A deed from a female child, just of age, and living with her
parents, made to a trustee for the benefit of one of those parents,
founded on no real consideration, executed under the influence of
misrepresentation by the parents, and containing in its preamble a
recital of false statements ordered to be set aside and the
property reconveyed to the grantor.
The principles upon which a court of equity interferes to
protect persons from undue and improper influences examined and
stated.
Page 49 U. S. 184
The bill was filed in the circuit court by Charlotte Taylor,
formerly Charlotte Scarborough, a resident of the State of New
Jersey, to set aside a deed which she alleged had been obtained
from her in an illegal and fraudulent manner. The defendants were
James Taylor, her husband, some of the members of her family,
Robert M. Goodwin, who had become the trustee under the deed after
the death of William Taylor, the original trustee, and Wallace and
Miller, who were the executors of William Taylor, the original
trustee.
Prior to the year 1819, William Scarborough, a merchant residing
in Savannah, became embarrassed in his affairs, and on 5 June in
that year executed a mortgage for the purpose of securing his
endorsers upon certain notes, the endorsers being Andrew Low and
Company, and William Taylor. The firm of Andrew Low and Company was
composed of Andrew Low, Robert Isaac (who had married William
Scarborough's sister), and James McHenry.
The property mortgaged consisted of certain stocks and real
estate, amongst which was the following lot:
"All that lot of land, and the buildings and improvements
thereon, situated, lying, and being in the City of Savannah
aforesaid, bounded on the east by West Broad Street, on the south
by a street or lane thirty feet wide, and on the west and south by
the lots contiguous to the same, containing ninety feet in front,
and being the lot and buildings opposite Mr. Daniel Hotchkiss, and
recently erected by the said William Scarborough."
On the next day, namely, 6 June, 1819, Scarborough confessed a
judgment in favor of Andrew Low for $87,534.50.
On 13 May, 1820, Scarborough executed a deed in fee simple of
the above-described property to Robert Isaac.
On 16 November, 1820, Scarborough was discharged as an insolvent
debtor by the Chatham County Inferior court.
On 2 January, 1825, a sale of Scarborough's furniture took place
by the marshal, under an execution which had been issued by virtue
of a judgment obtained against him by Andrew Low. The property was
all purchased by Isaac, according to the following schedule. It is
inserted here for the purpose of being compared with the inventory
which was taken of Isaac's property after his death, and which will
be stated in its proper place.
Page 49 U. S. 185
image:a
In February, 1826, an agreement was made amongst the partners
constituting the firm of A. Low and Company, by which the house and
lot, which had been mortgaged to the firm, and afterwards conveyed
to Isaac, was to be held as the separate and individual property of
Isaac, upon his paying to the firm the sum of $20,000.
On 26 August, 1827, Isaac made his will, which contained the
following clause:
"Seventh. Item, I give and bequeath unto my beloved niece,
Charlotte Scarborough, all my right, title, and interest in and to
the lot, dwelling house, and all other improvements thereon, which
formerly belonged to her father, William Scarborough, on West Broad
Street in the City of Savannah, known in the plan of said city as
lot No. ___, together also with the plate, furniture of all kinds,
books and prints, all which were purchased and paid for at
marshal's sales by me."
On 16 October, 1827, Isaac died.
Eight persons were named in the will as executors, but only
three acted,
viz., William Scarborough, William Taylor,
and Norman Wallace, to whom letters testamentary were granted on 17
January, 1828.
On 9 January, 1828, the will was proved, and on the next day,
viz., the 10th, Charlotte Scarborough, the niece
Page 49 U. S. 186
and devisee of the deceased, addressed the following letter to
her father, William Scarborough.
"MY EVER-HONORED FATHER -- From a sense of my unworthiness, I am
convinced that the love my dear uncle bore me, and which dictated
his bequest to me in his last will, would not, could he now see my
conduct, condemn me for pursuing the feelings of a heart strongly
and sincerely devoted in affection of the members of my family.
Having arrived at an age when I may with impunity legally make a
transfer of that which has been so generously placed at my
discretion, I unhesitatingly follow this course of conduct,
unbiased by any control whatsoever; and in the liberty I am now
using, I am acting by my own free will, dictated by my feelings
alone, and unknown to any person. Thus, then, I most emphatically
transfer all my right to the said property (the gift of my
ever-lamented uncle) to my beloved mother, to be used and enjoyed
as her unquestionable right during her lifetime, and at her death
and yours to be equally divided between my sisters, brothers, and
myself, my right operating in no manner in my favor to the
exclusion of the other members of our family."
"In thus making a transfer of the said property. I trust my
much-loved parent will acknowledge one slight proof of my gratitude
for all his numerous kindnesses lavished on me. Most thankful do I
feel for being made the simple instrument of accomplishing the will
of him who has so kindly and generously placed his confidence in
me, and in acting thus, convince the world that my devoted
affection for him was pure, disinterested, and unbiased by any
future expectation."
"I am, dear Sir, your most affectionate and grateful
daughter,"
"CHARLOTTE D. SCARBOROUGH"
"Savannah, January 10, 1828"
On 22 January, 1828, Charlotte executed the deed which it was
the object of the present suit to set aside. It recited a proposed
marriage settlement of 1805, and then proceeded as follows:
"And whereas, from neglect, the said deed was not recorded in
Chatham County and State of Georgia, and whereas, in the year 1819,
the said William Scarborough having failed in trade, and some
doubts having been suggested as to the validity of the said
marriage settlement, from the omission to record the same as
aforesaid, the said William Scarborough did, in consequence of such
doubt, transfer and convey all his right, title, and interest, if
any remained to him, in and to the aforesaid named and described
lots of land, to his principal creditor,
Page 49 U. S. 187
Robert Isaac, of Savannah, his heirs and assigns, in part
satisfaction of his debt; and whereas the said Robert Isaac hath
recently departed this life, leaving a last will and testament
whereby he bequeathed and devised to the said Charlotte
Scarborough, his niece, all his right, title, and interest in the
said lots of land, the dwelling house and improvements thereon,
together with the plate, furniture of all kinds, books and prints,
therein, which were purchased by the said Robert at marshal's
sales, in the City of Savannah, which said last will and testament
has been duly proved before the Court of Ordinary of Chatham
County; and whereas the said Charlotte Scarborough, to whom the
aforesaid devise was made, being of lawful age, and being desirous
of conveying or carrying the said marriage settlement into effect,
according to the original intention of the parties thereto, hath
determined to convey all her right, title, and interest in said
property in trust for that purpose. Now this indenture witnesseth
that the said Charlotte, in consideration of the premises, and from
natural love and affection for her said beloved mother, Julia
Scarborough, and her sisters and brothers, and also in
consideration of the sum of one dollar, to her in hand paid by the
said William Taylor of the second part, the receipt whereof is
hereby acknowledged, hath granted, bargained, and sold, released,
conveyed, and confirmed, and by these presents doth grant, bargain,
and sell, release, convey, and confirm, unto the said William
Taylor, his heirs and assigns, all her right, title, and interest
in and to the said lots of land herein before described and set
forth, together with the buildings and improvements thereon, with
the appurtenances, and together with the plate, furniture of all
kinds, books and prints, herein before referred to, which lots,
buildings, improvements, furniture, plate, books and prints were
devised to her by the said Robert Isaac as herein before set forth.
To have and to hold the said lots of land, with the other premises
and appurtenances, unto him, the said William Taylor, his heirs and
assigns, in trust nevertheless to and for the use of the said Julia
Scarborough, wife of the said William Scarborough, for and during
the term of her natural life, not to be in any manner or by any
means subject to or liable for the debts of the said William
Scarborough, her said husband, and from and after the decease of
the said Julia Scarborough, then in further trust to and for the
use and benefit of the said Charlotte Scarborough, and such of her
brothers and sisters, children of the said Julia as shall be living
at the time of the decease of the said Julia Scarborough, equally
to be divided between them, share and share alike."
The deed then contained a covenant for further assurances,
Page 49 U. S. 188
and was executed in presence of Andrew Low and John
Guilmartin.
On the 25th of January, 1828, Scarborough, as a qualified
executor of the estate of Isaac, exhibited an inventory to the
court, from which the following is an extract:
image:b
In April, 1829, Charlotte Scarborough married James Taylor, one
of the defendants in the present suit. They removed to New York to
reside, in 1835, and afterwards to New Jersey, where the
complainant resided at the institution of this suit. Julia
Scarborough, the mother of the complainant, resided in the house in
question at and after the execution of the deed, as did William
Scarborough, the father, with occasional absences, until 1835, when
he rented it to Barnsley, who had married one of his daughters, and
who was also one of the defendants in the present suit.
On 12 June, 1838, William Scarborough died.
In the early part of 1840, a petition was filed in the Superior
Court of Chatham County in the names of the different branches of
the Scarborough family, stating the death of William Taylor, the
trustee under the deed, and praying that Robert M. Goodwin might be
appointed in his place, which was accordingly done. To this
petition the name of Charlotte Taylor was signed as follows: "For
Charlotte Taylor, Joseph Scarborough."
Page 49 U. S. 189
On 4 September, 1843, Charlotte Taylor filed her bill against
all the parties enumerated in the commencement of this
statement.
It recited the devises of the will, stated that she was the
niece by marriage of Robert Isaac, and an inmate and resident of
his family, with whom she continued to reside until his death, when
she removed to the residence of her father and mother, being the
house devised to her (the oratrix) by the will. It then averred
that, upon her return to the family of her parents, her reception
was harsh and unkind; that she was charged with having dictated to
the testator, Robert Isaac, the disposition of the property, with
ruining the prospects of the family, and breaking the heart of her
father. The bill then proceeded thus:
"And your oratrix further showeth unto your honors that day
after day your oratrix's situation in her father's family became
more and more unpleasant and harassing, in consequence of their
unkind and, as your oratrix charges, their cruel treatment of her;
that your oratrix was at the time an infant under the age of
twenty-one years, having been born, as your oratrix charges, on 4
August in the year of our Lord 1807; that your oratrix was closely
watched by her father, mother, and sisters, secluded from society
and the advice of friends, and even denied the liberty of
communicating with the defendant, James Taylor, whom your oratrix
was then under an engagement to marry; that your oratrix was
importuned and urged by her mother, with the advice and countenance
of her father to relinquish your oratrix's rights under the will
aforesaid, and to settle the property on your oratrix, her mother,
brothers, and sisters; and with the view of effecting this object,
it was particularly urged that the said Robert Isaac, by the said
devise and bequest in the seventh item of his said last will and
testament, had so conveyed the said property, believing that your
oratrix would divide the same in the manner proposed by your
oratrix's parents as before stated, although your oratrix at the
time knew that the said Robert Isaac had, for a considerable time
preceding his death, borne a decided antipathy to the said Julia
Scarborough."
"And your oratrix further showeth unto your honors that when in
answer to these and other repeated importunities most unkindly
pressed upon your oratrix, your oratrix would hesitate or refuse to
enter into and yield to the proposed arrangement, your oratrix's
reluctance and refusal would be ascribed to the influence of the
said James Taylor, who was described to be a merciless, grasping
man, who would sacrifice anything for a gain. "
Page 49 U. S. 190
"And your oratrix further showeth unto your honors that when
again, in reply to the urgent importunity of the said Julia
Scarborough, your oratrix inquired of her what your oratrix should
do, your oratrix, after a conference between the said Julia and
William Scarborough, was informed that your oratrix should address
a letter to the said William Scarborough to the effect that,
supposing the said Robert Isaac had intended the property should be
divided between your oratrix, her mother, sisters, and brothers,
your oratrix wished that he, the said William Scarborough, would
consent that your oratrix should so have the property disposed of
that the said Julia Scarborough should have it during her life, and
that after her death it should be divided between your oratrix, her
two sisters and two brothers."
"And your oratrix further showeth unto your honors and expressly
charges that at this stage of the matter, your oratrix sought an
interview with the said James Taylor, and after relating to him the
circumstances above detailed, asked his opinion and advice as to
the duty of your oratrix in the premises, and that his reply was in
substance that individually he cared nothing about the course your
oratrix might pursue, as he was well off, and that he would never
meddle with a copper of the value of the property, but advised your
oratrix, as she valued her own interest, not to yield to the
arrangement proposed by the parents of your oratrix."
"And your oratrix further showeth unto your honors that at the
time referred to, the affairs of the said William Scarborough were
in a very deranged and embarrassed condition, that he was utterly
unable to pay his debts, and that as a consequence his family
having but very small resources independently of him, their
pecuniary situation was pitiable and distressing, and that, urged
by this consideration, by the unhappiness and even misery which
your oratrix was suffering from the treatment of the family and
their importunity, and influenced too by the hope that her marriage
with the said James Taylor might thereby receive the consent of her
parents, your oratrix finally yielded and wrote the letter to her
father reciting in substance, as your oratrix charges, that the
said Julia and William Scarborough were to have the house,
furniture &c., during their lives, and that at their death, the
plate, with the crest of the family, was to be given to your
oratrix's brothers as their share, and the house and lots divided
between your oratrix and her sisters. Your oratrix charges the
above to have been the substance of the writing, but that the she
cannot now ascertain the particulars, as the original draft, which
was kept by
Page 49 U. S. 191
your oratrix, was destroyed by fire in the City of New York in
the year 1835."
The bill then proceeded to state that a deed was drawn up, which
she signed without reading or hearing it read; that so far from the
marriage settlement upon her mother being an inducement to the
execution of the deed, as is alleged, she now finds, in the
recital, she had never at that time heard of any such marriage
settlement, but, on the contrary, the deed was extorted from her by
the most unfair and fraudulent means, and was executed by her as
the price of peace with her father, mother, and family.
The bill then stated the marriage of the oratrix with James
Taylor, on 28 April, 1829; that she had soon afterwards used all
the means in her power to convince her husband that the deed was
fraudulent and invalid, but that the objected to family disputes
about property, and averred that his own individual property and
means of support were sufficient for his family. It then stated
that she did not discover the amount of injustice which had been
practiced upon her until the year 1839, when she discovered that,
under the deed, in case she died before her mother, her children
would be cut off from all share in the property. It then stated the
death of Taylor, the trustee, and the appointment of Goodwin in his
place, and averred that she was entirely ignorant of the use of her
name, which was signed to the petition without her authority.
The bill then stated that Godfrey Barnsley had intermarried with
her sister, Julia Scarborough, and resided for a long time in the
house in question; that he had committed waste upon the goods and
chattels bequeathed to her (the oratrix), had sold or otherwise
disposed of a considerable portion of the stock of liquors, and
that waste had also been committed by Julia Scarborough, the
mother; that Barnsley knew that the oratrix had a claim to the
personalty; that she had applied to Goodwin, the trustee, to come
to an account with her, which he had refused to do.
The bill then contained a number of interrogatories for the
defendants to answer; prayed that the deed might be decreed
fraudulent and void, and that the defendants might come to and
account with her, and that the real estate, goods, chattels, plate,
furniture, goods, prints, rents, and profits, might be decreed to
be the separate property of the oratrix, not subject to the debts
or liable to the creditors of her husband, James Taylor,
&c.
Sundry intermediate steps were taken to bring the defendants all
into court which it is not necessary to mention. At
Page 49 U. S. 192
length they all came in and answered except Julia Scarborough,
the mother, and Joseph Scarborough, against which two parties an
order was obtained, taking the bill
pro confesso.
Robert M. Goodwin, the trustee, filed his answer on 6 November,
1843, admitting the existence of the trust deed, and that it was
under his control and stating that he consented to act at the
request of Horace Sistare, who married the complainant's sister,
and of Joseph, her brother, and that he supposed he was acting with
her consent, not only because her brother signed her name to the
petition for his appointment, but because, in conversations with
her, she never expressed the least objection to the appointment.
That William Taylor left no accounts, never having interfered with
the property or received it into his possession, or any of the
rents, issues, or profits, the same being left in the custody or
possession of the
cestui que trusts entitled thereto. He
denies that the trust deed was made by compulsion or undue means,
or that it was made by her when under age, but, on the contrary,
avers that the same was made freely and voluntarily, and that she
was then of full age, as would more fully appear by a letter
written by her to her father, dated 10 January, 1828, a copy of
which he annexed to his answer.
The answer of the executors of William Taylor was filed 6
November, 1843, and states that they do not believe their testator
acted as trustee, though he may have assented to the trusteeship;
that they have never seen any account of his as trustee, and do not
believe he left any, for he regarded the matter as a mere family
arrangement, and left everything in the hands of the
cestui que
trust, then entitled to the use of the same. They deny the
right of the complainant to call on them for an account of the
personal property conveyed in trust, because by the trust deed
Julia Scarborough, who is still living, has the use of it for life;
nor can they give any account of said property, or the rents and
profits of the real estate, because the said real and personal
property never passed into the hands of their testator in his
lifetime, nor into their control or possession since his death, but
had always been in the possession and management of Julia
Scarborough, the
cestui que trust, entitled to the same
under the deed.
The joint answer of Godfrey Barnsley and Julia, his wife, was
filed 19 February, 1844, and in substance states that the
complainant always called her mother's house her home, and lived as
much there as with her uncle; that she was not an infant at the
time of the execution of the deed, having been born on 4 August,
1806; that they do not know of any
Page 49 U. S. 193
consideration other than that stated in the deed; that Julia
Scarborough lived on the premises at the time of its execution, and
that William Scarborough sometimes resided in Darien, and sometimes
on the premises, until 1833, after which he generally resided on
the latter; and that complainant never, as far as they know,
pretended to have any claim thereto; and as late as April or May
last (1843), when defendant, Julia Barnsley, in consequence of
rumors which had reached her, asked complainant, "if it was true,
as she had been informed, that she (the complainant) intended to
attempt to set aside said deed," she stated, "she had no such
intention." They deny, as utterly and entirely untrue, the
statement of the complainant of unkind treatment by her family, and
never heard or knew of any, or of any importunity or coercion used
towards her to induce her to sign the deed; that they always
believed the execution of the deed was the free, voluntary act of
the complainant, and intended to fulfill the design of Robert
Isaac, whose title they insist is more than doubtful, in
consequence of the marriage settlement of 1805; that they are
advised that the said deed was and is valid, as between the parties
to the same, and therefore William Scarborough could not make any
conveyance to Robert Isaac, and that he always held the premises
subject to the marriage settlement, and that they have always heard
it in the family, and so believe, that the complainant executed the
deed freely and voluntarily, with a view to carry out the wishes
and intentions of her uncle, which would otherwise have been
defeated. The further allege that no marriage settlement between
the complainant and her husband was ever executed, and he having
been recently declared bankrupt, any interest which she may have in
the property, or any claim against them, belongs to the said James
Taylor, or his assignee in bankruptcy. The answer then explains the
defendant Godfrey Barsley's actings and doings with respect to the
property.
The answer of James Taylor, the husband of the complainant,
admitted all the material facts charged in the bill and stated that
before the marriage he had advised her not to execute the deed,
believing from her representations that she was unkindly treated by
the family; that he had been requested by William Scarborough to be
a witness to the execution of the deed, but declined to be so, and
that his belief of the unhappy situation of the complainant
operated upon him in a great measure to consummate his engagement
to marry her twelve months prior to the period before intended.
Several witnesses were examined on the parts of the complainant
and defendants. The following were the answers of
Page 49 U. S. 194
the subscribing witnesses to the deed,
viz., Andrew Low
and John Guilmartin, touching its execution.
Andrew Low:
"To the fourth direct interrogatory the witness answering saith
-- I was intimate in the family of the late William Scarborough,
both before, in, and after 1828; I was a subscribing witness to the
signing of the deed, and after it was signed the complainant
expressed to me that she was then satisfied, and was glad that she
had done it, or words to that effect."
"To the fifth direct interrogatory the witness answering saith
-- I was present, as stated before, at the execution of the deed;
it is impossible, at this distance of time, to remember all that
then transpired, but this I am certain of, that the complainant
knew the contents of the deed, and approved of it; in fact, as I
have before said, she herself told me so."
"To the fourth cross-interrogatory the witness answering saith
-- I became acquainted with the circumstances I have stated,
relative to the property, from my personal intimacy with William
Scarborough and his family, and upon my connection in business with
the late Robert Isaac. I was a subscribing witness to the deed at
the instance of William Scarborough."
"To the fifth cross-interrogatory the witness answering saith --
I do not know by whom the deed was drawn; the other subscribing
witness was Mr. Guilmartin; he was requested to be so by William
Scarborough. There was a change of one of the witnesses of the
deed, in consequence of James Taylor, who had previously arranged
to be a witness, declining to be so after his arrival at William
Scarborough's house, for that purpose. I do not remember that he
gave any reason for declining. The parties present when the deed
was executed were the complainant's father and mother, and the
witnesses. I did not see or hear the complainant read the deed, but
I was then, and still am, satisfied that she knew the contents, and
approved of it."
"To the sixth cross-interrogatory the witness answering saith --
I do not recollect the question being put to the complainant,
whether she knew the contents of the deed, nor do I recollect
whether any consideration money was offered; if there was, it was a
piece of coin, probably a dollar, in the usual way, in such cases;
I think I was in William Scarborough's house about two hours
previous to signing the deed, and left soon after."
"To the seventh cross-interrogatory the witness answering saith
-- James Taylor, now the husband of the complainant, had been asked
by Mr. Scarborough to attest the deed as a witness, and he
consented to go with me to the house for that purpose;
Page 49 U. S. 195
after closing our place of business, I asked him to accompany
me; he said he would soon follow me, which he did; he did not
express himself opposed to the execution of the deed, that I am
aware of; I certainly never heard him. It was not known or
understood by me that he was under an engagement to marry the
complainant; the previous year, there was something of the kind
spoken of, but he and the complainant had disagreed, and I was
given to believe that it was all broken off. At the dissolution of
the partnership of Low, Taylor and Company, in 1834 or 1835, James
Taylor was largely indebted on private account to the said firm,
and sometime in 1835 I granted him a discharge from the said debt
in consideration of his giving up to me every description of
property belonging to himself and his wife except his household
furniture, which I allowed him to retain; he did not at this time
mention to me that he or his wife had any claim to the property in
question, or I should have claimed it in conformity with our
agreement. I had never heard of his making any claim to the
property conveyed by the said deed, or any part it, until advised
of it by William Robertson under date 16 February, 1844."
John Guilmartin:
"To the first direct interrogatory the witness answers and says
that his name and handwriting is to the instrument as a witness,
and that he subscribed as a witness, at the instance of William
Scarborough, the deed now presented to him, being the original deed
from complainant to William Taylor, in trust."
"To the second direct interrogatory the witness answers and says
he cannot say positively he does, but it strikes him that there was
a question or two asked Miss Charlotte Scarborough,
viz.,
whether it was with a free will; he does not recollect the time,
but that he does not recollect that Andrew Low Sr. was present when
he came in; Mr. Scarborough said he had sent for witness, as such
to a deed from Miss Scarborough to her mother, of property, which
as a dutiful child she had made. Witness asked Miss Scarborough if
it was her voluntary act. Mr. Low replied that witness was called
in to witness the deed, and for no other purpose; she did not read
the deed, or hear it read in witness' presence. It was executed at
Mr. Scarborough's house in West Broad street."
At the April adjourned term of 1846, the cause came up for
argument before the circuit court, when the bill was dismissed.
The complainant appealed to this Court.
Page 49 U. S. 199
MR. JUSTICE DANIEL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The object of the complainant below (the appellant here), as
disclosed in her bill, is to vacate the deed, executed on 22
January, 1828, by her before her marriage, conveying to William
Taylor in trust for the use of the mother of the grantor for life
(exempt from the debts of her father), and after the death of her
father and mother, for the use in equal portions of the said
grantor, and of her brothers and sisters, all the property real and
personal which was given to the said grantor by the will of her
uncle Robert Isaac, whose will is made an exhibit in the cause and
referred to in the deed.
The grounds on which this deed is impeached are the following:
that it was founded on no real consideration; was executed during
the nonage of the complainant, and whilst she was living in the
family of her parents; that it was extorted from her by false
representations, both as to her filial duties, and her rights to
the property left her by her uncle, and of extreme urgency and
harsh treatment on the part of her parents, to procure its
execution, and of the hope, by a compliance with their
importunities, of reconciling her parents to her marriage with her
husband, which marriage they had theretofore opposed. The objection
of nonage must be surrendered in this investigation, it being
ascertained that the complainant was some few months over majority
when the deed was executed. The other allegations, as resting upon
the proofs in the cause, and upon the law as applicable to them,
remain for consideration.
The rules of law supposed to control the contracts of parties
who do not stand upon a perfect equality, but who deal at a
disadvantage on the one side, whether applicable to the relations
of parent and child, trustee and
cestui que trust,
attorney and client, or principal and agent, have been laid down in
various cases in the courts both of England and of our own country.
To trace these rules to the several cases by which they have been
propounded would be an undertaking rather of curiosity than of
necessity or usefulness here, as the extent to which this Court has
applied them or is disposed to apply them in cases resembling the
present may be found within a familiar and direct range of inquiry.
They are aptly exemplified by the late Justice Story in his
treatise on Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. I., § 307, where, speaking
of frauds which "arise from some peculiar confidence or fiduciary
relation between the parties,"
Page 49 U. S. 200
he remarks
"In this class of cases there is often found some intermixture
of deceit, imposition, overreaching, unconscionable advantage, or
other mark of direct and positive fraud. But the principle on which
courts of equity act in regard thereto stands, independent of any
such ingredients, upon a motive of public policy, and it is
designed in some degree as a protection to the parties against the
effects of overweening confidence and self-delusion, and the
infirmities of hasty and precipitate judgment. These courts will
therefore often interfere in such cases where, but for such
peculiar relations, they would wholly abstain from granting relief
or grant it in a very modified and abstemious manner."
He proceeds, § 308:
"It is undoubtedly true that it is not upon the feelings which a
delicate and honorable man must experience, nor upon any notion of
discretion, to prevent a voluntary gift or other act of a man
whereby he strips himself of his property, that courts of equity
have deemed themselves at liberty to interpose in cases of this
sort. They do not sit or affect to sit in judgment upon cases as
custodes morum, enforcing the strict rules of morality.
But they do sit to enforce what has not inaptly been called a
'technical morality.' If confidence is reposed, it must be
faithfully acted upon and preserved from any intermixture of
imposition. If influence is acquired, it must be kept free from the
taint of selfish interests and cunning and overreaching bargains.
If the means of personal control are given, they must be always
restrained to purposes of good faith and personal good. Courts of
equity will not, therefore, arrest or set aside an act or contract
merely because a man of more honor would not have entered into it.
There must be some relation between the parties which compels the
one to make a full discovery to the other or to abstain from all
selfish projects. But when such a relation does exist, courts of
equity, acting upon this superinduced ground in aid of general
morals, will not suffer one party, standing in a situation of which
he can avail himself against the other, to derive advantage from
that circumstance."
Applying the principles thus annunciated and drawn from an
extensive collection of the English cases to the relation of parent
and child and to transactions occurring in that relation, the same
author remarks, § 309:
"The natural and just influence which a parent has over a child
renders it peculiarly important for courts of justice to watch over
and protect the interests of the latter, and therefore all
contracts and conveyances whereby benefits are secured by children
to their parents are objects of jealousy, and if they are not
entered into with scrupulous good faith and are not reasonable
under the circumstances, they will
Page 49 U. S. 201
be set aside unless third persons have acquired an interest
under them."
The same principle has been clearly put by Justice Washington in
the case of
Slocum and Wife v. Marshall, 2 Wash.C.C. 400,
where, in stating that case, he remarks:
"The grantor, a young lady who from her birth had not but on one
occasion left the roof of her father -- bound to him by the strong
ties of filial affection -- accustomed to repose in his advice and
opinion the most unbounded confidence, and to consider his request
ever as equivalent to a command -- is informed by him that a
certain portion of her property had been conveyed to him by her
mother, but that the same, from some legal objection, had failed to
take effect. She is then requested to confirm this title, and at
the same time is assured by her father, that his design in
obtaining this confirmation is to promote her interest as well as
his own. She reflects upon the proposal and, influenced by the
double motive of promoting her own interest and that of her father
and of fulfilling the intentions of her dead mother, she makes the
conveyance."
He proceeds: "A transaction attended by such circumstances will
naturally excite the suspicions of a court of equity." It has been
insisted that for the principles just stated, the sanction of this
Court cannot be avouched, but that, on the contrary, they have been
weakened, if not rejected, by the doctrines ruled in the case of
Jenkins v.
Pye, 12 Pet. 241. The peculiar features of the
last-named case, which may in some respects distinguish it from the
one now under consideration and be thought to bring it less
obviously within the principles above stated, need not be pointed
out, but we inquire what are in truth the doctrines ruled in the
case in 12 Peters, and whether they are not substantially -- nay
literally -- those propounded by Justices Story and Washington. In
the case of
Jenkins v. Pye, this Court refuse to adopt the
rule which they said had in the argument been assumed as the
doctrine of the English chancery --
viz., that a deed from
a child to a parent should, upon considerations of public policy
arising from the relation of the parties,
be deemed void.
They deny, indeed, that this is the just interpretation of the
English decisions relied on, but declare that all the leading cases
they have examined are accompanied with some ingredient showing
undue influence exercised by the parent, operating upon the fears
or hopes of the child, and showing reasonable grounds to presume
that the act was not
perfectly free and
voluntary
on the part of the child. But the court, whilst they deny that a
deed from a child to a parent should
prima facie be held
absolutely void, as unequivocally declare, that
"it is undoubtedly
Page 49 U. S. 202
the duty of courts of equity carefully to watch and examine the
circumstances attending transactions of this kind, when brought
under review before them, to discover if any undue influence has
been exercised in obtaining the conveyance."
Between the doctrine here ruled and the principles stated by
Justices Story and Washington, no difference, much less any
contradiction, can be perceived. For why this watchfulness, thus
enjoined as a
duty, this severe and peculiar scrutiny as
applicable to contracts between parent and child, but that they are
justly "objects of jealousy," rendered so by the relation of the
contracting parties -- a relation aptly and naturally productive of
powerful influence on the one hand, and of submission on the other
-- subjecting such transactions to presumptions never attaching
a priori to contracts between parties standing upon a
perfect equality.
And now let the character of the contract under consideration,
and of the circumstances surrounding the execution of that
contract, be subjected to the test rationally and justly imposed by
the rules above stated.
This is a contract between parent and child, operating by its
terms exclusively for the benefit of the former, and to the
prejudice of the latter, for it transferred from her a valuable
interest, by the very terms of the transaction admitted to be
legally and absolutely hers, and by the same terms transferred it
without the shadow of an equivalent received or preferred and for
which, the testimony conclusively shows, none could possibly be
given. Thus far the provisions of the contract.
With regard to the circumstances attending and surrounding its
execution. It is shown that the grantor in this deed, though of
age, had little more than attained to majority; that she was living
in the house with her parents -- her only home -- and may fairly be
presumed to have been liable to the influence of feelings and
habits which, in the absence of contravening evidence, would
control the dispositions and conduct of a youthful female thus
situated. She might be moulded to almost anything, in compliance
with the earnest wishes (with her habitually yielded to as
commands) of her parents. Those parents, who once had lived in
affluence and luxury, had, with all the habits and necessities
which such a condition naturally creates, by commercial reverses
been brought to indigence; from the date of the purchase by Robert
Isaac of the property in dispute, had been permitted by him to
occupy and enjoy it. In fact, it was apparently their only means of
shelter or support. In this state of the family, Robert Isaac by
his will bestowed the whole of this property upon the complainant,
and it has been
Page 49 U. S. 203
argued that, with her knowledge of the situation of her parents,
the impulses of filial duty and affection might of themselves have
formed a sufficient groundwork for the complainant's conveyance.
However hazardous it might be to prescribe, as a rule of right or
of property, imperfect obligations which the law does not
originally enforce, this argument can be deemed satisfactory in
instances only in which the motives supposed to enter into such
obligations are shown to have been free and unconstrained in their
operation. In the present instance, too, independently of the
influences which will be shown to have been brought to bear upon
the transaction, it is thought that the injunctions of filial duty
and affection would have demanded something less than the surrender
of all possessed by the grantor, and would have been satisfied with
a concession, as to which there probably would never have existed a
difficulty -- one, indeed, that seems to have been assented to in
practice -- the occupation and enjoyment of the property during
their lives, by the parents of the grantor. Nay, it would seem that
proper
parental tenderness and solicitude for the welfare
of the child or the true principles of rectitude and fairness would
have permitted nothing beyond this. And in the estimate of motives
which may have led to the transaction under review, it should not
be without weight that this same filial duty and affection, however
commendable in themselves and however their spontaneous action may
be recognized and binding, strengthen the probability of their
being converted into means of wrong and oppression, and this very
probability it is which challenges the duty of watchfulness and
jealousy in the courts in scanning the transactions of those whose
peculiar situation exposes them to danger from such means.
Immediately after the death of Robert Isaac, it seems that the
various appliances designed to withdraw from the complainant the
fruits of the bounty of her affectionate uncle were put into
strikingly active operation. Directly following the death of Isaac,
it is charged in the bill, came the urgency of the complainant's
family, and their reproaches against her for having intercepted, as
they said, the bounty which but for her would have flowed to the
family, and for having dictated to her uncle the disposition of his
property, thereby having ruined their prospects and broken the
heart of complainant's father. The natural effects of such appeals
upon the feelings of an affectionate and sensitive girl, or even
upon a spirit awake to the impulses of pride alone, can easily be
comprehended. Then, as is alleged, was the reluctance of the
complainant to despoil herself of her property ascribed to the
avarice of her intended husband,
Page 49 U. S. 204
and then too, amidst her perplexity and distress, upon
consultation between both her parents, was suggested to her the
device of a letter from her declaring her belief of the wish of the
testator, Isaac, to bestow the property for the benefit of the
family and asking the consent of the father of the complainant to a
settlement of the property in conformity with such a wish. Although
these allegations are not supported by direct statements of
witnesses, yet the intrinsic evidence flowing from other conduct of
the parties to these transactions, and that presented by the
written documents in this cause, impart to the above allegations a
force equal, if not surpassing, that which an explicit narrative by
witnesses could give them. And here it is worthy of remark that the
will of Robert Isaac contains no expression nor hint of a desire or
intention that the property should go according to the supposition
assumed or according to the provisions of the deed subsequently
executed. This circumstance alone should be one of controlling
influence, even if the testator could be regarded as a person of a
capacity and character of the most inferior grade. But none can
fail to perceive from the proofs in this cause that the testator
was a man of intelligence and sagacity, extensively practiced in
the business of life. He strongly declares his affection for his
niece, and as clearly gives to her, and to her only, the property
in dispute. What room is here for assuming that others, and not
this niece, were the
chief objects of his bounty? Such an
assumption is forbidden by every rule of law or of common sense; it
goes very far, of itself, to stamp with fraud and contrivance the
means resorted to in order to divert that bounty to other ends.
We will next consider the letter (Exhibit A, filed with the
answer of Goodwin) addressed by the complainant, then Charlotte
Scarborough, to her father, concocted, as is alleged by the
complainant, between her parents as preparatory and introductory to
the wrong about to be consummated, in which letter she professes
her readiness and her desire to settle the property derived from
her uncle to the use of her parents for their lives, and after
their deaths to the use of all the children equally. The will of
Robert Isaac was admitted to probate on 9 January, 1828, and
amongst the persons who qualified as executors of that will were
William Scarborough, the father of the complainant, and William
Taylor, the trustee in the deed now sought to be vacated. These
men, the depositaries of the solemn trust reposed in them by Isaac
-- fully capable of comprehending his will, and one of them
sustaining the further obligation of a parent to protect the
interests of this
Page 49 U. S. 205
young woman -- make themselves the ready instruments to betray
this confidence, and this in violation of the clearest language in
which their duty could possibly have been prescribed. How far this
conduct can be excused or palliated under the pretext of duty to
Mrs. Scarborough, founded on the alleged marriage contract or on
any supposed intention of Isaac flowing from the same source, will
hereafter be shown in the conduct of Scarborough and Taylor in
reference to this very property, when dealing with it for their own
personal advantage. This conduct will furnish a most efficient clue
in unraveling the texture of the deed in question.
On 10 January, 1828, the day succeeding the probate of the will
of Robert Isaac, was written the letter above mentioned from
Charlotte Scarborough to her father. It seems impossible to resist
the evidence furnished by this singular production that it was a
fabrication, designed to conceal the very facts and circumstances
which it palpably betrays. In the first place, it may be inquired
why such a letter should be written, and whether it would be usual
or probable in a transaction between persons thus situated, if
dictated solely by an admitted sense of propriety and sanctioned by
a willingness of both the parties to it. Can we accredit the
probability of a formal diplomatic communication from a daughter
just grown to her father, residing under the same roof, to justify
an act which they both believed it a sacred duty to perform? Again,
let us look at the declaration here so anxiously and pompously
paraded, that in the act about to be performed by this daughter
she
"was unbiased by any control whatsoever, and that, in the
liberty she was then using, she was acting
by her own
free will, dictated by her feelings alone, and unknown to any
person,"
and we shall perceive an apprehension, or consciousness of
suspicions, which it was believed the simple transaction itself
would neither prevent nor allay. Here are the very
clausulae
inconsuetae pointed to in
Twyne's Case as the sure
badges of that which they are intended to hide. Why should this
young woman have taken such deliberate pains to declare, and to
place, as it were, on record, a history of her motives -- her
entire exemption from persuasion, authority, or even advice, in
what she was about to do in obedience to affection and a sense of
duty? If these had constituted the real incentive to her act, would
they have left room for one thought or surmise of dishonor,
connected with the objects of that affection and duty? Such
suspicions and surmises are rather the offspring of colder
calculation, and of the "compunctious visitings" that wait on
contemplated wrong. And again, in the concluding paragraph
Page 49 U. S. 206
of this letter, may be seen a strong corroboration of this
charge in the complainant's bill of the painful and discreditable
imputations which had been made against her as inducements to come
into the proposed arrangement. The language of this paragraph is as
follows:
"Most thankful do I feel for being made the simple instrument of
accomplishing the will of him who has so kindly and generously
placed his confidence in me, and in acting thus convince the world
that my devoted affection for him was pure, disinterested, and
unbiased by future expectation."
It will naturally occur to everyone to inquire, why this young
woman should accuse herself, or fancy herself accused by others, of
unworthy motives or conduct because she had been the object of her
uncle's affection? The rational solution of the matter would seem
to be this -- that the assumption of such motives on the part of
those around her, represented by them, too, as entering into the
opinions of the world, had been pressed as an efficient means of
influence, and that a vindication from their existence furnished a
plausible coloring for the proceeding about to be effected. The
tone, the language, the artificial structure of this letter, its
familiarity with the terms peculiar to the business of life, all
bespeak it, in our judgment, not the production of an inexperienced
girl, but of a far more practiced and deliberate author. Lastly may
be mentioned with respect to this letter the care with which it has
been preserved and placed beyond the control of this daughter as a
prop to a transaction which could not stand alone, and as a means
of stilling the murmurings of future complaint -- the very ends for
which it at last emerges from its secret recess.
Next in the chain of evidence, and closely following its
harbinger and herald, we will notice the deed itself from the
complainant, conveying from her every description of property
derived from her uncle, and it is one of the peculiarities of this
conveyance not without significance that it was executed before
there was an inventory made by the executor, to inform the grantor
specifically what she had a right to claim or to bestow. Turning
then to the recitals of this deed, they must be regarded as wholly
irreconcilable with truth, and especially with that
uberrima
fides, that fullness of candor and fairness, required in
transactions between parent and child -- transactions upon their
face, too, operating to the disadvantage of the latter. This deed
sets out a marriage contract entered into between Scarborough and
his wife anterior to their marriage, purporting to cover a portion
of the property in dispute; it then states the failure of this
contract by reason of an omission to record it, and
Page 49 U. S. 207
proceeds to declare that, some doubts having been suggested as
to the validity of the said marriage settlement from the omission
to record the same, the said William Scarborough
did, in
consequence of such doubts, transfer and convey all his right
&c., to the said Robert Isaac, and that the said Isaac, having
departed this life, had left this property, with certain personal
estate, to his niece Charlotte Scarborough, and that she to whom
the devise and bequest had been made,
being desirous of
carrying the marriage settlement into effect according to the
original intent of the parties, had, on coming of age,
determined to convey all her right, title, and interest in the
property derived from her uncle for that purpose.
The deductions from these recitals -- nay, their necessary
meaning, we may add, their literal import -- are these. That the
conveyance from Scarborough to Isaac was with the sole view of
effectuating the marriage settlement and of curing any defects
attributable to that contract; that Isaac took the property clothed
with this trust, and for no consideration moving from himself, and
vesting in him an absolute title or estate; that his devise and
bequest to his niece were purely to secure the same objects, and
that
she, fully aware of all these acts and intentions,
had, as soon as she could legally do so, determined upon their
accomplishment. Such are the declarations and recitals contained in
this deed, not one of which, save the statement of a project of a
marriage settlement, that is not by the evidence on the record
shown to be palpably false. Thus, if we look to the deed from
Scarborough to Isaac of 13 May, 1820 -- to the agreement between
Isaac and McHenry as the agent of A. Low & Co., in February,
1826 -- and to that between Robert Isaac and Andrew Low, on 8
March, 1827 -- and also to the return of the marshal of the sale
under execution of the personal property in dispute, we find that
Isaac was the purchaser and exclusive owner of all this property,
for a pecuniary consideration paid by him of nearly twenty-three
thousand dollars. Looking next from the recitals of this deed to
the will of Robert Isaac, we find no ambiguity, no declaration,
hint, or implication in the will to sustain these recitals, but
everything to falsify and condemn them. We there see clearly the
motive of the testator;
his affection for his favorite
niece, and the subjects and the mode with and by which he designed
that his affection should be manifested. He gives to her, clear of
all trusts or encumbrances,
"the lot, dwelling house, and all other improvements thereon,
which formerly belonged to her father, together also with the
plate, furniture of all kinds, books and prints, all of which
Page 49 U. S. 208
were purchased and paid for at marshal's sale by me."
If this clause of the will were shown to and clearly understood
by the complainant, it is difficult to conceive how it could be
made rationally to express or imply a duty on her part to disrobe
herself of this bounty, as being clearly designed for others, and
not for herself. The conduct of these persons, Scarborough and Low,
and of Taylor, who was named at trustee both in the marriage
settlement and in the deed from Charlotte Scarborough, furnishes
convincing evidence of the light in which they viewed any
obligation supposed to be adhering to this property, and forming a
binding consideration, either legal or moral, for the deed now
impugned -- that is, an obligation to bestow it in conformity with
the stipulations of the marriage contract. But it may be naturally
asked if this supposed obligation was limited to Charlotte
Scarborough. Did it not, if existing at all, extend equally to her
father, and to the trustee in the settlement, and to others
acquainted or connected with that contract?
In a moral view, at least, no difference is perceived in the
position of these parties, and it is not pretended that Charlotte
Scarborough sustained any legal obligation to convey away this
property. Yet it is seen by the record that William Scarborough, to
serve his convenience or his interest, had no difficulty in
subsequently encumbering it both to Low and to Taylor, the trustee
in the marriage settlement, or in subsequently selling it out and
out to Isaac; and that this same trustee, Taylor, manifested as
little scruple for the sanctity of his trust in its application for
his own benefit. And it seems to us to be a most pregnant state of
facts connected with this deed that when it was to be executed,
Taylor and Low, who had so dealt with this property as to be
necessarily cognizant of the falsehood of the recitals it
contained, were carried to the house of Scarborough to become, the
first the trustee, the second a witness to this instrument.
The other witness to this deed, John Guilmartin, seems to have
been taken under the stress of necessity, from the refusal of James
Taylor to attest the deed and the manner in which the transaction
impressed itself upon Guilmartin, is evinced in his deposition, in
which he says that he inquired of Miss Scarborough whether this
deed was her voluntary act, but was permitted to have no answer
from her, and was silenced in his inquiries by the remark from Low
that the witness had been sent for to
attest the deed, and for
no other purpose. This witness further swears that the deed
was not read to nor by the grantor in his presence. He states,
moreover, this uncalled for remark on the part of the father
(although witness was not permitted to obtain information
Page 49 U. S. 209
from the child) -- that he, Scarborough, had sent for the
witness to attest "a deed from Miss Scarborough to her mother,
which as a dutiful child she had made."
Again, when this deed from Charlotte Scarborough was to be
proved, the only witness to its execution called on was Andrew Low
-- he who knew that its recitals were inconsistent with truth, he
who deemed all inquiry about the willingness of the grantor to make
it to be impertinent. John Guilmartin was passed by; he might have
revealed, if called, circumstances coeval with the transaction,
which would be calculated to remove or to weaken the influence of
seeming acquiescence, or of the lapse of time -- circumstances
which time alone, in the absence of direct impeaching testimony,
would be competent entirely to cover up. The testimony adduced in
support of the deed from the complainant falls far short of the
object for which it was intended; much of that evidence, too, seems
to have been given under influences necessarily detracting from the
weight which it otherwise might have had. It wholly fails to
countervail the evidence arising from the statements of witnesses
on the other side, from the relative positions of the parties, and,
more than all, from the intrinsic nature and force of the documents
relied on both by plaintiff and defendants in the court below. From
a careful analysis of the facts and circumstances of this case, we
think the conclusion cannot be resisted that the deed from
Charlotte Scarborough to William Taylor of 22 January, 1822, was
not a fair and voluntary transaction, but was drawn from her by
means and under influences which rendered that conveyance void. We
are therefore, of the opinion that the real property conveyed by
that deed should be reconveyed to the said Charlotte, now Charlotte
Taylor, and that the several articles of personal property
bequeathed to her by her uncle, Robert Isaac, so far as the same
are now in existence, and in the possession or under the control of
Mrs. Julia Scarborough or of any other person acting under her
authority, or claiming from her and not for valuable consideration
without notice, or claiming under like circumstances from any
person by virtue of the provisions of the deed of trust above
mentioned, should be delivered up to the complainant as her own
property, but it is the opinion of this Court that rents and
profits for the use and occupation of the real estate above
mentioned, or compensation for the use and enjoyment of the
personal property bequeathed to the complainant, should not be
allowed her under all the circumstances attending this case; they
are accordingly hereby denied her. It is therefore, upon
consideration
Adjudged, ordered and decreed, that the decree of the
Circuit Court
Page 49 U. S. 210
for the Sixth Circuit and District of Georgia, pronounced in
this cause at the April term of that court in the year 1846, be,
and the same is hereby, reversed, and this cause is remanded to
that court with directions to decree therein in conformity with the
opinion herein above expressed.
MR. JUSTICE WAYNE remarked that the decree given in this case
was that which he wished to be given in the court below. But the
judges of the circuit court not being of the same opinion, the bill
of complaint was dismissed, that there might be an early appeal to
the Supreme Court. He concurs altogether in the reasoning and
conclusions which have just been announced by the court.
MR. JUSTICE NELSON and MR. JUSTICE WOODBURY dissented.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Georgia and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is
now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this Court that the
decree of the said circuit court in this cause be, and the same is
hereby, reversed with costs, and that this cause be and the same is
hereby remanded to the said circuit court with directions to decree
therein in conformity to the opinion of this Court.
