Six weeks after Pamela Lane was murdered, petitioner Butler was
arrested on an unrelated assault charge for which he retained
counsel. While in custody, Butler was informed that he was a
suspect in Lane's murder. After receiving
Miranda
warnings, he signed waiver of rights forms and made incriminating
statements about the Lane murder during interrogation. At his
capital murder trial, the court denied his motion to suppress these
statements, and he was convicted and sentenced to death. After his
conviction became final on direct appeal, he filed a petition for
federal habeas relief, which was dismissed by the District Court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting his argument that
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477,
requires the police, during continuous custody, to refrain from all
further questioning once an accused invokes his right to counsel on
any offense. Subsequently, this Court handed down
Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U. S. 675,
which held that the Fifth Amendment bars police-initiated
interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in the
context of a separate investigation. The Court of Appeals denied
Butler's request for rehearing. It reasoned that he was not
entitled to the retroactive benefit of
Roberson. According
to the court, the
Edwards-Roberson limitations on police
interrogation are only tangentially related to the truthfinding
function. It viewed those limitations as part of the prophylactic
protection of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel created to be
"guidelines" for the law enforcement profession, and held that
Butler's interrogation, while contrary to present "guidelines," had
been conducted in strict accordance with established law at the
time.
Held:
1.
Roberson announced a "new rule," since its result
was not dictated by a precedent existing at the time the
defendant's conviction became final, and is therefore inapplicable
to cases on collateral review under
Teague v. Lane,
489 U. S. 288, and
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302. The
fact that a majority of this Court said that
Roberson's
case was directly controlled by
Edwards is not conclusive
for purposes of deciding whether
Roberson is a new rule
under
Teague. Courts frequently view their decisions as
"controlled" or "governed" by prior opinions, even when aware of
reasonable contrary conclusions reached by other courts. It would
not have been an illogical or even a grudging
Page 494 U. S. 408
application of
Edwards to decide that it did not extend
to
Roberson's facts, since -- as evidenced by the
significant difference of opinion on the part of several lower
courts that had considered the question previously --
Roberson's outcome was susceptible to debate among
reasonable minds. Pp.
494 U. S.
412-415.
2.
Roberson's rule does not come within either of the
exceptions under which a new rule is available on collateral
review. The first exception -- for a rule that places certain kinds
of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe -- is clearly
inapplicable. The proscribed conduct in the instant case is capital
murder, the prosecution of which is not prohibited by the
Roberson rule, and
Roberson did not address any
categorical guarantees accorded by the Constitution,
see Penry,
supra, at
492 U. S. 329.
Nor did
Roberson establish any principle that would come
within the second exception. The scope of that exception -- for a
rule that requires the observance of those procedures that are
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty -- is limited to those
new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished. However, a violation of
Roberson's added restrictions on police investigatory
procedures may instead increase the likelihood of obtaining an
accurate determination. Pp.
494 U. S.
415-416.
846 F.2d 255 (CA4) affirmed.
REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, and in
Parts I, II, and III of which BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ.,
joined.
Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Horace Butler was convicted and sentenced to death
for the murder of Pamela Lane. After his conviction became final on
direct appeal, Butler collaterally attacked his conviction by way
of a petition for federal habeas corpus. Butler relied on our
decision in
Arizona v.
Roberson, 486
Page 494 U. S. 409
U.S. 675 (1988), decided after his conviction became final on
direct appeal. We have held, however, that a new decision generally
is not applicable in cases on collateral review unless the decision
was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's
conviction became final.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.
S. 302, (1989);
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.
S. 288, (1989). We hold that our ruling in
Roberson was not so dictated, and that Butler's claim is
not within either of two narrow exceptions to the general rule.
Pamela Lane, a clerk at a convenience store near Charleston,
South Carolina, was last seen alive when she left work riding a
moped late in the evening of July 17, 1980. The next day, several
fishermen discovered Lane's body near a bridge, and the following
day, a local minister found Lane's moped submerged in a pond behind
his church.
Petitioner Butler was arrested six weeks later on an unrelated
assault and battery charge and placed in the Charleston County
Jail. After invoking his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, Butler
retained counsel who appeared with him at a bond hearing on August
31, 1980. He was unable to make bond, however, and was returned to
the county jail. Butler's attorney would later contend in state
collateral relief proceedings that, after the bond hearing, he had
told the police officers not to question Butler further. The
officers testified that they remembered no such instruction.
Early in the morning of September 1, 1980, Butler was taken from
the jail to the Charleston County Police station. He was then
informed for the first time that he was a suspect in Lane's murder.
After receiving
Miranda warnings,
see Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966), Butler indicated that he understood his rights and signed
two "waiver of rights" forms. The police then interrogated Butler
about the murder. Butler did not request his attorney's presence at
any time during the interrogation.
Butler offered two explanations for Lane's death. First, he
claimed that a friend, one White, killed Lane and then sought
Butler's help in disposing of the moped. When his interrogators
Page 494 U. S. 410
evidenced skepticism over this statement, Butler tried again. He
said that he had come upon Lane in his car and had motioned her
over to the side of the road. She then voluntarily accompanied him
in a drive to a nearby wooded area where the two engaged in
consensual sex. Afterwards Lane threatened to accuse Butler of rape
when she realized she would be late getting home. Butler maintained
that he panicked, shot Lane with a handgun, and dumped her body off
a bridge. In this version of the story, Butler asserted that White
helped him dispose of the moped. Butler later took the police to
the locations of the various events culminating in Lane's
death.
The State indicted Butler and brought him to trial on a charge
of first-degree murder. The trial court denied Butler's motion to
suppress the statements given to police, and the statements were
introduced into evidence. The jury found Butler guilty and, in a
separate proceeding, sentenced him to death concluding that he
committed the murder during the commission of a rape. The Supreme
Court of South Carolina upheld Butler's conviction on direct
appeal,
State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 452,
290 S.E.2d
1, and we denied certiorari.
459 U. S. 932
(1982). Subsequently, Butler unsuccessfully petitioned for
collateral relief in the State's courts,
see Butler v.
State, 286 S.C. 441,
334 S.E.2d
813 (1985), and we again denied certiorari.
474 U.
S. 1094 (1986).
In May 1986, Butler filed this petition for federal habeas
relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. As characterized by the
District Court, one question raised in the petition was
"whether police had the right to initiate questioning about the
murder knowing petitioner had retained an attorney for the assault
charge."
App. 119. The District Court dismissed the petition on
respondents' motion for summary judgment.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit,
see Butler v. Aiken, 846 F.2d 255 (1988),
Page 494 U. S. 411
Butler argued that
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.
S. 477 (1981), requires the police, during continuous
custody, to refrain from all further questioning once an accused
invokes his right to counsel on any offense. In support of his
argument, Butler relied principally on
United States ex rel.
Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117 (CA7 1987). The Court of
Appeals rejected Butler's
Espinoza-based contention,
finding the Seventh Circuit's ruling an unpersuasive and "dramatic"
extension of
Edwards. Butler, 846 F.2d at
258.
The court concluded that Butler's statements were preceded by
appropriate warnings and a voluntary waiver of Fifth Amendment
protections. The statements, therefore, were not obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights or
Edwards'
prophylactic rule. According to the court, a properly initiated
interrogation on an entirely different charge does not intrude into
an accused's previously invoked rights, but instead offers the
accused an opportunity to weigh his rights intelligently in light
of changed circumstances. When, as occurred in this case, the
accused then freely waives any constitutional right to counsel and
provides voluntary statements of an incriminating nature, there is
no justification for undermining the search for the truth by
suppressing those statements.
Butler, 846 F.2d at 259. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Butler's petition, and
approximately one month later, denied Butler's request for
rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc.
On the same day the court denied Butler's rehearing petitions,
we handed down our decision in
Roberson. We held in
Roberson that the Fifth Amendment bars police-initiated
interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in the
context of a separate investigation. 486 U.S. at
486 U. S. 682.
On Butler's motion for reconsideration, the original Fourth Circuit
panel considered Butler's new contention that
Roberson
requires suppression of his statements taken in the separate
investigation of Lane's murder. Although the panel conceded that
the substance of its prior conclusion "was cast into
Page 494 U. S. 412
immediate and serious doubt" by our subsequent decision in
Roberson, Butler v. Aiken, 864 F.2d 24, 25 (CA4 1988), it
nevertheless determined that Butler was not entitled to the
retroactive benefit of
Roberson. According to the panel,
the
Edwards-Roberson limitations on police interrogation
are only tangentially related to the truthfinding function. 864
F.2d at 25. They are viewed most accurately as part of the
prophylactic protection of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel
created to be "guidelines" for the law enforcement profession.
Ibid. (citing
Roberson, supra, 486 U.S. at
486 U. S.
680-682). The interrogation of Butler, while
unquestionably contrary to present "guidelines," was conducted in
strict accordance with established law at the time. The panel,
therefore, denied Butler's petition for rehearing. A majority of
the circuit judges denied, over a dissent, Butler's petition for a
rehearing en banc. We granted certiorari, 490 U.S. 1045, and now
affirm.
Last Term, in
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.
S. 302 (1989), we held that in both capital and
noncapital cases, "new rules will not be applied or announced in
cases on collateral review unless they fall into one of two
exceptions." 492 U.S. at
492 U. S. 313
(citing
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at
494 U. S.
311-313)
see infra, at
494 U. S.
415-416 (discussing the exceptions and their
inapplicability to the instant case). Referring to
Teague,
we reiterated that, in general, a case announces a "new rule" when
it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or
the Federal Government.
Penry, 492 U.S. at
492 U. S. 314.
Put differently, and, indeed, more meaningfully for the majority of
cases, a decision announces a new rule "
if the result was not
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final.'" Id. at 494 U. S. 314
(quoting Teague, supra, at 489 U. S. 301)
(emphasis in original).
A new decision that explicitly overrules an earlier holding
obviously "breaks new ground" or "imposes a new obligation." In the
vast majority of cases, however, where the new decision is reached
by an extension of the reasoning of
Page 494 U. S. 413
previous cases, the inquiry will be more difficult. We said in
Teague:
"'[T]he relevant frame of reference . . . is not the purpose of
the new rule whose benefit the [defendant] seeks, but instead the
purposes for which the writ of habeas corpus is made available.'
Mackey [v. United States, 401 U. S.
667,
401 U. S. 682 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part)] . . . 'The interest in leaving concluded litigation in a
state of repose . . . , may quite legitimately be found by those
responsible for defining the scope of the writ to outweigh in some,
many, or most instances the competing interest in readjudicating
convictions according to all legal standards in effect when a
habeas petition is filed.' . . . Given the 'broad scope of
constitutional issues cognizable on habeas,' . . . it is 'sounder,
in adjudicating habeas petitions, generally to apply the law
prevailing at the time a conviction became final than it is to seek
to dispose of [habeas] cases on the basis of intervening changes in
constitutional interpretation.' . . . '[T]he threat of habeas
serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate
courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner
consistent with established constitutional standards. In order to
perform this
deterrence function, . . . the habeas court
need only apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at the
time the original proceedings took place.'"
Teague, supra, at
489 U. S. 306
(emphasis added; some brackets in original; some internal citations
omitted).
Teague further observed:
"[I]n many ways, the application of new rules to cases on
collateral review may be more intrusive than the enjoining of
[state] criminal prosecutions, . . . for it
continually
forces the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison
defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to
Page 494 U. S. 414
then-existing constitutional standards. Furthermore, as we
recognized in
Engle v. Isaac, [
456
U.S. 107,
456 U. S. 128, n. 33
(1982),] '[s]tate courts are understandably frustrated when they
faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to have a federal
court discover, during a [habeas] proceeding, new constitutional
commands.' . . .
See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S.
443,
344 U. S. 534 [(1953)]
(Jackson, J., concurring in result) (state courts cannot
'anticipate, and so comply with, this Court's due process
requirements or ascertain any standards to which this Court will
adhere in prescribing them')."
Teague, supra, at
489 U. S. 310
(plurality opinion) (emphasis in original; some internal citations
omitted).
The "new rule" principle therefore validates reasonable, good
faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts
even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.
Cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.
S. 897,
468 U. S.
918-919 (1984) (assuming the exclusionary rule
"effectively deters some police misconduct and provides incentives
for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in
accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and should
not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement
activity").
Butler contends that
Roberson did not establish a new
rule and is, therefore, available to support his habeas petition.
Butler argues that
Roberson was merely an application of
Edwards to a slightly different set of facts. Brief for
Petitioner 9; Reply Brief for Petitioner 18. In support of his
position, Butler pointed out that the majority had said that
Roberson's case was directly controlled by
Edwards. Brief for Petitioner 10. At oral argument,
Butler's counsel also pointed out that the
Roberson
opinion had rejected Arizona's request to create an "exception" to
Edwards for interrogations concerning separate
investigations. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. According to counsel, the
opinion in
Roberson showed that
Page 494 U. S. 415
the Court believed
Roberson's case to be within the
"logical compass" of
Edwards. Tr. of Oral Arg.
passim.
But the fact that a court says that its decision is within the
"logical compass" of an earlier decision, or indeed that it is
"controlled" by a prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes of
deciding whether the current decision is a "new rule" under
Teague. Courts frequently view their decisions as being
"controlled" or "governed" by prior opinions, even when aware of
reasonable contrary conclusions reached by other courts. In
Roberson, for instance, the Court found
Edwards
controlling, but acknowledged a significant difference of opinion
on the part of several lower courts that had considered the
question previously. 486 U.S. at
486 U. S. 679,
n. 3. That the outcome in
Roberson was susceptible to
debate among reasonable minds is evidenced further by the differing
positions taken by the judges of the Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth and Seventh Circuits noted previously. It would not have
been an illogical or even a grudging application of
Edwards to decide that it did not extend to the facts of
Roberson. We hold, therefore, that
Roberson
announced a "new rule."
The question remains whether the new rule in
Roberson
nevertheless comes within one of the two recognized exceptions
under which a new rule is available on collateral review. Under the
first exception,
"a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places
'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.'"
Teague, 489 U.S. at
489 U. S. 307
(quoting
Mackey, 401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 692
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part)). This exception is clearly inapplicable. The proscribed
conduct in the instant case is capital murder, the prosecution of
which is, to put it mildly, not prohibited by the rule in
Roberson. Nor did
Roberson address any
"categorical guarantees accorded by the Constitution" such as a
prohibition on the imposition of a particular punishment on a
certain class of offenders.
See Penry, 492 U.S. at
492 U. S.
329.
Page 494 U. S. 416
Under the second exception, a new rule may be applied on
collateral review "if it requires the observance of
those
procedures that . . . are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."'" Teague, 489 U.S. at 489 U. S. 311
(quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 401 U. S. 693
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.
S. 319, 302 U. S. 325
(1937) (Cardozo, J.))). Teague, it should be noted,
however, discerned a latent danger in relying solely on this famous
language from Palko:
"Were we to employ the
Palko test without more, we
would be doing little more than importing into a very different
context the terms of the debate over incorporation. . . . Reviving
the
Palko test now, in this area of law, would be
unnecessarily anachronistic. . . . [W]e believe that Justice
Harlan's concerns about the difficulty in identifying both the
existence and the value of accuracy-enhancing procedural rules can
be addressed by limiting the scope of the second exception to those
new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished. Because we operate from the
premise that such procedures would be so central to an accurate
determination of innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that
many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge."
Teague, supra, at
489 U. S.
312-313. Because a violation of
Roberson's
added restrictions on police investigatory procedures would not
seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate
determination -- indeed, it may increase that likelihood -- we
conclude that
Roberson did not establish any principle
that would come within the second exception.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Affirmed.
Page 494 U. S. 417
Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, and with whom
Justice BLACKMUN and Justice STEVENS join as to Parts I, II, and
III, dissenting.
Last Term in
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.
S. 288 (1989), this Court manifested its growing
hostility toward Congress' decision to authorize federal collateral
review of state criminal convictions, [
Footnote 1] curtailing the writ of habeas corpus by
dramatically restructuring retroactivity doctrine. The Court
declared that a federal court entertaining a state prisoner's
habeas petition generally may not reach the merits of the legal
claim unless the court determines, as a threshold matter, that a
favorable ruling on the claim would flow from the application of
legal standards "
prevailing at the time [the petitioner's]
conviction became final.'" Id. at 489 U. S. 306
(quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.
S. 667, 401 U. S. 689
(1971) (opinion of Harlan, J.)). Thus, with two narrow exceptions,
Teague, supra, at
489 U. S. 307, "new" rules of law provide no basis for
habeas relief. The Court stated that a ruling qualifies as "new"
"if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant's conviction became final." 489 U.S. at
489 U. S. 301
(emphasis in original).
Today, under the guise of fine-tuning the definition of "new
rule," the Court strips state prisoners of virtually
any
meaningful federal review of the constitutionality of their
incarceration. A legal ruling sought by a federal habeas petitioner
is now deemed "new" as long as the correctness of the rule, based
on precedent existing when the petitioner's conviction became
final, is "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds."
Ante at
494 U. S. 415.
Put another way, a state prisoner can secure habeas relief only by
showing that the state
Page 494 U. S. 418
court's rejection of the constitutional challenge was
so clearly invalid under then-prevailing legal standards
that the decision could not be defended by any reasonable jurist.
With this requirement, the Court has finally succeeded in its
thinly veiled crusade to eviscerate Congress' habeas corpus
regime.
I
Because constitutional interpretation is an evolutionary
process, the analytical distinction between legal rules
"prevailing" at the time of conviction and "new" legal rules is far
from sharp. This distinction must be drawn carefully, with
reference to the nature of adjudication in general and the purposes
served by habeas corpus in particular. But while the Court purports
to draw guidance from the retroactivity analysis advanced by
Justice Harlan,
see ante at ___ (quoting
Teague,
supra,), the Court simply ignores Justice Harlan's admonition
that
"[t]he theory that the 'habeas petitioner is entitled to the law
prevailing at the time of his conviction is . . . more complex than
the Court has seemingly recognized."
Desist v. United States, 394 U.
S. 244,
394 U. S. 263
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Instead, the Court embraces a
virtually all-encompassing definition of "new rule" without pausing
to articulate any justification therefor. Result, not reason,
propels the Court today.
A
The Court's preclusion of federal habeas review for all but the
most indefensible state court rejections of constitutional
challenges is made manifest by the Court's conclusion that our
recent holding in
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.
S. 675 (1988), qualifies as establishing a "new rule."
Long before
Roberson, this Court recognized the
presumptively coercive nature of custodial interrogations and held
that an interrogation must cease if and when a suspect requests an
attorney.
"If the interrogation continues without the presence of an
attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests upon the
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly
Page 494 U. S. 419
and intelligently waived his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436,
384 U. S. 475
(1966). In
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.
S. 477 (1981), we applied this rule to a situation where
detectives renewed an interrogation of the accused about a series
of offenses, after he had requested counsel during an earlier
interrogation concerning the same offenses. We
"reconfirm[ed] these views [expressed in
Miranda,
supra] and, to lend them substance, emphasize[d] that it is
inconsistent with
Miranda and its progeny for the
authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in
custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel."
451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 485.
We carefully considered the circumstances under which a suspect,
who has requested counsel during a custodial interrogation, may be
deemed to have validly waived his right to counsel prior to the
resumption of interrogation. We concluded that
"when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present
during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot
be established by showing only that he responded to further
police-initiated interrogation even if he has been advised of his
rights."
Id. at
451 U. S. 484.
As a result, we established a bright-line rule: a suspect who
has
"expressed his desire to deal with the police only through
counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused
himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police."
Id. at
451 U. S.
484-485.
In
Roberson, supra, the State of Arizona "ask[ed] us to
craft an exception to that rule." 486 U.S. at
486 U. S. 677.
Noting that
Edwards involved two interrogations concerning
the same offenses, the State of Arizona sought an exception "for
cases in which the police want to interrogate a suspect about an
offense that is unrelated to the subject of their initial
interrogation." 486 U.S. at
496 U. S. 677.
We declined, finding "unavailing" the State's "attempts at
distinguishing the factual setting here from that in
Edwards."
Id. at
486 U. S. 685.
We explained
Page 494 U. S. 420
that the rule articulated in
Edwards reflected our
concern that,
"if a suspect believes that he is not capable of undergoing
[custodial] questioning without advice of counsel, then it is
presumed that any subsequent waiver that has come at the
authorities' behest, and not at the suspect's own instigation, is
itself the product of the 'inherently compelling pressures,' and
not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect."
486 U.S. at
486 U. S. 681.
That
Roberson's second interrogation concerned a different
subject than his first in no way assuaged our concern that
Roberson's initial request for counsel reflected an
inability to deal with police questioning without legal advice.
Therefore
Edwards' application did not turn on the subject
matter of the two interrogations. 486 U.S. at
486 U. S. 681;
see id. at
486 U. S. 684
("[T]here is no reason to assume that a suspect's state of mind is
in any way investigation-specific"). We likewise
"attach[ed] no significance to the fact that the officer who
conducted the second interrogation did not know that
[Roberson] had made a request for counsel,"
because "
Edwards focuses on the state of mind of the
suspect and not of the police."
Id. at
486 U. S.
687.
B
It is clear from our opinion in
Roberson that we would
have reached the identical conclusion had that case reached us in
1983, when Butler's conviction became final. In
Roberson,
we simply applied the legal principle established in
Miranda and reconfirmed in
Edwards to a set of
facts that was not dissimilar in any salient way. We did not
articulate any new principles of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence that
were not already established in 1983.
Yet today, the Court classifies
Roberson as a "new
rule"
notwithstanding the above, characterizing the
"outcome in
Roberson [as] susceptible to debate among
reasonable minds."
Ante at
494 U. S. 415.
For this conclusion, the majority appears to rely solely on the
fact that the court below and several state courts had incorrectly
predicted the outcome in
Roberson by
Page 494 U. S. 421
holding that the
Edwards rule ought not apply here the
second interrogation involves different subject matter.
Ibid. But this reliance is perplexing. The majority might
mean to suggest that a particular result is reasonable so long as a
certain number of courts reach the same result. But this would be
an odd criterion for "reasonableness." Its application would be
ad hoc, both because there appears to be no principled
basis for choosing any particular number of courts whose agreement
is required before the result is deemed "reasonable," and because
the criterion ultimately rests on a bootstrap to the extent that
the later courts reaching the result simply rely on the earlier
courts' having done the same.
On the other hand, the majority might mean that the lower court
decisions foreshadowing the dissent's position in
Roberson, though ultimately erroneous, were nevertheless
"reasonable" according to some objective criterion of adjudication.
[
Footnote 2] But the Court does
not purport to identify any such criterion or explain its
application in this case. Instead, the Court announces in
peremptory fashion that "[i]t would not have been an illogical or
even a grudging application of
Edwards to decide that it
did not extend to the facts of
Roberson."
Ante at
494 U. S. 415.
This characterization is mystifying, given our explanation in
Roberson that the result was clearly dictated by
Edwards. See supra, at
494 U. S.
419-420.
The only conclusion discernible from the majority's discussion
is that the majority would label "new" any rule of law favoring a
state prisoner that can be distinguished from prior precedent on
any conceivable basis, legal or factual. [
Footnote 3] The
Page 494 U. S. 422
converse of this conclusion is that, in the majority's view,
adjudication according to "prevailing" law must consist solely of
applying binding precedents to factual disputes that cannot be
distinguished from prior cases in any imaginable way. Because,
after
Teague, 489 U. S. 288
(1989), a federal court may entertain a habeas petition on the
merits only if the petitioner seeks application of "prevailing" law
as so narrowly defined, the majority today limits federal courts'
habeas corpus function to reviewing state courts' legal analysis
under the equivalent of a "clearly erroneous" standard of review. A
federal court may no longer consider the merits of the petitioner's
claim based on its best interpretation and application of the law
prevailing at the time her conviction became final; rather, it must
defer to the state court's decision rejecting the claim unless that
decision is patently unreasonable. [
Footnote 4]
II
The Court's exceedingly broad definition of "new rule" -- and
conversely its narrow definition of "prevailing" law -- betrays a
vision of adjudication fundamentally at odds with any this Court
has previously recognized. According to Justice Harlan, whose
retroactivity jurisprudence undergirds
Page 494 U. S. 423
Teague and its progeny:
"One need not be a rigid partisan of Blackstone to recognize
that many, though not all, of this Court's constitutional decisions
are grounded upon fundamental principles whose content does not
change dramatically from year to year, but whose meanings are
altered slowly and subtly as generation succeeds generation."
Desist, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 263
(Harlan, J., dissenting). As every first-year law student learns,
adjudication according to prevailing law means far more than
obeying precedent by perfunctorily applying holdings in previous
cases to virtually
identical fact patterns. Rather, such
adjudication requires a judge to evaluate both the content of
previously enunciated legal rules and the breadth of their
application. A judge must thereby discern whether the principles
applied to specific fact patterns in prior cases fairly extend to
govern
analogous factual patterns. In Justice Harlan's
view, adjudication according to prevailing law demands that a court
exhibit "conceptual faithfulness" to the principles underlying
prior precedents, not just "decisional obedience" to precise
holdings based upon their unique factual patterns.
Id. at
394 U. S. 266,
n. 5 (employing Justice Fortas' terminology). The inability of
lower courts to predict significant reformulations by this Court of
the principles underlying prior precedents does not excuse them
from the obligation to draw reasoned conclusions from principles
that are well established at the time of their decisions.
The majority suggests obliquely that adoption of a "
new
rule' principle [that] validates reasonable, good-faith
interpretations of existing precedents," ante at
494 U. S. 414
-- which in turn means that adjudication according to "prevailing"
law requires only strict "decisional obedience" to existing
precedents -- would still serve the "deterrence function"
animating federal habeas review. Ibid. (emphasis in
original). But this claim begs a central question: deterrence of
what? Under the definition of "prevailing" law embraced today,
federal courts may not entertain habeas petitions challenging state
court rejections of constitutional claims unless those
Page 494 U. S. 424
state decisions are clearly erroneous. So at best, the threat of
habeas review will deter state courts only from completely
indefensible rejections of federal claims. State courts essentially
are told today that, save for outright "illogical" defiance of a
binding precedent precisely on point, their interpretations of
federal constitutional guarantees -- no matter how cramped and
unfaithful to the principles underlying existing precedent -- will
no longer be subject to oversight through the federal habeas
system. State prosecutors surely will offer every conceivable basis
in each case for distinguishing our prior precedents, and state
courts will be free to "`disregard the plain purport of our
decisions and to adopt a let's-wait-until-it's-decided [by the
Supreme Court] approach.'"
United States v. Johnson,
457 U. S. 537,
457 U. S. 561
(1982) (quoting
Desist, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 277
(Fortas, J., dissenting));
cf. Johnson, supra, 457 U.S. at
457 U. S. 561
(rejecting contention that "all rulings resolving unsettled Fourth
Amendment questions should be nonretroactive [to cases pending upon
direct review because otherwise,] in close cases, law enforcement
officials would have little incentive to err on the side of
constitutional behavior"). [
Footnote 5]
This Court has never endorsed such a cramped view of the
deterrent purpose of habeas review: we have always expected the
threat of habeas to encourage state courts to adjudicate federal
claims "correctly," not just "reasonably."
See, e.g.,
Teague, 489 U.S. at
489 U. S.
306-307 (deterrence rationale requires "[r]eview on
habeas to determine that the conviction rests upon
correct
application of the law in effect at the time of the conviction")
(emphasis added) (quoting
Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.
S. 638,
465 U. S. 653
(1984) (Powell, J., concurring
Page 494 U. S. 425
in judgment)). And, as explained above, "correct" adjudication
has always been thought to require courts to exhibit "conceptual
faithfulness" to the principles underlying our precedents and
thereby to anticipate reasonably foreseeable applications of those
principles.
See, e.g., Johnson, supra, 457 U.S. at
457 U. S. 549
("When a decision of this Court merely has applied settled
precedents to new and different factual situations, no real
question [of retroactivity] has arisen. . . . In such cases, it has
been a foregone conclusion that the rule of the later case applies
in earlier cases, because the later decision has not in fact
altered that rule in any material way"). [
Footnote 6]
Page 494 U. S. 426
Indeed, even Justice Harlan, the chief proponent of the view
that federal habeas is designed merely to deter erroneous state
court rejections of constitutional claims, believed that federal
review is appropriate when a state court fails to presage
reasonably foreseeable applications of established constitutional
principles
beyond the precise factual settings of prior
precedent. Justice Harlan would have held state courts responsible
for "appl[ying] a well-established constitutional principle to
govern a case which is closely analogous to those which have been
previously considered in the prior case law."
Desist,
supra, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 263.
In the context of this case, Justice Harlan would not have held the
rule in
Roberson to be "new" today unless he could "say
with . . .
assurance that this Court would have ruled
differently" (
i.e., in the State's favor) at the time
Butler's conviction became final. 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 264
(emphasis added). In contrast, the majority embraces the opposite
presumption; it holds
Roberson's rule to be "new" because
it cannot say with assurance that the Court could not have ruled in
favor of the State at that time. [
Footnote 7] Thus, the Court's holding today is unfaithful
even to the purported progenitor of its position.
Page 494 U. S. 427
Most significantly, the limited scope of the deterrence promised
by the Court's holding today defeats Congress' purpose in
establishing the scheme of federal habeas review of state criminal
proceedings. Congress established such review because it perceived
a potential
"inadequacy of state procedures to raise and preserve federal
claims [and was] concern[ed] that state judges may be unsympathetic
to federally created rights."
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.
S. 217,
394 U. S.
225-226 (1969). [
Footnote 8] Congress intended the "threat of habeas"
both
"to serv[e] as a necessary additional incentive for [state]
trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their
proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional
standards,"
ante at
494 U. S. 413
(citations omitted),
and to provide petitioners a
remedy for unlawful state deprivations of their liberty
interests through a fresh and full review of their claims by an
Article III court. As we recognized in
Fay v. Noia,
372 U. S. 391,
372 U. S. 424
(1963),
"the manifest federal policy [underlying § 2254(a) is] that
federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be
denied without the fullest opportunity for
plenary federal
judicial review"
(emphasis added).
See also e.g., Kaufman, supra, 394
U.S. at
394 U. S. 228
("Congress has determined that the full protection of . . .
constitutional rights requires the availability of a mechanism for
collateral attack. The right then is not merely to a federal
Page 494 U. S. 428
forum but to full and fair consideration of constitutional
claims"). It has long been established, therefore, that federal
habeas proceedings ought not accord any deference to the state
court's constitutional ruling under collateral attack. [
Footnote 9] Instead, the federal court
must determine for itself the proper scope of constitutional
principles and their application to the particular factual
circumstances. As explained by Justice Frankfurter,
"[t]he congressional requirement is [that the] State court
cannot have the last say when it, though on fair consideration and
what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a
federal constitutional right."
Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443,
344 U. S. 508
(1953). Congress thus entitled petitioners to
de novo
review of their federal claims in federal habeas proceedings.
[
Footnote 10] But the
Page 494 U. S. 429
Court's decision today denies federal courts the role on habeas
review that Congress envisioned because it limits them to remedying
only clearly unreasonable state court applications of federal law,
rather than all erroneous ones.
Moreover, Congress' insistence that "federal courts have the
last say' with respect to questions of federal law" raised
during state criminal proceedings, Kaufman, supra, at 225,
cannot be satisfied by this Court's jurisdiction to review state
proceedings directly. State courts are well aware that the
"Supreme Court's burden and responsibility are too great to
permit it to review and correct every misstep made by the lower
courts in the application of accepted principles. Hence, the Court
generally will not grant certiorari just because the decision below
may be erroneous."
R. Stern, E. Gressman & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice §
4.17, p. 221 (6th ed. 1986). [
Footnote 11] We have long recognized that Congress'
decision in 1867 to
"exten[d] to state prisoners . . . the federal habeas corpus
remedy bespoke congressional unwillingness to trust direct
appellate review of state court decisions by the Supreme Court as
the lone avenue of vindication of the new constitutional
strictures"
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Page 494 U. S. 430
Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise
in Federalism, 7 Utah L.Rev. 423, 426 (1961). But today's decision,
essentially foreclosing habeas review as an alternative "avenue of
vindication," overrides Congress' will, and leaves federal judicial
protection of fundamental constitutional rights during the state
criminal process solely to this Court upon direct review. I share
Congress' lack of confidence in such a regime. After today, despite
constitutional defects in the state processes leading to their
conviction or sentencing, state prisoners will languish in jail --
and others like Butler will die -- because state courts were
reasonable, even though wrong. [
Footnote 12]
Page 494 U. S. 431
The majority apparently finds such injustice acceptable based
upon an asserted "
interest in leaving concluded litigation in a
state of repose.'" Ante at 494 U. S. 413
(quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 489 U. S.
306). This will not do. It is one thing to preclude
federal habeas petitioners from asserting claims based on legal
principles contrary to or at least significantly dissimilar from
those in existence at the time their convictions became final; such
a basis for habeas relief engenders the possibility of
"'
continually forc[ing] the States to marshal resources
in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals
conformed to then-existing constitutional standards.'"
Ante at
494 U. S. 413
(quoting
Teague, supra, at
489 U. S.
306). It is a
far different thing to say that
concerns for repose and resource scarcity justify today's judicial
decision to protect States from the consequences of retrying or
resentencing defendants whose trials and appeals
did not
conform to then-existing constitutional standards but are viewed as
suffering from only "reasonable" defects.
"This Court has never held . . . that finality, standing alone,
provides a sufficient reason for federal courts to compromise their
protection of constitutional rights under § 2254."
Reed v. Ross, 468 U. S. 1,
468 U. S. 15
(1984). Until today.
III
It is Congress, and not this Court, who is "
responsible for
defining the scope of the writ.'" Ante at 494 U. S. 413
(citations omitted). [Footnote
13]
Page 494 U. S. 432
Yet the majority, whose Members often pride themselves on their
reluctance to play an "activist" judicial role by infringing upon
legislative prerogatives, does not hesitate today to dismantle
Congress' extension of federal habeas to state prisoners.
Hereafter, federal habeas relief will be available in only the most
egregious cases, in which state courts have flouted applicable
Supreme Court precedent that cannot be distinguished on any
arguable basis. I must dissent from this curtailment of the writ's
capacity for securing individual liberty.
"For surely it is an abuse to deal too casually and too lightly
with rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, even though
they involve limitations upon State power and may be invoked by
those morally unworthy. Under the guise of fashioning a procedural
rule, we are not justified in wiping out the practical efficacy of
a jurisdiction conferred by Congress on the District Courts."
Brown, 344 U.S. at
344 U. S.
498-499 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
IV
Even if I did not believe that petitioner is entitled in this
habeas proceeding to claim the protections of the Fifth Amendment
as defined by this Court in
Roberson, I would vacate his
death sentence. I adhere to my view that the death penalty is in
all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment.
Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U. S. 153,
428 U. S. 210
(1976).
[
Footnote 1]
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982 ed.) provides that a federal
court
"shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
[
Footnote 2]
If, according to such a criterion, these decisions were
unreasonable at the time they were issued, then, of course, no
matter how many such decisions were issued, they provide no
evidence for the proposition that "reasonable minds" could reach
different results about the application of
Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U. S. 477
(1981), to the fact pattern in
Arizona v. Roberson,
486 U. S. 675
(1988). From this perspective, 10 egregiously wrong decisions can
be no more reasonable than 1.
[
Footnote 3]
Indeed elsewhere the Court practically trips over itself in
evident haste to employ the broadest possible definition of a "new
rule."
See Saffle v. Parks, post, at
489 U. S. 491
(habeas petitioner's legal claim proposes "new rule" when existing
precedents favorably "inform, or even control or govern" the claim,
but do not "compel the rule that [petitioner] seeks").
[
Footnote 4]
This limitation of the federal courts' function creates a
systemic bias within the habeas system in favor of narrow
interpretations of criminal procedure protections. Habeas
petitioners may no longer benefit from legal rulings that expand
required procedural protections. But, under the Court's regime,
habeas petitioners who have valid claims under "prevailing" law
even as defined today may nevertheless lose their claims should a
federal court on habeas review decide to issue a "new" rule of law
in favor of the
State (indeed, with increasing frequency,
States attempt to defend decisions denying federal habeas relief on
the ground that the existing Supreme Court precedent upon which the
petitioner purports to rely should be overruled or modified).
Today's decisions in
Butler and
Saffle,
foreclosing relief for two petitioners based on "new"
understandings of the limits of federal habeas, starkly illustrate
the Court's lack of concern for symmetry -- and fairness.
[
Footnote 5]
Particularly if the Court today purports to hinge the
determination of "reasonability" of a state court decision on a
headcount of other lower courts resolving similar claims,
see
supra, at
494 U. S.
420-421, the threat of habeas certainly would not deter
state courts from adopting, without engaging in independent review
of the merits, any previous court decisions rejecting these claims.
Such follow-the-leader courts would be insulated from habeas
review.
[
Footnote 6]
The Court's analogy between the deterrent function of federal
habeas and the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule,
see
ante at
494 U. S. 414
(referencing
United States v. Leon, 468 U.
S. 897 (1984)), is unsound, for the purported analogy
continues to beg the question of
what conduct ought to be
deterred. In
Leon, the Court explained the threat of
evidentiary exclusion ordinarily cannot deter a search that turns
out to be illegal due to a technically invalid warrant "when an
officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search
warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope."
Id. at
468 U. S. 920.
This is because the assigned task of the police officer is to
execute the warrant, not independently to evaluate its compliance
with substantive Fourth Amendment standards:
"It is the magistrate's responsibility to determine whether the
officer's allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue
a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to
question the magistrate's probable-cause determination or his
judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient.
'[O]nce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the
policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law.'"
Id. at
468 U. S. 921
(citation omitted). Under these circumstances, the threat of
evidentiary exclusion is not designed to conform police behavior to
a higher standard than dutiful obedience to the court order. Such
obedience is deemed "objectively reasonable law enforcement
activity,"
id, at
468 U. S. 919, because it is precisely what we
expect of police officers.
In contrast, as explained previously,
see supra, at
494 U. S. 424,
state courts entertaining constitutional challenges to criminal
proceedings are expected independently to evaluate these challenges
in light of their best understanding of prevailing legal standards
embodied in precedent. Hence, selecting any reasonable legal rule
without flouting directly applicable precedent cannot be described
as "objectively reasonable [judicial] activity." Given the
difference between the nature of police conduct at issue in
Leon and judicial interpretation, the majority's proffered
analogy is flawed. It ultimately does no more than borrow language
from
Leon, and in so doing, fails to justify the
majority's decision to embrace a "reasonableness" test as the
appropriate objective of state court adjudication.
[
Footnote 7]
Compare
Desist v. United States, 394 U.
S. 244,
394 U. S.
264-265 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (even a decision
by this Court to overrule one of its own precedents ought not be
deemed a "new rule" unavailable for habeas petitioners whose
convictions have already become final as long as the overruling has
been foreshadowed in prior cases), with
Saffle,
(petitioner seeks application of "new rule"
unless "state
court considering [petitioner's] claim at the time his conviction
became final
must, on the basis of existing precedent,
have concluded that the rule [petitioner] seeks was required by the
Constitution") (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 8]
Congress was aware that popularly elected state judges on
occasion experience various political and institutional pressures,
from which life-tenured federal judges are insulated, to narrow
federal constitutional protections in order to advance the State's
interest in law enforcement.
See, e.g., Reed v. Ross,
468 U. S. 1,
468 U. S. 15
(1984) ("Although there is a remote possibility that a given state
court will be the first to discover a latent constitutional issue
and to order redress if the issue is properly raised, it is far
more likely that the court will fail to appreciate the claim and
reject it out of hand");
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.
S. 545,
443 U. S. 563
(1979) ("There is strong reason to believe that federal [habeas]
review would indeed reveal flaws not appreciated by state judges
perhaps too close to the day-to-day operation of their system to be
able properly to evaluate claims that the system is
defective").
[
Footnote 9]
Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443,
344 U. S. 458
(1953) (for purposes of habeas proceedings, the "state adjudication
carries [only] the weight that federal practice gives to the
conclusion of a court of last resort of another jurisdiction on
federal constitutional issues").
[
Footnote 10]
This congressional intent is further evidenced by Congress'
differential treatment of state court factual and legal
determinations; the former but not the latter are accorded a
presumption of correctness. In
Townsend v. Sain,
372 U. S. 293
(1963), we held that, in specified circumstances, federal district
courts entertaining habeas petitions must hold hearings to
determine evidentiary facts relevant to the legal claims presented.
In other circumstances, evidentiary hearings are discretionary, and
"the district judge may, where the state court has reliably found
the relevant facts, defer to the state court's findings of fact."
Id. at
372 U. S. 318.
We made very clear, however, that the district judge
"may not defer to [the state court's] findings of law. It is the
district judge's duty to apply the applicable federal law to the
state court fact findings independently. The state conclusions of
law may not be given binding weight on habeas."
Ibid.
In 1966, Congress amended the habeas statute to add § 2254(d),
which "was an almost verbatim codification of the standards
delineated in"
Sain. Miller v. Fenton,
474 U. S. 104,
474 U. S. 111
(1985). Congress elevated the Court's exhortation in
Sain
that district courts should defer to state court factfinding after
a full and fair evidentiary hearing to the status of a "mandatory
presumption of correctness."
Id. at
474 U. S.
111-112. But Congress reaffirmed that district courts
should
not defer to state court conclusions of law but,
rather, should make independent determinations of petitioners'
legal claims based on their own best interpretations of relevant
legal principles underlying existing precedent.
See, e.g,
id, at
474 U. S. 112
("subsidiary factual questions" surrounding confession entitled to
presumption of correctness, but voluntariness of confession "is a
matter for independent federal determination").
Cf. Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U. S. 188,
409 U. S. 191
(1972) (as "amended in 1966, § 2244(b) [generally proscribing
successive petitions] shields against senseless repetition of
claims by state prisoners without endangering the principle that
each is entitled, other limitations aside, to a redetermination of
his federal claims by a federal court on habeas corpus").
[
Footnote 11]
See, e.g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.
S. 259,
451 U. S. 275
(1981) (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("Most certainly, this Court does
not sit primarily to correct what we perceive to be mistakes
committed by other tribunals");
Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U. S. 600,
417 U. S.
616-617 (1974) ("This Court's [direct certiorari] review
[of state court criminal proceedings] . . . is discretionary and
depends on numerous factors other than the perceived correctness of
the judgment we are asked to review").
[
Footnote 12]
The Court's decision today to limit
de novo federal
review of alleged constitutional defects in a state criminal
proceeding to direct review by this Court not only thwarts
Congress' intent to provide for effective federal review of such
state proceedings but also threatens to retard the heretofore
robust process by which constitutional principles evolve through
repeated interpretation and application by both state and federal
courts.
Because state courts need not fear federal habeas review so long
as they avoid clearly unreasonable constructions of existing
doctrine, they will have no incentive to reflect carefully about
existing legal principles and thereby to develop novel and more
sophisticated understandings of constitutional guarantees. In the
long run, both the evolution of law and our federalist system
designed to foster it will suffer.
"Federalism is a device for realizing the concepts of decency
and fairness which are among the fundamental principles of liberty
and justice lying at the base of all our civil and political
institutions. Its goals are more surely approached through an
administration of federal habeas corpus which puts the state courts
on the path directed to securing state prisoners against invasions
of the rights guaranteed them by the basic law of the land."
Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise
in Federalism, 7 Utah L.Rev. 423, 442 (1961).
See also
Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and
the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035 (1977).
In addition, a healthy regime of federal habeas review enables
this Court to await the treatment of difficult and novel legal
problems by both state and federal courts before having to address
such issues. Today's decision, together with
Teague,
489 U. S. 288
(1989), means that sensitive issues of criminal procedure will be
litigated by lower federal courts only when adjudicating
federal criminal prosecutions (a relatively small category
of cases) and by state courts that, for reasons discussed above,
are not inclined institutionally to interpret and apply federal
constitutional principles expansively. Rather than have the benefit
of numerous and varied rulings on particular issues before we must
address them, we likely will have the benefit of only a few state
cases embracing narrow constitutional interpretations. We thus
constrict
"[t]he process of percolation allow[ing] a period of exploratory
consideration and experimentation by lower courts before the
Supreme Court ends the process with a nationally binding rule."
Estreicher & Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme
Court's Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 681,
716 (1984). Hence, today's decision not only withdraws the personal
protections properly accorded state prisoners from unconstitutional
confinement, but it also disrupts our ability to structure a
contemplative process of constitutional decisionmaking.
[
Footnote 13]
As noted by Justice Frankfurter:
"Congress could have left the enforcement of federal
constitutional rights governing the administration of criminal
justice in the States exclusively to the State courts. These
tribunals are under the same duty as the federal courts to respect
rights under the United States Constitution."
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at
344 U. S.
499.
"[But Congress] has seen fit to give . . . to the lower federal
courts power to inquire into federal claims, by way of habeas
corpus. . . . [I]t would be in disregard of what Congress has
expressly required to deny State prisoners access to the federal
courts."
Id. at
344 U. S.
508-510.