After respondent filed a charge against petitioner alleging
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
issued her a Notice of Right to Sue, which did not identify the
forum in which she might sue, but did advise her that she must
bring suit within 90 days. Within that period, she filed a
complaint in an Illinois county court, alleging that petitioner had
discriminated against her on the basis of her sex in violation of
the State Human Rights Act. After petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss -- and outside the 90-day period -- respondent moved to
amend her complaint to allege that the facts already pleaded also
constituted a violation of Title VII. Petitioner removed the case
to the Federal District Court and moved to dismiss, contending
that, because the state court lacked jurisdiction over a Title VII
claim, the original filing in state court could not toll the 90-day
period. The District Court rejected this contention and, after a
trial on the merits, entered judgment for respondent which the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: Federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction
over Title VII actions. The fact that Title VII contains no
language that expressly confines jurisdiction to federal courts or
ousts state courts of their jurisdiction is strong evidence that
Congress did not intend to divest state courts of concurrent
jurisdiction. Although most legislators, judges, and administrators
who have been involved in the enactment and interpretation of Title
VII may have expected that such litigation would be processed
exclusively in federal courts, such anticipation cannot overcome
the presumption, recently reaffirmed in
Tafflin v. Levitt,
493 U. S. 455,
that state courts have the inherent authority, and are competent,
to adjudicate federal claims. Pp.
494 U. S.
823-826.
874 F.2d 402 (C.A.7 1989), affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 494 U. S. 821
Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over civil actions brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253,
as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq. (1982 ed.). We recently answered a
similar question involving the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
Tafflin v.
Levitt, 493 U. S. 455
(1990). For essentially the reasons set forth in that opinion, we
conclude that Congress did not divest the state courts of their
concurrent authority to adjudicate federal claims.
I
Respondent is a qualified dock worker. Shortly after moving to
Chicago Ridge, Illinois, in 1982, she applied for work at
petitioner's facility four blocks from her home. The company had no
vacancies, but assured respondent that she would be the first
person hired when the situation changed. Petitioner maintained this
position in response to respondent's inquiries over the next 1 1/2
years, while it in fact was hiring a number of men. Respondent was
hired only after she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 1984.
On March 15, 1985, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue. The
notice did not identify the forum in which respondent might sue,
but it did advise her that she "must do so within ninety (90) days"
or that right would be lost. Plaintiff's Exh. B, App. 14. Within
the 90-day period, on May 22, 1985, respondent filed a complaint in
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, alleging that
petitioner had discriminated
Page 494 U. S. 822
against her on the basis of her sex in violation of the Illinois
Human Rights Act. Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 68, � 1-101
et seq.
(1987).
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
respondent had not exhausted her state administrative remedies.
Respondent countered with a motion to amend her complaint to allege
that the facts already pleaded also constituted a violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This motion was not
filed within the 90-day period. Petitioner removed the case to
federal court and moved to dismiss the amended complaint.
Petitioner argued that the original filing in the state court could
not toll the 90-day limitation period because the state court had
no jurisdiction over a Title VII claim. [
Footnote 1] The District Court rejected the
jurisdictional argument, App. to Pet. for Cert. A-35 to A-39, and,
after a trial on the merits, entered judgment for respondent. 682
F. Supp. 374 (ND Ill.1988). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed. 874 F.2d 402 (CA7 1989). Because other Courts of
Appeals have held that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over Title VII litigation, [
Footnote 2] we granted certiorari, 493 U.S. 953
(1989).
Page 494 U. S. 823
II
Under our
"system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that
state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively
competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the
United States."
Tafflin, 493 U.S. at
493 U. S. 458;
see Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.
S. 473,
453 U. S.
477-478 (1981);
Claflin v. Houseman,
93 U. S. 130,
93 U. S.
136-137 (1876). To give federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over a federal cause of action, Congress must, in an
exercise of its powers under the Supremacy Clause, affirmatively
divest state courts of their presumptively concurrent jurisdiction.
Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 459-460.
We begin with the text of Title VII itself. The enforcement
provisions of Title VII provide that
"[e]ach United States district court and each United States
court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this
subchapter."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1982 ed.). Unlike a number of
statutes in which Congress unequivocally stated that the
jurisdiction of the federal courts is exclusive, [
Footnote 3] Title VII contains no language
that expressly confines jurisdiction to federal courts or ousts
state courts of their presumptive jurisdiction. The omission of any
such provision is strong, and arguably sufficient evidence that
Congress had no such intent.
Page 494 U. S. 824
Petitioner, however, contends that the legislative history of
Title VII unmistakably reveals Congress' intention that these
claims be brought exclusively in the federal courts, and that
certain features of Title VII render concurrent state court
jurisdiction incompatible with federal interests. Petitioner has
called our attention to a number of passages in the legislative
history indicating that many participants in the complex process
that finally produced the law fully expected that all Title VII
cases would be tried in federal court. [
Footnote 4] That expectation, even if universally shared,
is not an adequate
Page 494 U. S. 825
substitute for a legislative decision to overcome the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. Like its plain text, the
legislative history of the Act affirmatively describes the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, but is completely silent on any
role of the state courts over Title VII claims.
We do not find any incompatibility between the procedures
provided in Title VII and state court jurisdiction over these
claims. Petitioner correctly points out that § 706(c) of the Act
requires the EEOC to delay at least 60 days to give state or local
agencies an opportunity to remedy the allegedly unlawful practice
prior to any federal action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982 ed.).
Petitioner argues that it is anomalous to contemplate reference to
a state agency, followed by review in the federal agency, as a
condition of proceeding with litigation in state court.
Petitioner's "anomaly," however, is merely a consequence of Title
VII's dual-track method of procedure. The first hiatus is designed
to give state administrative agencies an opportunity to invoke
state rules of law. The action by the EEOC, in contrast, is a
predicate for litigation based on the federal statute. When the
right to sue under Title VII arises, the fact that both a state
agency and the EEOC have failed to resolve the matter does not
affect the question of what judicial forum should or may entertain
the action. Congress employed a similar scheme in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, in which complaints must be
screened through both state and federal agencies, although
concurrently, before an action may be brought "in any court of
competent jurisdiction." 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(c)(1), 633(b) (1982 ed.).
See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.
S. 750 (1979) (§ 14(b) of the ADEA was patterned after §
706(c) of Title VII).
Nor does the Act's provision for appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1291, 1292 (1982 ed.), and references to injunctive relief and
appointment of masters pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
65 and 53, preclude concurrent state court jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-5(j), (f)(2), (f)(5) (1982 ed.).
Page 494 U. S. 826
We rejected a similar argument based on statutory references to
procedures applicable to federal courts in
Tafflin, 493
US. at
493 U. S.
466-467 (federal venue and service of process in RICO
actions), and
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U. S. 502
(1962) (injunctive relief under federal rules in Labor Management
Relations Act actions).
It may be assumed that federal judges will have more experience
in Title VII litigation than state judges. That, however, is merely
a factor that the plaintiff may weigh when deciding where to file
suit, or that may motivate a defendant to remove a case to federal
court. We have no reason to question the presumption that state
courts are just as able as federal courts to adjudicate Title VII
claims.
Cf. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,
456 U. S. 461
(1982) (state court decisions may have preclusive effect in Title
VII cases before federal courts).
In sum, without disagreeing with petitioner's persuasive showing
that most legislators, judges, and administrators who have been
involved in the enactment, amendment, enforcement, and
interpretation of Title VII expected that such litigation would be
processed exclusively in federal courts, we conclude that such
anticipation does not overcome the presumption of concurrent
jurisdiction that lies at the core of our federal system.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Petitioner also argued that the Title VII claim was untimely
because a complaint merely alleging a violation of the state Act
could not toll the federal statute of limitations. The District
Court and the Court of Appeals rejected that argument, relying on
Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. App. to Pet.
for Cert. A-38 to A-39; 874 B.2d 402, 410-411 (CA7 1989).
[
Footnote 2]
See Bradshaw v. General Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 110, 112
(CA3 1986);
Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434,
435-436 (CA9 1984);
Jones v. Intermountain Power Project,
794 F.2d 546, 553 (CA10 1986);
Long v. Florida, 805 F.2d
1542, 1546 (CA11 1986),
rev'd on other grounds,
487 U. S. 223
(1988).
The United States has not filed any
amicus curiae brief
with the Court in this case. In 1980, it contended, in a case that
did not directly present the question, that federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII actions. Brief for United
States and EEOC as
Amici Curiae, O.T.1980, No. 79-1213,
pp. 11-15;
Minnick v. California Dept. of Corrections,
452 U. S. 105,
452 U. S. 120,
n. 28 (1981) (dismissed as improvidently granted).
See
also Brief for EEOC as
Amicus Curiae in
Pirela v.
North Aurora, No. 89-1231 (CA7), pp. 10-14.
[
Footnote 3]
The Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 -- enacted
just two years after the extensive amendments to the Civil Rights
Act -- illustrates this distinction in specifying that
"[e]xcept for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this
section, the district courts of the United States shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter,"
but that
"[s]tate courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts of
the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of actions
under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section."
28 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1982 ed.); Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub.L.
92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 104.
See also statutes cited in
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U. S. 455,
493 U. S. 471
(1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring).
[
Footnote 4]
Thus, for example, after it was decided to opt for judicial
rather than administrative enforcement of the Act, Congressman
McCulloch commented:
"As the Title was originally worded, the Commission would have
had authority to not only conduct investigations, but also
institute hearing procedures and issue orders of a cease-and-desist
nature. A substantial number of committee members, however,
preferred that the ultimate determination of discrimination rest
with the Federal judiciary. Through this requirement, we believe
the settlement of complaints will occur more rapidly and with
greater frequency."
H.R.Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 29 (1963),
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1964, pp. 2355, 2515 (additional
views by Rep. McCulloch). An Interpretive Memorandum presented to
the Senate suggests that the judicial path was presumed to be
through the federal courts:
"[T]he party allegedly discriminated against may, with the
written permission of one member of the Commission, bring his own
suit in Federal court. If he does so, he would conduct the
litigation and bear his own costs, just like any other private
plaintiff in a civil action."
"
* * * *"
"The suit against the respondent, whether brought by the
Commission or by the complaining party, would proceed in the usual
manner for litigation in the Federal courts. It would be a trial de
novo and not, in any sense, a suit for judicial review of a
Commission determination."
110 Cong.Rec. 7213 (1964) (Interpretive Memorandum of Title VII
of H.R. 7152 submitted jointly by Sen. Clark and Sen. Case).
Of course, if Congress had vested exclusive enforcement
authority in a federal administrative agency, presumably only a
federal court would have had jurisdiction to review the federal
agency's decisions. The authorization of a judicial remedy,
however, gave rise to the normal presumption that state as well as
federal courts could grant appropriate relief.