Pursuant to a plea agreement, petitioner Hughey pleaded guilty
to using one unauthorized MBank credit card. Under the restitution
provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA)
which authorize federal courts to order "a defendant convicted of
an offense" to "make restitution to any victim of such offense," 18
U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. 4) -- the District Court
ordered Hughey to pay $90,431 in restitution, the total of MBank's
losses relating to his alleged theft and use of 21 cards from
various MBank cardholders. Denying Hughey's motion to reduce and
correct his sentence, the court rejected his argument that it had
exceeded its authority in ordering restitution for offenses other
than the offense of conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: A VWPA restitution award is authorized only for
the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the
offense of conviction. Pp.
495 U. S. 415-422.
(a) VWPA's plain language clearly links restitution to the
offense of conviction. Given that the ordinary meaning of
"restitution" is restoring someone to a position he occupied before
a particular event, § 3579's repeated focus on the offense of
conviction suggests strongly that restitution is intended to
compensate victims only for losses caused by the conduct underlying
the offense of conviction. The Government's view that § 3579(a)
merely identifies the victim, but that the restitution amount is
calculated in accordance with § 3580(a) -- which delineates
"[p]rocedure[s] for issuing" restitution orders -- is unconvincing.
Section 3579(b), by giving detailed substantive guidance regarding
the calculation of restitution, establishes the amount of
restitution that courts can award. In addition, to regard § 3580
rather than § 3579 as fixing the substantive boundaries of such
orders would ignore this Court's commitment to "giving effect to
the meaning and placement of the words chosen by Congress."
Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.
S. 638,
494 U. S. 645.
More significantly, because a general statutory term should be
understood in light of the specific terms that surround it, §
3580(a)'s catchall phrase -- which directs courts to consider "such
other factors as the court deems appropriate" in calculating the
amount of restitution -- should not be read to introduce into the
calculus losses that would
Page 495 U. S. 412
expand a defendant's liability beyond the offense of conviction.
That phrase is preceded by more specific considerations for
determining whether to order, and the amount of, restitution, all
of which are designed to limit, rather than to expand, the scope of
any restitution order. Pp.
495 U. S. 415-420.
(b) Any policy questions surrounding VWPA's
offense-of-conviction limitation on restitution orders need not be
resolved. Even were the statutory language ambiguous, longstanding
principles of lenity preclude the resolution of the ambiguity
against Hughey on the basis of general declarations of policy in
the statute and legislative history. Pp.
495 U. S.
420-422.
877 F.2d 1256 (CA5 1989), reversed and remanded.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and
SCALIA, JJ., joined, and in which WHITE and KENNEDY, JJ., joined
except as to Part
495 U. S.
Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The restitution provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection
Act of 1989 (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579, 3680 (1982 ed. and Supp.
IV), authorize federal courts, when sentencing defendants convicted
of certain offenses, to order, "in addition to or in lieu of any
other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make
restitution to any victim of such offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1)
(1982 ed., Supp. IV). We must decide whether these provisions allow
a court to order a defendant who is charged with multiple offenses
but who is convicted
Page 495 U. S. 413
of only one offense to make restitution for losses related to
the other alleged offenses. We hold that the language and structure
of the Act make plain Congress' intent to authorize an award of
restitution only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that
is the basis of the offense of conviction. [
Footnote 1]
I
In 1986, petitioner Frasiel L. Hughey was indicted for three
counts of theft by a United States Postal Service employee and
three counts of use of unauthorized credit cards. Petitioner
pleaded guilty to count four of the indictment in exchange for the
Government's agreement to dismiss the remaining counts and to forgo
prosecution "for any other offense arising in the Western District
of Texas as part of the scheme alleged in the indictment." App. 7.
Count four charged
"[t]hat on or about October 18, 1985, . . . [petitioner]
Page 495 U. S. 414
did knowingly and with intent to defraud use an unauthorized
[MBank Mastercard credit card] issued to Hershey Godfrey, . . . and
by such conduct did obtain things of value aggregating more than
$1,000. . . ."
Id. at 5. During the plea proceeding and as part of the
factual basis of petitioner's plea, the Government proferred
evidence that petitioner had stolen not only Godfrey's card, but
also at least fifteen other cards.
Id. at 10. Petitioner's
counsel informed the court at that time that petitioner's plea was
confined to the allegations in count four, and that petitioner did
"not mak[e] admissions to anything other than the facts pertaining
to count four."
Id. at 11.
After the plea hearing but before sentencing, the Government
notified petitioner that it would propose that he be ordered to pay
restitution of $147,646.89. The Government calculated that figure
by adding the losses of several financial institutions, including
MBank, that resulted from petitioner's alleged theft and use of
approximately 30 credit cards. Petitioner objected to the proposed
restitution order on the ground that the proposed figure was
unauthorized because it "exceed[ed] the losses of any victims of
the offense of which the Defendant was convicted."
Id. at
13. The Government then submitted a revised restitution figure of
$90,431, the total of MBank's losses relating to petitioner's
alleged theft and use of 21 cards from various MBank cardholders.
Petitioner countered that the appropriate restitution figure should
be $10,412, the losses MBank sustained as a result of all
unauthorized uses of the Godfrey credit card identified in the
count for which he was convicted.
The District Court ordered petitioner to make restitution to
MBank in the amount of $90,431.
Id. at 78. Petitioner
moved to reduce and correct his sentence under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 35, arguing that the District Court had exceeded
its authority in ordering restitution for offenses other than the
offense of conviction. The District Court denied the motion.
Id. at 82-85. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, holding that
"VWPA permits a
Page 495 U. S. 415
court to require restitution beyond that amount involved in the
offense of conviction when there is a significant connection
between the crime of conviction and similar actions justifying
restitution."
877 F.2d 1256, 1264 (1989).
The courts of appeals have reached varying conclusions regarding
a court's ability under VWPA to require an offender to pay
restitution for acts other than those underlying the offense of
conviction. [
Footnote 2] We
granted certiorari to resolve this split in authority. 493 U.S.
1018 (1990).
II
A
As in all cases involving statutory interpretation, we look
first to the language of the statute itself.
Landreth Timber
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U. S. 681,
471 U. S. 685
(1985). Title 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. IV) provides
that "a defendant
Page 495 U. S. 416
convicted of an offense" may be ordered to "make restitution to
any victim of such offense." Other subsections of § 3579 likewise
link restitution to the offense of conviction.
See §
3579(b)(1) (listing damages recoverable "in the case of an offense
resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a
victim of the offense"); § 3579(b)(2) (listing damages recoverable
"in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury to a
victim"); § 3579(b)(3) (listing damages recoverable "in the case of
an offense resulting in bodily injury [that] also results in the
death of a victim"). As the Government concedes, Brief for United
States 14, a straightforward reading of the provisions indicates
that the referent of "such offense" and "an offense" is the offense
of conviction. Given that the ordinary meaning of "restitution" is
restoring someone to a position he occupied before a particular
event,
see, e.g., Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1936 (1986); Black's Law Dictionary 1180 (5th ed.1979),
the repeated focus in § 3579 on the offense of which the defendant
was convicted suggests strongly that restitution as authorized by
the statute is intended to compensate victims only for losses
caused by the conduct underlying the offense of conviction.
The Government argues, however, that § 3579 answers only the
question of
who may receive restitution, and offers no
guidance as to
how much restitution a court may order the
defendant to pay. In the Government's view, § 3679(a) indicates
merely that, to receive restitution, a victim must be a victim of
the offense of conviction. Once such a victim is identified, the
Government maintains, the amount of restitution is calculated in
accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a) (1982 ed.), which provides:
"The court, in determining whether to order restitution under
section 3579 of this title and the amount of such restitution,
shall consider the amount of the loss sustained by any victim as a
result of the offense, the financial
Page 495 U. S. 417
resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning
ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such
other factors as the court deems appropriate."
Specifically, the Government contends that the catchall phrase
of § 3580(a), which directs courts to consider "such other factors
as the court deems appropriate," authorizes courts to include in
their restitution calculus losses resulting from offenses other
than the offense of conviction.
The Government's reading of §§ 3579 and 3580 is unconvincing. As
an initial matter, the detailed substantive guidance regarding the
calculation of restitution that is found in subsections (b)(1),
(b)(2), and (b)(3) makes clear that § 3579 [
Footnote 3]
Page 495 U. S. 418
does more than simply designate
who is entitled to
restitution under the Act; those provisions establish the
amount of restitution that courts can award for various
losses caused by the offense.
In addition, it would be anomalous to regard § 3580, which
delineates "[p]rocedure[s] for issuing order[s] of restitution,"
rather than § 3579, which governs the court's authority to issue
restitution orders, as fixing the substantive boundaries of such
orders. The Government's argument ignores this Court's commitment
to "giving effect to the meaning and placement of the words chosen
by Congress."
Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.
S. 638,
494 U. S. 645
(1990) (rejecting claim that Congress intended to limit private
right of action under Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1801
et seq., in section other
than "Enforcement Provisions" section in which Congress established
private right of action) (citation omitted).
More significantly, § 3580(a)'s catchall phrase does not reflect
a congressional intent to include in the restitution calculus
losses beyond those caused by the offense of conviction. Section
3580(a) sets forth the considerations for "determining whether to
order restitution under section 3579 of this title and the amount
of such restitution." The first such consideration is "the amount
of loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense." This
language suggests persuasively that Congress intended restitution
to be tied to the loss caused by the offense of conviction. Indeed,
had Congress intended to permit a victim to recover for losses
stemming from all conduct attributable to the defendant, including
conduct unrelated to the offense of conviction, Congress would
likely have chosen language other than "the offense," which refers
without question to the offense of conviction.
See supra
at
495 U. S.
416.
The remaining considerations preceding the catchall phrase also
are designed to limit, rather than to expand, the scope of any
order of restitution. These factors -- "the financial resources
Page 495 U. S. 419
of the defendant" and "the financial needs and earning ability
of the defendant's dependents" -- provide grounds for awarding
less than full restitution under the statute. Congress
plainly did not intend that wealthy defendants pay more in
"restitution" than otherwise warranted because they have
significant financial resources, nor did it intend a defendant's
dependents to be forced to bear the burden of a restitution
obligation because they have great "earning ability." In light of
the principle of
ejusdem generis -- that a general
statutory term should be understood in light of the specific terms
that surround it -- the catchall phrase should not be read to
introduce into the restitution calculus losses that would expand a
defendant's liability beyond the offense of conviction.
Cf.
Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.,
411 U. S. 726,
411 U. S. 734
(1973) (holding that "catchall provision" is "to be read as
bringing within a statute categories similar in type to those
specifically enumerated"). Moreover, this reading of the catchall
phrase harmonizes § 3580(a) with § 3579(a)(2), which states
that,
"[i]f the court does not order restitution, or orders only
partial restitution, under this section, the court shall state on
the record the reasons therefor."
If a court chooses to award partial or no restitution in
accordance with § 3579(a)(2), it must couch its refusal in terms of
the criteria set forth in § 3580(a). [
Footnote 4]
Page 495 U. S. 420
Section 3580(a) hence confirms, rather than undermines, our
conclusion that the loss caused by the conduct underlying the
offense of conviction establishes the outer limits of a restitution
order. We reject as implausible the Government's contention that
the "such other" language in § 3580(a)'s catchall phrase imports
into the restitution provisions a wholly new substantive dimension
not otherwise evident in the statute. Rather, the factors listed in
§ 3580(a), including the catchall factor, are intended to guide a
court's discretion when it decides whether to award full or partial
restitution under § 3579.
B
The Government endeavors to buttress its interpretation of the
statute by invoking the expansive declaration of purpose
accompanying VWPA,
see, e.g., § 2(b)(2), note following 18
U.S.C. § 1512 (one purpose of the Act is "to ensure that the
Federal Government does all that is possible within limits of
available resources to assist victims . . . without infringing on
the constitutional rights of the defendant"), and by referring to
portions of the legislative history that reflect Congress' goal of
ensuring "that Federal crime victims receive the fullest possible
restitution from criminal wrongdoers," 128 Cong.Rec. 27391 (Oct. 1,
1982) (remarks of Rep. Rodino). [
Footnote 5]
Page 495 U. S. 421
The Government also emphasizes policy considerations that
purportedly support court-ordered restitution for acts outside the
offense of conviction. Without such authority, the Government
insists, in many cases courts cannot compensate victims for the
full losses they suffered as a result of a defendant's conduct. The
potential for undercompensation is heightened by prosecutorial
discretion in charging a defendant, the argument goes, because
prosecutors often frame their indictments with a view to success at
trial, rather than to a victim's interest in full compensation.
See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 798 F.2d 402, 405 (CA10
1986). Finally, the Government maintains that the extensive
practice of plea bargaining would, as a practical matter, wholly
undermine victims' ability to recover fully for their losses,
because prosecutors often drop charges of which a defendant may be
guilty in exchange for a plea to one or more of the other charges.
See, e.g., United States v. Berrios, 869 F.2d 25, 30 (CA2
1989).
These concerns are not insignificant ones, but neither are they
unique to the issue of victim compensation. If a prosecutor chooses
to charge fewer than the maximum possible number of crimes, the
potential recovery of victims of crime is undoubtedly limited, but
so too is the potential sentence that may be imposed on a
defendant. And although a plea agreement does operate to limit the
acts for which a court may order the defendant to pay restitution,
it also
ensures that restitution will be ordered as to the
count or counts to which the defendant pleads guilty pursuant to
the agreement. The essence of a plea agreement is that both the
prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential
losses. Nothing in the statute suggests that Congress intended to
exempt victims of crime from the effects of such a bargaining
process.
Page 495 U. S. 422
C
In any event, we need not resolve the policy questions
surrounding VWPA's offense-of-conviction limitation on restitution
orders. Even were the statutory language regarding the scope of a
court's authority to order restitution ambiguous, longstanding
principles of lenity, which demand resolution of ambiguities in
criminal statutes in favor of the defendant,
Simpson v. United
States, 435 U. S. 6,
435 U. S. 14-15
(1978) (applying rule of lenity to federal statute that would
enhance penalty), preclude our resolution of the ambiguity against
petitioner on the basis of general declarations of policy in the
statute and legislative history.
See Crandon v. United
States, 494 U. S. 152,
494 U. S. 160
(1990) ("Because construction of a criminal statute must be guided
by the need for fair warning, it is rare that legislative history
or statutory policies will support a construction of a statute
broader than that clearly warranted by the text").
III
The plain language of VWPA makes clear that the District Court's
restitution order in this case was unauthorized. Petitioner pleaded
guilty only to the charge that he fraudulently used the credit card
of Hershey Godfrey. Because the restitution order encompassed
losses stemming from alleged fraudulent uses of cards issued to
persons other than Godfrey, such portions of the order are invalid.
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
** Justice WHITE and Justice KENNEDY join all but Part II-C of
this opinion.
[
Footnote 1]
The restitution provisions in effect at the time of petitioner's
sentencing were recodified, effective November 1, 1987, pursuant to
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987. Thus, 18 U.S.C. §
3579 now appears as 18 U.S.C. § 3663, and 18 U.S.C. § 3580 appears
as 18 U.S.C. § 3664. We will refer to the provisions as they were
codified at the time of petitioner's sentencing in April, 1987.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580 (1982 ed.).
Additionally, in 1986, Congress amended the language of §
3579(a), replacing "victim of the offense" with "victim of such
offense." Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of
1986, 100 Stat. 3619. The amendment -- making this sole change --
became effective on the date of its enactment,
ibid.,
which was after petitioner committed the offense but prior to his
sentencing. The parties agree that the change in language was not
intended to alter the meaning of the provision.
See
H.R.Rep. No. 99-334, p. 7 (1985). But they disagree as to which
version of the Act governs, because the House Report accompanying
the amendment arguably supports petitioner's view that VWPA does
not authorize courts to order restitution for losses beyond those
caused by the offense of conviction. We agree with the implicit
conclusion of the court below that the amended version applies to
this case,
see 877 F.2d 1256, 1258 (CA5 1989), though we
note that our construction of the statute does not turn on the
minor change in the language or on the legislative history
accompanying the amendment,
see n. 5,
infra.
[
Footnote 2]
The Fifth Circuit's decision in this case follows the decisions
of the Second and Tenth Circuits.
See United States v.
Berrios, 869 F.2d 25, 32 (CA2 1989) (permitting court to order
restitution for losses beyond those "specified in the charge on
which the defendant is convicted where the victim of that offense
also suffered other losses as a result of the defendant's related
course of conduct");
United States v. Duncan, 870 F.2d
1532, 1537 (CA10 1989) (permitting court to order restitution for
"other criminal acts that had a significant connection to the act
for which conviction was had"). The Sixth Circuit has held that a
court may require a defendant to make restitution "to victims of
the offense for which he was convicted."
United States v.
Durham, 755 F.2d 511, 512 (1985). The Eleventh Circuit has
held that
"[t]he amount of restitution [under VWPA] may not exceed the
actual losses flowing from the offense for which the defendant has
been convicted."
United States v. Barnette, 800 F.2d 1558, 1571 (1986)
(citing
United States v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 699, 701 (CA11
1983) (construing Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982
ed.))). The Ninth Circuit has ruled that,
"in cases which involve a continuing scheme to defraud, 'it is
within the power of the court to require restitution of any amount
up to the entire illicit gain from such a scheme, even if only some
specific incidents are the basis of the guilty plea.'"
United States v. Pomazi 851 F.2d 244, 250 (1988)
(quoting
United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1055 (CA7
1982)).
[
Footnote 3]
Section 3579(b) provides in part:
"The [restitution] order may require that such defendant --
"
"(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or
destruction of property of a victim of the offense -- "
"(A) return the property to the owner of the property or someone
designated by the owner; or"
"(B) if return of the property under subparagraph (A) is
impossible, impractical, or inadequate, pay an amount equal to the
greater of -- "
"(i) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss,
or destruction, or"
"(ii) the value of the property on the date of sentencing, less
the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of
the property that is returned;"
"(2) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury to a
victim -- "
"(A) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary medical and
related professional services and devices relating to physical,
psychiatric, and psychological care, including nonmedical care and
treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing
recognized by the law of the place of treatment;"
"(B) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary physical and
occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and"
"(C) reimburse the victim for income lost by such victim as a
result of such offense;"
"(3) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury [that]
also results in the death of a victim, pay an amount equal to the
cost of necessary funeral and related services. . . ."
[
Footnote 4]
Under the Government's construction of § 3580(a), a court that
did not award restitution for acts beyond the offense of conviction
would presumably be required to explain its refusal to do so under
§ 3579(a)(2). The requirement that a court explain its refusal to
award full restitution is more consistent with a scheme that
establishes a clearly discernible outer limit of restitutionary
liability than with one that permits an open-ended inquiry into
losses resulting from the "defendant's related course of conduct,"
Berrios, 869 F.2d at 32, or from "acts that had a
significant connection to the act for which conviction was had,"
Duncan, 870 F.2d at 1537. Further, the open-ended approach
to restitution advocated by the Government, taken with §
3579(a)(2)'s requirement that a court explain its refusal to award
full restitution, would in some cases undermine the statute's goal
of compensating victims. Section 3579(d) authorizes a court to
decline to award restitution altogether where
"the court determines that the complication and prolongation of
the sentencing process resulting from the fashioning of an order of
restitution . . . outweighs the need to provide restitution to any
victims."
Determining the existence of and resulting loss from offenses
other than the one supporting conviction will often be sufficiently
difficult to implicate this provision.
[
Footnote 5]
We need not decide whether further support for our reading of
the statutory provisions can be gleaned from the legislative
history of the amended version of § 3579(a).
See n. 1,
supra. We note, and the Government implicitly concedes,
that whatever light the legislative history sheds on the issue is
favorable to petitioner.
See H.R.Rep. No. 99-334, p. 7
(1985) (citing to H.R.Rep. No. 98-1017, p. 83, n. 43 (1984)) ("To
order a defendant to make restitution to a victim of an offense for
which the defendant was not convicted would be to deprive the
defendant of property without due process of law").