The Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) -- which enacts a
comprehensive scheme to assure that handicapped children may
achieve a free public education appropriate for their needs --
provides,
inter alia, that parents may challenge the
appropriateness of their child's "individualized education program"
(IEP) in an administrative hearing with subsequent judicial review.
Respondent Muth (hereinafter respondent) requested a hearing to
contest the local school district's IEP for his son Alex, who is
handicapped within the meaning of the EHA. Before the hearing was
convened, respondent enrolled Alex in a private school. Alex's IEP
then was revised and declared appropriate by the hearing examiner,
and that decision was affirmed by Pennsylvania's secretary of
education more than one year after the original hearing. While the
administrative proceedings were underway, respondent brought suit
in the Federal District Court against the school district and the
secretary challenging the appropriateness of the IEP and the
validity of the administrative proceedings and seeking, among other
things, reimbursement for Alex's private school tuition and
attorney's fees. The court found that, while the revised IEP was
appropriate, procedural flaws had delayed the administrative
process and that, since the EHA had abrogated the Commonwealth's
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, the school district and the
Commonwealth were jointly and severally liable for reimbursement of
Alex's tuition and attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held: The EHA does not abrogate the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit, and, thus, the Amendment bars
respondent's attempt to collect tuition reimbursement from
Pennsylvania. Pp.
491 U. S.
227-232.
(a) Congress may abrogate the States' immunity only by making
its intention "unmistakably
Page 491 U. S. 224
clear in the language of the statute."
Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234. Pp.
491 U. S.
227-228.
(b) Respondent's nontextual arguments -- that abrogation is
necessary to meet the EHA's goals and that amendments to the
Rehabilitation Act, though not retroactively applicable to
respondent's suit, evince a previous intention to abrogate immunity
from EHA suits -- have no bearing on the abrogation analysis, since
congressional intent must be unmistakably clear in the statute's
language. Although nontextual evidence might have some weight under
a normal exercise in statutory construction, it is generally
irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. The argument that application of
the
Atascadero standard is unfair in this case because
Congress could not have foreseen that application is premised on an
unrealistic view of the legislative process. It is unlikely that
the Ninety-fourth Congress, taking careful stock of the state of
Eleventh Amendment law, would drop coy hints but stop short of
making its intention manifest. Pp.
491 U. S.
228-230.
(c) The EHA provisions relied on by the Court of Appeals -- the
preamble's statement of purpose, the 1986 amendments dealing with
attorney's fees, and the authorization for judicial review -- do
not address abrogation even in oblique terms. The statutory
structure -- which, unlike the
Atascadero statute, makes
frequent references to States -- lends force only to a permissible
inference that States are logical defendants, and is not an
unequivocal declaration of congressional intent to abrogate. Pp.
491 U.S. 231-232.
839 F.2d 113, reversed and remanded.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined.
SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
491 U. S. 233.
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL,
BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined,
post, p.
491 U. S. 233.
BLACKMUN, J.,
post, p.
491 U. S. 243,
and STEVENS, J.,
post, p.
491 U. S. 243,
filed dissenting opinions.
Page 491 U. S. 225
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether the Education of the
Handicapped Act abrogates the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit in the federal courts.
I
The Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), 84 Stat. 175,
as
amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1400
et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp.
V.), enacts a comprehensive scheme to assure that handicapped
children may receive a free public education appropriate to their
needs. To achieve these ends, the Act mandates certain procedural
requirements for participating state and local educational
agencies. In particular, the Act guarantees to parents the right to
participate in the development of an "individualized education
program" (IEP) for their handicapped child, and to challenge the
appropriateness of their child's IEP in an administrative hearing
with subsequent judicial review.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415
(1982 ed. and Supp. V);
School Committee of Burlington v.
Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.
S. 359,
471 U. S. 361
(1985).
Alex Muth, the son of respondent Russell Muth (hereinafter
respondent), is a bright child, but one handicapped within the
meaning of the EHA by a language learning disability and associated
emotional problems. Alex was enrolled in public school in the
Central Bucks School District of Pennsylvania from 1980 to 1983. In
the summer of 1983, Russell Muth requested a statutory
administrative hearing to challenge the district's IEP for Alex. In
September, shortly before the hearing convened, Muth enrolled Alex
in a private school for learning disabled children for the coming
school year.
The hearing examiner found that Alex's original IEP was
inappropriate, and made a number of recommendations. Both
respondent and the school district then appealed the decision to
the secretary of education, as provided under Pennsylvania law,
see 22 Pa.Code § 13.32(24) (1988). The secretary remanded
the case to the hearing examiner with instructions
Page 491 U. S. 226
to the school district to revise Alex's IEP (1988). After the
district did so, the hearing examiner issued a decision declaring
the revised IEP appropriate, and the secretary affirmed that
decision on October 24, 1984, more than a year after the original
due process hearing.
While the administrative proceedings were underway, Muth brought
this suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the
school district and the state secretary of education, whose
successor is petitioner here. As amended, Muth's complaint alleged
that the district's IEP for Alex was inappropriate and that the
Commonwealth's administrative proceedings had violated the
procedural requirements of the EHA in two respects: the assignment
of review to the secretary, an allegedly partial officer, and the
delays occasioned by the secretary's remand to the hearing
examiner. Respondent requested declaratory and injunctive relief,
reimbursement for Alex's private school tuition in 1983-1984, and
attorNey's fees.
The District Court found various procedural infirmities in
Pennsylvania's administrative scheme, and entered summary judgment
on Muth's procedural claims. The court held a hearing to resolve
the remaining issues in the case and to determine the proper remedy
for the procedural violations. The court concluded that, while the
district's proposed IEP for 1983-1984 had been appropriate within
the meaning of the EHA, Muth was entitled to reimbursement for
Alex's tuition that year because the procedural flaws had delayed
the administrative process. The District Court further determined
that the school district and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were
jointly and severally liable, agreeing with Muth that the EHA
abrogated Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. The
coUrt also awarded attorney's fees, assessed jointly and severally
against the school district and the Commonwealth.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed.
Muth v. Central Bucks School Dist., 839 F.2d
Page 491 U. S. 227
113 (1988). Most pertinent for this case, the Court of Appeals
agreed with the District Court that the Eleventh Amendment did not
bar the reimbursement award against the Commonwealth. The court
concluded that
"the text of EHA and its legislative history leave no doubt that
Congress intended to abrogate the 11th amendment immunity of the
states."
Id. at 128.
To resolve a conflict among the Circuits, we granted certiorari
sub nom. Gilhool v. Muth, 488 U.S. 815 (1988), on the
question whether the EHA abrogates the States' sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment.
Compare David D. v. Dartmouth
School Committee, 775 F.2d 411 (CA1 1985) (finding
abrogation),
with Gary A. v. New Trier High School Dist. No.
203, 796 F.2d 940 (CA7 1986),
Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d
1470 (CA9 1986), and
Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (CA8
1982) (finding no abrogation). We now reverse.
II
We have recognized that Congress, acting in the exercise of its
enforcement authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
[
Footnote 1] may abrogate the
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445,
427 U. S. 456
(1976). We have stressed, however, that abrogation of sovereign
immunity upsets "the fundamental constitutional balance between the
Federal Government and the States,"
Atascadero State Hospital
v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234,
473 U. S. 238
(1985), placing a considerable strain on "
[t]he principles of
federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine,'" Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S.
89, 465 U. S. 100
(1984), quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.
S. 678, 437 U. S. 691
(1978). To temper Congress' acknowledged powers of
Page 491 U. S. 228
abrogation with due concern for the Eleventh Amendment's role as
an essential component of our constitutional structure, we have
applied a simple but stringent test:
"Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured
immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."
Atascadero, supra, at
473 U. S.
242.
In concluding that the EHA contains the requisite clear
statement of congressional intent, the Court of Appeals rested
principally on three textual provisions. The court first cited the
Act's preamble, which states Congress' finding that
"it is in the national interest that the Federal government
assist State and local efforts to provide programs to meet the
education needs of handicapped children in order to assure equal
protection of the law."
20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(9). Second, and most important for the Court
of Appeals, was the Act's judicial review provision, which permits
parties aggrieved by the administrative process to
"bring a civil action . . . in any State court of competent
jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without
regard to the amount in controversy."
20 U.S.C. 1415(e)(2). Finally, the Court of Appeals pointed to a
1986 amendment to the EHA, which states that the Act's provision
for a reduction of attorney's fees shall not apply
"if the court finds that the State or local educational agency
unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the action or
proceeding or there was a violation of this section."
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(G) (1982 ed., Supp. V). In the view of
the Court of Appeals, this amendment represented an express
statement of Congress' understanding that States can be parties in
civil actions brought under the EHA.
Respondent supplements these points with some nontextual
arguments. Most notably, respondent argues that abrogation is
"necessary . . . to achieve the EHA's goals," Brief for Respondent
Muth 37; and that the 1986 amendments to another statute, the
Rehabilitation Act, 100 Stat.
Page 491 U. S. 229
1845, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1982 ed., Supp. IV), expressly
abrogate state immunity from suits brought under the EHA, Brief for
Respondent Muth 30. In connection with the latter argument,
respondent recognizes that the Rehabilitation Act Amendments
expressly apply only to "violations that occur in whole or in part
after October 21, 1986." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(b) (1982 ed.,
Supp.IV). Respondent contends, however, that,
"[a]lthough the amendment became effective after Muth initially
filed suit, . . . the overwhelming support for the amendment shows
that it reflects Congress' intent in originally enacting the EHA
[in 1975]."
Brief for Respondent Muth 32, n. 48. [
Footnote 2]
We turn first to respondent's nontextual arguments, because they
are the easier to dismiss. It is far from certain that the EHA
cannot function if the States retain immunity, or that the 1986
amendments to the Rehabilitation Act are a useful guide to
congressional intent in 1975. Indeed, the language of the 1986
amendments to the Rehabilitation Act appears to cut against
respondent. Without intending in any way to prejudge the
Rehabilitation Act Amendments, we note that a comparison of the
language in the amendments with the language of the EHA serves only
to underscore the difference in the two statutes, and the absence
of any clear statement of abrogation in the EHA. The amendments to
the Rehabilitation Act read in pertinent part,
"A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a
violation of [several enumerated provisions] or the provisions of
any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients
of
Page 491 U. S. 230
Federal financial assistance."
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (1) (1982 ed., Supp.IV). When measured
against such explicit consideration of abrogation of the Eleventh
Amendment, the EHA's treatment of the question appears ambiguous,
at best.
More importantly, however, respondent's contentions are beside
the point. Our opinion in
Atascadero should have left no
doubt that we will conclude Congress intended to abrogate sovereign
immunity only if its intention is "unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute."
Atascadero, supra, at
473 U. S. 242.
Lest
Atascadero be thought to contain any ambiguity, we
reaffirm today that, in this area of the law, evidence of
congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual.
Respondent's evidence is neither. In particular, we reject the
approach of the Court of Appeals, according to which,
"[w]hile the text of the federal legislation must bear evidence
of such an intention, the legislative history may still be used as
a resource in determining whether Congress' intention to lift the
bar has been made sufficiently manifest."
839 F.2d at 128. Legislative history generally will be
irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. If Congress' intention is
"unmistakably clear in the language of the statute," recourse to
legislative history will be unnecessary; if Congress' intention is
not unmistakably clear, recourse to legislative history will be
futile, because, by definition, the rule of
Atascadero
will not be met.
The gist of the dissent's argument appears to be that
application of the governing law in
Atascadero is unfair
in this case. The dissent complains that we "resor[t] to an
interpretative standard that Congress could have anticipated only
with the aid of a particularly effective crystal ball."
Post at
491 U. S. .
This complaint appears to be premised on an unrealistic and cynical
view of the legislative process. We find it difficult to believe
that the Ninety-fourth Congress, taking careful stock of the state
of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it
Page 491 U. S. 231
would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention
manifest. Rather, the salient point in our view is that it cannot
be said with perfect confidence that Congress in fact intended in
1975 to abrogate sovereign immunity, and imperfect confidence will
not suffice given the special constitutional concerns in this area.
Cf. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361,
415 U. S.
373-374 (1974) (federal statute will not be construed to
preclude judicial review of constitutional challenges absent clear
and convincing evidence of congressional intent).
We now turn our attention to the proper focus of an inquiry into
congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity, the language of the
statute. We cannot agree that the textual provisions on which the
Court of Appeals relied, or any other provisions of the EHA,
demonstrate with unmistakable clarity that Congress intended to
abrogate the States' immunity from suit. The EHA makes no reference
whatsoever to either the Eleventh Amendment or the States'
sovereign immunity.
Cf. supra at
491 U. S. 228.
Nor does any provision cited by the Court of Appeals address
abrogation in even oblique terms, much less with the clarity
Atascadero requires. The general statement of legislative
purpose in the Act's preamble simply has nothing to do with the
States' sovereign immunity. The 1986 amendment to the EHA deals
only with attorney's fees, and does not alter or speak to what
parties are subject to suit. Respondent conceded as much at oral
argument, acknowledging that "the 1986 EHA Amendments . . . are not
directly relevant [here] because they concerned only attorney's
fees." Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. Finally, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), the
centerpiece of the Court of Appeals' textual analysis, provides
judicial review for aggrieved parties, but in no way intimates that
the States' sovereign immunity is abrogated. As we made plain in
Atascadero,
"A general authorization for suit in federal court is not the
kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment."
473 U.S. at
473 U. S.
246.
Page 491 U. S. 232
At its core, respondent's attempt to distinguish this case from
Atascadero appears to reduce to the proposition that the
EHA "is replete with references to the states," whereas, in
"
Atascadero . . . the statutory language at issue did not
include mention of states." Brief for Respondent Muth 32-33. We
recognize that the EHA's frequent reference to the States, and its
delineation of the States' important role in securing an
appropriate education for handicapped children, make the States,
along with local agencies, logical defendants in suits alleging
violations of the EHA. This statutory structure lends force to the
inference that the States were intended to be subject to damages
actions for violations of the EHA. But such a permissible
inference, whatever its logical force, would remain just that: a
permissible inference. It would not be the unequivocal declaration
which, we reaffirm today, is necessary before we will determine
that Congress intended to exercise its powers of abrogation.
III
We hold that the statutory language of the EHA does not evince
an unmistakably clear intention to abrogate the States'
constitutionally secured immunity from suit. [
Footnote 3] The Eleventh Amendment bars
respondent's attempt to collect tuition reimbursement from the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Page 491 U. S. 233
[
Footnote 1]
Petitioner concedes that the EHA was enacted pursuant to
Congress' authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that
Congress has the power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment with
respect to the Act. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15;
see Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234,
473 U. S.
244-245, n. 4 (1985). We decide the case on these
assumptions.
[
Footnote 2]
Respondent also offers us another avenue to affirm the result
below, which is to overrule the longstanding holding of
Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890),
that an unconsenting State is immune from liability for damages in
a suit brought in federal court by one of its own citizens. We
decline this most recent invitation to overrule our opinion in
Hans.
[
Footnote 3]
Our grant of certiorari also embraced the question whether the
EHA precluded petitioner from hearing administrative appeals. Since
we conclude that the Commonwealth is not subject to suit under the
EHA, and since the school district did not petition for review of
the Court of Appeals decision, we have no occasion to reach this
question.
After oral argument, respondent filed a motion to remand this
suit to the District Court for consolidation with another related
action. In light of our disposition today, respondent's motion is
denied.
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, with the understanding that its
reasoning does not preclude congressional elimination of sovereign
immunity in statutory text that clearly subjects States to suit for
monetary damages, though without explicit reference to state
sovereign immunity or the Eleventh Amendment.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN,
and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Court's holding that the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is immune from suit in the federal
courts for violations of the Education of the Handicapped Act
(EHA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400
et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp.V). For
reasons I have set out elsewhere,
see Welch v. Texas Dept. of
Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U.
S. 468,
483 U. S.
509-511 (1987) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting);
Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234,
473 U. S.
258-302 (1985) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I would accept
respondent Muth's invitation to overrule
Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890),
as that case has been interpreted in this Court's recent decisions.
Even if I did not hold that view, I would nevertheless affirm the
decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground that Congress in the
EHA abrogated state immunity.
I
Applying the standard method for ascertaining congressional
intent, I conclude, with the Court of Appeals, that "[t]he text of
EHA and its legislative history leave no doubt that Congress
intended to abrogate the 11th amendment immunity of the states."
Muth v. Central Bucks School Dist., 839 F.2d 113, 128 (CA3
1988).
The EHA imposes substantial obligations on the States, as well
as on local education authorities, as might be expected in an Act
authorizing federal financial aid "to assist States and localities
to provide for the education of all handicapped children."
Page 491 U. S. 234
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c). To be eligible for federal assistance, a
State must develop a plan for the education of all handicapped
children and establish the procedural safeguards mandated in §
1415. §§ 1412(2), (5). It is the state educational agency that
is
"responsible for assuring that the requirements of [EHA
Subchapter II, dealing with federal assistance for education of
handicapped children] are carried out and that all educational
programs for handicapped children within the State, including all
such programs administered by any other State or local agency,
[are] under the general supervision of the persons responsible for
educational programs for handicapped children in the State
educational agency."
§ 1412(6).
See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.
S. 992,
468 U. S.
1010 (1984) ("The responsibility for providing the
required education remains on the States");
Board of Education
of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley,
458 U. S. 176,
458 U. S.
182-183 (1982).
In accord with this overarching responsibility placed upon the
States, the EHA contemplates that, in a number of situations where
a local education authority cannot or will not provide appropriate
educational services to the handicapped, the State will do so
directly.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(c)(4)(A)(ii) (State to
assure provision of services where local authority barred from
receiving federal funds because it has failed to submit a proper
application); § 1414(d) (State "to provide special education and
related services directly to handicapped children residing in the
area served by [a] local educational agency" that is unable or
unwilling to establish or maintain programs, or to be merged with
other local agencies to enable it to do so, or that has
"handicapped children who can best be served by a regional or State
center"). And in any event, where a local education authority would
be entitled to less than $7,500 in EHA funding for a fiscal year,
the State may not distribute the funds, but must use the funds
itself to ensure provision of appropriate services. §§
1411(c)(4)(A)(i),
Page 491 U. S. 235
(c)(4)(B). Moreover, a State may choose to administer up to 25
percent of its federal funding itself, rather than distributing
these funds to local education authorities, and use such funds to
provide direct services to the handicapped. §§ 1411(c)(1),
(c)(2).
"[T]he EHA confers upon disabled students an
enforceable substantive right to public education in
participating States, and conditions federal financial assistance
upon a State's compliance with the substantive and procedural goals
of the Act."
Honig v. Doe, 484 U. S. 305,
484 U. S. 310
(1988) (emphasis added; citation omitted).
See also Smith v.
Robinson, supra, at
468 U. S.
1010. Thus, § 1415(e)(2) provides that
"any party aggrieved by the findings and decision [made in an
administrative process] shall have the right to bring a civil
action . . . in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a
district court of the United States without regard to the amount in
controversy."
This provision makes no distinction between civil actions based
upon the type of relief sought, and hence plainly contemplates
tuition reimbursement actions.
See School Committee of
Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts,
471 U. S. 359
(1985). In light of the States' pervasive role under the EHA, and
the clarity with which the statute imposes both procedural and
substantive obligations on the States, I have no trouble in
inferring from the text of the EHA that "Congress intended that the
state should be named as an opposing party, if not the sole party,
to [a] proceeding" brought under § 1415(e)(2), whatever remedy is
sought, and that Congress thereby abrogated Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit in federal court.
David D. v. Dartmouth
School Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 422 (CA1 1985),
cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986). Indeed, in those situations
where a State has elected to provide educational services to the
handicapped directly, or where under the EHA it is required to
provide direct services, the State would appear
Page 491 U. S. 236
to be the only proper defendant in a federal action to enforce
EHA rights. [
Footnote 2/1]
This solely textually based interpretation of the EHA is
supported by the statute's legislative history. Senator Williams, a
primary author of the EHA, explained to Congress that, under the
Act,
"it should be clear that a parent or guardian may present a
complaint
alleging that a State or local educational
agency has refused to provide services to which a child may be
entitled or
alleging that a State or local educational
agency has erroneously classified a child as a handicapped
child."
121 Cong.Rec. 37415 (1975) (emphasis added). In addition, he
emphasized that
"any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in
the due process hearing o[r] the State educational agency review of
such hearing shall have the right to bring a civil action
with
respect to the original complaint,"
id. at 37416 (emphasis added), that is, with respect to
the administrative complaint, which of course may allege EHA
violations by the State. [
Footnote
2/2] The text and legislative
Page 491 U. S. 237
history of the EHA thus make it unmistakably clear that Congress
there intended to abrogate state immunity from suit.
II
The Court does not seem to disagree with this analysis of actual
congressional intent. Even without benefit of reference to the
legislative history that confirms the obvious interpretation of the
text and makes Congress' purpose undeniably clear -- history
spurned by the Court because it has devised in this case a novel
rule that "[l]egislative history generally will be irrelevant to a
judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment,"
ante at
491 U. S. 230
-- the Court is able to
"recognize that the EHA's frequent reference to the States, and
its delineation of the States' important role in securing an
appropriate education for handicapped children, make the States,
along with local agencies, logical defendants in suits alleging
violations of the EHA. This statutory structure lends force to the
inference that the States were intended to be subject to damages
actions for violations of the EHA."
Ante at
491 U. S. 232.
Nevertheless, although Congress did intend to abrogate the States'
immunity from suit, the Court refuses to give effect to this
intention because it was not, in the Court's view, "unequivocal and
textual."
Ante at
491 U. S. 230.
Page 491 U. S. 238
I dispute the Court's conclusion that the text of the EHA is
equivocal. To my mind, immunity is "unequivocally" textually
abrogated when state amenability to suit is the logical inference
from the language and structure of the text.
Cf. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651,
415 U. S. 673
(1974) (a clear declaration of a State's consent to suit in federal
court does not require "
express language,'" but may be found in
"`overwhelming implications from the text [that] leave no room for
any other reasonable construction,'" quoting Murray v. Wilson
Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151,
213 U. S. 171
(1909)). The Court reaches the conclusion it does only because it
requires more than an unequivocal text. In doing so, the Court is
far removed from any real concern to discern a "clear and manifest"
statement of congressional intent, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U. S. 218,
331 U. S. 230
(1947), which is all that the Court has otherwise looked for when
inquiring into the meaning of congressional action, even "[i]n
traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the
federal balance," United States v. Bass, 404 U.
S. 336, 404 U. S. 349
(1971).
Were the Court in fact concerned with Congress' intent, it could
not have adopted the strict drafting regulations it devises today,
ruling out resort to legislative history and apparently also
barring inferential reasoning from text and structure. The Court's
justification for such a rule is that abrogation of immunity
"upsets 'the fundamental constitutional balance between the
Federal Government and the States,' . . . placing considerable
strain on '[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh
Amendment doctrine,'"
and that a "stringent test" is necessary
"[t]o temper Congress' acknowledged powers of abrogation with
due concern for the Eleventh Amendment's role as an essential
component of our constitutional structure."
Ante at
491 U. S.
227-228. I maintain that the Court makes one very basic
error here, for "[t]here simply is no constitutional principle of
state sovereign immunity."
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at
473 U. S. 259
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting). But quite apart from that, the Court has
never explained
Page 491 U. S. 239
why it is that the constitutional principle it has created
should require a novel approach to ascertaining congressional
intent. As I said in
Atascadero,
"special rules of statutory drafting are not justified (nor are
they justifiable) as efforts to determine the genuine intent of
Congress; no reason has been advanced why ordinary canons of
statutory construction would be inadequate to ascertain the intent
of Congress."
Id. at
473 U. S. 254.
I entirely fail to see, for example, why the "clear and manifest
purpose of Congress" to preempt under Article VI "the historic
police powers of the States,"
Rice, supra, at
331 U. S. 230,
may be found in so many and various ways, while the Court in the
Eleventh Amendment context insists on setting up ever-tighter
drafting regulations that Congress must have followed (though
Congress could not have been aware of such requirements when it
acted) in order to abrogate immunity. A genuine concern to identify
Congress' purpose would lead the Court to consider both the logical
inferences to be drawn from the text and structure of the EHA,
cf. Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at
415 U. S. 673,
and the statute's legislative history,
see Employees v.
Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.
S. 279,
411 U. S.
283-285 (1973) (examining legislative history in order
to determine whether Congress abrogated Eleventh Amendment
immunity), in deciding whether Congress intended to subject States
to suit in federal court.
Though the special and strict drafting regulations the Court has
now foisted on Congress are unjustifiable, still worse is the
Court's retroactive application of these new rules. It would be one
thing to tell Congress how in the future the Court will measure
Congress' intent. That at least would ensure that Congress and this
Court were operating under the same rules at the same time. But it
makes no sense whatsoever to test congressional intent using a set
of interpretative rules that Congress could not conceivably have
foreseen at the time it acted -- rules altogether different from,
and much more stringent than, those with which Congress, reasonably
relying upon this Court's opinions, believed itself
Page 491 U. S. 240
to be working.
See Atascadero, supra, at
473 U. S. 255,
n. 7 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The effect of retroactively
applying the Court's peculiar rule will be to override
congressional intent to abrogate immunity, though such intent was
absolutely clear under principles of statutory interpretation
established at the time of enactment. Retroactive application of
new drafting regulations in such circumstances is simply
unprincipled.
Cf. Welch, 483 U.S. at
483 U. S. 496
(SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (where
Congress has enacted statutes based on an assumption reasonably
derived from our cases, "[e]ven if we were now to find that
assumption to have been wrong, we could not, in reason, interpret
the statutes as though the assumption never existed").
Congress has already had cause to complain of the Court's
changing its interpretative rules in midcourse. After the Court
held in
Atascadero that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, contained no "unmistakable language"
abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity, 473 U.S. at
473 U. S. 243,
Congress in 1986 enacted an amendment to the Act providing:
"A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a
violation of [enumerated provisions of the Rehabilitation Act] or
the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting
discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance."
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1982 ed., Supp.IV). Congress enacted
this provision, the Senate Conference Report tells us, because
"[t]he Supreme Court's decision [in
Atascadero]
misinterpreted congressional intent. Such a gap in Section 504
coverage was never intended. It would be inequitable for Section
504 to mandate state compliance with its provisions and yet deny
litigants the right to enforce their rights in Federal courts when
State or State agency actions are in issue."
S.Rep. No. 99-388, pp. 27-28 (1986).
See also 132
Cong.Rec. S15105 (Oct. 3, 1986) (amendment
Page 491 U. S. 241
"eliminate[s] the court-made barrier to effectuating
congressional intent that the holding in the
Atascadero
case so unwisely has raised") (Sen. Cranston, a principal author of
§ 504 of the 1973 Act). Had the Court followed the usual rules for
determining legislative intent, as Congress in 1973 had every
reason to expect it would, the Court could not have fallen into
this error.
See Atascadero, supra, at
473 U. S.
248-252 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (examining the text,
structure, and legislative history of § 504 to conclude that
Congress intended that the States be amenable to suit in federal
court).
It is perfectly clear that again today the Court ignores
Congress' actual intent to abrogate state immunity -- an intent
that is even plainer here than in the case of § 504, which lacked
the EHA's frequent reference to the obligations of States --
instead resorting to an interpretative standard that Congress could
have anticipated only with the aid of a particularly effective
crystal ball. When § 1415 was enacted in its present form in 1975,
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651
(1974), and
Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and
Welfare, supra, established that this Court would consider
legislative history and make inferences from text and structure in
determining whether Congress intended to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Indeed, in
Quern v. Jordan,
440 U. S. 332,
440 U. S.
342-345 (1979), the Court evidently remained of the view
that legislative history might be taken into account.
Cf. Hutto
v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678,
437 U. S.
693-694 (1978). And later still, in
Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S.
89,
465 U. S. 99
(1984), the Court still was requiring only "an unequivocal
expression of congressional intent," and citing cases in support --
Edelman and
Quern -- that discuss legislative
history in assessing whether Congress intended to abrogate
immunity. Obviously, there was no rule in 1975 of the sort the
Court has devised in this case, and I fail to understand what
theory it is that justifies
Page 491 U. S. 242
the Court now gauging the Ninety-fourth Congress' intent by
using such a rule. [
Footnote
2/3]
III
Though I would hold that Pennsylvania is not immune from suit in
federal court for breaches of its obligations under the EHA, I find
it unnecessary to go on to consider the second question upon which
certiorari was granted: whether the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that Pennsylvania's secretary of state is precluded from
deciding special education administrative appeals under § 1415(c)
because he is an employee of the Commonwealth. There was an
alternative ground for the Court of Appeals' judgment against
Pennsylvania -- that, because of the secretary's remand to a
hearing officer following respondent's administrative appeal,
respondent was deprived of the timely "final" judgment to which he
was entitled under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) and 34 CFR § 300.512 (1988).
839 F.2d at 124-125. Petitioner did not seek review of the Court of
Appeals' decision on this alternative ground, which appears
adequate to support the judgment below, and no purpose would be
served by our considering whether the secretary's participation in
the appeal was a violation of the EHA's procedural requirements. I
would thus affirm the judgment below.
Page 491 U. S. 243
[
Footnote 2/1]
Moreover, it is not even clear that in those situations where
the State is the only proper defendant, an action could always be
brought against the State even in state court; for in
Will v.
Michigan Dept. of State Police, ante, at
491 U. S. 66,
the Court seems to suggest that the very same rule of
interpretation it applies here to decide whether Eleventh Amendment
immunity is abrogated is also to be used to determine whether a
federal statute requires a State to allow itself to be sued in
state court.
See ante at
491 U. S. 76
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting). If the EHA does not guarantee that the
State can be sued somewhere, then our previous statements that the
statute provides enforceable rights are a mockery.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The view that Congress believed it had abrogated state immunity
in the EHA is confirmed by the legislative history of the
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1985. Congress complained
that "[c]ongressional intent was ignored by the U.S. Supreme Court
when . . . it handed down its decision in
Smith v.
Robinson,"
468 U. S. 992
(1984), where the Court held that
"'the EHA repealed the availability of sections 504 [of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973] and 1983 [of Title 42] to individuals
seeking a free appropriate public education,'"
so that such litigants could no longer obtain attorney's fees.
H.R.Rep. No. 99-296, p. 4 (1985) (quoting
Smith, supra, at
1030 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting)). To correct this error, Congress
enacted an amendment, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4) (1982 ed.,
Supp.V), providing for the award of attorney's fees under the EHA.
The statement in the House Report on this amendment that "[i]n some
actions or proceedings in which the parents or guardian prevail,
more than one local or State agency may be named as a respondent,"
and that, in such cases, "it is expected that the court will
apportion the award of attorneys' fees and other expense based on
the relative culpability of the agencies," H.R.Rep. No. 99-296, at
6, clearly demonstrates a belief that Congress had abrogated
Eleventh Amendment immunity in the EHA.
[
Footnote 2/3]
I can only express amazement at the Court's statement that
"a comparison of the language in the [Rehabilitation Act]
Amendments with the language of the EHA serves only to underscore
the difference in the two statutes,"
ante at
491 U. S. 229,
as if the omission from the EHA of the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments' provision that "[a] State shall not be immune under the
Eleventh Amendment" actually tells us something about Congress'
intent when it enacted the EHA. The 1986 amendment was a response
to
Atascadero, tailored to overrule a decision that had
misinterpreted Congress' intent in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
to abrogate state immunity. If Congress' reaction to
Atascadero tells us anything, it is that Congress, prior
to that decision, believed it could effectively express its intent
to abrogate immunity
without resorting to the degree of
textual clarity the Court demands in this case.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.
I join JUSTICE BRENNAN'S opinion because he correctly ascertains
the unmistakable intent of Congress to subject state agencies to
liability for tuition reimbursement awards under the Education of
the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2).
See also School
Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education of
Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 359
(1985). Indeed, as JUSTICE BRENNAN convincingly demonstrates, this
statute passes even the stringent test set forth in
Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234
(1985). It is only by resorting to a stricter standard yet that the
Court is able to reach the result that it does here. Because the
Court never should have started down this road, it certainly should
not take today's additional step.
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
While I join JUSTICE BRENNAN'S dissent, I adhere to my view that
a "statute cannot amend the Constitution."
Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., ante at
491
U.S. 24 (concurring opinion). Because this case deals with
the judicially created doctrine of sovereign immunity, rather than
the real Eleventh Amendment's limitation on federal judicial power,
the congressional decision to confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts must prevail.