Following his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol,
respondent Wells gave the Florida Highway Patrol permission to open
the trunk of his impounded car. An inventory search of the car
turned up two marijuana cigarette butts in an ashtray and a locked
suitcase in the trunk. The suitcase was opened, and a considerable
amount of marijuana was discovered. After the state trial court
denied Wells' motion to suppress the marijuana on the ground that
it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, he pleaded
nolo contendere to a charge of possession of a controlled
substance, but retained his right to appeal the denial of the
motion to suppress. The intermediate appellate court held,
inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying
suppression of the marijuana found in the suitcase. The State
Supreme Court affirmed, noting the absence of any Highway Patrol
policy on the opening of closed containers found during inventory
searches, and holding that
Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U. S. 367,
requires police to mandate either that all containers be opened
during such searches or that no containers be opened, leaving no
room for discretion on the part of individual officers.
Held: Absent any Highway Patrol policy with respect to
the opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory
search, the instant search was insufficiently regulated to satisfy
the Fourth Amendment. Requiring standardized criteria or
established routine as to such openings prevents individual police
officers from having so much latitude that inventory searches are
turned into a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover
incriminating evidence. However, denying, as did
Page 495 U. S. 2
the State Supreme Court, police officers all discretion is at
odds with
Bertine. While an "all or nothing" policy is
permissible, one that allows a police officer sufficient latitude
to determine whether a particular container should be opened in
light of the nature of the search and characteristics of the
container itself does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Pp.
495 U. S. 3-5.
539 So. 2d
464, (Fla.1989), affirmed.
REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, J.,
joined,
post, p.
495 U. S. 5.
BLACKMUN, J.,
post, p.
495 U. S. 10, and
STEVENS, J.,
post, p.
495 U. S. 12,
filed opinions concurring in the judgment.
OPINION
Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
A Florida Highway Patrol trooper stopped respondent Wells for
speeding. After smelling alcohol on Wells' breath, the trooper
arrested Wells for driving under the influence. Wells then agreed
to accompany the trooper to the station to take a breathalyzer
test. The trooper informed Wells that the car would be impounded,
and obtained Wells' permission to open the trunk. At the
impoundment facility, an inventory search of the car turned up two
marijuana cigarette butts in an ashtray and a locked suitcase in
the trunk. Under the trooper's direction, employees of the facility
forced open the suitcase and discovered a garbage bag containing a
considerable amount of marijuana.
Wells was charged with possession of a controlled substance. His
motion to suppress the marijuana on the ground that it was seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution was denied by the trial court.
Page 495 U. S. 3
He thereupon pleaded
nolo contendere to the charge, but
reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.
On appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal for the Fifth
District held,
inter alia, that the trial court erred in
denying suppression of the marijuana found in the suitcase. Over a
dissent, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.
539 So. 2d
464, 469 (1989). We granted certiorari, 491 U.S. 903 (1989),
and now affirm (although we disagree with part of the reasoning of
the Supreme Court of Florida).
The Supreme Court of Florida relied on the opinions in
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U. S. 367
(1987);
id. at
479 U. S. 376
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring). Referring to language in the
Bertine concurrence and a footnote in the majority
opinion, the court held. that:
"[i]n the absence of a policy specifically requiring the opening
of closed containers found during a legitimate inventory search,
Bertine prohibits us from countenancing the procedure
followed in this instance."
539 So. 2d at 469. According to the court, the record contained
no evidence of any Highway Patrol policy on the opening of closed
containers found during inventory searches.
Ibid. The
court added, however, that:
"[t]he police under
Bertine must mandate either that
all containers will be opened during an inventory search, or that
no containers will be opened. There can be no room for
discretion."
Ibid.
While this latter statement of the Supreme Court of Florida
derived support from a sentence in the
Bertine concurrence
taken in isolation, we think it is at odds with the thrust of both
the concurrence and the opinion of the Court in that case. We said
in
Bertine:
"[n]othing in
[South Dakota v.] Opperman[, 428 U. S.
364 (1976)] or
[Illinois v.] Lafayette[,
462 U. S.
640 (1983)] prohibits the exercise of police discretion
so long as that
Page 495 U. S. 4
discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on
the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal
activity."
479 U.S. at
479 U. S. 375.
Our view that standardized criteria,
ibid., or established
routine,
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.
S. 640,
462 U. S. 648
(1983), must regulate the opening of containers found during
inventory searches is based on the principle that an inventory
search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to
discover incriminating evidence. The policy or practice governing
inventory searches should be designed to produce an inventory. The
individual police officer must not be allowed so much latitude that
inventory searches are turned into "a purposeful and general means
of discovering evidence of crime,"
Bertine, supra, 479
U.S. at
479 U. S. 376
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring).
But in forbidding uncanalized discretion to police officers
conducting inventory searches, there is no reason to insist that
they be conducted in a totally mechanical "all or nothing"
fashion.
"[I]nventory procedures serve to protect an owner's property
while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims
of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police
from danger."
Id. at
479 U. S. 372;
see also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.
S. 364,
428 U. S. 369
(1976). A police officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to
determine whether a particular container should or should not be
opened in light of the nature of the search and characteristics of
the container itself. Thus, while policies of opening all
containers or of opening no containers are unquestionably
permissible, it would be equally permissible, for example, to allow
the opening of closed containers whose contents officers determine
they are unable to ascertain from examining the containers'
exteriors. The allowance of the exercise of judgment based on
concerns related to the purposes of an inventory search does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.
In the present case, the Supreme Court of Florida found that the
Florida Highway Patrol had no policy whatever with respect to the
opening of closed containers encountered during
Page 495 U. S. 5
an inventory search. We hold that, absent such a policy, the
instant search was not sufficiently regulated to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment, and that the marijuana which was found in the suitcase
therefore was properly suppressed by the Supreme Court of Florida.
Its judgment is therefore Affirmed.
Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, concurring in
the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the judgment of the Florida Supreme
Court should be affirmed because the Florida Highway Patrol had no
policy at all with respect to opening closed containers. As the
majority recognizes,
see ante at
495 U. S. 4, the
search was therefore unconstitutional under any reading of our
cases.
See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.
S. 367,
479 U. S. 374
(1986) (opening closed container found in a vehicle during an
inventory search constitutional only because policy mandated
opening of such containers). Our cases have required that inventory
searches be "sufficiently regulated,"
ante, this page, so
as to avoid the possibility that police will abuse their power to
conduct such a search.
See South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U. S. 364,
428 U. S. 384
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[N]o significant discretion is
placed in the hands of the individual officer: he usually has no
choice as to the subject of the search or its scope").
The facts of this case demonstrate a prime danger of
insufficiently regulated inventory searches: police may use the
excuse of an "inventory search" as a pretext for broad searches of
vehicles and their contents. In this case, there was no evidence
that the inventory search was done in accordance with
any
standardized inventory procedure. Although the State characterized
the search as an inventory search in the trial court, it did not
point to any standard policy governing inventory searches of
vehicles (much less to any policy governing the opening of closed
containers) until the case reached the Florida Supreme Court. At
that time, which was after our
Page 495 U. S. 6
decision in
Bertine, supra, the Florida Highway Patrol
entered the case as
amicus curiae, and argued that Chapter
16 of the "Florida Highway Patrol Forms and Procedural Manual"
contained the standard policy that guided the conduct of the search
in this case. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the manual
did not provide any policy for the opening of closed containers.
App. 256. But it now appears that the Florida Supreme Court may
have been under the misapprehension that the manual was in effect
at the time of the search in this case.
See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 30-31. The State conceded at oral argument before this Court
that the manual was
not in effect at the time of the
search in this case, but argued nonetheless that the officer had
performed the search according to "standard operating procedures"
that were later incorporated into the Highway Patrol Manual.
See id. at 17 ("The rules and regulations which . . . came
into effect shortly thereafter, merely codified what the Florida
Highway Patrol was doing to all procedures [
sic] during
that period of time"). But the State did not offer any evidence at
the suppression hearing to support a finding that Trooper Adams
performed the inventory according to "standard operating
procedures." Trooper Adams testified that he asked his immediate
superior whether he should impound and inventory the car, but that
his superior left it to Adams' discretion, stating that he found
nothing suspicious about the car. Trooper Adams testified that he
"took it upon [himself] to go ahead and have the car towed." App.
88. He also testified that he thought that opening the suitcase was
part of a proper inventory, but that he did not ask anyone else's
opinion until after the search was completed.
Id. at
82-83. He testified "Well, I had to take my chances."
Id.
at 83.
In addition, there was no evidence that an inventory was
actually done in this case: the State introduced neither an
inventory sheet nor any testimony that the officer actually
inventoried the items found in respondent's car. Tr. of Oral Arg.
5, and 25-26. Rather, the testimony at the suppression
Page 495 U. S. 7
hearing suggests that the officer used the need to "inventory"
as an excuse to search for drugs. The testimony establishes that,
after arresting respondent for driving under the influence of
alcohol and accompanying him to the station house, Trooper Adams
returned to the impound lot to conduct the inventory search at 1:30
a.m. Grover Bryan, who assisted the state trooper with the
inventory, testified at the hearing that Trooper Adams told him
that "he wanted to inventory the car good, he wanted to go through
it real good because he felt that there was drugs in it." App. 141.
According to Bryan, Adams' desire to inventory the car stemmed from
the fact that there was a large amount of cash lying on the floor
of the car when respondent was arrested. Bryan testified that Adams
insisted that contraband would be found in the car because "[t]here
ain't nobody runs around with that kind of money in the floorboard
unless they're dealing drugs or something like that."
Id.
at 142;
see ibid. ("[H]e felt that the money that they had
found was from a drug deal"). When they finally found the locked
suitcase in the trunk, Bryan testified that Adams "want[ed] in the
suitcase" because he "had a strong suspicion there was drugs in
that car and it was probably in that suitcase."
Id. at
145. The men then spent ten minutes prying open the lock on the
suitcase with two knives.App. 82 and 147. Bryan testified that once
they opened the suitcase and found a bag of marijuana inside,
"[Adams] was quite excited. He said
there it is.'" Id.
at 147. See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 24 ("Well, to be quite
frank, the officer, as he got further and further along in his
search, got hungrier and hungrier").
The majority finds it unnecessary to recount these facts because
it affirms the Florida Supreme Court on the narrow ground, clearly
established by
Opperman and
Bertine, that police
may not be given total discretion to decide whether to open closed
containers found during an inventory search. With this much I
agree. Like JUSTICE BLACKMUN,
post at
495 U. S. 11-12,
however, I cannot join the majority opinion because it
Page 495 U. S. 8
goes on to suggest that a State may adopt an inventory policy
that vests individual police officers with
some discretion
to decide whether to open such containers.
See ante at
495 U. S. 4 ("A
police officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to determine
whether a particular container should or should not be opened in
light of the nature of the search and characteristics of the
container itself"). This suggestion is pure dictum, given the
disposition of the case. But as JUSTICE BLACKMUN notes,
post at
495 U. S. 11,
there is a danger that this dictum will be relied on by lower
courts in reviewing the constitutionality of particular inventory
searches, or even by local policymakers drafting procedures for
police to follow when performing inventories of impounded vehicles.
Thus, I write separately to emphasize that the majority's
suggestion is inconsistent with the reasoning underlying our
inventory search cases, and relies on a mischaracterization of the
holding in
Bertine.
Our cases clearly hold that an inventory search is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment only if it is done in accordance with
standard procedures that
limit the discretion of the
police.
See Opperman, 428 U.S. at
428 U. S. 384
(Powell, J., concurring). In
Bertine, the Court held that
the police may open closed containers found within an impounded
vehicle only if the inventory policy mandates the opening of all
such containers.
See 479 U.S. at
479 U. S. 374,
n. 6 ("We emphasize that, in this case, the trial court found that
the Police Department's procedures mandated the opening of closed
containers and the listing of their contents"). Contrary to the
majority's assertion today,
ante at
495 U. S. 3,
Bertine did not establish that police may exercise
discretion with respect to the opening of closed containers during
an inventory search. The statement in
Bertine that
"[n]othing in
Opperman . . . prohibits the exercise of
police discretion so long as that discretion is exercised according
to standard criteria," 479 U.S. at
479 U. S. 375,
was made in response to an argument that the inventory search was
unconstitutional because the police had some discretion to
determine whether to
impound the car. The Court's
conclusion
Page 495 U. S. 9
that the opening of defendant's backpack was constitutional was
clearly premised on the city's inventory policy that left no
discretion to individual police officers as to the opening of
containers found inside a car once it was impounded.
See
id. at
479 U. S. 374,
n. 6. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S concurrence in
Bertine could not
be clearer:
"it is permissible for police officers to open closed containers
in an inventory search
only if they are following standard
police procedures that mandate the opening of such containers in
every impounded vehicle."
Id. at
479 U. S. 377
(emphasis added). [
Footnote
1]
Opening a closed container constitutes a great intrusion into
the privacy of its owner, even when the container is found in an
automobile.
See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.
S. 753,
442 U. S.
762-764 (1979);
United States v. Chadwick,
433 U. S. 1,
433 U. S. 13
(1977). For this reason, I continue to believe that, in the absence
of consent or exigency, police may not open a closed container
found during an inventory search of an automobile.
See
Bertine, 479 U.S. at
479 U. S. 387
(MARSHALL, J., joined by BRENNAN, J., dissenting). [
Footnote 2] In any event, in
Bertine, the
Page 495 U. S. 10
Court recognized that opening a container constitutes such a
great intrusion that the discretion of the police to do so must be
circumscribed sharply to guard against abuse. If the Court wishes
to revisit that holding, it must wait for another case. Attempting
to cast doubt on the vitality of the holding in
Bertine in
this otherwise easy case is not justified.
[
Footnote 1]
Indeed, the majority's suggestion that police may be vested with
discretion to open a container "in light of the nature of the
search and characteristics of the container itself,"
ante
at
495 U. S. 4,
flatly contradicts the reasoning in
Bertine. In that case,
the Court rejected the argument that police are required to
"weigh the strength of the individual's privacy interest in the
container against the possibility that the container might serve as
a repository for dangerous or valuable items."
Bertine, 479 U.S. at
479 U. S. 374.
The Court found such a rule unworkable for
"'it would be unreasonable to expect police officers in the
everyday course of business to make fine and subtle distinctions in
deciding which container or items may be searched and which must be
sealed as unit.'"
Id. at
479 U. S. 375,
quoting
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.
S. 640,
462 U. S. 648
(1983);
see also 479 U.S. at
479 U. S. 375
("We reaffirm these principles here: [a] single familiar standard
is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time
and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual
interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront")
(internal quotations omitted).
[
Footnote 2]
The Court has recognized that an inventory search potentially
can serve three governmental interests: protection of the owner's
valuables, protection of the police from false claims of theft or
damage, and protection of the police from danger.
South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364,
428 U. S. 369
(1976);
id. at
428 U. S. 378
(Powell, J., concurring). The Court has concluded that routine
inventory searches are constitutional because these government
interests outweigh an individual's diminished expectation of
privacy in a car.
Id. at
428 U. S.
378-379 (Powell, J., concurring). I do not agree that
these interests justify the opening of a closed container in which
an individual retains a significant expectation of privacy.
See
Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at
479 U. S.
382-387 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Indeed, I do not see
how the treatment of the luggage in this case -- prying open the
lock with two knives -- served any of these governmental
interests.
Justice BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Florida is to be affirmed. If our cases establish anything, it is
that an individual police officer cannot be given complete
discretion in choosing whether to search or to leave undisturbed
containers and other items encountered during an inventory search.
See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U. S. 367,
479 U. S. 374,
n. 6 (1987);
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.
S. 364 (1976). Here, given the complete discretion
Florida Highway Patrol troopers enjoyed to open or not to open
closed containers, the evidence in question properly was
suppressed. I do not join the majority opinion, however, because,
instead of ending the case at that point, it continues with
language, unnecessary on the facts of this case, concerning the
extent to which a policeman, under the Fourth Amendment,
may be given discretion in conducting an inventory
search.
The majority disagrees with the Florida Supreme Court's
statement that a police department must have a policy which
"mandate[s] either that all containers will be opened during
Page 495 U. S. 11
an inventory search, or that no containers will be opened."
Ante at
495 U. S. 3. The
majority concludes that the Fourth Amendment does not impose such
an "all or nothing" requirement. With this much I agree. A State,
for example, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, probably could
adopt a policy which requires the opening of all containers that
are not locked, or a policy which requires the opening of all
containers over or under a certain size, even though these policies
do not call for the opening of all or no containers. In other
words, a State has the discretion to choose a scheme that lies
somewhere between the extremes identified by the Florida Supreme
Court.
It is an entirely different matter, however, to say, as this
majority does, that an individual policeman may be afforded
discretion in conducting an inventory search. The exercise of
discretion by an individual officer, especially when it cannot be
measured against objective, standard criteria, creates the
potential for abuse of Fourth Amendment rights our earlier
inventory search cases were designed to guard against. Thus, when
the majority states that a
"police officer may be allowed sufficient
latitude to
determine whether a particular container should or should not be
opened in light of the nature of the search,"
and that it is permissible for a State
"to
allow the opening of closed containers whose
contents officers determine they are unable to ascertain from
examining the containers' exteriors,"
ante at
495 U. S. 4
(emphasis added), the majority is doing more than refuting the
Florida Supreme Court's all-or-nothing approach; it is opining
about a very different and important constitutional question not
addressed by the state courts here and not raised by the
circumstances of the case. Although the majority's statements on
the issue perhaps are to be regarded as no more than dicta, they
nonetheless are problematic, inasmuch as they may be taken out of
context or misinterpreted by policymakers and trial courts.
Because, as noted above, the complete discretion afforded Florida
policemen in this case renders the search at issue
Page 495 U. S. 12
undeniably unconstitutional, I see no reason for the Court to
say anything about precisely
how much, if any, discretion
an individual policeman constitutionally may exercise.
Justice STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
While I agree with JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S opinion, I think
additional criticism of the Court's activism is appropriate. One
must wonder why this case merited a grant of certiorari. The
judgment of the Florida Supreme Court was obviously correct. Its
opinion contained a minor flaw, as countless opinions do. Unless we
are to become self-appointed editors of state court opinions in the
criminal law area, that is surely an insufficient reason for
exercising our certiorari jurisdiction.
The flaw, of course, might impose a stricter standard for the
conduct of inventory searches in Florida than the Federal
Constitution actually requires, but there is no suggestion that the
extra layer of protection provided to Florida citizens by the
Florida Supreme Court will hamper law enforcement in that State.
Apparently the mere possibility of a minor burden on law
enforcement interests is enough to generate corrective action by
this Court.
But then, as JUSTICE BLACKMUN properly observes, the Court does
not content itself with commenting on the flaw in the Florida
Supreme Court's opinion. Instead, it plunges ahead with a flawed
opinion of its own. While purportedly reaffirming the requirement
of "standard criteria" to control police discretion in conducting
inventory searches,
see Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.
S. 367,
479 U. S. 375
(1987), the Court invites the State to allow their officers
discretion to open -- or not to open -- "closed containers whose
contents officers determine they are unable to ascertain from
reviewing the containers' exteriors."
Ante at
495 U. S. 4. Thus,
luggage, briefcases, handbags, brown paper bags, violin cases --
indeed, virtually all containers except goldfish bowls -- could be
opened at the whim of the officer, whether locked or unlocked. What
is left for the "standard criteria"?
Page 495 U. S. 13
It is a proper part of the judicial function to make law as a
necessary by-product of the process of deciding actual cases and
controversies. But to reach out so blatantly and unnecessarily to
make new law in a case of this kind is unabashed judicial
activism.