Insurance companies commonly enter into reinsurance agreements,
whereby the reinsurer pays the primary insurer, or "ceding
company," an up-front fee -- a "ceding commission" -- and agrees to
assume the ceding company's liabilities on the reinsured policies
in return for the future income generated from the policies and
their associated reserve accounts. Under an "assumption"
reinsurance agreement, the reinsurer steps into the ceding
company's shoes, becoming directly liable to the policyholders and
receiving all premiums directly. In contrast, under an indemnity
reinsurance agreement, the reinsurer assumes no direct liability,
instead reimbursing the ceding company for a specified percentage
of the claims and expenses attributable to the risks that have been
insured and receiving a like percentage of the premiums generated
by the insurance of those risks. In 1975 and 1976, petitioner
entered into four indemnity reinsurance agreements on life
insurance policies written by Transport Life Insurance Company, the
ceding company, agreeing to pay Transport ceding commissions.
Sections 801-820 of the Internal Revenue Code -- which relate to
life insurance companies -- do not specifically address the tax
treatment of indemnity reinsurance ceding commissions. On its
income tax returns for the years in question, petitioner claimed
deductions for the full amount of the commissions. Respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions on the
ground that the commissions had to be capitalized and amortized
over the useful life of the reinsurance agreements, a 7-year
period, but the Tax Court reversed. The Court of Appeals, in turn,
reversed, holding that ceding commissions are not currently
deductible. It reasoned that, since they represent payments to
acquire an asset within an income producing life that extends
substantially beyond one year, the payments must be amortized over
the estimated life of the asset.
Held: Ceding commissions paid under an indemnity
reinsurance agreement must be amortized over the anticipated life
of the agreement. Pp.
491 U. S.
249-260.
(a) Such commissions represent an investment in the future
income stream from the reinsured policies and, as such, should be
treated in the same manner as commissions involved in assumption
reinsurance, which
Page 491 U. S. 245
must be capitalized and amortized.
See 26 CFR §
1.817-4(d). This analogy is appropriate, since none of the
differences between indemnity and assumption reinsurance goes to
the function and purpose of ceding commissions. Whether the
reinsurer assumes direct liability to the policyholder in no way
alters the commissions' economic role. Less compelling is
petitioner's analogy to agents' commissions incurred by a life
insurance company in issuing directly written insurance, which are
currently deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses
under § 809(d)(2). The agent's commission in a direct insurance
setting is an administrative expense -- akin to a salary and other
sales expenses of writing new policies -- to remunerate a third
party who helps facilitate the sale, whereas the payment in the
reinsurance setting is for the asset sold by the ceding company,
rather than for services. Even accepting that petitioner's analogy
were true, this would not undermine the basic character of ceding
commissions as capital expenditures, but would, at most, prove that
Congress decided to carve out an exception for agents' commissions,
notwithstanding their arguable character as capital expenses. This
Court will not extend such an exception to other capital
expenditures where Congress has not so provided. Pp.
491 U. S.
249-253.
(b) No Code provision requires that the commissions in question
be currently deductible. They are not ordinary and necessary
business expenses under § 809(d)(12). Nor does § 818(a) -- which
requires life insurance companies to compute their taxes in
accordance with the accounting procedures of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for preparing an
annual statement, except when such procedures would be inconsistent
with accrual accounting rules -- authorize current deduction even
though NAIC prescribes such treatment of ceding commissions. NAIC's
practice is inconsistent with accrual accounting rules, which
require that capital expenditures be amortized. Moreover,
petitioner's reading of § 818(a) is unduly expansive, since it is
inconceivable that Congress intended to delegate to the insurance
industry the core policy determination whether an expense is a
capital outlay or a business expense. Ceding commissions also are
not "return premiums, and premiums and other consideration arising
out of reinsurance ceded," which § 809(c)(1) permits a company to
exclude from the gross premiums included in its tax base, thereby
reducing its taxable income. Such commissions -- which are
up-front, one-time payments to secure a share in a future income
stream and bear no resemblance to premiums -- fall well outside §
809(c)(1)'s intended purpose, which is to except from the general
definition of premium income a small, residual category of payments
that resemble premiums but, because they in fact never really
accrued to the company that nominally receives them, do not fairly
represent income to the recipient. Petitioner's reading of §
809(c)(1) is
Page 491 U. S. 246
highly implausible, since it is unlikely that Congress would
have subsumed a major deduction within the fine details of its
definition of premium income, rather than including it with the
other deductions discussed in § 809(d). Pp.
491 U. S.
253-260.
843 F.2d 201, affirmed.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and SCALIA, JJ.,
joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN
and O'CONNOR JJ., joined,
post, p.
491 U. S.
260.
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The arcane but financially important question before us is
whether ceding commissions paid by a reinsurance company to a
direct insurer under a contract for indemnity reinsurance are fully
deductible in the year tendered, or instead must be amortized over
the anticipated life of the reinsurance agreements.
I
This case involves the workings of the reinsurance industry. In
order to spread the risks on policies they have written or to
reduce required reserves, insurance companies commonly enter into
reinsurance agreements. Under these agreements, the reinsurer pays
the primary insurer, or "ceding company," a negotiated amount and
agrees to assume the
Page 491 U. S. 247
ceding company's liabilities on the reinsured policies. In
return, the reinsurer receives the future income generated from the
policies and their associated reserve accounts.
Reinsurance comes in two basic types, assumption reinsurance and
indemnity reinsurance. In the case of assumption reinsurance, the
reinsurer steps into the shoes of the ceding company with respect
to the reinsured policy, assuming all its liabilities and its
responsibility to maintain required reserves against potential
claims. The assumption reinsurer thereafter receives all premiums
directly and becomes directly liable to the holders of the policies
it has reinsured.
In indemnity reinsurance, which is at issue in this case, it is
the ceding company that remains directly liable to its
policyholders, and that continues to pay claims and collect
premiums. The indemnity reinsurer assumes no direct liability to
the policyholders. Instead, it agrees to indemnify, or reimburse,
the ceding company for a specified percentage of the claims and
expenses attributable to the risks that have been reinsured, and
the ceding company turns over to it a like percentage of the
premiums generated by the insurance of those risks.
Both the assumption and the indemnity reinsurer ordinarily pay
an up-front fee, known as a "ceding commission," to the ceding
company. [
Footnote 1] The issue
in this case is whether ceding commissions for indemnity
reinsurance may be deducted by the reinsurer in the year in which
they are paid, or whether they must be capitalized over the
estimated life of the underlying policies. Petitioner writes and
reinsures life, accident, and health insurance. In 1975 and 1976,
petitioner entered into four indemnity reinsurance agreements to
reinsure
Page 491 U. S. 248
blocks of life insurance policies written by Transport Life
Insurance Company, the ceding company. The agreements required
petitioner to indemnify Transport for 76.6% of Transport's
liabilities under the block of reinsured policies. [
Footnote 2] Petitioner also contracted to pay
ceding commissions of $680,000 for the 1975 pair of agreements and
$852,000 for the 1976 pair of agreements. In addition, petitioner
paid Transport a "finder's fee" of $13,600 in 1975, which the
parties agree is subject to the same tax treatment as the ceding
commissions.
On its federal income tax returns for 1975 and 1976, petitioner
claimed deductions for the full amount of the ceding
Page 491 U. S. 249
commissions and the finder's fee. The Commissioner disallowed
the deductions, concluding that the ceding commissions and finder's
fee had to be capitalized and amortized over the useful life of the
reinsurance agreements, a period later stipulated to be seven
years. Petitioner then filed for review in the Tax Court, which
agreed with petitioner that the ceding commissions could be
deducted in full in the year of payment.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding
that ceding commissions are not currently deductible. 843 F.2d 201
(1988). The Court of Appeals reasoned that ceding commissions
represent payments to acquire an asset with an income producing
life that extends substantially beyond one year, and that, under
fundamental principles of taxation law, such payments must be
amortized over the estimated life of the asset.
To resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals, [
Footnote 3] we granted certiorari. 488 U.S.
980 (1988).
II
This case is initially a battle of analogies. The tax treatment
of life insurance companies is prescribed in Part I of Subchapter L
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. §§ 801-820 (1970
ed. and Supp. V). Given that these provisions do not specify in
explicit terms whether ceding commissions for indemnity reinsurance
may be taken as current deductions, the parties each argue that the
tax treatment of allegedly analogous payments should be
controlling. Petitioner analogizes to the tax treatment of "agents'
commissions and other expenses incurred by a life insurance company
in issuing directly written insurance." Brief for Petitioner 21.
Such expenses of primary insurers are currently deductible under §
809(d)(12) of the Code, which incorporates
Page 491 U. S. 250
the allowance for "ordinary and necessary" business expenses
under § 162(a). [
Footnote 4]
Petitioner argues that indemnity reinsurance is, in effect, a
direct insurance agreement between the reinsurer and the ceding
company. Parties to an indemnity reinsurance agreement, petitioner
points out, stand in the same relation to one another as do the
parties to a conventional insurance policy: in return for a
premium, the reinsurer agrees to reimburse the ceding company in
the event the company becomes liable for certain designated risks.
Petitioner reasons that, just as a direct insurer may currently
deduct the commissions it pays to acquire policies, so should an
indemnity reinsurer be able to deduct currently the ceding
commissions it expends to acquire business.
Respondent counters with an analogy to assumption reinsurance,
the ceding commissions for which, it is well established, must be
capitalized and amortized.
See 26 CFR § 1.817-4(d) (1988).
"[T]here is essentially no economic difference," respondent argues,
"between a ceding commission paid in an assumption reinsurance
transaction and one paid in an indemnity reinsurance transaction."
Brief for Respondent 19-20. In both cases, according to
respondent's analysis, the ceding commission represents payment for
the right to share in the future income stream from the reinsured
policies.
Id. at 18-19.
As the parties' dispute makes clear, indemnity reinsurance bears
some formal and functional similarities to both direct insurance
and assumption reinsurance. But the salient comparison is between
ceding commissions in indemnity reinsurance and their asserted
analogues in the other two forms of insurance. At this level of
inquiry, we agree with respondent that the analogy to ceding
commissions in assumption reinsurance
Page 491 U. S. 251
is the more compelling one. Although indemnity reinsurance is
different from assumption reinsurance in some important ways, none
of them go to the function and purpose of the ceding commissions.
Whether the reinsurer assumes direct liability to the policyholder
in no way alters the economic role that the ceding commissions play
in both kinds of transactions. The only rational business
explanation for the more than $1,500,000 that petitioner paid in
ceding commissions to Transport is that petitioner was investing in
the future earnings on the reinsured policies. The ceding
commissions thus are not administrative expenses on the order of
agents' commissions in direct insurance; rather, they represent
part of the purchase price to acquire the right to a share of
future profits.
The parallels between ceding commissions in indemnity insurance
and agents' commissions in direct insurance, on the other hand, are
chiefly nominal. The commission paid to the insurance agent in a
direct insurance setting is an administrative expense to remunerate
a third party who helps to facilitate the sale; the agent's
commission is akin to a salary, and to other sales expenses of
writing new policies, such as administrative overhead. In the
reinsurance setting, by contrast, the ceding company owns the asset
it is selling, and the reinsurer pays a substantial "commission" as
part of the purchase price to induce the ceding company to part
with the asset it has created; the payment, in other words, is for
the asset itself rather than for services. [
Footnote 5] This point is illustrated
Page 491 U. S. 252
by a comparison with risk premium insurance, which is in effect
like a direct insurance contract between the reinsurer and the
ceding company. In risk premium reinsurance, the reinsurer does not
acquire a future stream of income extending beyond the l-year term
of insurance; rather, in exchange for a premium, it agrees to
indemnify the ceding company against liability to its
policyholders. Not coincidentally, risk premium reinsurance
agreements typically do not involve the payment of ceding
commissions.
See n 1,
supra.
Finally, even if we were to accept petitioner's arguments about
the resemblances between direct insurance and indemnity
reinsurance, it would not undermine the basic character of the
ceding commissions at issue here as capital expenditures.
Petitioner's argument, at most, proves only that Congress decided
to carve out an exception for agents' commissions, notwithstanding
their arguable character as capital expenditures. We would not take
it upon ourselves to extend that exception to other capital
expenditures, notwithstanding firmly established tax principles
requiring capitalization, where Congress has not provided for the
extension. [
Footnote 6]
We therefore agree with respondent that the ceding commissions
paid in respect of indemnity reinsurance, like those involved in
assumption reinsurance, represent an investment in a future income
stream. The general tax treatment of this sort of expense is well
established. Both the Code and our cases long have recognized that
amounts expended to acquire an asset with an income-producing life
extending substantially beyond the taxable year of acquisition must
be capitalized
Page 491 U. S. 253
and amortized over the useful life of the asset.
See 26
U.S.C. § 263 (1970 ed. and Supp. V.);
Commissioner v. Idaho
Power Co., 418 U. S. 1,
418 U. S. 12
(1974);
Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.
S. 572,
397 U. S. 575
(1970);
see also Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States,
364 U. S. 92,
364 U. S. 104
(1960) (the basic purpose of capitalization rules is to "mak[e] a
meaningful allocation of the cost entailed in the use . . . of the
asset to the periods to which it contributes [income] "). Our
agreement with respondent as to the character of ceding commissions
therefore resolves this case, absent some specific statutory
provision indicating that ceding commissions for indemnity
insurance are an exception to the general rule for which Congress
has authorized current deduction. Petitioner offers three possible
sources in Subchapter L of such a specific authorization.
We consider first petitioner's contention that the commissions
are currently deductible under § 809(d)(12) of the Code. That
provision authorizes deductions for "ordinary and
Page 491 U. S. 254
necessary" business expenses as described in § 162(a). It is §
809(d)(12) upon which direct insurers rely in deducting the
commissions paid to their agents. Petitioner argues that there is
no distinction in Subchapter L between direct insurance and
indemnity reinsurance, and therefore that the allowance for direct
insurers applies in the latter context as well. This argument, in
other words, is the statutory hook upon which petitioner hangs its
general submission that its ceding commissions should receive the
same tax treatment as the agents' commissions paid by direct
insurers.
Were we to agree with petitioner's general premise, § 809(d)(12)
would be a logical source of authority to deduct ceding commissions
as ordinary and necessary business expenses. But since we have
rejected petitioner's efforts to analogize ceding commissions to
agents' commissions paid in a direct insurance setting, we
necessarily reject its argument that § 809(d)(12) authorizes the
deduction petitioner claimed. That section does permit petitioner
to deduct ordinary and necessary business expenses such as salaries
and certain administrative costs, but the ceding commissions at
issue in this case do not fall in that category.
Petitioner also relies on § 818(a) of the Code, which requires a
life insurance company to compute its taxes in a manner consistent
with the accounting procedures established by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for purposes of
preparing an annual statement, except when such procedures would be
inconsistent with accrual accounting rules.
See Commissioner v.
Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 433 U.
S. 148,
433 U. S.
158-159 (1977). Petitioner points out that NAIC
practices prescribe the current deduction of ceding commissions,
and argues that the Code, through § 818(a), incorporates the same
prescription. In the first place, we think petitioner's argument
begs the question. Treasury regulations require accrual taxpayers
to amortize the expenses of procuring intangible assets that
produce economic benefits extending over more than one year. Thus,
§ 1.461-1(a)(2) of the Treasury Regulations, 26 CFR § 1.4611(a)(2)
(1987), entitled "Taxpayer using an accrual method," provides
that
"any expenditure which results in the creation of an asset
having a useful life which extends substantially beyond the close
of the taxable year may not be deductible, or may be deductible
only in part, for the taxable year in which incurred. [
Footnote 7]"
Since NAIC practices do not apply where their application would
be inconsistent with accrual accounting rules, they are inapposite
if a ceding commission is properly
Page 491 U. S. 255
characterized as an
"expenditure which results in the creation of an asset having a
useful life which extends substantially beyond the close of the
taxable year."
Petitioner's contention that § 818(a) justifies the deduction
therefore loops back into its general contention that ceding
commissions are up-front expenses, rather than capital
expenditures, a contention which we have rejected.
More important, petitioner's argument rests on an unduly
expansive reading of the reference to the NAIC in § 818(a), one
that would trump many of the precise and careful substantive
sections of the Code. Under petitioner's interpretation, the
fundamental question whether an expense is properly characterized
as a capital outlay which has to be amortized, or instead as an
ordinary business expense subject to immediate deduction, would be
answered by simple reference to accounting procedures in the
industry. It is inconceivable that Congress intended to delegate
such a core policy determination to the NAIC. Indeed, under
petitioner's argument, it appears that ceding commissions for
assumption reinsurance, no less than those for indemnity
reinsurance, should be immediately deductible, because NAIC
accounting principles appear not to distinguish between the two
kinds of ceding commissions.
See Patterson, Underwriting
Income, in Reinsurance 539 (R. Strain ed. 1980). Yet it is common
ground among the parties that ceding commissions for assumption
reinsurance must be amortized, regardless of the treatment they are
accorded under NAIC accounting. As this point suffices to
illustrate, petitioner's interpretation of § 818(a) proves too
much.
Petitioner's remaining statutory argument, based on § 809 (c)(1)
of the Code, is more difficult to dismiss. As part of their
computation of gains from operations, life insurance companies must
calculate the gains from several designated categories, including
"Premiums." Section 809(c)(1) provides the somewhat complicated
formula governing gains
Page 491 U. S. 256
from premiums. The provision instructs the company to take into
account:
"The gross amount of premiums and other consideration (including
advance premiums, deposits, fees, assessments, and consideration in
respect of assuming liabilities under contracts not issued by the
taxpayer) on insurance and annuity contracts (including contracts
supplementary thereto)."
From this amount, the taxpayer is then to subtract:
"return premiums, and premiums and other consideration arising
out of reinsurance ceded. Except in the case of amounts of premiums
or other consideration returned to another life insurance company
in respect of reinsurance ceded, amounts returned where the amount
is not fixed in the contract but depends on the experience of the
company or the discretion of the management shall not be included
in return premiums."
26 U.S.C. § 809(c)(1) (1970 ed.).
The sum of the amounts identified in the first clause of the
provision minus the amounts excluded in the second part of the
provision represents the gross amount of premium income earned by a
life insurance company. This figure is then added to the other
sources of income identified in §§ 809(b) and (c), and from that
total the life insurance company subtracts any allowable deductions
identified in § 809(d). The result represents the company's net
gain or loss from operations, which is the basis of its tax bill.
In this way, the items identified in the latter part of § 809(c)(1)
which are subtracted from premium income contribute eventually to a
reduction in the insurance company's taxable income.
Petitioner contends that § 809(c)(1) allows it to subtract the
ceding commissions it pays for indemnity reinsurance from its
premium income in either of two ways. The commissions, petitioner
argues, qualify under the latter part of § 809(c)(1) both as
"return premiums" and as "premiums and
Page 491 U. S. 257
other consideration arising out of reinsurance ceded." In
construing the statutory phrase "return premiums," petitioner
relies on the definition of that phrase in the Treasury
Regulations. Title 26 CFR § 1.809-4(a)(1)(ii) (1988) provides:
"The term 'return premiums' means amounts returned or credited
which are fixed by contract and do not depend on the experience of
the company or the discretion of the management. Thus, such term
includes amounts refunded due to policy cancellations or
erroneously computed premiums. Furthermore, amounts of premiums or
other consideration returned to another life insurance company in
respect of reinsurance ceded shall be included in return
premiums."
Thus, to compress petitioner's labyrinthine statutory argument,
petitioner should prevail in this case if ceding commissions for
indemnity reinsurance are fairly encompassed in either the
statutory term "premiums and other consideration arising out of
reinsurance ceded" or the regulatory definition "consideration
returned to another life insurance company in respect of
reinsurance ceded." [
Footnote
8]
It cannot be denied that the language on which petitioner
relies, taken in isolation, could be read to authorize the tax
treatment it seeks. Ceding commissions for indemnity reinsurance
might loosely be described as consideration "arising out of" or "in
respect of reinsurance ceded." But when the statutory and
regulatory language is parsed more carefully, petitioner's position
becomes dubious, and when the language is read against the
background of the statutory structure, it becomes untenable.
The difficulty with including ceding commissions within the
regulatory definition of "return premiums" is that ceding
Page 491 U. S. 258
commissions are not "
returned to" the ceding company at
all. The commissions never belong to the ceding company until they
are paid over in exchange for the right to share in the future
income from the reinsured policies. The term "return premiums" more
naturally refers to premiums that the insuring or reinsuring
company has been paid, and then must remit to the individual
policyholder or ceding company, as, for example, pursuant to an
experience-rated refund clause, which readjusts the amounts of
policy premiums paid over to the ceding company to reflect
unanticipated savings.
As for the statutory language "premiums and other consideration
arising out of reinsurance ceded," ceding commissions do not find a
snug fit within this phrase either. Unlike individual policyholders
and, in the case of risk premium reinsurance, ceding companies,
reinsurers do not pay premiums. Therefore, a plausible reading of
this language is that it refers only to payments from the ceding
company to the reinsurer, as, for example, when the ceding company
is simply passing on premiums it has received from a policyholder,
but is obligated to deliver to a reinsurer under an indemnity
reinsurance agreement. The "other consideration" phrase, while
admittedly open-ended, can be read in quite a sensible way as
tag-along language that refers to analogous expenditures of this
kind, rather than as a broad catchall provision that encompasses
payments of any kind from any party. This reading is supported by a
comparison with the identical language in the first portion of §
809(c)(1), which also furnishes possible content to "other
consideration." That phrase would appear to refer only to
incidental items such as "advance premiums, deposits, [and] fees"
paid, like premiums, to the reinsurer from the ceding company.
What this closer reading augurs a broader examination of the
statutory structure confirms: ceding commissions are not at all the
kind of payments that Congress sought to permit the taxpayer to
exclude from gross premiums in § 809(c)(1). In fact, deduction of
ceding commissions has nothing to do
Page 491 U. S. 259
with the calculations prescribed by that provision. The purpose
of § 809(c)(1) is to ensure that "premium income" is included in a
company's tax base, and to specify exactly what is and is not
encompassed by that term. The provision begins with a general
definition of premium income, which it then fine-tunes in the
latter part of the section by excluding certain items that might
otherwise be considered to come within the general definition. As
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has written, the latter
part of § 809(c)(1)
"serves simply to eliminate from the 'gross amount of premiums
and other consideration' those portions of premiums received which
do not, in the end, 'belong' to the company in question, but which
must either be returned to the policyholder or turned over to or
shared with another company under an indemnity reinsurance
agreement."
Modern American Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 830 F.2d
110, 113-114 (CA8 1987) (footnote omitted).
Thus, we read the latter part of § 809(c)(1) as a fine-tuning
mechanism that permits the exclusion from premium income of phantom
premiums that might be encompassed within a strict definition of
premiums, but that in fact never really accrued to the company that
nominally receives them. This category might include, for example,
experience-rated refunds; or premium payments that have been
refunded because of an overcharge or the cancellation of a policy;
or premiums that the ceding company has received from policyholders
and must pass on to an indemnity reinsurer.
See S.Rep. No.
291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 39, 54 (1959). But the ceding
commissions that are at issue in this case fall well outside what
we take to be the intended purpose of the provision, which is to
except from the general provision a small, residual category of
payments that resemble premiums but do not fairly represent income
to the recipient. There is no need for careful delineation of
ceding commissions as apart from the general statutory category of
premium income, because ceding commissions never would be thought
to come
Page 491 U. S. 260
within that category in the first place. Unlike the above
examples, ceding commissions bear no resemblance to premiums;
rather, they are an up-front, one-time payment to secure a share in
a future income stream.
Finally, we note that petitioner's reading of § 809(c)(1) is
highly implausible in light of the intricate attention to detail
displayed throughout Subchapter L. To accept petitioner's
submission, we would have to conclude that Congress subsumed a
major deduction within the fine details of its definition of
premium income. This would be especially surprising given that §
809(c), in its entirety, concerns gross income; deductions are
treated in a separate subsection, § 809(d). We find it incredible
that Congress, with but a whisper, would have tucked away in the
fine points of its definition of premium income a deduction of this
magnitude.
III
We have concluded that ceding commissions are costs incurred to
acquire an asset with an income-producing life that may extend
substantially beyond one year. General tax principles provide that
such costs must be amortized and capitalized over the useful life
of the asset, and no specific provision in the Code dictates a
contrary result. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore
is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
There is a form of indemnity reinsurance known as risk-premium,
or yearly-renewable-term, reinsurance that does not involve ceding
commissions. Under risk-premium reinsurance, much like a normal
insurance policy, the ceding company typically pays an annual
premium to the reinsurer in return for which the reinsurer promises
to reimburse the ceding company should identified losses arise.
[
Footnote 2]
The parties structured the agreements so as to require the
actual transfer of only a small amount of cash. To understand this
arrangement, it is necessary to touch on the differences between
the two types of coinsurance, which is the most common form of
indemnity reinsurance. These two types are conventional coinsurance
and modified coinsurance. The two differ in their effect on the
reserves that insurance companies are required to maintain against
potential liabilities, and which represent essentially an estimate
of the present value of future benefits less future premiums. In a
conventional coinsurance agreement, the ceding company pays a
"reinsurance commission" to the reinsurer in an amount equal to the
reserves that the reinsurer must establish to support the
liabilities assumed; in a modified coinsurance agreement, the
ceding company continues to maintain the reserves and transfers to
the reinsurer only the investment income that the reserves
generate. Insurance companies frequently pair conventional and
modified coinsurance agreements in such a proportion that the
ceding commission is roughly equal to the reinsurance commission,
with the net effect being that very little money changes hands. So
it was in this case: petitioner entered into two modified
coinsurance agreements covering 70% of a block of policies, and two
conventional coinsurance agreements covering 6.6% of the same block
of policies; the total ceding commissions were designed to be
roughly equal to the reserves petitioner was required to establish
under the conventional agreements, with the result being that
petitioner actually paid Transport a total of less than $5,000. The
parties elected to treat the modified coinsurance agreements for
tax purposes as if they were conventional coinsurance agreements,
which the Code then permitted. 26 U.S.C. § 820 (1976 ed.). Thus,
the difference between modified and conventional coinsurance
agreements is, mercifully, of no legal significance in this
case.
[
Footnote 3]
Compare Prairie States Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
828 F.2d 1222 (CA8 1987) (requiring capitalization),
with Merit
Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 853 F.2d 1435 (CA7 1988)
(permitting current deduction).
[
Footnote 4]
Although the Code does not explicitly permit primary insurers to
deduct agent's commissions in the year in which they are paid, such
deductions have been permitted historically, and Congress has
recognized and approved of the historic practice.
See
S.Rep. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 7, 9 (1959); H.R.Rep.
No. 98-432, p. 1428 (1984).
[
Footnote 5]
Petitioner suggests that the ceding commission is designed in
part to reimburse the ceding company for the deductible
administrative costs it originally incurred in issuing the
policies. Even assuming this is so, however, petitioner's argument
confuses the character of the payment to the taxpayer with its
function to the seller. Whether the payment represents a partial
reimbursement of deductible expenses to the seller is not pivotal,
for, as respondent points out, that is often the case with capital
assets.
See Brief for Respondent 19, n. 11. The important
point is not how the purchase price breaks down for the seller, but
whether the taxpayer is investing in an asset or economic interest
with an income-producing life that extends substantially beyond the
taxable year. For this reason, contrary to JUSTICE STEVENS'
suggestion,
see post at
491 U. S. 261,
n., whether the receipt of the ceding commission creates a capital
gain for the ceding company is of no relevance in this case.
[
Footnote 6]
Likewise, we do not mean to imply that other expenses that do
bear a greater resemblance to agents' commissions
would be
currently deductible, notwithstanding the strictures of the Code.
We confront today only the specific tax treatment of ceding
commissions for indemnity reinsurance.
[
Footnote 7]
Petitioner suggests that § 1.461-1(a)(2) is not an accrual
accounting rule, because its prescription applies equally to
cash-basis taxpayers. Under petitioner's argument, NAIC accounting
principles would dictate all questions of accounting, save in those
rare instances where Congress or the Commissioner had promulgated a
special rule applicable only to accrual-basis taxpayers. We decline
to interpret a statutory provision requiring life insurance
companies to compute their taxable income "under an accrual method
of accounting," § 818(a)(1), to prescribe application of the rules
of accrual accounting only to the extent that they are inconsistent
with the rules of cash-basis accounting.
[
Footnote 8]
As petitioner points out, 26 CFR § 1.809-4(a)(1)(iii) (1988)
specifies that the term "reinsurance ceded" in § 809(c)(1) includes
indemnity reinsurance, but not assumption reinsurance.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR
join, dissenting.
Charting one's course through the intricacies of the Internal
Revenue Code on the basis of first principles, rather than
statutory text, can be hazardous. Intuitively, the Court concludes
that the ceding commission a reinsurer pays to indemnify a direct
insurer on its policy risks constitutes the purchase price for a
capital asset because it produces a stream of future income. The
same intuition should lead to the conclusion that the commission a
direct insurer pays to acquire policies that will bring future
profits constitutes a
Page 491 U. S. 261
capital expenditure. Yet everyone agrees that the latter payment
is currently deductible.
See ante at
491 U. S. 250.
*
If the Court had begun its analysis with the text of 26 U.S.C. §
809 (1970 ed.) and the regulations promulgated thereunder --
instead of waiting until after it had decided the case on its view
of first principles to respond to the statutory provision -- it
might well have recognized the merit in the taxpayer's position.
Section 809(c)(1) distinguishes between assumption and indemnity
reinsurance, providing that return premiums "arising out of" an
indemnity reinsurance transaction are deductible from gross
premiums received.
See ante at ___. The Treasury
Regulations thus confirm that, while payments made by an assumption
reinsurer for purchases of policies must be amortized, Treas.Reg. §
1.8174(d)(2)(ii)(B), 26 CFR § 1.817-4(d)(2)(ii)(B) (1988),
"consideration returned to another life insurance company [by an
indemnity reinsurer] in respect of reinsurance ceded" is
immediately deductible from the reinsurer's gross premiums.
Treas.Reg. § 1.809-4(a)(1)(ii), 26 CFR § 1.809-4(a)(1)(ii) (1988).
There is no warrant in the text for the Court's rulings that
assumption reinsurance and indemnity reinsurance should be treated
alike for tax purposes,
ante at
491 U. S. 251,
and that experience refunds constitute return premiums, while
ceding commissions do not.
See ante at
491 U. S.
257-258. In the context of this transaction, in which
the ceding commission was netted against the initial reinsurance
premium, the commission quite literally is a sum that the
"reinsuring company has been paid and then must remit to the . . .
ceding company."
Ante at
491 U. S. 258.
In all events, for the reasons stated in full in Judge Will's
opinion for the Court of Appeals for the
Page 491 U. S. 262
Seventh Circuit in
Merit Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner,
853 F.2d 1435 (1988),
cert. pending, No. 88-955, I would
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
* Similarly, if a ceding commission constituted a capital asset
for the purchaser in an indemnity reinsurance transaction, the
receipt of a commission should, at least in some circumstances,
create a capital gain for the seller. Yet, as the Commissioner
conceded at oral argument, the receipt of the ceding commission is
taxable as ordinary income.
See Tr. of Oral Arg.
20-21.