WILKERSON v. TEXAS, 493 U.S. 924 (1989)
U.S. Supreme Court
WILKERSON v. TEXAS , 493 U.S. 924 (1990)493 U.S. 924
Richard James WILKERSON,
petitioner,
v.
TEXAS. No. 89-5072.
Supreme Court of the United States
October 16, 1989
Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Denied.
Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231, 2950, 2973 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case. Even if I did not hold this view, I would grant the petition to determine whether a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges based in part on racial considerations violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I
Richard Wilkerson, an Afro-American, was convicted of murder by an all-white jury and sentenced to death. During voir dire, the prosecution exercised 4 of its 12 peremptory challenges to remove all of the potential Afro-American jurors. After trial, while petitioner's case was pending on direct review, this Court held that the Equal Protection Clause "forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the assumption that they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97, 1723 ( 1986). Petitioner subsequently raised a Batson claim in a petition for habeas corpus filed in state court.
The trial court concluded that Wilkerson had made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination by the prosecution in the jury selection process. At the Batson hearing, one of the prosecutors who conducted voir dire conceded that race was a factor in his peremptory strike of an Afro-American juror: [ Wilkerson v. Texas 493 U.S. 924 (1990)
]
Responding to questions concerning his peremptory strike of a different juror, the prosecutor indicated that he "thought perhaps [the juror] might make some identification I guess, with the defendant to some extent." Id., at 3-4. The questioning continued:
Finally, on redirect examination by the State, the same prosecutor stated that his perception that an Afro-American juror would extend sympathy to an Afro-American defendant was "[o]ne of the many considerations [for striking a particular juror] but nothing major about that." Id., at 76.
The trial court nonetheless concluded that the prosecutors "did
not exercise peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner to
exclude venirepersons based upon racial considerations, nor did
they, in any way, purposefully or deliberately deny jury
participation to black persons because of race." Id., at 10. The
court based this legal conclusion on several pages of factual
findings that relate in detail the prosecution's race-neutral
explanations for its peremptory challenges to the Afro- American
venirepersons. Unaccountably, these findings do not mention, much
less discuss, the prosecution's open admissions that race played a
role in its decision to prevent the Afro-American members of the
venire from serving on the petit jury. This omission in the state
court's factual findings provides ample justification for this
Court to dispense with the traditional deference, now codified by
statute, that such findings are accorded on federal review. See 28
U.S.C. 2254(d)(8) (1982 ed.) (presumption of correctness overcome
if a federal court concludes that a state court's "factual
determination[s] [are] not fairly supported by the record").
Accordingly, this case is properly characterized as one involving
mixed prosecutorial mo- [493 U.S. 924 , 926]
U.S. Supreme Court
WILKERSON v. TEXAS , 493 U.S. 924 (1990) 493 U.S. 924 Richard James WILKERSON, petitioner,v.
TEXAS. No. 89-5072. Supreme Court of the United States October 16, 1989 Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Denied. Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting. Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231, 2950, 2973 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case. Even if I did not hold this view, I would grant the petition to determine whether a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges based in part on racial considerations violates the Equal Protection Clause. I Richard Wilkerson, an Afro-American, was convicted of murder by an all-white jury and sentenced to death. During voir dire, the prosecution exercised 4 of its 12 peremptory challenges to remove all of the potential Afro-American jurors. After trial, while petitioner's case was pending on direct review, this Court held that the Equal Protection Clause "forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the assumption that they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97, 1723 ( 1986). Petitioner subsequently raised a Batson claim in a petition for habeas corpus filed in state court. The trial court concluded that Wilkerson had made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination by the prosecution in the jury selection process. At the Batson hearing, one of the prosecutors who conducted voir dire conceded that race was a factor in his peremptory strike of an Afro-American juror: [ Wilkerson v. Texas 493 U.S. 924 (1990) ] Page 493 U.S. 924 , 925