Petitioner and one Harris, who are black, were charged with the
kidnaping, rape, and forcible sodomy of Starla Matthews, a white
woman. In his defense, petitioner asserted that he and Matthews had
engaged in consensual sex, an account corroborated by several
witnesses. Matthews' story was corroborated only by the testimony
of one Russell. Petitioner claimed that, at the time of the
incident, Matthews and Russell had been engaged in an extramarital
affair, and that she had lied to Russell to protect that
relationship. In order to show that Matthews had a motive to lie,
petitioner wanted to introduce evidence that Matthews and Russell
were living together at the time of the trial. However, the trial
court granted the prosecutor's motion to keep such evidence from
the jury, and sustained the prosecutor's objection when the defense
attempted to cross-examine Matthews about the matter after she had
testified that she was living with her mother. The jury acquitted
Harris of all charges and found petitioner guilty only of forcible
sodomy. On appeal, petitioner claimed,
inter alia, that
the court's failure to allow him to impeach Matthews' testimony
deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses
against him. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky upheld the
conviction. While acknowledging the relevance of the testimony, it
found that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by
the possibility of prejudice against Matthews that might result
from revealing her interracial relationship to the jury.
Held: Petitioner was denied his right to confront the
witnesses against him, and, considering the relevant factors
enumerated in
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.
S. 673, that error was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Matthews' testimony was crucial to the prosecution's case.
Her account was directly contradicted by petitioner, and was
corroborated only by the testimony of Russell, whose impartiality
may have been impugned by evidence of his relationship with
Matthews. In addition, as the jury's verdicts show, the State's
case was far from overwhelming.
Certiorari granted; reversed and remanded.
Page 488 U. S. 228
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner James Olden and his friend Charlie Ray Harris, both
of whom are black, were indicted for kidnaping, rape, and forcible
sodomy. The victim of the alleged crimes, Starla Matthews, a young
white woman, gave the following account at trial: she and a friend,
Regina Patton, had driven to Princeton, Kentucky, to exchange
Christmas gifts with Bill Russell, petitioner's half-brother. After
meeting Russell at a local car wash and exchanging presents with
him, Matthews and Patton stopped in J.R.'s, a "boot-legging joint"
serving a predominantly black clientele, to use the restroom.
Matthews consumed several glasses of beer. As the bar became more
crowded, she became increasingly nervous because she and Patton
were the only white people there. When Patton refused to leave,
Matthews sat at a separate table, hoping to demonstrate to her
friend that she was upset. As time passed, however, Matthews lost
track of Patton and became somewhat intoxicated. When petitioner
told her that Patton had departed and had been in a car accident,
she left the bar with petitioner and Harris to find out what had
happened. She was driven in Harris' car to another location, where,
threatening her with a knife, petitioner raped and sodomized her.
Harris assisted by holding her arms. Later, she was driven to a
dump, where two other men joined the group. There, petitioner raped
her once again. At her request, the men then dropped her off in the
vicinity of Bill Russell's house.
On cross-examination, petitioner's counsel focused on a number
of inconsistencies in Matthews' various accounts of the alleged
crime. Matthews originally told the police that she had been raped
by four men. Later, she claimed that she had been raped by only
petitioner and Harris. At trial, she contended that petitioner was
the sole rapist. Further, while Matthews testified at trial that
petitioner had threatened her with a knife, she had not previously
alleged that petitioner had been armed.
Page 488 U. S. 229
Russell, who also appeared as a State's witness, testified that,
on the evening in question, he heard a noise outside his home and,
when he went out to investigate, saw Matthews get out of Harris'
car. Matthews immediately told Russell that she had just been raped
by petitioner and Harris.
Petitioner and Harris asserted a defense of consent. According
to their testimony, Matthews propositioned petitioner as he was
about to leave the bar, and the two engaged in sexual acts behind
the tavern. Afterwards, on Matthews' suggestion, Matthews,
petitioner, and Harris left in Harris' car in search of cocaine.
When they discovered that the seller was not at home, Matthews
asked Harris to drive to a local dump so that she and petitioner
could have sex once again. Harris complied. Later that evening,
they picked up two other men, Richard Hickey and Chris Taylor, and
drove to an establishment called The Alley. Harris, Taylor, and
Hickey went in, leaving petitioner and Matthews in the car. When
Hickey and Harris returned, the men gave Hickey a ride to a store
and then dropped Matthews off, at her request, in the vicinity of
Bill Russell's home.
Taylor and Hickey testified for the defense, and corroborated
the defendants' account of the evening. While both acknowledged
that they joined the group later than the time when the alleged
rape occurred, both testified that Matthews did not appear upset.
Hickey further testified that Matthews had approached him earlier
in the evening at J.R.'s and told him that she was looking for a
black man with whom to have sex. An independent witness also
appeared for the defense and testified that he had seen Matthews,
Harris, and petitioner at a store called Big O's on the evening in
question, that a policeman was in the store at the time, and that
Matthews, who appeared alert, made no attempt to signal for
assistance.
Although Matthews and Russell were both married to and living
with other people at the time of the incident, they were apparently
involved in an extramarital relationship. By the
Page 488 U. S. 230
time of trial, the two were living together, having separated
from their respective spouses. Petitioner's theory of the case was
that Matthews concocted the rape story to protect her relationship
with Russell, who would have grown suspicious upon seeing her
disembark from Harris' car. In order to demonstrate Matthews'
motive to lie, it was crucial, petitioner contended, that he be
allowed to introduce evidence of Matthews' and Russell's current
cohabitation. Over petitioner's vehement objections, the trial
court nonetheless granted the prosecutor's motion in limine to keep
all evidence of Matthews' and Russell's living arrangement from the
jury. Moreover, when the defense attempted to cross-examine
Matthews about her living arrangements, after she had claimed
during direct examination that she was living with her mother, the
trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection.
Based on the evidence admitted at trial, the jury acquitted
Harris of being either a principal or an accomplice to any of the
charged offenses. Petitioner was likewise acquitted of kidnaping
and rape. However, in a somewhat puzzling turn of events, the jury
convicted petitioner alone of forcible sodomy. He was sentenced to
10 years' imprisonment.
Petitioner appealed, asserting,
inter alia, that the
trial court's refusal to allow him to impeach Matthews' testimony
by introducing evidence supporting a motive to lie deprived him of
his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the conviction. No. 86-CR-006 (May
11, 1988). The court specifically held that evidence that Matthews
and Russell were living together at the time of trial was not
barred by the State's rape shield law. Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. ยง 510.145
(Michie 1985). Moreover, it acknowledged that the evidence in
question was relevant to petitioner's theory of the case. But it
held, nonetheless, that the evidence was properly excluded as "its
probative value [was] outweighed by its possibility for prejudice."
App. to Pet. for Cert. A6. By way
Page 488 U. S. 231
of explanation, the court stated:
"[T]here were the undisputed facts of race; Matthews was white
and Russell was black. For the trial court to have admitted into
evidence testimony that Matthews and Russell were living together
at the time of the trial may have created extreme prejudice against
Matthews."
Judge Clayton, who dissented but did not address the evidentiary
issue, would have reversed petitioner's conviction both because he
believed the jury's verdicts were "manifestly inconsistent," and
because he found Matthews' testimony too incredible to provide
evidence sufficient to uphold the verdict.
Id. at A7.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals failed to accord proper weight to
petitioner's Sixth Amendment right "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." That right, incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment and therefore available in state proceedings,
Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400
(1965), includes the right to conduct reasonable cross-examination.
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308,
415 U. S.
315-316 (1974).
In
Davis v. Alaska, we observed that, subject to
"the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive
and unduly harassing interrogation . . . the cross-examiner has
traditionally been allowed to impeach,
i.e., discredit,
the witness."
Id. at
415 U. S. 316.
We emphasized that
"the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper
and important function of the constitutionally protected right of
cross-examination."
Id. at
415 U. S.
316-317, citing
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.
S. 474,
360 U. S. 496
(1959). Recently, in
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.
S. 673 (1986), we reaffirmed
Davis, and held
that
"a criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation
Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise
appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form
of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby 'to expose to the
jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw
inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'"
475 U.S. at
475 U. S. 680,
quoting
Davis, supra, at
415 U. S.
318.
Page 488 U. S. 232
In the instant case, petitioner has consistently asserted that
he and Matthews engaged in consensual sexual acts and that Matthews
-- out of fear of jeopardizing her relationship with Russell --
lied when she told Russell she had been raped and has continued to
lie since. It is plain to us that
"[a] reasonable jury might have received a significantly
different impression of [the witness'] credibility had [defense
counsel] been permitted to pursue his proposed line of
cross-examination."
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, at
475 U. S.
680.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals did not dispute, and indeed
acknowledged, the relevance of the impeachment evidence.
Nonetheless, without acknowledging the significance of, or even
adverting to, petitioner's constitutional right to confrontation,
the court held that petitioner's right to effective
cross-examination was outweighed by the danger that revealing
Matthews' interracial relationship would prejudice the jury against
her. While a trial court may, of course, impose reasonable limits
on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a
prosecution witness, to take account of such factors as
"harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness'
safety, or interrogation that [would be] repetitive or only
marginally relevant,"
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, at
475 U. S. 679,
the limitation here was beyond reason. Speculation as to the effect
of jurors' racial biases cannot justify exclusion of
cross-examination with such strong potential to demonstrate the
falsity of Matthews' testimony.
In
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, we held that
"the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant's
opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation
Clause errors, is subject to
Chapman [v. California,
386 U. S.
18 (1967)] harmless error analysis."
Id. at
475 U. S. 684.
Thus, we stated:
"The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging
potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing
court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Page 488 U. S. 233
Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends
upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts.
These factors include the importance of the witness' testimony in
the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the
testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of
cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall
strength of the prosecution's case."
Ibid. Here, Matthews' testimony was central, indeed
crucial, to the prosecution's case. Her story, which was directly
contradicted by that of petitioner and Harris, was corroborated
only by the largely derivative testimony of Russell, whose
impartiality would also have been somewhat impugned by revelation
of his relationship with Matthews. Finally, as demonstrated
graphically by the jury's verdicts, which cannot be squared with
the State's theory of the alleged crime, and by Judge Clayton's
dissenting opinion below, the State's case against petitioner was
far from overwhelming. In sum, considering the relevant
Van
Arsdall factors within the context of this case, we find it
impossible to conclude "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the
restriction on petitioner's right to confrontation was
harmless.
The motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and
the petition for certiorari are granted, the judgment of the
Kentucky Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
I continue to believe that summary dispositions deprive
litigants of a fair opportunity to be heard on the merits, and
create a significant risk that the Court is rendering an erroneous
or ill-advised decision that may confuse the lower courts.
See
Pennsylvania v. Bruder, ante p. 11 (MARSHALL,
Page 488 U. S. 234
J., dissenting);
Rhodes v. Stewart, ante p.
488 U. S. 4
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting);
Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc.,
485 U. S. 265,
485 U. S. 269
(1988) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting);
Commissioner v. McCoy,
484 U. S. 3,
484 U. S. 7 (1987)
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). I therefore dissent from the Court's
decision today to reverse summarily the decision below.