After respondent collection agency obtained money judgments
against participants in an "employee welfare benefit plan" covered
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), its
request to garnish the debtors' plan benefits was granted by a
Georgia trial court. The State Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 (1982), barring the garnishment of
"[f]unds or benefits of [an] . . . employee benefit plan or program
subject to . . . [ERISA]," exempted plan benefits from garnishment.
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, concluding that § 18-4-22.1 was
preempted by ERISA, and that the plan was therefore subject to
garnishment under the general state garnishment law.
Held:
1. Section 18-4-22.1, which singles out ERISA employee welfare
benefit plans for different treatment than non-ERISA welfare plans
under state garnishment procedures, is preempted under § 514(a) of
ERISA, which supersedes any state law insofar as it "relate[s] to"
ERISA-covered plans. The state statute's express reference to ERISA
plans brings it within the federal law's preemptive reach.
Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85.
Moreover, the possibility that § 18-4-22.1 was enacted to help
effectuate ERISA's underlying purposes is not enough to save it
from preemption, since § 514(a) displaces all state laws that fall
within its sphere, including those that are consistent with ERISA's
substantive requirements.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724. Pp.
486 U. S.
829-830.
2. Congress did not intend to preempt state law garnishment of
an ERISA welfare benefit plan, even where the purpose is to collect
judgments against plan participants. Pp.
486 U.S. 830-840.
(a) Unlike § 18-4-22.1, Georgia's general garnishment statute
does not single out or specially mention ERISA plans of any kind.
The argument that, because the general statute requires plan
trustees such as petitioners to respond to garnishment orders with
funds otherwise due beneficiary-debtors, and to incur substantial
administrative burdens and costs, the statute consequently "relates
to" the plan within the meaning of § 514(a) is refuted by certain
other ERISA provisions, and by several aspects of that statute's
structure. Although § 502(d) provides that a
Page 486 U. S. 826
plan may "sue or be sued" as an entity for specified relief and
clearly contemplates the enforcement of money judgments against a
plan, and although lawsuits against ERISA plans for run-of-the-mill
state law contract or tort claims are relatively commonplace, ERISA
does not provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments
won in either type of action. In lieu of such a provision, state
law collection methods, including garnishment, remain undisturbed
by ERISA.
See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 69(a). Section 514(a)'s
language does not support petitioners' attempt to distinguish, as
permissible, garnishment to collect plan creditors' judgments from,
as impermissible, garnishment on behalf of plan participants'
judgment creditors. The fact that § 206(d)(1)'s ban on alienation
or assignment is limited to pension benefits also supports the
conclusion that Congress did not intend to preclude garnishment of
welfare plan benefits. Section 514(a) cannot be read to protect
only benefits, but not plans, from garnishment, since § 206(d)(1)
demonstrates Congress' ability to distinguish between benefits and
plans when it wished, and since such a construction would render §
206(d)(1) substantially redundant with § 514(a), and therefore
superfluous. Pp.
486 U. S.
831-838.
(b) Petitioners' contention that the Retirement Equity Act of
1984 -- which specified that § 514(a)'s preemption provision does
not apply to "qualified domestic relations orders" -- establishes
that § 514(a), as originally enacted, preempts state attachment and
garnishment procedures on the theory that, otherwise, an amendment
to save such orders would have been unnecessary, is not persuasive.
An equally plausible explanation for the amendment is that Congress
meant to clarify the original meaning of § 514(a) by correcting
court decisions that had erroneously construed the section as
preempting such orders. Even if petitioners' contention is correct,
the opinion of a later Congress as to the meaning of a law enacted
10 years earlier does not control the issue. Rather, ERISA's
language and structure demonstrate the intent of the Congress that
originally enacted § 514(a) not to preempt state garnishment
procedures. Pp.
486 U.S.
838-840.
256 Ga. 499,
350 S.E.2d
439, affirmed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN,
O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined,
post, p.
486 U. S.
841.
Page 486 U. S. 827
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue here is whether and to what extent the Georgia
statutes bearing on the garnishment of funds due to participants in
ERISA employee welfare benefit plans are preempted by the federal
statute which governs such plans.
I
Petitioners are the trustees of an employee benefit plan that
provides vacation and holiday benefits to eligible employees in
several southeastern States. The covered workers draw their
vacation benefits from the plan annually. The plan is an "employee
welfare benefit plan" as defined by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). [
Footnote 1]
Respondent is a collection agency. It sought and obtained money
judgments
Page 486 U. S. 828
against 23 plan participants who owed money to clients of
respondent. To collect these money judgments, respondent instituted
an action in a Georgia trial court seeking to garnish the debtors'
plan benefits. The trial court granted the garnishment request.
App. to Pet. for Cert. A-21. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that a Georgia statute, Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 (1982),
[
Footnote 2] barring the
garnishment of "[f]unds or benefits of [an] . . . employee benefit
plan or program subject to . . . [ERISA]," exempted plan benefits
from garnishment. 178 Ga.App. 467, 470,
343 S.E.2d
492, 495 (1986).
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed. 256 Ga. 499,
350 S.E.2d 439
(1986). It agreed that § 18-4-22.1, by its terms, barred this
garnishment action, but concluded that the section was preempted by
ERISA "since it purports to regulate garnishment of ERISA funds and
benefits, a matter specifically provided for" in the federal
scheme.
Id. at 501, 350 S.E.2d at 442. Through an analysis
of ERISA's preemption provisions, the Georgia Supreme Court
concluded that Congress had not barred garnishment of employee
welfare benefits, even though employee pension benefits were so
protected.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1982 ed. and Supp.
IV). Since § 18-4-22.1 "prohibits that which the federal statute
permits," the Georgia Supreme Court held, the state law was "in
conflict with" the federal scheme, and therefore preempted by it.
256 Ga. at 501, 350 S.E.2d at 442. Consequently, the plan was
subject to garnishment under the general state garnishment law,
Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-20
et seq. (1982 and Supp.1987).
Because of conflicting decisions among the courts on the
questions presented here, we granted certiorari. 483 U.S.
Page 486 U. S. 829
1004 (1987). We now affirm the Georgia Supreme Court's judgment.
[
Footnote 3]
II
ERISA § 514(a) preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered
by the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). We believe that, under our
precedents, Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 is such a state law.
The Georgia statute at issue here expressly refers to -- indeed,
solely applies to -- ERISA employee benefit plans.
See
n 2,
supra.
"A law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with
or reference
to such a plan."
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S.
85,
463 U. S. 96-97
(1983) (emphasis added). On several occasions since our decision in
Shaw, we have reaffirmed this rule, concluding that state
laws which make "reference to" ERISA plans are laws that "relate
to" those plans within the meaning of § 514(a).
See, e.g.,
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41,
481 U. S. 47-48
(1987); 471 U. S. S. 830�
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.
S. 724,
471 U. S. 739
(1985). In fact, we have virtually taken it for granted that state
laws which are "specifically designed to affect employee benefit
plans" are preempted under § 514(a).
Cf. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, supra, at
481 U. S. 47-48;
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, at
463 U. S.
98.
The possibility that § 18-4-22.1 was enacted by the Georgia
Legislature to help effectuate ERISA's underlying purposes -- the
view of the Georgia Court of Appeals below,
see 178
Ga.App. at 467, 343 S.E.2d at 493 -- is not enough to save the
state law from preemption.
"The preemption provision [of § 514(a)] . . . displace[s] all
state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws
that are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements."
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, supra, at
471 U. S. 739.
The decision in
Shaw particularly underscores this point.
There, we found a New York antidiscrimination statute preempted
under § 514(a), even though Congress had not expressed any intent
in ERISA to approve of the employment practices that the State had
banned by its statute.
Shaw, supra, at
463 U. S. 97, n.
15,
463 U. S. 98-99.
Legislative "good intentions" do not save a state law within the
broad preemptive scope of § 514(a).
Consequently, adhering to our precedents in this area, we hold
that Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1, which singles out ERISA employee
welfare benefit plans for different treatment under state
garnishment procedures, [
Footnote
4] is preempted under § 514(a). The state statute's express
reference to ERISA plans suffices to bring it within the federal
law's preemptive reach.
III
A more complex question is posed by the argument of petitioners,
rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court, that the entire Georgia
garnishment procedure is preempted by ERISA. We reserved decision
on the issue in
Franchise Tax Board of California v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California,
463 U. S. 1,
463 U. S. 7,
463 U. S. 26, n.
30 (1983); the question, which is one of federal law, [
Footnote 5] is a close
Page 486 U. S. 831
one. We believe, however, that petitioners' contention
misapprehends ERISA's preemptive scope.
A
Unlike the Georgia antigarnishment provision discussed above,
Georgia's general garnishment statute does not single out or
specially mention ERISA plans of any kind. But as we have
recognized, the preemptive force of § 514(a) is not limited to such
state laws.
See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
supra, at
481 U. S. 47-48,
and
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, at
463 U. S. 98.
Consequently, we must decide whether § 514(a) preempts Georgia's
general garnishment law because it "relates to" the ERISA welfare
benefit plans that petitioners direct.
In arguing for preemption, petitioners assert that, when an
employee welfare benefit plan is garnisheed under Georgia law by a
creditor of a participant, plan trustees are served with a
garnishment summons, become parties to a suit, and must respond and
deposit the demanded funds due the beneficiary-debtor -- funds that
otherwise they are required to hold and pay out to those
beneficiaries. At the very least, petitioners contend, benefit
plans subjected to garnishment will incur substantial
administrative burdens and costs. Because garnishment will involve
and affect the plan and its trustees in these ways, petitioners
submit the Georgia garnishment law necessarily "relates to" such
ERISA welfare benefit plans, and is therefore preempted by §
514(a).
Unfortunately, ERISA itself offers no express answer as to
whether welfare benefit plan trustees must comply with garnishment
orders like those respondent is seeking to enforce. In our view,
however, certain ERISA provisions, and several aspects of the
statute's structure, indicate that Congress did not intend to
forbid the use of state law mechanisms of executing judgments
against ERISA welfare benefit plans, even when those mechanisms
prevent plan partici
Page 486 U. S. 832
pants from receiving their benefits. Consequently, we join the
virtually unanimous view of federal and state courts which have
faced this question, and hold that federal law does not bar a
garnishment action like respondent's. [
Footnote 6]
At the outset, we consider the several types of civil suits that
can be brought against ERISA welfare benefit plans. First, ERISA's
§ 502 provides that civil enforcement actions may be brought by
particular persons against ERISA plans, to secure specified relief,
including the recovery of plan benefits. Suits for benefits or to
enforce a participant's rights under a plan may be brought in
either federal or state court. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e). Section 502,
which provides that a plan may "sue or be sued" as an entity in §
502 actions, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1), clearly contemplates the
enforcement of money judgments against benefit plans, 29 U.S.C.
Page 486 U. S. 833
§ 1132(d)(2). [
Footnote 7]
See also H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 327 (1974).
ERISA plans may be sued in a second type of civil action, as
well. These cases -- lawsuits against ERISA plans for
run-of-the-mill state law claims such as unpaid rent, failure to
pay creditors, or even torts committed by an ERISA plan -- are
relatively commonplace. [
Footnote
8] Petitioners and the United States (appearing here as
amicus curiae) concede that these suits, although
obviously affecting and involving ERISA plans and their trustees,
are not preempted by ERISA § 514(a).
See Tr. of Oral Arg.
6, 11-12, 15.
ERISA does not provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting
judgments won in either of these two types of actions. Thus, while
§ 502(d), the "sue and be sued" provision, contemplates execution
of judgments won against plans in civil actions, it does not
provide mechanisms to do so. Moreover,
Page 486 U. S. 834
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), which would apply when
either type of civil suit discussed above is brought against an
ERISA plan in federal court, defers to state law to provide methods
for collecting judgments.
Cf. also Huron Holding Corp. v.
Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U. S. 183,
312 U. S.
188-194 (1941). Consequently, state law methods for
collecting money judgments must, as a general matter, remain
undisturbed by ERISA; otherwise, there would be no way to enforce
such a judgment won against an ERISA plan. If attachment of ERISA
plan funds does not "relate to" an ERISA plan in any of these
circumstances, we do not see how respondent's proposed garnishment
order would do so. [
Footnote
9]
It is thus clear enough that money judgments against ERISA
welfare benefit plans, based on state or federal law, won in state
or federal court, must be collectible in some way; garnishment is
one permissible method. In fact, while petitioners' brief argued
that
any garnishment of an ERISA plan was preempted,
see Brief for Petitioners 14, under questioning at oral
argument, petitioners conceded that garnishment is among the state
law enforcement mechanisms that may used in certain types of cases
involving ERISA welfare benefit plans.
See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 6-7. [
Footnote 10]
Page 486 U. S. 835
Nonetheless, petitioners and the United States insist that ERISA
§ 514(a) bars enforcement of the particular garnishment orders at
issue here. The Solicitor General rests this claim on his view that
§ 514(a) prohibits ERISA welfare benefit plans from complying with
state law enforcement orders (like garnishment)
only where
these orders affect "whether benefits will be paid to a plan
participant."
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 15-16. Under this view
of § 514(a), state law enforcement mechanisms can be used to
collect judgments from plan funds when they are won by general
creditors of the plan, but not by creditors of plan
participants.
The problem with this proposed interpretation of § 514(a) is
that it has no basis whatsoever in the language of the statute.
Section 514(a) preempts State laws "insofar as they . . . relate to
. . . employee benefit plan[s]"; no distinction is made between
plan funds generally and those funds due a particular participant
at a particular time. As the
amicus curiae
Page 486 U. S. 836
appointed by this Court put it,
"there is simply no logical way to construe the English language
so that garnishment or attachment laws 'relate to' benefit plans
when they are invoked by creditors of the beneficiaries, but not
when they are invoked by beneficiaries or creditors of the [plan]
itself."
Brief of
Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 24.
If § 514(a) allows a creditor of a plan to employ state law
procedures to attach plan funds (to collect a judgment it has won
against the plan) -- if such an action does not "relate to" a
benefit plan -- we do not see how § 514(a) bars a participant's
creditor from employing the same state law mechanisms.
Where Congress intended in ERISA to preclude a particular method
of state law enforcement of judgments, or extend anti-alienation
protection to a particular type of ERISA plan, it did so expressly
in the statute. Specifically, ERISA § 206(d)(1) bars (with certain
enumerated exceptions) the alienation or assignment of benefits
provided for by ERISA
pension benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. §
1056(d)(1). Congress did not enact any similar provision applicable
to ERISA
welfare benefit plans, such as the one at issue
in this case. Section 206(d)(1) is doubly instructive.
First, § 206(d)(1) expressly includes a distinction that the
Solicitor General would have us read into § 514(a). Section
206(d)(1) bars the assignment or alienation of pension plan
benefits, and thus prohibits the use of state enforcement
mechanisms only insofar as they prevent those benefits from being
paid to plan participants. As discussed above, § 514(a), by
contrast, deals with state laws as they relate to
plans.
The Solicitor General asks us to read § 514(a) as protecting only
benefits -- but not plans as a whole -- from state law attachment
orders (recognizing the numerous problems that would arise if we
were to conclude that welfare benefit plans could in no way be
subjected to state law attachment). But by adopting § 206(d)(1),
Congress demonstrated that it could, where it wished to, stay the
operation of state law as it affects only benefits and not plans.
The Solicitor General asks
Page 486 U. S. 837
us to imply a limitation on a preemption provision in one
portion of the statute that Congress made express in another
portion of ERISA (§ 206(d)(1)). We see no basis for construing the
statute in this manner, and therefore, in light of § 206(d)(1),
reject the Solicitor General's suggested interpretation of §
514(a).
Section 206(d)(1) also supports our conclusion in another way.
If we were to give ERISA § 514(a) the meaning which petitioners and
the Solicitor General attribute to it -- barring garnishment of all
ERISA plan benefits -- we would render § 206(d)(1) substantially
redundant with § 514(a), as they concede.
See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 8-9, 14. As our cases have noted in the past, we are hesitant
to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which
renders superfluous another portion of that same law. [
Footnote 11]
Ultimately, in examining §§ 206(d)(1) and 514(a), there is no
ignoring the fact that, when Congress was adopting ERISA, it had
before it a provision to bar the alienation or garnishment of ERISA
plan benefits, and chose to impose that limitation only with
respect to ERISA pension benefit plans, and
not ERISA
welfare benefit plans. In a comprehensive regulatory scheme like
ERISA, such omissions are significant ones.
Cf. Massachusetts
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.
S. 134,
473 U. S. 147
(1985). Once Congress was sufficiently aware of the prospect that
ERISA plan benefits could be attached and/or garnisheed -- as
evidenced by its adoption of § 206(d)(1) -- Congress' decision to
remain silent concerning the attachment or garnishment of ERISA
welfare plan benefits "acknowledged and accepted the practice,
rather than prohibiting it."
Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451
Page 486 U. S. 838
U.S. 504,
451 U. S. 516
(1981). We therefore conclude that Congress did not intend to
preclude state law attachment of ERISA welfare plan benefits.
[
Footnote 12]
B
In support of his reading of § 514(a), the Solicitor General
relies heavily on a 1984 amendment to ERISA, the Retirement Equity
Act of 1984, Pub.L. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426. The 1984 Act included
several changes in ERISA which Congress felt were necessary to
guarantee that the Nation's private retirement-income system
provided fair treatment for women.
See S.Rep. No. 98-575,
p. 1 (1984); H.R.Rep. No. 98-655, p. 1 (1984). Among the Act's
provisions were amendments to ERISA which insured that the
statute's antigarnishment and preemption provisions could not be
used to block the enforcement of "qualified domestic relations
orders" -- generally, court orders providing for child support and
alimony payments by ERISA plan participants.
See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(3) (1982 ed., Supp. IV); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1982
ed., Supp. IV). While the primary focus of this portion of the 1984
Act was removing § 206(d)(1)'s antigarnishment protection from
pension plan benefits when spouses sought enforcement of domestic
support orders, Congress at the same time also amended § 514(a)'s
preemption provision. It apparently adopted the latter amendments
in response to lower court rulings that had interpreted § 514(a) to
bar state law garnishment for the purpose of enforcing domestic
relations orders. [
Footnote
13]
Page 486 U. S. 839
Petitioners and the Solicitor General argue that the 1984
amendment to § 514(a) makes clear that the section, as originally
enacted, generally preempts state attachment and garnishment
procedures. Otherwise, they contend, there would have been no
necessity to amend § 514(a) to save domestic relation orders from
preemption. There is, however, another plausible construction of
Congress' action in 1984, namely, that Congress thought that some
courts had erroneously construed § 514(a) as preempting such
orders. In this view, the 1984 amendment served the purpose of
correcting the error, thus clarifying the original meaning of the
section. [
Footnote 14]
Cf. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568,
485 U. S. 585
(1988);
United Airlines, Inc.
v.
Page 486 U. S. 840
McMann, 434 U.
S. 192,
434 U. S. 218
(1977) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting.) Moreover, even if the Solicitor
General is correct, and Congress in 1984 thought that § 514(a) as
originally enacted preempted domestic relations orders directed at
ERISA plans -- and other state law attachments and garnishments as
well -- the opinion of this later Congress as to the meaning of a
law enacted 10 years earlier does not control the issue.
United
Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, supra, at
434 U. S. 200,
n. 7. "[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis
for inferring the intent of an earlier one."
United States v.
Price, 361 U. S. 304,
361 U. S. 313
(1960). [
Footnote 15]
Much the same is to be said about the sentence in the relevant
House Committee Report on which the Solicitor General relies:
"[T]he Committee reasserts that a state tax levy on employee
welfare benefit plans is preempted by ERISA (see the holding of the
9th Circuit in
Franchise Tax Board . . .)."
H.R.Rep. No. 98-655, pt. 1,
supra, at 42. This
statement does suggest that the House Committee in 1984 thought
that § 514(a) foreclosed state law attachment orders akin to those
at issue here. But again, these views -- absent an amendment to the
original language of the section -- do not direct our resolution of
this case. Instead, we must look at the language of ERISA and its
structure, to determine the intent of the Congress that originally
enacted the provision in question. "It is the intent of the
Congress that enacted [the section] . . . that controls."
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.
S. 324,
431 U. S. 354,
n. 39 (1977). This inquiry supports our reading of § 514(a), which
is the reading given it by every other court that has considered
the issue in this context (save the Ninth Circuit in a decision
that was vacated by this Court).
Page 486 U. S. 841
IV
Accordingly, we hold that ERISA does not forbid garnishment of
an ERISA welfare benefit plan, even where the purpose is to collect
judgments against plan participants. Moreover, since we agree with
the Georgia Supreme Court that the Georgia antigarnishment
provision found in Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 (1982) is preempted by
ERISA, the judgment below is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
As defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3), employee benefit plans are of
two types: welfare benefit plans provide health, legal, vacation,
or training benefits. § 1002(1). Pension benefit plans provide
retirement income. § 1002(2). The plan involved here is a welfare
benefit plan.
[
Footnote 2]
The Georgia law at issue here provides, in relevant part:
"Funds or benefits of a pension, retirement, or employee benefit
plan or program subject to the provisions of the federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, shall not be
subject to the process of garnishment . . . unless such garnishment
is based upon a judgment for alimony or for child support. . .
."
Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 (1982)
[
Footnote 3]
Respondent elected not to appear in this Court, and we appointed
an
amicus curiae to defend the judgment below.
[
Footnote 4]
This "different treatment" is illustrated not only by the
express reference to ERISA plans in the language of § 18-4-22.1,
but also in the disparate treatment accorded to non-ERISA benefit
plans under Georgia law. Under the State's garnishment statutes,
non-ERISA pension and retirement plans are exempted from
garnishment, but no exemption is provided for non-ERISA employee
welfare benefit plans.
Compare Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-22
(Supp 1987)
with Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 (1982).
Consequently, ERISA welfare benefit plans are protected from
garnishment under Georgia law, but non-ERISA plans are not so
protected.
[
Footnote 5]
All of the litigants who argued before this Court agreed that
federal law controls the resolution of this question.
See
Brief for Petitioners 11-13; Brief for United States as
Amicus
Curiae 16-17 (filed Aug. 27, 1987); Brief of
Amicus
Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 9.
[
Footnote 6]
As far as we are aware, the only state or federal court decision
in a case involving an employee welfare benefit plan to adopt the
Solicitor General's view (that § 514(a) preempts state law
attachments of welfare benefit plans) was the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in
Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction
Laborers' Vacation Trust for Southern California, 679 F.2d
1307 (1982). That decision was subsequently vacated by the Court,
463 U. S. 1
(1983).
Since that action, decisions from the Ninth Circuit have
abandoned the position taken by the panel majority in
Franchise
Tax Board, and have adopted the interpretation of § 514(a)
that Judge Tang expressed in dissent in that case, 679 F.2d at
1310-1311.
See, e.g., Misic v. Building Service Employees
Health & Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1376-1377 (CA9
1986);
Arizona Laborers, Teamsters, and Cement Masons, Local
395 Pension Trust Fund v. Nevarez, 661 F.
Supp. 365, 368-370 (Ariz.1987).
Other courts which have faced this question in this context have
likewise concluded that ERISA does not preempt the application of
state garnishment procedures to ERISA welfare benefit plans.
See, e.g., Local Union 212, Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers Vacation Trust Fund v. Local 212, Int'l Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers Credit Union, 735 F.2d 1010, 1011 (CA6
1984) (per curiam),
aff'g 549
F. Supp. 1299, 1300-1302 (SD Ohio 1982);
First Nat. Bank of
Commerce v. Latiker, 432 So. 2d 293, 296 (La. App.1983);
Electrical Workers Credit Union v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust
Fund, 583 S.W.2d
154, 158-159 (Mo.1979).
[
Footnote 7]
The "sue and be sued" clause found in ERISA § 502 provides, in
pertinent part:
"(a) . . ."
"A civil action may be brought -- "
"(1) by a participant or beneficiary -- "
"
* * * *"
"(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan.
. . . "
"
* * * *"
"(d) . . ."
"(1) An employee benefit plan may sue or be sued under this
subchapter as an entity. . . ."
"(2) Any money judgment won under this subchapter against an
employee benefit plan shall be enforceable only against the plan as
an entity. . . ."
29 U.S.C. § 1132.
[
Footnote 8]
See, e.g., Morris v. Local 804, Delivery & Warehouse
Employees Health & Welfare Fund, 116 Misc.2d 234, 455
N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct.1982) (suit against ERISA plan for
unpaid rent);
Luxemburg v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees
& Bartenders Int'l Union Pension Fund, 91 Misc.2d 930, 398
N.Y.S.2d 589 (New York Cty.Ct.1977) (suit against ERISA plan for
unpaid attorneys' fees);
Abofreka v. Alston Tobacco Co.,
288 S.C. 122,
341 S.E.2d
622 (1986) (tort suit against ERISA plan).
[
Footnote 9]
Our conclusion here is further supported by the interpretation
we have adopted of "sue and be sued" clauses in previous cases
involving other statutes. When Congress provides by law that an
entity may "sue and be sued," this includes "all civil process[es]
incident to . . . Legal proceedings" including "[g]arnishment and
attachment."
FHA v. Burr, 309 U.
S. 242,
309 U. S.
245-246 (1940). We have reaffirmed the view that a "sue
and be sued" clause creates a presumption of susceptibility to
garnishment and attachment in our more recent cases, as well.
See, e.g., Franchise Tax Board of California v. USPS,
467 U. S. 512,
467 U. S.
517-525 (1984). Even petitioners concede that our usual
rule is that a "sue and be sued" clause makes a subject entity
susceptible to garnishment.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.
[
Footnote 10]
Following this concession, petitioners later suggested (in a
somewhat contradictory argument) that garnishment is not a state
procedural device for collecting judgments obtained under some
other substantive body of law, but rather, "substantive law . . .
[that] creates rights and liabilities where none existed before."
See id. at 9.
We note, however, that under Georgia law (at least), garnishment
is a "procedural" mechanism for the enforcement of judgments.
Georgia's statute that provides for garnishment creates no
substantive causes of action, no new bases for relief, or any
grounds for recovery; the Georgia garnishment law does not create
the rule of decision in any case affixing liability. Rather under
Georgia law, post-judgment garnishment is nothing more than a
method to collect judgments
otherwise obtained by
prevailing on a claim against the garnishee.
See Ga.Code
Ann. § 18-4-60 (1982).
This analysis is reinforced by the fact that, under the Georgia
statute, a garnishor can obtain a writ of garnishment for the
purpose of executing the judgments of either the state or federal
courts sitting in Georgia,
ibid., and by the Georgia
Supreme Court's description of postgarnishment actions as
"procedural,"
see, e.g., Antico v. Antico, 241 Ga. 294,
244 S.E.2d
820, 821 (1978);
Easterwood v. LeBlanc, 240 Ga. 61,
239 S.E.2d
383,
383-384
(1977).
Such is the usual understanding of garnishment. For example,
garnishment in the federal system is available under the Federal
Rule that provides the "
[p]rocess to enforce a judgment."
See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 69(a) (emphasis added);
see
also, e.g., 7 J. Moore, J. Lucas, & K. Sinclair, Moore's
Federal Practice � 69.04[3], p. 69-24 (1986).
[
Footnote 11]
See, e.g., Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U. S. 134,
473 U. S. 142
(1985);
FEC v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee, 470 U. S. 480,
470 U. S. 486
(1985);
Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc.,
469 U. S. 189,
469 U. S. 197
(1985);
United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.
S. 453,
460 U. S.
458-459 (1983);
Dickerson v. New Banner
Institute, 460 U. S. 103,
460 U. S. 118
(1983).
[
Footnote 12]
It is not incongruous to find that Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-20
(Supp.1987), which provides for garnishment of ERISA welfare
benefit plans, escapes preemption under ERISA, while striking down
§ 18-4-22.1 -- an exception to the general state law provision --
as preempted. While we believe that state law garnishment
procedures are not preempted by § 514 (a), we also conclude that
any state law which singles out ERISA plans, by express
reference, for special treatment is preempted.
See
486 U. S.
supra. It is this "singling out" that preempts the Georgia
antigarnishment exception.
[
Footnote 13]
"The courts are divided on the question of whether [ERISA's]
anti-assignment clause applies to State domestic relations orders
and also on the question of whether the preemption clause [§
514(a)] refers to State domestic relations laws and court
orders."
H.R.Rep. No. 98-655, pt. 1, p. 30 (1984).
[
Footnote 14]
For this reason, we think the dissent's suggestion that our
reading of § 514(a) renders that provision "redundant" with §
514(b)(7) is unsound.
Post at
486 U. S.
845-846. Section 514(b)(7) was enacted a decade after §
514(a) was adopted, in response to lower court interpretations of §
514(a) which were not of Congress' liking. Consequently, even if
(given the interpretation of § 514(a) which we adopt today) §
514(b)(7) overlaps with § 514(a), our decision does not suffer from
the evil of rendering duplicative two statutory provisions
simultaneously adopted by Congress.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the dissent's reading
of § 206(d)(1) and § 514(a), which does render "redundant" two
provisions of ERISA enacted at the same time. It is this sort of
redundancy --
i.e., the suggestion that Congress
intentionally adopted, at a single time, two separate provisions
having the same meaning -- that calls a particular statutory
interpretation into question.
See n 11,
supra. Even the dissent concedes
that this problem plagues its reading of § 514(a).
Post at
486 U. S.
845.
[
Footnote 15]
See also e.g., Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn. v.
Abbott Labs., 460 U. S. 150,
460 U. S. 165,
n. 27 (1983);
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U. S. 102,
447 U. S.
116-118, and n. 13 (1980);
Oscar Mayer & Co. v.
Evans, 441 U. S. 750,
441 U. S. 758
(1979).
The dissent claims that we are ignoring, in § 514(b)(7), "a
positive expression of legislative will" that forecloses our
interpretation of § 514(a).
Post at
486 U. S. 843.
But whatever else one can say about the relevance of § 514 (b)(7)
to this case, one cannot say that that statutory provision amounts
to a congressional enactment that controls here. Section 514(b)(7)
has no direct bearing on this case, because it involves a type of
garnishment order not at issue here. The most one can glean from §
514(b)(7) is a sense of what Congress, in 1984, understood the
scope of § 514(a) to be -- a sense that does not command our
obedience here. Moreover, for the reasons we discuss above, we do
not even think that it is clear that the 98th Congress actually
read § 514(a) in the way that the dissent insists that it did.
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE O'CONNOR,
and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting.
When it enacted ERISA in 1974, Congress expressly preempted "any
and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan," and broadly defined "state law" to
include "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State
action having the effect of law." ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
The Court holds that these provisions preempt a Georgia statute,
Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 (1982), specifically exempting ERISA plans
from the State's garnishment laws. With this much I agree. The
Court also holds, however, that § 514(a), ERISA's preemption
provision, does not prohibit the garnishment of funds due to
participants in ERISA welfare benefit plans. I believe that this
latter conclusion is inconsistent with both the statute and our
precedents and, with all respect, I dissent.
I
We have said with repeated emphasis that the reach of § 514(a)
is not limited to state laws specifically designed to affect
employee benefit plans.
See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41,
481 U. S. 45-46
(1987);
Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U. S.
85,
463 U. S. 98
(1983). Further, the reach of § 514(a) is not limited to state laws
that conflict with the substantive provisions of ERISA.
See
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.
S. 724,
471 U. S. 739
(1985). On the contrary,
Page 486 U. S. 842
the phrase "relate to" must be
""given its broad common sense meaning, such that a state law
relate[s] to' a benefit plan `in the normal sense of the
phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a
plan.'""
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, supra, at
481 U. S. 47,
quoting
Metropolitan Life, supra, at
471 U. S. 739.
In my view, state garnishment laws necessarily relate to employee
benefit plans to the extent they require such plans to act as
garnishees, which is a substantial and onerous obligation.
Compliance with the state garnishment procedures subjects the
plan to significant administrative burdens and costs. Petitioners
are required to confirm the identity of each of the 23 plan
participants who owe money to respondent, calculate the
participant's maximum entitlement from the fund for the period
between the service date and the reply date of the summons of
garnishment, determine the amount that each participant owes to
respondent, and make payments into state court of the lesser of the
amount owed to respondent and the participant's entitlement.
Petitioners must also make decisions concerning the validity and
priority of garnishments and, if necessary, bear the costs of
litigating these issues. Further, as trustees of a multi-employer
plan covering participants in several States, petitioners are
potentially subject to multiple garnishment orders under varying or
conflicting state laws. It is apparent that these effects of
garnishment laws on employee benefit plans are not tenuous, remote,
or peripheral, and that such laws are accordingly preempted.
See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., supra, at
463 U. S. 100,
n. 21.
This common-sense reading of the language of § 514(a) is
confirmed by Congress' decision to exempt certain "domestic
relations orders" from the preemptive reach of ERISA.
See
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). As the majority
acknowledges, this provision was intended to save from preemption
certain garnishments designed to enforce domestic relations
obligations.
See ante at
486 U.S. 838. The majority
Page 486 U. S. 843
disregards, however, the strong structural implication created
by the limited scope of this exception. Surely Congress knew that
similar questions concerning the validity of garnishment procedures
would arise in other contexts. Indeed, the majority recognizes as
much.
See ante at
486
U.S. 840, citing H.R.Rep. No. 98-655, pt. 1, p. 42 (1984).
Yet Congress decided to save from preemption only a limited class
of garnishment orders, and then only upon specifically prescribed
conditions.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i) (1982 ed.,
Supp. IV) (defining "qualified domestic relations order"). The
majority's conclusion that ERISA does not bar garnishment of
welfare plan benefits renders nugatory this carefully calibrated
legislative choice.
It is no answer to say, as the majority does, that the
"
views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for
inferring the intent of an earlier one.'" Ante at
486 U.S. 840, quoting
United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304,
361 U. S. 313
(1960). For the views that the majority rejects are not the
postenactment musings of a Member of Congress or congressional
committee, but a positive expression of legislative will to which
we are bound to give effect. In enacting § 514(b)(7), Congress
dispelled any possible doubt concerning the circumstances under
which welfare benefit plans are required to comply with state
orders providing for the garnishment of plan benefits. The Court,
which not infrequently calls upon Congress to manifest its intent
more clearly, today disregards a clear answer given by Congress in
a valid enactment.
II
In reaching its conclusion that Georgia's garnishment statutes
are not preempted in the circumstances of this case, the Court
relies on two principal arguments. First, the Court notes that
Congress contemplated that ERISA benefit plans would be subject to
suit under certain circumstances. The majority notes, correctly,
that civil enforcement actions are maintainable pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 1132. The majority
Page 486 U. S. 844
points further to certain suits that may be brought "against
ERISA plans for run-of-the-mill state law claims. . . ."
Ante at
486 U. S. 833.
The Court reasons that, as ERISA does not provide an enforcement
mechanism for collecting judgments won in such suits, Congress must
have intended that state law methods of collection remain
undisturbed.
This argument has no relevance to the issue before us. The
question we face is not whether garnishment may be used to enforce
a valid judgment obtained against an ERISA plan. When garnishment
is so used, its process issues against some third party who owes
the plan a debt or who has property in his possession in which the
plan has an interest. The significant burdens of complying with the
garnishment order fall on the plan's debtor, not on the plan. The
issue we face in this case is quite different: it is whether an
ERISA benefit plan may be forced to act as a
garnishee by
creditors of the plan's participants and beneficiaries. Because the
Court fails to analyze the different contexts in which state
garnishment laws may affect ERISA plans, its conclusion that such
laws are never preempted is far too broad. And while the Court's
conclusion may be valid in garnishment proceedings where an ERISA
plan is the debtor, it is plainly unwarranted in situations where,
as here, the plan is a garnishee. For it is in the latter situation
that plans face the repetitious and costly burden of monitoring
controversies involving hundreds of beneficiaries and participants
in various States.
Further, it assumes the point in issue to say that the Court's
conclusion is required by cases holding that a "sue-and-be-sued"
clause creates a presumption of susceptibility to garnishment and
other state law procedures for enforcing judgments.
See
ante at
486 U. S. 834,
n. 9, citing
Franchise Tax Board of California v. USPS,
467 U. S. 512
(1984), and
FHA v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242
(1940). The "sue-and-be-sued" clause in each of those cases was a
waiver of the sovereign immunity that otherwise would have
protected certain federal agencies from legal process, including
writs of garnishment. In that
Page 486 U. S. 845
context, it was perfectly sensible to
"presum[e] that, when Congress launched a governmental agency
into the commercial world and endowed it with authority to 'sue or
be sued,' that agency is no less amenable to judicial process than
a private enterprise under like circumstances would be."
FHA v. Burr, supra, at
309 U. S. 245.
In the ERISA context, by contrast, § 514(a) substantively limits
the States' ability to treat employee benefit plans as they may
treat any commercial enterprise. Our cases finding several state
law causes of action preempted establish at least this much.
See, e.g., Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at
481 U. S. 47-48
(holding that certain contract and tort laws, though otherwise
generally applicable, may not be invoked against an employee
benefit plan);
Shaw, 463 U.S. at
463 U. S.
103-106 (finding certain fair employment laws
preempted).
The second argument on which the Court relies is that the
conclusion that § 514(a) preempts the state statutes at issue in
this case would render redundant the bar against alienation or
assignment of pension benefits set forth in ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).
See ante at
486 U. S. 837.
This provision prohibits any assignment, whether voluntary or
involuntary, of pension plan assets. Under the view the Court
rejects, § 514(a) would prohibit involuntary assignments of pension
and welfare plan assets because such assignments necessarily would
be effected by application of state laws, like the Georgia laws at
issue in this case, that are preempted. I agree with the Court that
ordinarily the partial redundancy of a statutory command, such as
would result from the interpretation of § 514(a) that the Court
rejects, is not lightly to be inferred. Nevertheless, I believe
there are two reasons why this consideration is not weighty in the
present context.
First, the alternative construction adopted by the Court results
in the total redundancy of § 514(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7)
(1982 ed., Supp. IV). It is preferable, in my view, to tolerate the
partial overlap rejected by the Court than to construe § 514(a) so
as to render another section of the
Page 486 U. S. 846
statute surplus in its entirety. Second, the deliberate,
expansive reach of § 514(a) necessarily encompasses many state laws
that would be preempted even in the absence of its broad mandate,
solely on the basis of their conflict with ERISA's substantive
requirements. Some degree of overlap is a necessary concomitant of
the approach to preemption chosen by Congress. The partial
redundancy which the Court strives to avoid is essentially
analogous to a host of like overlaps that Congress must have
foreseen. To suggest that this type of overlap is sufficient to
call into question the applicability of § 514(a) is to defeat the
very purpose for which it was enacted. I cannot agree with the
Court's conclusion that petitioners must comply with the
garnishment orders at issue in this case.