State as well as federal courts have jurisdiction over suits
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a remedy for
violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under
color of state law. Petitioner, a former high school student, filed
a § 1983 suit in a Florida Circuit Court seeking damages and
injunctive relief against,
inter alios, the local school
board, alleging, among other things, that his federal
constitutional rights were violated when his car was searched on
school premises in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Federal Constitution, and that he was suspended
from classes without due process. The court held that it lacked
jurisdiction over the board, and dismissed the complaint against
the board with prejudice, citing
Hill v. Department of
Corrections, 513 So. 2d
129, in which the State Supreme Court ruled that Florida's
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity applied only to state court
tort actions and conferred a blanket immunity on state governmental
entities from federal civil rights actions under § 1983 in state
court. The District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding
that the availability of sovereign immunity in a § 1983 action
brought in state court is a matter of state law, and that, under
Hill, the statutory waiver of immunity did not apply.
Held: A state law "sovereign immunity" defense is not
available to a school board in a § 1983 action brought in a state
court that otherwise has jurisdiction when such defense would not
be available if the action were brought in a federal forum. Pp.
496 U. S.
361-383.
(a) Since the defendant in
Hill was a state agency
protected from suit in federal court by the Eleventh Amendment,
see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332,
440 U. S. 341,
and thus was not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983,
see
Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S.
58,
Hill's actual disposition, if not its
language and reasoning, comports with
Will, which
established that the State and arms of the State, which have
traditionally enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity, are not subject
to suit under § 1983 in either federal or state court. However, in
construing
Hill to extend absolute immunity not only to
the State and its arm
Page 496 U. S. 357
but also to municipalities, counties, and school districts who
might otherwise be subject to suit under § 1983 in federal court,
the District Court of Appeal's decision raises the concern that
that court may be evading federal law and discriminating against
federal causes of action. The adequacy of the state law ground to
support a judgment precluding litigation of the federal claim is a
federal question, which this Court reviews
de novo. See, e.g.,
James v. Kentucky, 466 U. S. 341,
466 U. S.
348-349.
496 U. S.
361-366,
(b) Under the Supremacy Clause, state courts have a concurrent
duty to enforce federal law according to their regular modes of
procedure.
See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S.
130,
93 U. S.
136-137. Such a court may not deny a federal right, when
the parties and controversy are properly before it, in the absence
of a "valid excuse."
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.
Co., 279 U. S. 377,
279 U. S.
387-389. An excuse that is inconsistent with or violates
federal law is not a valid excuse: the Supremacy Clause forbids
state courts to dissociate themselves from federal law because of
disagreement with its content or a refusal to recognize the
superior authority of its source.
See, e.g., Mondou v. New
York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U. S. 1,
223 U. S. 57. A
valid excuse may exist when a state court refuses jurisdiction
because of a neutral state rule of judicial administration,
see, e.g., Douglas, supra, unless that rule is preempted
by federal law,
see Felder v. Casey, 487 U.
S. 131. Pp.
496 U. S.
367-375.
(c) The District Court of Appeal's refusal to entertain § 1983
actions against state entities such as school boards violates the
Supremacy Clause. If that refusal amounts to the adoption of a
substantive rule of decision that state agencies are not subject to
liability under § 1983, it directly violates federal law, which
makes governmental defendants that are not arms of the State liable
for their constitutional violations under § 1983.
See, e.g.,
St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U. S. 112,
485 U. S.
121-122. Conduct by persons acting under color of state
law which is wrongful under § 1983 cannot be immunized by state
law, even though the federal cause of action is being asserted in
state court.
See, e.g., Martinez v. California,
444 U. S. 277,
444 U. S. 284,
and n. 8. If, on the other hand, the District Court of Appeal's
decision meant that § 1983 claims are excluded from the category of
tort claims that the Circuit Court could hear against a school
board, it was no less violative of federal law.
Cf. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. v. Burnette, 239 U.
S. 199,
239 U. S. 201.
The State has constituted the Circuit Court as a court of general
jurisdiction, and it entertains state common law and statutory
claims against state entities in a variety of their capacities, as
well as § 1983 actions against individual state officials. A state
policy that declines jurisdiction over one discrete category of §
1983 claims, yet permits similar state law actions against state
defendants, can be based only on the rationale that such defendants
should not be held liable for § 1983 violations. Thus, there is no
neutral or valid excuse for the refusal to hear suits like
petitioner's. Pp.
496 U. S.
375-381.
Page 496 U. S. 358
(d) There is no merit to respondent's argument that a federal
court has no power to compel a state court to entertain a claim
over which it lacks jurisdiction under state law. The fact that a
rule is denominated jurisdictional does not provide a state court
an excuse to avoid the obligation to enforce federal law if the
rule does not reflect the concerns of power over the person and
competence over the subject matter that jurisdictional rules are
designed to protect. Also meritless is respondent's contention that
sovereign immunity is not a creature of state law, but of
long-established legal principles that Congress did not intend to
abrogate in enacting § 1983. Congress did take common law
principles into account in,
e.g., excluding States and
arms of the State from the definition of "person," but individual
States may not rely on their own common law heritage to exempt from
federal liability persons that Congress subjected to liability. Pp.
496 U. S.
381-383.
537 So. 2d 706 (App.2d Dist.1989), reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev.Stat. § 1979, now
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982 ed.), creates a remedy for
violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under
color of state law. [
Footnote
1] State courts as well as federal courts have jurisdiction
over § 1983 cases. The question in
Page 496 U. S. 359
this case is whether a state law defense of "sovereign immunity"
is available to a school board otherwise subject to suit in a
Florida court even though such a defense would not be available if
the action had been brought in a federal forum.
I
Petitioner, a former high school student, filed a complaint in
the Circuit Court for Pinellas County, Florida, naming the School
Board of Pinellas County and three school officials as defendants.
He alleged that an assistant principal made an illegal search of
his car while it was parked on school premises, and that he was
wrongfully suspended from regular classes for five days. Contending
that the search and subsequent suspension violated rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and
under similar provisions of the State Constitution, he prayed for
damages and an order expunging any reference to the suspension from
the school records.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on various grounds,
including failure to exhaust state administrative remedies.
[
Footnote 2] The school board
also contended that the court was without jurisdiction to hear the
federal claims -- but not the state claims -- because the Florida
waiver of sovereign immunity statute did not extend to claims based
on § 1983. App. 13-14. The Circuit Court dismissed the complaint
with prejudice, citing a state case requiring state law challenges
to be first presented to the District Court of Appeal and the
Florida Supreme Court decision in
Hill v. Department of
Corrections,513 So. 2d 129
(1987). App. 19.
The District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of
petitioner's § 1983 claim against the
Page 496 U. S. 360
school board. [
Footnote 3]
It held that the availability of sovereign immunity in a § 1983
action brought in state court is a matter of state law, and that
Florida's statutory waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply to §
1983 cases. The court rejected the argument that whether a State
has maintained its sovereign immunity from a § 1983 suit in its
state courts is a question of federal law. It wrote:
"[W]hen a section 1983 action is brought in state court, the
sole question to be decided on the basis of
state law is
whether the state has waived its common law sovereign immunity to
the extent necessary to allow a section 1983 action in state court.
Hill holds that Florida has not so waived its sovereign
immunity. We therefore do not reach appellant's second issue in
this case,
i.e., whether, under
federal law, a
Florida school board is immune from a section 1983 law. There is no
question under Florida law that agencies of the state, including
school boards and municipalities, are the beneficiaries of
sovereign immunity."
537 So. 2d 706, 708 (1989) (emphasis in original).
The Court of Appeal acknowledged our holding in
Martinez v.
California, 444 U. S. 277
(1980), that a State cannot immunize an official from liability for
injuries compensable under federal law. It held, however, that,
under
Hill, a State's invocation of a "state common law
immunity from the use of its courts for suits against the state in
those state courts" raised "purely a question of state law." 537
So. 2d at 708. The Florida Supreme Court denied review. 545 So. 2d
1367 (1987). In view of the importance of the question decided by
the Court of Appeal, we granted certiorari. 493 U.S. 963
(1989).
Page 496 U. S. 361
II
The question in this case stems from the Florida Supreme Court's
decision in the
Hill case. In that case, the plaintiff
sought damages for common law negligence and false imprisonment and
violations of his constitutional rights under § 1983 from the
Florida Department of Corrections for the conduct of one of its
probation supervisors.
Hill argued that the Department was
a "person" under § 1983, that it was responsible for the actions of
its supervisor, and that it was subject to suit in the Circuit
Court pursuant to the Florida waiver of sovereign immunity.
Fla.Stat. § 768.28 (1989). [
Footnote 4] That statute provides that the State and its
subdivisions, including municipalities and school boards, §
768.28(2), are subject to suit in Circuit Court for tort claims "in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances," § 768.28(5). [
Footnote 5] Although the terms of the waiver
Page 496 U. S. 362
could be read narrowly to restrict liability to claims against
the State in its proprietary capacity, the Florida courts have
rejected that interpretation. [
Footnote 6] In 16 cases arising under Florida statutory
and common law, the State Supreme Court has held that the state may
be sued in
respondeat superior for the violation of
nondiscretionary duties in the exercise of governmental authority.
The Florida courts thus have entertained suits against state
agencies for the violation of nondiscretionary duties committed in
the performance of various governmental activities, including the
roadside stop and arrest of an individual driving with an expired
inspection sticker, [
Footnote
7] the negligent maintenance by city employees of a
Page 496 U. S. 363
storm sewer system, [
Footnote
8] the failure of a state caseworker to detect and prevent
child abuse, [
Footnote 9] the
negligent maintenance of county swimming pools and failure to warn
or correct known dangerous conditions, [
Footnote 10] and the failure to protect a prison
inmate from other inmates known to be dangerous. [
Footnote 11]
Hill argued
Page 496 U. S. 364
that, just as the State could be joined in an action for the
violation of established state common law or statutory duties, it
was also subject to suit for violations of its nondiscretionary
duty not to violate the Constitution.
See Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U. S. 622,
445 U. S.
649-650 (1980).
The trial court dismissed Hill's § 1983 claim but entered
judgment on the jury's verdict in his favor on the common law
claims. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal affirmed the
dismissal of the § 1983 claim and reversed the judgment on the
common law claim. It also certified to the Florida Supreme Court
the question whether Florida's statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity permitted suits against the State and its agencies under §
1983.
Department of Corrections v. Hill, 490 So. 2d 118
(1986).
The State Supreme Court answered that question in the negative.
Hill v. Department of Corrections, 513 So. 2d 129
(Fla. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988). Without
citing any of its own sovereign immunity cases, and relying solely
on analogy to the Eleventh Amendment and decisions of the courts of
other States, the State Supreme Court held that the Florida statute
conferred a blanket immunity on governmental entities from federal
civil rights actions under § 1983. 513 So.2d, at 133. It
stated:
"While Florida is at liberty to waive its immunity from section
1983 actions, it has not done so. The recovery ceilings in section
768.28 were intended to waive sovereign immunity for state tort
actions, not federal civil rights actions commenced under section
1983."
Ibid. The court thus affirmed the dismissal of the §
1983 claim, but reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment on
Page 496 U. S. 365
the common law claim and allowed the judgment for
Hill
on that claim to stand.
On its facts, the disposition of the
Hill case would
appear to be unexceptional. The defendant in
Hill was a
state agency protected from suit in a federal court by the Eleventh
Amendment.
See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.
S. 332,
440 U. S. 341
(1979) (§ 1983 does not "override the traditional sovereign
immunity of the States"). [
Footnote 12] As we held last Term in
Will v. Michigan
Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58
(1989), an entity with Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a
"person" within the meaning of § 1983. The anomaly identified by
the State Supreme Court, and by the various state courts which it
cited, [
Footnote 13] that a
State might be forced to entertain in its own courts suits from
which it was immune in federal court, is thus fully met by our
decision in
Will. Will establishes that the State and arms
of the State, which have traditionally enjoyed Eleventh Amendment
immunity, are not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal
court or state court.
The language and reasoning of the State Supreme Court, if not
its precise holding, however, went further. That further step was
completed by the District Court of Appeal in this case. As it
construed the law, Florida has extended
Page 496 U. S. 366
absolute immunity from suit not only to the State and its arms
but also to municipalities, counties, and school districts who
might otherwise be subject to suit under § 1983 in federal court.
That holding raises the concern that the state court may be evading
federal law and discriminating against federal causes of action.
The adequacy of the state law ground to support a judgment
precluding litigation of the federal claim is itself a federal
question which we review
de novo. See Johnson v.
Mississippi, 486 U. S. 578,
486 U. S. 587
(1988);
James v. Kentucky, 466 U.
S. 341,
466 U. S.
348-349 (1984);
Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.
S. 255,
457 U. S. 263
(1982);
Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.
S. 146,
378 U. S. 149
(1964);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.
S. 449,
357 U. S. 455
(1958);
Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.
S. 226,
192 U. S.
230-231 (1904); Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65
Colum.L.Rev. 943, 954-957 (1965). Whether the constitutional rights
asserted by petitioner were
"'given due recognition by the [Court of Appeal] is a question
as to which the [petitioner is] entitled to invoke our judgment,
and this [he has] done in the appropriate way. It therefore is
within our province to inquire not only whether the right was
denied in express terms, but also whether it was denied in
substance and effect, as by putting forward nonfederal grounds of
decision that were without any fair or substantial support."
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.
S. 313,
355 U. S.
318-319 (1958) (quoting
Ward v. Love County Board of
Comm'rs, 253 U. S. 17,
253 U. S. 22
(1920)). [
Footnote 14]
Page 496 U. S. 367
III
Federal law is enforceable in state courts not because Congress
has determined that federal courts would otherwise be burdened or
that state courts might provide a more convenient forum -- although
both might well be true -- but because the Constitution and laws
passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the States as laws passed
by the state legislature. The Supremacy Clause makes those laws
"the supreme Law of the Land," and charges state courts with a
coordinate responsibility to enforce that law according to their
regular modes of procedure.
"The laws of the United States are laws in the several States,
and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the
State laws are. . . . The two together form one system of
jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the State;
and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each
other, nor to be treated by each other as such, but as courts of
the same country, having jurisdiction partly different and partly
concurrent."
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130,
93 U. S.
136-137 (1876);
see Minneapolis & St. Louis R.
Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211,
241 U. S. 222
(1916) ("the governments and courts of both the Nation and the
several States [are not] strange or foreign to each other in the
broad sense of that word, but [are] all courts of a common country,
all within the orbit of their lawful authority being charged with
the duty to safeguard and enforce the right of every citizen
without reference to the
Page 496 U. S. 368
particular exercise of governmental power from which the right
may have arisen, if only the authority to enforce such right comes
generally within the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by the
government creating them"); Hart, The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 Colum.L.Rev. 489 (1954) ("The law which governs
daily living in the United States is a single system of law");
see also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.
S. 455,
493 U. S. 469
(1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring). [
Footnote 15] As Alexander Hamilton expressed the
principle in a classic passage:
"[I]n every case in which they were not expressly excluded by
the future acts of the national legislature, [state courts]
will of course take cognizance of the causes to which those
acts may give birth. This I infer from the nature of judiciary
power, and from the general genius of the system. The judiciary
power of every government looks beyond its own local or municipal
laws, and in civil cases lays hold of all subjects of litigation
between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of
dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of the
globe.
Page 496 U. S. 369
Those of Japan, not less than of New York, may furnish the
objects of legal discussion to our courts. When in addition to this
we consider the State governments and the national governments, as
they truly are, in the light of kindred systems, and as parts of
ONE WHOLE, the inference seems to be conclusive, that the State
courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising
under the laws of the Union, where it was not expressly
prohibited."
The Federalist No. 82, p. 132 (E. Bourne ed. 1947) (emphasis
added).
Three corollaries follow from the proposition that "federal" law
is part of the Law of the Land in the State:
1. A state court may not deny a federal right, when the parties
and controversy are properly before it, in the absence of "valid
excuse."
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.,
279 U. S. 377,
279 U. S.
387-388 (1929) (Holmes, J.) [
Footnote 16] "The existence
Page 496 U. S. 370
of the jurisdiction creates an implication of duty to exercise
it."
Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U. S.
1,
223 U. S. 58
(1912);
see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.
S. 386 (1947);
Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. &
M.R. Co. v. Taylor, 266 U. S. 200,
266 U. S. 208
(1924);
Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.
S. 624,
111 U. S. 637
(1884). [
Footnote 17]
Page 496 U. S. 371
2. An excuse that is inconsistent with or violates federal law
is not a valid excuse: the Supremacy Clause forbids state courts to
dissociate themselves from federal law because of disagreement with
its content or a refusal to recognize the superior authority of its
source.
"The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with
the policy of the State, and therefore that the courts of the State
are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible because it
presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When
Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the
Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all
the States, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy
is as much the policy of [the State] as if the act had emanated
from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in
the courts of the State."
Mondou, 223 U.S. at
223 U. S. 57;
see Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.
S. 698,
315 U. S.
703-704
Page 496 U. S. 372
(1942) ("By virtue of the Constitution, the courts of the
several states must remain open to such litigants on the same basis
that they are open to litigants with causes of action springing
from a different source");
McKnett v. St. Louis & San
Francisco R. Co., 292 U. S. 230,
292 U. S.
233-234 (1934);
Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co.
v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211
(1916);
cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.
S. 742,
456 U. S. 776,
n. 1 (1982) (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.) (State may not discriminate
against federal causes of action).
3. When a state court refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral
state rule regarding the administration of the courts, we must act
with utmost caution before deciding that it is obligated to
entertain the claim.
See Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v.
Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1 (1950);
Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Musgrove, 335 U.S.
900 (1949);
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.
S. 117 (1945);
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.
Co., 279 U. S. 377
(1929). The requirement that a state court of competent
jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not
necessarily include within it a requirement that the State create a
court competent to hear the case in which the federal claim is
presented. The general rule "bottomed deeply in belief in the
importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that
federal law takes the state courts as it finds them." Hart, 54
Colum.L.Rev. at 508;
see also Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U. S. 1,
456 U. S. 33
(1984) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting);
FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. at
456 U. S. 774
(opinion of Powell, J.). The States thus have great latitude to
establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts.
See Herb, supra; Bombolis, supra; Missouri v. Lewis,
101 U. S. 22,
101 U. S. 30-31
(1880). In addition, States may apply their own neutral procedural
rules to federal claims, unless those rules are preempted by
federal law.
See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.
S. 131 (1988);
James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. at
466 U. S.
348.
These principles are fundamental to a system of federalism in
which the state courts share responsibility for the application
Page 496 U. S. 373
and enforcement of federal law. In
Mondou, for example,
we held that rights under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA) "may be enforced, as of right, in the courts of the States
when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate
to the occasion." 223 U.S. at
223 U. S. 59. The
Connecticut courts had declined cognizance of FELA actions because
the policy of the federal act was "not in accord with the policy of
the State" and it was "inconvenient and confusing" to apply federal
law.
Id. at
223 U. S. 55-56.
We noted, as a matter of some significance, that Congress had not
attempted "to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts
or to control or affect their modes of procedure,"
id. at
56, and found from the fact that the state court was a court of
general jurisdiction with cognizance over wrongful death actions
that the court's jurisdiction was "appropriate to the occasion,"
id. at
223 U. S. 57.
"The existence of the jurisdiction creat[ed] an implication of duty
to exercise it,"
id. at
223 U. S. 58,
which could not be overcome by disagreement with the policy of the
federal act,
id. at
223 U. S. 57.
In
McKnett, the state court refused to exercise
jurisdiction over a FELA cause of action against a foreign
corporation for an injury suffered in another State. We held
"[w]hile Congress has not attempted to compel states to provide
courts for the enforcement of the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
the Federal Constitution prohibits state courts of general
jurisdiction from refusing to do so solely because the suit is
brought under a federal law."
292 U.S. at
292 U. S.
233-234 (citation omitted). Because the state court had
"general jurisdiction of the class of actions to which that here
brought belongs, in cases between litigants situated like those in
the case at bar,"
id. at
292 U. S. 232,
the refusal to hear the FELA action constituted discrimination
against rights arising under federal laws,
id. at
292 U. S. 234, in
violation of the Supremacy Clause.
We unanimously reaffirmed these principles in
Testa v.
Katt. We held that the Rhode Island courts could not decline
jurisdiction over treble damages claims under the federal
Page 496 U. S. 374
Emergency Price Control Act when their jurisdiction was
otherwise "adequate and appropriate under established local law."
330 U.S. at
330 U. S. 394.
The Rhode Island court had distinguished our decisions in
McKnett and
Mondou on the grounds that the
federal act was a "penal statute," which would not have been
enforceable under the Full Faith and Credit Clause if passed by
another State. We rejected that argument. We observed that the
Rhode Island court enforced the "same type of claim" arising under
state law and claims for double damages under federal law. 330 U.S.
at
330 U. S. 394.
We therefore concluded that the court had "jurisdiction adequate
and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate this
action."
Ibid. [
Footnote 18] The court could not decline to exercise this
jurisdiction to enforce federal law by labeling it "penal." The
policy of the Federal Act was to be considered "the prevailing
policy in every state" which the state court could not refuse to
enforce "
because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom
on the part of Congress in having called into play its lawful
powers.'" Id. at 330 U. S. 393
(quoting Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis,
241 U.S. at 241 U. S.
222).
On only three occasions have we found a valid excuse for a state
court's refusal to entertain a federal cause of action. Each of
them involved a neutral rule of judicial administration. In
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.
S. 377 (1929), the state statute permitted discretionary
dismissal of both federal and state claims where neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant was a resident of the forum state.
[
Footnote 19] In
Herb, the city court denied jurisdiction over a
Page 496 U. S. 375
FELA action on the grounds that the cause of action arose
outside its territorial jurisdiction. Although the state court was
not free to dismiss the federal claim "because it is a federal
one," we found no evidence that the state courts "construed the
state jurisdiction and venue laws in a discriminatory fashion." 324
U.S. at
324 U. S. 123.
Finally, in
Mayfield, we held that a state court could
apply the doctrine of
forum non conveniens to bar
adjudication of a FELA case if the State "enforces its policy
impartially so as not to involve a discrimination against
Employers' Liability Act suits." 340 U.S. at
340 U. S. 4
(citation omitted).
IV
The parties disagree as to the proper characterization of the
District Court of Appeal's decision. Petitioner argues that the
court adopted a substantive rule of decision that state agencies
are not subject to liability under § 1983. Respondent, stressing
the court's language that it had not "opened its own courts for
federal actions against the state," 537 So. 2d at 708, argues that
the case simply involves the court's refusal to take cognizance of
§ 1983 actions against state defendants. We conclude that, whether
the question is framed in preemption terms, as petitioner would
have it, or in the obligation to assume jurisdiction over a
"federal" cause of action, as respondent would have it, the Florida
court's refusal to entertain one discrete category of § 1983
claims, when the court entertains similar state law actions against
state defendants, violates the Supremacy Clause.
If the District Court of Appeal meant to hold that governmental
entities subject to § 1983 liability enjoy an immunity over and
above those already provided in § 1983, that holding directly
violates federal law. The elements of, and the defenses to, a
federal cause of action are defined by federal law.
See, e.g.,
486 U. S. Co. v.
Morgan, 486
Page 496 U. S. 376
U.S. 330,
486 U. S. 335
(1988);
Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Kuhn, 284 U. S.
44,
284 U. S. 46-47
(1931). A State may not, by statute or common law, create a cause
of action under § 1983 against an entity whom Congress has not
subjected to liability.
Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U. S. 693,
411 U. S.
698-710 (1973). Since this Court has construed the word
"person" in § 1983 to exclude States, neither a federal court nor a
state court may entertain a § 1983 action against such a defendant.
Conversely, since the Court has held that municipal corporations
and similar governmental entities are "persons,"
see Monell v.
New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.
S. 658,
436 U. S. 663
(1978);
cf. Will, 491 U.S. at
491 U. S. 69, n.
9;
Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle,
429 U. S. 274,
429 U. S.
280-281 (1977), a state court entertaining a § 1983
action must adhere to that interpretation.
"Municipal defenses -- including an assertion of sovereign
immunity -- to a federal right of action are, of course, controlled
by federal law."
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. at
445 U. S. 647,
n. 30.
"By including municipalities within the class of 'persons'
subject to liability for violation of the Federal Constitution and
laws, Congress -- the supreme sovereign on matters of federal law
-- abolished whatever vestige of the State's sovereign immunity the
municipality possessed."
Id. at
445 U. S.
647-648 (footnote omitted).
In
Martinez v. California, 444 U.
S. 277 (1980), we unanimously concluded that a
California statute that purported to immunize public entities and
public employees from any liability for parole release decisions
was preempted by § 1983 "even though the federal cause of action
[was] being asserted in the state courts."
Id. at
444 U. S. 284.
We explained:
"'Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is
wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985(3) cannot be immunized by
state law. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a
state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a
basic guarantee into an illusory promise, and the supremacy clause
of the Constitution insures that the proper construction
Page 496 U. S. 377
may be enforced.
See McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d
287, 290 (7th Cir.1968). The immunity claim raises a question of
federal law.'
Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (CA7
1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917."
Id., 444 U.S. at
444 U. S. 284,
n. 8.
In
Felder v. Casey, we followed
Martinez and
held that a Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute that effectively
shortened the statute of limitations and imposed an exhaustion
requirement on claims against public agencies and employees was
preempted insofar as it was applied to § 1983 actions. After
observing that the lower federal courts, with one exception, had
determined that notice of claim statutes were inapplicable to §
1983 actions brought in federal courts, we stated that such a
consensus also demonstrated that
"enforcement of the notice-of-claim statute in § 1983 actions
brought in state court . . . interfer[ed] with and frustrat[ed] the
substantive right Congress created."
487 U.S. at
487 U. S. 151.
We concluded,
"The decision to subject state subdivisions to liability for
violations of federal rights . . . was a choice that Congress, not
the Wisconsin Legislature, made, and it is a decision that the
State has no authority to override."
Id. at
487 U. S.
143.
While the Florida Supreme Court's actual decision in
Hill is consistent with the foregoing reasoning, the Court
of Appeal's extension of
Hill to persons subject by § 1983
to liability is flatly inconsistent with that reasoning and the
holdings in both
Martinez and
Felder. Federal law
makes governmental defendants that are not arms of the State, such
as municipalities, liable for their constitutional violations.
See St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.
S. 112,
485 U. S.
121-122 (1988);
Monell v. New York City Dept. of
Social Services, 436 U. S. 658
(1978). Florida law, as interpreted by the District Court of
Appeal, would make all such defendants absolutely immune from
liability under the federal statute. To the extent that the Florida
law of sovereign immunity reflects a substantive disagreement with
the extent to which governmental entities should be held liable for
their constitutional
Page 496 U. S. 378
violations, that disagreement cannot override the dictates of
federal law.
"Congress surely did not intend to assign to state courts and
legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of
defining and characterizing the essential elements of a federal
cause of action."
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261,
471 U. S. 269
(1985).
If, on the other hand, the District Court of Appeal meant that §
1983 claims are excluded from the category of tort claims that the
Circuit Court could hear against a school board, its holding was no
less violative of federal law.
Cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
v. Burnette, 239 U. S. 199,
239 U. S. 201
(1915). This case does not present the questions whether Congress
can require the States to create a forum with the capacity to
enforce federal statutory rights or to authorize service of process
on parties who would not otherwise be subject to the court's
jurisdiction. [
Footnote 20]
The State of Florida has constituted the Circuit Court for Pinellas
County as a court of general jurisdiction. [
Footnote 21] It exercises jurisdiction over tort
claims by private citizens against state entities (including school
boards) of the size and type of petitioner's claim here, and it can
enter judgment against them. That court also exercises jurisdiction
over § 1983 actions against individual officers, [
Footnote 22] and is fully competent to
provide the remedies the federal
Page 496 U. S. 379
statute requires.
Cf. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U. S. 229,
396 U. S. 238
(1969). Petitioner has complied with all the state law procedures
for invoking the jurisdiction of that court.
The mere facts, as argued by respondent's
amici, that
state common law and statutory law do not make unlawful the precise
conduct that § 1983 addresses and that § 1983 actions "are more
likely to be frivolous than are other suits," Brief for Washington
Legal Foundation
et al. as
Amici Curiae 17,
clearly cannot provide sufficient justification for the State's
refusal to entertain such actions. These reasons have never been
asserted by the State, and are not asserted by the school board.
More importantly, they are not the kind of neutral policy that
could be a "valid excuse" for the state court's refusal to
entertain federal actions. To the extent that the Florida rule is
based upon the judgment that parties who are otherwise subject to
the jurisdiction of the court should not be held liable for
activity that would not subject them to liability under state law,
we understand that to be only another way of saying that the court
disagrees with the content of federal law. Sovereign immunity in
Florida turns on the nature of the claim -- whether the duty
allegedly breached is discretionary -- not on the subject matter of
the dispute. There is no question that the Circuit Court, which
entertains state common law and statutory claims against state
entities in a variety of their capacities, ranging from law
enforcement to schooling to the protection of individuals using
parking lots, [
Footnote 23]
has jurisdiction over the subject of this suit. That court cannot
reject petitioner's § 1983 claim
Page 496 U. S. 380
because it has chosen, for substantive policy reasons, not to
adjudicate other claims which might also render the school board
liable. The federal law is law in the State as much as laws passed
by the state legislature. A
"state court cannot 'refuse to enforce the right arising from
the law of the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or
want of wisdom on the part of Congress in having called into play
its lawful powers.'"
Testa, 330 U.S. at
330 U. S. 393
(quoting
Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis,
241 U.S. at
241 U. S.
222).
The argument by
amici that suits predicated on federal
law are more likely to be frivolous and have less of an entitlement
to the State's limited judicial resources warrants little response.
A State may adopt neutral procedural rules to discourage frivolous
litigation of all kinds, as long as those rules are not preempted
by a valid federal law. A State may not, however, relieve
congestion in its courts by declaring a whole category of federal
claims to be frivolous. Until it has been proven that the claim has
no merit, that judgment is not up to the States to make.
Respondent has offered no neutral or valid excuse for the
Circuit Court's refusal to hear § 1983 actions against state
entities. The Circuit Court would have had jurisdiction if the
defendant were an individual officer and the action was based on §
1983. It would also have had jurisdiction over the defendant school
board if the action were based on established state common law or
statutory law. A state policy that permits actions against state
agencies for the failure of their officials to adequately police a
parking lot and for the negligence of such officers in arresting a
person on a roadside, but yet declines jurisdiction over federal
actions for constitutional violations by the same persons can be
based only on the rationale that such persons should not be held
liable for § 1983 violations in the courts of the State. That
reason, whether presented in terms of direct disagreement with
substantive federal law or simple refusal to take cognizance of
Page 496 U. S. 381
the federal cause of action, flatly violates the Supremacy
Clause.
V
Respondent offers two final arguments in support of the judgment
of the District Court of Appeal. [
Footnote 24] First, at oral argument -- but not in its
brief -- it argued that a federal court has no power to compel a
state court to entertain a claim over which the state court has no
jurisdiction as a matter of state law. Second, respondent argues
that sovereign immunity is not a creature of state law, but of
long-established legal principles which have not been set aside by
§ 1983. We find no merit in these contentions.
The fact that a rule is denominated jurisdictional does not
provide a court an excuse to avoid the obligation to enforce
federal law if the rule does not reflect the concerns of power over
the person and competence over the subject matter that
jurisdictional rules are designed to protect. It is settled that a
court of otherwise competent jurisdiction may not avoid its
parallel obligation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
entertain another State's cause of action by invocation of the term
"jurisdiction."
See First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 342 U. S. 396
(1952);
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.
S. 609,
341 U. S. 611
(1951);
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.
S. 629,
294 U. S.
642-643 (1935);
Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, Loyal Order
of Moose, 252 U. S. 411
(1920). A State cannot
"escape this constitutional obligation to enforce the rights and
duties validly created under the laws of other states by the simple
device of removing jurisdiction from courts otherwise competent.
"
Page 496 U. S. 382
Hughes, 341 U.S. at
341 U. S. 611.
[
Footnote 25] Similarly, a
State may not evade the strictures of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause by denying jurisdiction to a court otherwise competent.
See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183,
330 U. S.
188-189 (1947);
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.
Co., 279 U. S. 377
(1929);
cf. 80 U. S. Hart,
13 Wall. 646,
80 U. S.
653-654 (1872) (contract clause). As our discussion of
Testa, McKnett, and
Mondou establishes, the same
is true with respect to a state court's obligations under the
Supremacy Clause. [
Footnote
26] The force
Page 496 U. S. 383
of the Supremacy Clause is not so weak that it can be evaded by
mere mention of the word "jurisdiction." Indeed, if this argument
had merit, the State of Wisconsin could overrule our decision in
Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131
(1988), by simply amending its notice of claims statute to provide
that no state court would have jurisdiction of an action in which
the plaintiff failed to give the required notice. The Supremacy
Clause requires more than that.
Respondent's argument that Congress did not intend to abrogate
an immunity with an ancient common law heritage is the same
argument, in slightly different dress, as the argument that we have
already rejected that the States are free to redefine the federal
cause of action. Congress did take common law principles into
account in providing certain forms of absolute and qualified
immunity,
see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.
S. 308 (1975);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.
S. 232 (1974);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.
S. 547 (1967), and in excluding States and arms of the
State from the definition of person,
see Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 U. S. 58
(1989);
Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.
S. 182 (1990);
see also Quern v. Jordan,
440 U. S. 332
(1979). But as to persons that Congress subjected to liability,
individual States may not exempt such persons from federal
liability by relying on their own common law heritage. If we were
to uphold the immunity claim in this case, every State would have
the same opportunity to extend the mantle of sovereign immunity to
"persons" who would otherwise be subject to § 1983 liability.
States would then be free to nullify for their own people the
legislative decisions that Congress has made on behalf of all the
People.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
[
Footnote 2]
The defendants did not call into question the school board's
potential liability if the actions of the school officials violated
the Constitution. The school board, of course, could only be held
liable if, as a matter of state law, it had delegated final
decisionmaking authority in this area to the school principal and
assistant principal.
See St. Louis v. Praprotnik,
485 U. S. 112,
485 U. S. 123
(1988) (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.).
[
Footnote 3]
The parties did not brief, and the District Court of Appeal did
not address, petitioner's claims under the State Constitution or
against the individual defendants.
See Brief for
Petitioner 4, n. 5; Brief for Respondents 1-2.
[
Footnote 4]
The statute expanded the protections of sovereign immunity in
some respects and narrowed it in others.
See Cauley v.
Jacksonville, 403 So. 2d 379
(Fla.1981). Before the passage of § 768.28, the doctrine had been
cast into serious doubt. We have previously noted that Florida led
the States in the abrogation of municipal immunity:
"The seminal opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d
130 (1957), has spawned 'a minor avalanche of decisions
repudiating municipal immunity,' which, in conjunction with
legislative abrogation of sovereign immunity, has resulted in the
consequence that only a handful of States still cling to the old
common-law rule of immunity for governmental functions."
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.
S. 622,
445 U. S. 646,
n. 28 (1980) (citation omitted).
[
Footnote 5]
Florida considered common law sovereign immunity to be
"jurisdictional."
See, e.g., Schmauss v. Snoll, 245 So. 2d
112 (App. 3d Dist. 1971). Since the enactment of the statute,
several courts have held that sovereign immunity is jurisdictional,
see, e.g., Kaisner v. Kolb, 509 So. 2d 1213, 1215, n. 2
(App. 2d Dist.1987),
rev'd on other
grounds, 543 So. 2d 732
(1989);
Sebring Utilities Comm'n v. Sicher, 509 So. 2d
968, 969 (App. 2d Dist.1987);
State Dept. of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles v. Kropff, 491 So. 2d 1252, 1254, n. 1 (App. 3d
Dist.1986), but at least one court has come to the opposite
conclusion,
see Hutchins v. Mills, 363 So. 2d 818, 821
(App. 1st Dist.1978);
see also Penthouse, Inc. v. Saba,
399 So. 2d 456, 458, n. 2 (App. 2d Dist.1981) ("Discretionary acts
do not give rise to liability, because they are not tortious. By
definition, one who has discretion to act has no duty to act").
The statute makes the State liable in
respondeat
superior, and provides that no officer, employee or agent of
the State, acting in the scope of employment, may be held
personally liable in tort or be named as a defendant unless that
person "acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner
exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety or
property." Fla.Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) (1989). Counsel for petitioner
represented at oral argument that the individual defendants would
be protected by the statute from a state tort law claim based on
the actions involved in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16.
[
Footnote 6]
See, e.g, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v.
Yamuni, 529 So. 2d
258, 261 (1988) ("We recede from any suggestion in
Reddish that there has been no waiver of immunity for
activities performed only by the government and not private
persons. The only government activities for which there is no
waiver of immunity are basic policymaking decisions at the planning
level");
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River
County, 371 So. 2d
1010, 1016-1017 (1979) (citing
Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U. S. 61,
350 U. S. 64-65
(1955)).
See also Dunagan v. Seely, 533 So. 2d 867, 869
(App. 1st Dist.1988).
[
Footnote 7]
See Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732
(1989).
See also the statements in
Everton v.
Willard, 468 So. 2d
936, 938 (Fla.1985) ("We recognize that, if a special
relationship exists between an individual and a governmental
entity, there could be a duty of care owed to the individual. This
relationship is illustrated by the situation in which the police
accept the responsibility to protect a particular person who has
assisted them in the arrest or prosecution of criminal defendants
and the individual is in danger due to that assistance. In such a
case, a special duty to use reasonable care in the protection of
the individual may arise").
[
Footnote 8]
See Slemp v. North Miami, 545 So. 2d
256 (1989).
[
Footnote 9]
See Yamuni, 529 So. 2d at 261.
[
Footnote 10]
See Avallone v. Board of County
Commissioners, 493 So. 2d
1002 (1986) (negligent maintenance of swimming pool);
Department of Transportation v. Webb, 438 So. 2d 780
(1983);
Perez v. Department of
Transportation, 435 So. 2d 830
(1983);
St. Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So. 2d
1082 (1982);
A.L Lewis Elementary School v. Metropolitan
Dade County, 376 So. 2d 32 (App. 3d Dist.1979). The Florida
courts will not entertain actions against the State for defects in
the construction of a road or the decision to install or not
install traffic control devices in general not regulated by statute
and "inherent in the overall plan."
See State Department of
Transportation v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d
1071, 1077-1078 (1982);
Ingham v. State Department of
Transportation, 419 So. 2d
1081 (Fla. 1982);
see also Harrison v. Escambia County
School Bd., 434 So. 2d
316, 320 (1983) ("the statutory words
most reasonably safe
locations available' have no fixed or readily ascertainable meaning
and . . . in deciding on the location of a school bus stop, a
school board makes a policy or planning level decision").
[
Footnote 11]
See Dunagan v. Seely, 533 So. 2d 867 (App. 1st
Dist.1988);
Green v. Inman, 539 So. 2d 614 (App. 4th
Dist.1989);
Hutchinson v. Miller, 548 So. 2d 883 (App. 5th
Dist.1989);
see also State Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative
Servs. v. Whaley, 531 So. 2d 723 (App. 4th Dist.1988)
(negligent failure to take care of juvenile delinquent). The
Circuit Court also entertains actions against governmental entities
for failure to properly supervise their staffs or warn of dangerous
conditions in public parking lots and other facilities.
See
Daniele v. Board of County Comm'rs, 375 So. 2d 1 (App. 4th
Dist.1979);
State Department of Transportation v. Kennedy,
429 So. 2d 1210 (App. 2d Dist.1983) (maintenance of a sidewalk);
Pitts v. Metropolitan Dade County, 374 So. 2d 996 (App. 3d
Dist.1978) (negligence of police officers in failing to adequately
supervise a parking lot when the plaintiff is attacked by a third
party).
The sovereign immunity statute preserves immunity only from
claims based on the negligent exercise of discretionary judgment.
See, e.g., Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936
(1985);
Reddish v. Smith, 468 So. 2d
929 (1985);
Trianon Park Condominium Assn., Inc. v.
Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912
(1985). Such immunity does not extend to the violation of
constitutional duties.
See Trianon Park, 468 So.2d, at 919
("The judicial branch has no authority to interfere with the
conduct of those [legislative] functions
unless they violate a
constitutional or statutory provision") (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 12]
Prior to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in
Hill,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had
concluded that a state agency was protected from suit in federal
court under § 1983, and that the waiver of immunity statute did not
constitute a consent to suit in federal court.
See Gamble v.
Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 779 F.2d
1509 (CA11 1986).
[
Footnote 13]
See De Bleecker v. Montgomery County, 292 Md. 498, 513,
n. 4, 438 A.2d 1348, 1356, n. 4 (1982);
Kapil v. Association of
Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties, 68 Pa.
Commw. 287, 448 A.2d 717 (1982),
rev'd on other grounds,
504 Pa. 92,
470 A.2d
482 (1983);
Karchefske v. Department of Mental Health,
143 Mich.App. 1, 9-10, 371 N.W.2d 876, 881-882 (1985);
Kristensen v. Strinden, 343 N.W.2d
67 (N.D.1983);
Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Board of
Revenue, 104 N.M. 302,
720 P.2d
1243 (App.),
cert. denied, 479 U.
S. 940 (1986);
Woodbridge v. Worcester State
Hospital, 384 Mass. 38, 44-45, n. 7,
423
N.E.2d 782, 786, n. 7 (1981).
[
Footnote 14]
We reject the suggestion of respondent's
amici, see
Brief for Washington Legal Foundation
et al. as
Amici
Curiae 7, that we remand the case to the state court for
further explanation. While we have followed that course when there
was reason to believe that the state court decision rested on
unstated premises of state law,
see Employment Division, Dept.
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.
S. 660,
485 U. S.
673-674 (1988), we have long held that this Court has an
independent obligation to ascertain whether a judgment defeating
the enforcement of federal rights rests upon a valid nonfederal
ground and whether that ground finds "fair or substantial support"
in state law.
See, e.g, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U. S. 229,
396 U. S. 234
(1969);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.
S. 449,
357 U. S. 454
(1958);
Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina ex rel.
Daniel, 281 U. S. 537,
281 U. S. 540
(1930). The reasons for that rule rest on nothing less than this
Court's ultimate authority to review state court decisions in which
"any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or
claimed under the Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a);
See Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816). "To hold otherwise
would open an easy method of avoiding the jurisdiction of this
court."
Terre Haute & Indianapolis R. Co. v. Indiana ex
rel. Ketcham, 194 U. S. 579,
194 U. S. 589
(1904) (Holmes, J.).
[
Footnote 15]
See also Worcester v.
Georgia, 6 Pet. 515,
31 U. S. 571
(1832) (McLean, J.):
"It has been asserted that the federal government is foreign to
the state governments, and that it must consequently be hostile to
them. Such an opinion could not have resulted from a thorough
investigation of the great principles which lie at the foundation
of our system. The federal government is neither foreign to the
state governments nor is it hostile to them. It proceeds from the
same people, and is as much under their control as the state
governments."
"Where, by the Constitution, the power of legislation is
exclusively vested in Congress, they legislate for the people of
the Union, and their acts are as binding as are the constitutional
enactments of a state legislature on the people of the state."
Congress, of course, may oust the state courts of their
concurrent jurisdiction.
See Yellow Freight System, Inc. v.
Donnelly, 494 U. S. 820
(1990);
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.
S. 455 (1990);
Houston v.
Moore, 5 Wheat. 1,
18 U. S. 25-26
(1820).
[
Footnote 16]
See Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.
S. 255,
457 U. S. 263
(1982);
Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.
S. 146,
378 U. S. 149
(1964);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. at
357 U. S. 455;
Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226,
192 U. S.
230-231 (1904);
Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.
S. 361 (1893); Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65
Colum.L.Rev. 943, 954-957 (1965).
To understand why this is so, one need only imagine a contrary
system in which the Supremacy Clause operated as a constraint on
the activity of state court judges like that imposed on other state
actors, rather than as a rule of decision. On that hypothesis,
state courts would be subject to the ultimate superintendence of
federal courts which would vacate judgments entered in violation of
federal law, just as they might overturn unconstitutional state
legislative or executive decisions. Federal courts would exercise a
superior authority to enforce and apply the Constitution and laws
passed pursuant to it.
See Wechsler, The Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and the
Logistics of Direct Review, 34 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 1043, 1047
(1977) (describing, and rejecting, alternative view of Supremacy
Clause, as intrusion on state autonomy).
The language of the Supremacy Clause -- which directs that "the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding,"
-- and our cases confirm that state courts have the coordinate
authority and consequent responsibility to enforce the Supreme Law
of the Land. Early in our history, in support of the Court's power
of review over state courts, Justice Story anticipated that such
courts
"in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction . . . would
incidentally take cognizance of cases arising under the
constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States,"
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. at
14 U. S. 342,
and would decide federal questions even when, pleaded in
replication, they were necessary to the plaintiff's case.
Id. at
14 U. S. 340.
The adequate state ground doctrine accords respect to state courts
as decisionmakers by honoring their modes of procedure. The
structure of our system of judicial review, the requirement that a
federal question arising from a state case must first be presented
to the state courts for decision,
see, e.g., Cardinale v.
Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437
(1969);
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Duel,
324 U. S. 154,
324 U. S.
160-161 (1945);
McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 309 U. S. 430,
309 U. S. 434
(1940), and the rule that a federal district court cannot entertain
an original action alleging that a state court violated the
Constitution by giving effect to an unconstitutional state statute,
see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.
S. 413,
263 U. S.
415-416 (1923) ("If the constitutional questions stated
in the bill actually arose in the cause, it was the province and
duty of the state courts to decide them; and their decision,
whether right or wrong, was an exercise of jurisdiction. . . .
Unless and until so reversed or modified, it would be an effective
and conclusive adjudication");
see also District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462,
460 U. S. 476,
460 U. S.
483-484, n. 16 (1983), all also presuppose that state
courts presumptively have the obligation to apply federal law to a
dispute before them and may not deny a federal right in the absence
of a valid excuse.
[
Footnote 17]
Amici argue that the obligation of state courts to
enforce federal law rests, not on the Supremacy Clause, but on a
presumption about congressional intent and that Congress should be
explicit when it intends to make federal claims enforceable in
state court. Brief for Washington Legal Foundation
et al.
as
Amici Curiae 8-9, 13. The argument is strikingly
similar to the argument that we addressed in
Minneapolis &
St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.
S. 211 (1916), when we held that state courts need not
comply with the Seventh Amendment in hearing a federal statutory
claim. We rejected the argument that
"state courts [had] become courts of the United States
exercising a jurisdiction conferred by Congress, whenever the duty
was cast upon them to enforce a Federal right."
Id. at
241 U. S. 222.
We reject it again today. We stated in
Bombolis:
"It is true in the
Mondou Case it was held that, where
the general jurisdiction conferred by the state law upon a state
court embraced otherwise causes of action created by an act of
Congress, it would be a violation of duty under the Constitution
for the court to refuse to enforce the right arising from the law
of the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of
wisdom on the part of Congress in having called into play its
lawful powers. But that ruling in no sense implied that the duty
which was declared to exist on the part of the state court depended
upon the conception that for the purpose of enforcing the right the
state court was to be treated as a Federal court deriving its
authority not from the State creating it, but from the United
States. On the contrary, the principle upon which the
Mondou
Case rested, while not questioning the diverse governmental
sources from which state and national courts drew their authority,
recognized the unity of the governments, national and state, and
the common fealty of all courts, both state and national, to both
state and national constitutions, and the duty resting upon them,
when it was within the scope of their authority, to protect and
enforce rights lawfully created, without reference to the
particular government from whose exercise of lawful power the right
arose."
Id. at
241 U. S.
222-223.
See also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S.
at
483 U. S. 469-
470 (SCALIA, J., concurring).
[
Footnote 18]
We cited for this proposition the section of the Rhode Island
code authorizing the State District Court and Superior Court to
entertain actions for fines, penalties and forfeitures.
See 330 U.S. at
330 U. S. 394,
n. 13 (citing R.I.Gen.Laws ch. 631, § 4 (1938)).
[
Footnote 19]
We wrote:
"It may very well be that, if the Supreme Court of New York were
given no discretion, being otherwise competent, it would be subject
to a duty. But there is nothing in the Act of Congress that
purports to force a duty upon such Courts as against an otherwise
valid excuse.
Second Employers' Liability Cases,
223 U. S.
1,
223 U. S. 56,
223 U. S.
57."
279 U.S. at
279 U. S.
387-388, 49 S.Ct. at
50 U. S.
356-357.
[
Footnote 20]
Virtually every State has expressly or by implication opened its
courts to § 1983 actions, and there are no state court systems that
refuse to hear § 1983 cases.
See S. Steinglass, Section
1983 Litigation in State Courts 1-3, and App. E (1989) (listing
cases). We have no occasion to address in this case the contentions
of respondent's
amici, see Brief for National Association
of Counties
et al. as
Amici Curiae 16-25, Brief
for Washington Legal Foundation
et al. as
Amici
Curiae 9-15, that the States need not establish courts
competent to entertain § 1983 claims.
See Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1,
448 U. S. 3, n. 1
(1980);
Martinez v. California, 444 U.
S. 277,
444 U. S. 283,
n. 7 (1980).
[
Footnote 21]
See Fla.Stat. § 26.012(2)(a) (1989).
[
Footnote 22]
See, e.g., Lloyd v. Ellis, 520 So. 2d 59, 60 (App. 1st
Dist.1988);
Skoblow v. Ameri-Manage, Inc., 483 So. 2d 809,
812 (App. 3d Dist.1986),
aff'd on other grounds, Spooner v.
Department of Corrections, 514 So. 2d
1077 (1987);
Chapman v. State Dept. of Health and
Rehabilitative Services, 517 So. 2d 104, 105-106 (App. 3d
Dist.1987);
Arney v. Department of Natural Resources, 448
So. 2d 1041, 1045 (App. 1st Dist.1983);
Penthouse, Inc. v.
Saba, 399 So. 2d 456, 458-459 (App. 2d Dist. 1981). The
Florida courts have also considered on the merits applications for
attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, even against county school
boards.
See, e.g., Hoffmeister v. Coler, 544 So. 2d 1067
(App. 4th Dist.1989);
Franklin County School Board v.
Page, 540 So. 2d 891 (App. 1st Dist.1989).
[
Footnote 23]
See nn.
6-11
supra.
[
Footnote 24]
Respondent also argues in its brief on the merits that a Florida
school board is an arm of the State, and thus is not a person under
§ 1983. This contention was not presented in respondent's brief in
opposition to the petition for certiorari, and we decline to reach
it here.
See California Board of Equalization v. Sierra Summit,
Inc., 490 U. S. 844,
490 U. S. 846
(1989);
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.
S. 378,
489 U. S.
384-385 (1989);
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U. S. 808,
471 U. S.
815-816 (1985).
[
Footnote 25]
See Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause
of Action, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 268, 302 (1959) ("The supremacy clause .
. . forecloses state social and economic policies just as the full
faith and credit clause forecloses them when the subject is solely
within the control of a sister state"); Hill, Substance and
Procedure in State FELA Actions -- The Converse of the Erie
Problem?, 17 Ohio St.L.J. 384, 410-411, n. 159 (1956) ("Just as the
states are obliged to give effect to legal rights created by other
states, so they are obliged, even without a Congressional
directive, to give effect to legal rights created by federal law"
(citations omitted)); Brilmayer & Underhill, Congressional
Obligation to Provide a Forum for Constitutional Claims:
Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules and the Conflict of Laws, 69
Va.L.Rev. 819, 819-829 (1983).
[
Footnote 26]
As Justice Brandeis stated in
McKnett v. St. Louis & San
Francisco R. Co., 292 U. S. 230
(1934):
"The power of a State to determine the limits of the
jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the controversies
which shall be heard in them is, of course, subject to the
restrictions imposed by the Federal Constitution. The privileges
and immunities clause requires a state to accord to citizens of
other states substantially the same right of access to its courts
as it accords to its own citizens.
Corfield v. Coryell, 4
Wash.C.C. 371, 381.
Compare Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v.
Eggen, 252 U. S. 553. The full faith
and credit clause requires a state court to take jurisdiction of an
action to enforce a judgment recovered in another state, although
it might have refused to entertain a suit on the original cause of
action as obnoxious to its public policy.
Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U. S. 230;
Kenney v.
Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411,
252 U. S.
415;
Loughran v. Loughran, decided this day,
ante p.
496 U. S. 216. By
Mondou
v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U. S. 1,
an action in a Connecticut court against a domestic corporation, it
was settled that a state court whose ordinary jurisdiction as
prescribed by local laws is appropriate for the occasion may not
refuse to entertain suits under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act."
Id. at
292 U. S.
233.