injunctive relief whenever a
person is in violation of any requirement of an "applicable
implementation plan." § 113(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2) (1982
ed.). There can be little or no doubt that the existing SIP remains
the "applicable implementation plan" even after the State has
submitted a proposed revision. The statute states:
"For purposes of this chapter, an applicable implementation plan
is the implementation plan, or most recent revision thereof, which
has been approved under [§ 110(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (1982 ed.),]
or promulgated under [110(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (1982 ed.),] and
which implements the requirements of this section."
§ 110(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(d) (1982 ed.). Both this Court and
the Courts of Appeals have recognized that the approved SIP is the
applicable implementation plan during the time a SIP revision
proposal is pending.
See, e.g., Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 421 U. S. 60,
421 U. S. 92
(1975);
United States v. Alcan Foil Products Division of Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 889 F.2d 1513, 1519 (CA6 1989),
cert.
pending, No. 89-1104;
United States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh
Steel Corp., 818 F.2d 1077, 1084 (CA3 1987);
Duquesne
Light Co. v. EPA, 225 U.S.App.D.C. 290, 305, 698 F.2d 456, 471
(1983). The commentators agree with this conclusion.
See
D. Currie, Air Pollution: Federal Law and Analysis § 8.07,
Page 496 U. S. 541
n. 14 (Supp.1990); 1 W. Rodgers, Environmental Law: Air and
Water § 3.39(c) (1986 and Supp.1988).
There is nothing in the statute that limits EPA's authority to
enforce the "applicable implementation plan" solely to those cases
where EPA has not unreasonably delayed action on a proposed SIP
revision. Moreover, we find it significant that Congress expressly
enacted an enforcement bar elsewhere in the statute.
See §
113(d)(10); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(10) (1982 ed.) ("During the period
of the order . . . no Federal enforcement action pursuant to this
section and no action under section 304 of this Act shall be
pursued against such owner. . . ."). The fact that Congress
explicitly enacted an enforcement bar similar to the one proposed
by petitioner in one section of the statute, but failed to do so in
the section at issue in this case, reinforces our refusal to import
such a bar here.
See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
at
464 U. S. 23.
[
Footnote 3]
We note that other statutory remedies are available when EPA
delays action on a SIP revision. [
Footnote 4] Although these statutory remedies may not
appear to be so strong a deterrent to EPA delay as would an
enforcement bar, these are the remedies that Congress has provided
in the statute. [
Footnote 5]
Cf. 476 U. S. S.
542� v. Pierce County,@
476 U. S. 253,
476 U. S. 260
(1986) ("We would be most reluctant to conclude that every failure
of an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent
agency action, especially when important public rights are at
stake. When, as here, there are less drastic remedies available for
failure to meet a statutory deadline, courts should not assume that
Congress intended the agency to lose its power to act" (footnote
omitted)). In the absence of a specific provision suggesting that
Congress intended to create an enforcement bar, we decline to infer
one.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
See, e.g., American Cyanamid Co. v. EPA, 810 F.2d 493
(CA5 1987);
Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 225 U.S.App.D.C.
290, 698 F.2d 456 (1983).
[
Footnote 2]
Even supposing, moreover, that § 110(g) does create some new
requirement, it is not at all clear that the requirement is a
general obligation on the part of the Administrator to process
every proposed revision within four months. That section says only
that the Governor may suspend the SIP if the State has submitted a
proposed revision which, among other things, "the Administrator has
not approved or disapproved under this section within the required
four-month period." The "required four-month period" simply could
impose a waiting period on the Governor; before he suspends the
existing SIP, he must give the Administrator four months to
consider the proposed revision. The Administrator is not always
obliged to process a proposed revision within four months, although
he may be constrained to act on certain proposals in that period if
he wants to prevent the Governor from exercising his prerogative
under § 110(g).
[
Footnote 3]
Our conclusion is further supported by the language of § 110(g),
42 U.S.C. § 7410(g) (1982 ed.), discussed above. Section 110(g)
grants certain authority to a State's Governor to suspend the
existing SIP after four months. As the Court of Appeals discerned,
876 F.2d 1060, 1069, n. 6 (CA1 1989), there would have been no
reason for Congress to add that section if the existing SIP
automatically became unenforceable after some period of EPA delay.
The existence of this explicit exception indicates that in all
other circumstances the existing SIP remains in effect.
[
Footnote 4]
As the Court of Appeals observed, the statutory remedies for EPA
inaction include a suit to compel agency action under § 304(a)(2),
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1982 ed.), and a request pursuant to §
113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1982 ed.), for reduction or
elimination of penalties during any period in which unreasonable
agency delay results in prejudice. 876 F.2d at 1067-1068.
[
Footnote 5]
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the State whose interests are
involved here, in a brief joined by 12 other States, asserts that
its interest is better served by preserving EPA's ability to
enforce the Act.
See Brief for Massachusetts
et
al. as
Amici Curiae 10-12.