After a jury awarded petitioner $10,000 in damages on his claim
that respondent sheriff's deputy had beaten him and thereby
deprived him of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
Federal District Court awarded him $7,500 in attorney's fees under
42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides that the court, "in its
discretion, may allow . . . a reasonable attorney's fee" to a
prevailing party in certain federal civil rights actions, including
those under § 1983. The Court of Appeals reduced the fee award to
$4,000, ruling that petitioner's 40% contingent fee arrangement
with his lawyer served as a cap on the amount of fees that could be
awarded. The court also found that hours billed for the time of law
clerks and paralegals were not compensable, since they would be
included within the contingency fee.
Held:
1. An attorney's fee allowed under § 1988 is not limited to the
amount provided in the plaintiff's contingent fee arrangement with
his counsel. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the
statute, which broadly requires all defendants to pay a reasonable
fee to all prevailing plaintiffs if ordered to do so by the court
acting in its sound judgment and in light of all the circumstances
of the case. This Court's decisions have required that the initial
estimate of a reasonable court-awarded fee be calculated by
multiplying prevailing billing rates by the hours reasonably
expended on successful claims, which "lodestar" figure may then be
adjusted by other factors. The Court has never suggested that any
one such factor should substitute for the lodestar approach. In
fact, the lodestar figure is entitled to a strong presumption of
reasonableness, and prevents a "windfall" for attorneys in § 1983
actions by guaranteeing that they receive only the reasonable worth
of the services rendered. Thus, as § 1988's legislative history
confirms, a private fee arrangement is but one of the many factors
to be considered and cannot, standing alone, impose an automatic
limitation on the exercise of the trial judge's discretion, which
is central to the operation of the statute. Moreover, such a
limitation might place an undesirable emphasis on the importance of
the recovery of damages, whereas § 1988 makes no distinction
between damages actions and equitable suits, but was intended to
encourage meritorious claims, irrespective of their nature, because
of the benefits of
Page 489 U. S. 88
civil rights litigation for the named plaintiff and for society
at large. Fee awards in § 1983 damages cases should not be modeled
upon the contingent fee arrangements used in personal injury
litigation, which benefits only the individual plaintiff. Pp.
489 U. S.
91-96.
2. Since the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the fee award
was controlled by the contingency arrangement, it must consider the
determination of the total fee award on remand. P.
489 U. S.
97.
831 F.2d 563, reversed and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS,
O'CONNOR, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
post,
p.
489 U. S.
97.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue before us is whether an attorney's fee allowed under
42 U.S.C. § 1988 is limited to the amount provided in a contingent
fee arrangement entered into by plaintiff and his counsel.
I
Petitioner Arthur J. Blanchard brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Louisiana alleging
violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Blanchard
asserted that he was beaten by Sheriff's Deputy James Bergeron
while he was in Oudrey's Odyssey Lounge. Blanchard brought his
claim against the deputy, the sheriff and the St. Martin Parish
Sheriff's Department. He also joined with his civil rights claim a
state law negligence claim against the above defendants and against
the owners and a
Page 489 U. S. 89
manager of the lounge and the lounge itself. The case was tried,
and a jury awarded Blanchard compensatory damages in the amount of
$5,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $5,000 on his § 1983
claim. Under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which permit the
award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party in certain federal
civil rights actions, [
Footnote
1] Blanchard sought attorney's fees and costs totaling more
than $40,000. The District Court, after reviewing the billing and
cost records furnished by counsel, awarded $7,500 in attorney's
fees and $886.92 for costs and expenses. [
Footnote 2]
Page 489 U. S. 90
Petitioner appealed this award to the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, seeking to increase the award. The Court of Appeals,
however, reduced the award because petitioner had entered into a
contingent fee arrangement with his lawyer, [
Footnote 3] under which the attorney was to
receive 40% of any damages awarded should petitioner prevail in his
suit. While recognizing that other Circuits had different views,
the court held that it was bound by its prior decision in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714,
718 (CA5 1974), to rule that the contingency fee agreement "serves
as a cap on the amount of attorney's fee to be awarded." 831 F.2d
563, 564 (1987). The court further found that hours billed for the
time of law clerks and paralegals were not compensable, since they
would be included within the contingency fee.
Ibid.
Accordingly, the court limited the fee award to 40% of the $10,000
damages awarded -- $4,000.
Because other Courts of Appeals have concluded that a § 1988 fee
award should not be limited by a contingent fee agreement between
the attorney and his client, [
Footnote 4] we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict,
487 U.S. 1217 (1988). We now reverse.
Page 489 U. S. 91
II
Section 1988 provides that the court, "in its discretion, may
allow . . . a reasonable attorney's fee. . . ." The section does
not provide a specific definition of "reasonable" fee, and the
question is whether the award must be limited to the amount
provided in a contingent fee agreement. The legislative history of
the Act is instructive insofar as it tells us:
"In computing the fee, counsel for prevailing parties should be
paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying
client, 'for all time reasonably expended on a matter.'"
S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976) (citing
Davis v. County of
Los Angeles, 8 EPD � 9444 (CD Cal.1974); and
Stanford
Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 684 (ND Cal.1974)).
In many past cases considering the award of attorney's fees
under § 1988, we have turned our attention to
Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., supra, a case decided before
the enactment of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Award Act of 1976.
As we stated in
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.
S. 424,
461 U. S.
429-431 (1983),
Johnson provides guidance to
Congress' intent because both the House and Senate Reports refer to
the 12 factors set forth in
Johnson for assessing the
reasonableness of an attorney's fee award. [
Footnote 5] The Senate Report,
Page 489 U. S. 92
in particular, refers to three District Court decisions that
"correctly applied" the 12 factors laid out in
Johnson.
[
Footnote 6]
In the course of its discussion of the factors to be considered
by a court in awarding attorney's fees, the
Johnson court
dealt with fee arrangements:
"'Whether or not [a litigant] agreed to pay a fee and in what
amount is not decisive. Conceivably, a litigant might agree to pay
his counsel a fixed dollar fee. This might be even more than the
fee eventually allowed by the court. Or he might agree to pay his
lawyer a percentage contingent fee that would be greater than the
fee the court might ultimately set. Such arrangements should not
determine the court's decision. The criterion for the court is not
what the parties agree, but what is reasonable.'"
488 F.2d at 718 (quoting
Clark v. American Marine
Corp., 320 F.
Supp. 709, 711, (ED La.1970),
aff'd, 437 F.2d 959 (CA5
1971)).
Yet in the next sentence,
Johnson says
"In no event, however, should the litigant be awarded a fee
greater than he is contractually bound to pay, if indeed the
attorneys have contracted as to amount."
488 F.2d at 718. This latter statement, never disowned in the
Circuit, was the basis for the decision below. But we doubt that
Congress embraced this aspect of
Johnson, for it pointed
to the three District Court cases in which the factors are
"correctly applied." Those cases clarify that the fee arrangement
is but a single factor, and not determinative. In
Stanford
Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (ND Cal.1974),
aff'd,
550 F.2d 464 (CA9 1977),
rev'd on other grounds,
436 U. S. 547
(1978), for example,
Page 489 U. S. 93
the District Court considered a contingent fee arrangement to be
a factor, but not dispositive, in the calculation of a fee award.
In
Davis v. County of Los Angeles, supra, the court
permitted a fee award to counsel in a public interest firm which
otherwise would have been entitled to no fee. Finally, in
Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 66 F.R.D. 483
(WDNC 1975), the court stated that reasonable fees should be
granted regardless of the individual plaintiff's fee obligations.
Johnson's "list of 12" thus provides a useful catalog of
the many factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness
of an award of attorney's fees; but the one factor at issue here,
the attorney's private fee arrangement, standing alone, is not
dispositive.
The
Johnson contingency fee factor is simply that, a
factor. The presence of a preexisting fee agreement may aid in
determining reasonableness.
"'The fee quoted to the client or the percentage of the recovery
agreed to is helpful in demonstrating the attorney's fee
expectations when he accepted the case.'"
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean
Air, 483 U. S. 711,
483 U. S. 723
(1987), quoting
Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718. But as we see
it, a contingent fee contract does not impose an automatic ceiling
on an award of attorney's fees, and to hold otherwise would be
inconsistent with the statute and its policy and purpose.
As we understand § 1988's provision for allowing a "reasonable
attorney's fee," it contemplates reasonable compensation, in light
of all of the circumstances, for the time and effort expended by
the attorney for the prevailing plaintiff, no more and no less.
Should a fee agreement provide less than a reasonable fee
calculated in this manner, the defendant should nevertheless be
required to pay the higher amount. The defendant is not, however,
required to pay the amount called for in a contingent fee contract
if it is more than a reasonable fee calculated in the usual way. It
is true that the purpose of § 1988 was to make sure that competent
counsel was available to civil rights plaintiffs, and it is of
course arguable that, if a plaintiff is able to secure an
attorney
Page 489 U. S. 94
on the basis of a contingent or other fee agreement, the purpose
of the statute is served if the plaintiff is bound by his contract.
On that basis, however, the plaintiff should recover nothing from
the defendant, which would be plainly contrary to the statute. And
Congress implemented its purpose by broadly requiring all
defendants to pay a reasonable fee to all prevailing plaintiffs, if
ordered to do so by the court. Thus it is that a plaintiff's
recovery will not be reduced by what he must pay his counsel.
Plaintiffs who can afford to hire their own lawyers, as well as
impecunious litigants, may take advantage of this provision. And
where there are lawyers or organizations that will take a
plaintiff's case without compensation, that fact does not bar the
award of a reasonable fee. All of this is consistent with and
reflects our decisions in cases involving court-awarded attorney's
fees.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424
(1983), directed lower courts to make an initial estimate of
reasonable attorney's fees by applying prevailing billing rates to
the hours reasonably expended on successful claims. And we have
said repeatedly that
"[t]he initial estimate of a reasonable attorney's fee is
properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate."
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886,
465 U. S. 888
(1984). The courts may then adjust this lodestar calculation by
other factors. We have never suggested that a different approach is
to be followed in cases where the prevailing party and his (or her)
attorney have executed a contingent fee agreement. To the contrary,
in
Hensley and in subsequent cases, we have adopted the
lodestar approach as the centerpiece of attorney's fee awards. The
Johnson factors may be relevant in adjusting the lodestar
amount, but no one factor is a substitute for multiplying
reasonable billing rates by a reasonable estimation of the number
of hours expended on the litigation. In
Blum, we rejected,
as contrary to congressional intent, the notion that fees are to be
calculated on a cost-based standard. Further, as we said in
Blum,
"Congress did not
Page 489 U. S. 95
intend the calculation of fee awards to vary depending on
whether plaintiff was represented by private counsel or by a
nonprofit legal services organization."
465 U.S. at
465 U. S. 894.
That a nonprofit legal services organization may contractually have
agreed not to charge
any fee of a civil rights plaintiff
does not preclude the award of a reasonable fee to a prevailing
party in a § 1983 action, calculated in the usual way.
It is clear that Congress
"intended that the amount of fees awarded . . . be governed by
the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex
Federal litigation, . . . and not be reduced because the rights
involved may be nonpecuniary in nature."
S.Rep. No. 94-1011, at 6. "The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure
effective access to the judicial process' for persons with
civil rights grievances." Hensley, supra, at 461 U. S. 429,
quoting H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976). Even when considering
the award of attorney's fees under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7401, the Court has applied the § 1988 approach, stating:
"A strong presumption that the lodestar figure -- the product of
reasonable hours times a reasonable rate -- represents a
'reasonable fee' is wholly consistent with the rationale behind the
usual fee-shifting statute. . . ."
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean
Air, 478 U. S. 546,
478 U. S. 565
(1986).
If a contingent fee agreement were to govern as a strict
limitation on the award of attorney's fees, an undesirable emphasis
might be placed on the importance of the recovery of damages in
civil rights litigation. The intention of Congress was to encourage
successful civil rights litigation, not to create a special
incentive to prove damages and shortchange efforts to seek
effective injunctive or declaratory relief. Affirming the decision
below would create an artificial disincentive for an attorney who
enters into a contingent fee agreement, unsure of whether his
client's claim sounded in state tort law or in federal civil
rights, from fully exploring all possible avenues of relief.
Section 1988 makes no distinction between actions for damages and
suits for equitable relief.
Page 489 U. S. 96
Congress has elected to encourage meritorious civil rights
claims because of the benefits of such litigation for the named
plaintiff and for society at large, irrespective of whether the
action seeks monetary damages.
It should also be noted that we have not accepted the contention
that fee awards in § 1983 damages cases should be modeled upon the
contingent fee arrangements used in personal injury litigation.
"[W]e reject the notion that a civil rights action for damages
constitutes nothing more than a private tort suit benefiting only
the individual plaintiffs whose rights were violated. Unlike most
private tort litigants, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate
important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued
solely in monetary terms."
Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U. S. 561,
477 U. S. 574
(1986).
Respondent cautions us that refusing to limit recovery to the
amount of the contingency agreement will result in a "windfall" to
attorneys who accept § 1983 actions. Yet the very nature of
recovery under § 1988 is designed to prevent any such "windfall."
Fee awards are to be reasonable, reasonable as to billing rates and
reasonable as to the number of hours spent in advancing the
successful claims. Accordingly, fee awards, properly calculated, by
definition will represent the reasonable worth of the services
rendered in vindication of a plaintiff's civil rights claim. It is
central to the awarding of attorney's fees under § 1988 that the
district court judge, in his or her good judgment, make the
assessment of what is a reasonable fee under the circumstances of
the case. The trial judge should not be limited by the contractual
fee agreement between plaintiff and counsel.
The contingent fee model, premised on the award to an attorney
of an amount representing a percentage of the damages, is thus
inappropriate for the determination of fees under § 1988. The
attorney's fee provided for in a contingent fee agreement is not a
ceiling upon the fees recoverable under § 1988. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand.
Page 489 U. S. 97
III
Blanchard also complains of the failure of the court below to
award fees in compensation for the time of paralegals and law
clerks. Because the Court of Appeals held that recovery for legal
fees was to be limited by the contingency agreement, that court
never addressed the issue of separate billing for legal assistants.
"[A]ny hours
billed' by law clerks or paralegals would also
naturally be included within the contingency fee." 831 F.2d at 564.
Since we hold today that the contingency fee arrangement does not
control the award for attorney's fees, the determination of the
total fee will be considered on remand. We reserve for another day
the question whether legal assistants' fees should be included in
the award.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub.L.
94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 states:
". . . In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX
of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs."
The section states that the court "in its discretion" may allow
a fee, but that discretion is not without limit: the prevailing
party "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust."
Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.
S. 400,
390 U. S. 402
(1968);
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.
S. 424,
461 U. S. 429
(1983).
[
Footnote 2]
The District Court referred to the guidelines announced by this
Court in
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.
S. 424 (1983), for determining the calculation of fee
awards. In that case, we said that
"[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of
a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate."
Id. at
461 U. S. 433.
We also went on to say that "[t]he district court . . . should
exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not
reasonably expended'" on the litigation. Id. at
461 U. S. 434,
quoting S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976). The District Court here
first determined that the plaintiff, Blanchard, was a prevailing
party. Then, to arrive at a reasonable fee, the court multiplied
what it deemed to be the reasonable hours expended on the
litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. This lodestar figure was
then further reduced by the District Court based on its
considerations of "the elemental nature of this litigation and the
contingency fee arrangement entered." App. to Pet. for Cert. 14A
(ruling in Civil Action No. 83-0755, filed Oct. 23, 1986; Record
363, 370). Accordingly, the District Court adjusted its lodestar of
$9,720 downward to the awarded fee of $7,500. We express no opinion
on the number of hours reasonably expended on this litigation or on
the reasonable hourly rate for the work involved here, or even
whether the District Court correctly characterized the nature of
the litigation as "elemental."
[
Footnote 3]
Blanchard's attorney when he filed his original complaint on
March 29, 1983, was Charles Pisano. On June 11, 1984, the District
Court granted a motion substituting William Rosen as counsel.
[
Footnote 4]
Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496, 1507 (CA10 1983);
Lusby v. T. G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423 (CA10
1984),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985);
Sisco v. J.
S. Alberici Constr. Co., 733 F.2d 55, 56 (CA8 1984);
Sanchez v. Schwartz, 688 F.2d 503, 505 (CA7 1982). The
Fifth Circuit is not alone, however, in holding that a contractual
agreement between a § 1983 plaintiff and counsel should govern the
award of attorney's fees under § 1988.
See Pharr v. Housing
Authority of Prichard, 704 F.2d 1216 (CA11 1983).
[
Footnote 5]
The 12 factors set forth by the
Johnson court for
determining fee awards under Section 706(k) of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) are: (1) the time
and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney
due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether
the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the
client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the
results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of
the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the
nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
and (12) awards in similar cases. 488 F.2d at 717-719.
[
Footnote 6]
"The appropriate standards,
see Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974), are correctly applied in
such cases as
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680
(N.D.Cal.1974);
Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D. �
9444 (C.D.Cal.1974); and
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education, 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C.1975). These cases have
resulted in fees which are adequate to attract competent counsel,
but which do not produce windfalls to attorneys."
S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976).
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.
I concur in the judgment and join the opinion of the Court
except that portion which rests upon detailed analysis of the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (CA5 1974), and the District Court
decisions in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 66 F.R.D. 483 (WDNC 1975);
Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (ND Cal.1974); and
Davis v. County
of Los Angeles, 8 EPD � 9444 (CD Cal.1974).
See ante
at 91-93. The Court carefully examines those opinions, separating
holding from dictum, much as a lower court would study our opinions
in order to be faithful to our guidance. The justification for this
role reversal is that the Senate and House Committee Reports on the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 referred
approvingly to
Johnson, and the Senate Report alone
referred to the three District
Page 489 U. S. 98
Court opinions as having "correctly applied"
Johnson.
The Court resolves the difficulty that
Johnson contradicts
the three District Court opinions on the precise point at issue
here by concluding, in effect, that the analysis in
Johnson was dictum, whereas in the three District Court
opinions it was a holding. Despite the fact that the House Report
referred only to
Johnson, and made no mention of the
District Court cases, the Court "doubt[s] that Congress embraced
this aspect of
Johnson, for it pointed to the three
District Court cases in which the factors are
correctly
applied.'" Ante at 489 U. S.
92.
In my view, Congress did no such thing. Congress is elected to
enact statutes, rather than point to cases, and its Members have
better uses for their time than poring over District Court
opinions. That the Court should refer to the citation of three
District Court cases in a document issued by a single committee of
a single house as the action of Congress displays the level of
unreality that our unrestrained use of legislative history has
attained. I am confident that only a small proportion of the
Members of Congress read either one of the Committee Reports in
question, even if (as is not always the case) the Reports happened
to have been published before the vote; that very few of those who
did read them set off for the nearest law library to check out what
was actually said in the four cases at issue (or in the more than
50 other cases cited by the House and Senate Reports); and that no
Member of Congress came to the judgment that the District Court
cases would trump
Johnson on the point at issue here
because the latter was dictum. As anyone familiar with modern-day
drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware, the
references to the cases were inserted, at best by a committee staff
member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee
staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the
purpose of those references was not primarily to inform the Members
of Congress what the bill meant (for that end,
Johnson
would not merely have been
Page 489 U. S. 99
cited, but its 12 factors would have been described, which they
were not), but rather to influence judicial construction. What a
heady feeling it must be for a young staffer to know that his or
her citation of obscure district court cases can transform them
into the law of the land, thereafter dutifully to be observed by
the Supreme Court itself.
I decline to participate in this process. It is neither
compatible with our judicial responsibility of assuring reasoned,
consistent, and effective application of the statutes of the United
States, nor conducive to a genuine effectuation of congressional
intent, to give legislative force to each snippet of analysis, and
even every case citation, in committee reports that are
increasingly unreliable evidence of what the voting Members of
Congress actually had in mind. By treating
Johnson and the
District Court trilogy as fully authoritative, the Court today
expands what I regard as our cases' excessive preoccupation with
them -- and with the 12-factor
Johnson analysis in
particular.
See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.
S. 886,
465 U. S.
893-896,
465 U. S. 900
(1984);
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.
S. 424,
461 U. S.
429-432,
461 U. S.
434-435 (1983). This expansion is all the more puzzling
because I had thought that, in the first
Delaware Valley
case,
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for
Clean Air, 478 U. S. 546
(1986), we had acknowledged our emancipation from
Johnson,
see 478 U.S. at
478 U. S.
563-565. Indeed, the plurality opinion in the second
Delaware Valley case,
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.
S. 711,
483 U. S.
723-724 (1987) (
Delaware Valley II), discussed
Johnson and the other three cases almost exclusively by
way of refuting arguments made in reliance upon them in JUSTICE
BRENNAN's separate opinion in
Blum v. Stenson, supra, at
465 U. S.
902-903. Moreover, the concurring opinion that formed
the fifth vote for the judgment in
Delaware Valley II did
not discuss the four cases at all. 483 U.S. at
483 U. S.
731-734 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment). Except for the few passages to which I object,
today's opinion admirably follows our more
Page 489 U. S. 100
recent approach of seeking to develop an interpretation of the
statute that is reasonable, consistent, and faithful to its
apparent purpose, rather than to achieve obedient adherence to
cases cited in the committee reports. I therefore join the balance
of the opinion.