Observing the approach of a police car on routine patrol,
respondent began to run. The police followed him "to see where he
was going," and, after catching up with him and driving alongside
him for a short distance, observed him discarding a number of
packets. Surmising that the pills subsequently discovered in the
packets contained codeine, the police arrested him and, after a
search of his person revealed other drugs and a hypodermic needle,
charged him with possession of controlled substances in violation
of Michigan law. At a preliminary hearing, a Magistrate dismissed
the charges on the ground that respondent had been unlawfully
seized during the police pursuit preceding his disposal of the
packets. The trial court upheld the dismissal, and the Michigan
Court of Appeals affirmed. Applying state precedents interpreting
the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the latter court
ruled that any "investigatory pursuit" amounts to a seizure under
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, since
the defendant's freedom is restricted as soon as the officers begin
their pursuit. The court also concluded that respondent's flight
from the police was insufficient, by itself, to give rise to the
particularized suspicion necessary to justify this kind of
seizure.
Held: The officers' pursuit of respondent did not
constitute a "seizure" implicating Fourth Amendment protections.
Thus, the charges against him were improperly dismissed. Pp.
486 U. S.
572-576.
(a) No bright-line rule applicable to all investigatory pursuits
can be fashioned. Rather, the appropriate test is whether a
reasonable man, viewing the particular police conduct as a whole
and within the setting of all of the surrounding circumstances,
would have concluded that the police had in some way restrained his
liberty so that he was not free to leave. Pp.
486 U. S.
572-574.
(b) Under this test, respondent was not "seized" before he
discarded the drug packets. One officer's characterization of the
police conduct as a "chase," standing alone, is insufficient to
implicate the Fourth Amendment, since the police conduct -- which
consisted of a brief acceleration to catch up with respondent,
followed by a short drive alongside him -- would not have
communicated to the reasonable person an attempt to capture him or
otherwise intrude on his freedom of movement. The record does not
reflect that the police activated a siren or flashers; commanded
respondent to halt or displayed any weapons; or operated the
Page 486 U. S. 568
car aggressively to block his course or to control his direction
or speed. Thus, the police conduct was not so intimidating that
respondent could reasonably have believed that he was not free to
disregard the police presence and go about his business. The police
therefore were not required to have a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting him of criminal activity in order to pursue
him. Pp.
486 U. S.
574-576.
157 Mich. App. 181, 403 N.W.2d 74, reversed and remanded.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SCALIA, J.,
joined.
Page 486 U. S. 569
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we review a determination by the Michigan Court of
Appeals that any "investigatory pursuit" of a person undertaken by
the police necessarily constitutes a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution. We conclude that the police conduct
in this case did not amount to a seizure, for it would not have
communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to
ignore the police presence and go about his business.
I
Early on the afternoon of December 19, 1984, four officers
riding in a marked police cruiser were engaged in routine patrol
duties in Metropolitan Detroit. As the cruiser came to an
intersection, one of the officers observed a car pull over to the
curb. A man got out of the car and approached respondent Michael
Mose Chesternut, who was standing alone on the corner. When
respondent saw the patrol car nearing the corner where he stood, he
turned and began to run. As Officer Peltier, one of those in the
car, later testified, the patrol car followed respondent around the
corner "to see where he was going." App. 25. The cruiser quickly
caught up with respondent and drove alongside him for a short
distance. As they drove beside him, the officers observed
respondent discard a number of packets he pulled from his
right-hand pocket. Officer Peltier got out of the cruiser to
examine the packets. He discovered that they contained pills. While
Peltier was engaged in this inspection, respondent, who had run
only a few paces farther, stopped. Surmising on the basis of his
experience as a paramedic that the pills contained codeine, Officer
Peltier arrested respondent for the possession of narcotics and
took him to the station house. During an ensuing search, the police
discovered in respondent's hatband another packet of pills, a
packet containing heroin, and a hypodermic needle. Respondent was
charged with knowingly and intentionally possessing heroin,
tablets
Page 486 U. S. 570
containing codeine, and tablets containing diazepam, all in
violation of Mich.Comp.Laws § 333.7403(2) (1980).
At a preliminary hearing, at which Officer Peltier was the only
witness, respondent moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that
he had been unlawfully seized during the police pursuit preceding
his disposal of the packets. The presiding Magistrate granted the
motion and dismissed the complaint. [
Footnote 1] Relying on
People v. Terrell, 77
Mich.App. 676, 259 N.W.2d 187 (1977), [
Footnote 2] the Magistrate ruled from the bench that a
police "chase" like the one involved in this case implicated Fourth
Amendment protections and could not be justified by the mere fact
that the suspect ran at the sight of the police. App. 31-35.
Applying a clearly erroneous standard to the Magistrate's ruling,
the trial court upheld the dismissal order.
Id. at
2-10.
The Michigan Court of Appeals "reluctantly" affirmed, 157
Mich.App. 181, 184, 403 N.W.2d 74, 76 (1986), noting that
"although we find the result unfortunate, we cannot say that the
lower court's ruling was clearly erroneous under the present law or
the facts presented."
Id. at 183, 403 N.W.
Page 486 U. S. 571
2d at 75. Like the courts below it, the Court of Appeals rested
its ruling on state precedents interpreting the Fourth Amendment.
[
Footnote 3] The court
determined, first, that any "investigatory pursuit" amounts to a
seizure under
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 (1968). "As soon as the officers began their pursuit,"
the court explained, "defendant's freedom was restricted." 157
Mich.App. at 183, 403 N.W.2d at 75. The court went on to conclude
that respondent's flight from the police was insufficient, by
itself, to give rise to the particularized suspicion necessary to
justify this kind of seizure. Because "the police saw [respondent]
do absolutely nothing illegal, nor did they observe other
suspicious activity," the court determined that the investigatory
pursuit had violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable seizures.
Id. at 184, 403 N.W.2d at 76.
Page 486 U. S. 572
After the Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioner leave to
appeal, [
Footnote 4] App. to
Pet. for Cert. 9a, petitioner sought review here. We granted a writ
of certiorari, 484 U.S. 895 (1987), to consider whether the
officers' pursuit of respondent constituted a seizure implicating
Fourth Amendment protections, and, if so, whether the act of
fleeing, by itself, was sufficient to constitute reasonable
suspicion justifying that seizure. Because we conclude that the
officers' conduct did not constitute a seizure, we need not reach
the second question.
II
A
Petitioner argues that the Fourth Amendment is never implicated
until an individual stops in response to the police's show of
authority. Thus, petitioner would have us rule that a lack of
objective and particularized suspicion would not poison police
conduct, no matter how coercive, as long as the police did not
succeed in actually apprehending the individual. Respondent
contends, in sharp contrast, that any and all police "chases" are
Fourth Amendment seizures. Respondent would have us rule that the
police may never pursue an individual absent a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting that he is engaged in criminal
activity.
Both petitioner and respondent, it seems to us, in their
attempts to fashion a bright-line rule applicable to all
investigatory pursuits, have failed to heed this Court's clear
direction that any assessment as to whether police conduct amounts
to a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment must take into
account "
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident'" in
each individual case. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.
S. 210, 466 U. S. 215
(1984), quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.
S. 544, 446 U. S. 554
(1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.). Rather than adopting either rule
proposed by the parties and determining that an investigatory
pursuit is or is not necessarily a
Page 486 U. S. 573
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, we adhere to our traditional
contextual approach and determine only that, in this particular
case, the police conduct in question did not amount to a
seizure.
B
In
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968),
the Court noted:
"Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and
citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a
'seizure' has occurred."
Id. at
392 U. S. 19, n.
16. A decade later, in
United States v. Mendenhall,
Justice Stewart, writing for himself and then-JUSTICE REHNQUIST,
first transposed this analysis into a test to be applied in
determining whether "a person has been
seized' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 554.
[Footnote 5] The test provides
that the police can be said to have seized an individual "only if,
in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." Ibid. The Court has since embraced this test.
See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 466 U. S. 215.
See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.
S. 491, 460 U. S. 502
(1983) (plurality opinion); id. at 460 U. S. 514
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).
The test is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to
assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole,
rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in
isolation. Moreover, what constitutes a restraint on liberty
prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to "leave" will
vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but
also with the setting in which the conduct occurs.
Compare
United States v. Mendenhall, supra, (considering
Page 486 U. S. 574
whether police request to see identification and ticket of
individual who stopped upon police's approach constituted seizure),
with INS v. Delgado, supra, (considering whether INS
"factory survey" conducted while employees continued to move about
constituted seizure of entire workforce).
While the test is flexible enough to be applied to the whole
range of police conduct in an equally broad range of settings, it
calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the
next, regardless of the particular individual's response to the
actions of the police. The test's objective standard -- looking to
the reasonable man's interpretation of the conduct in question --
allows the police to determine in advance whether the conduct
contemplated will implicate the Fourth Amendment. 3 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 9.2(h), pp. 407-408 (2d ed.1987 and
Supp.1988). This "reasonable person" standard also ensures that the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection does not vary with the state
of mind of the particular individual being approached.
C
Applying the Court's test to the facts of this case, we conclude
that respondent was not seized by the police before he discarded
the packets containing the controlled substance. Although Officer
Peltier referred to the police conduct as a "chase," and the
Magistrate who originally dismissed the complaint was impressed by
this description, [
Footnote 6]
the characterization is not enough, standing alone, to implicate
Fourth Amendment protections. Contrary to respondent's assertion
that a chase necessarily communicates that detention is
Page 486 U. S. 575
intended and imminent, Brief for Respondent 9, the police
conduct involved here would not have communicated to the reasonable
person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon respondent's
freedom of movement. [
Footnote
7] The record does not reflect that the police activated a
siren or flashers; or that they commanded respondent to halt, or
displayed any weapons; or that they operated the car in an
aggressive manner to block respondent's course or otherwise control
the direction or speed of his movement. Tr. of Oral Arg. 2, 11, 20.
[
Footnote 8] While the very
presence of a police car driving parallel to a running pedestrian
could be somewhat intimidating, this kind of police presence does
not, standing alone, constitute a seizure. [
Footnote 9]
Cf. United States v. Knotts,
460 U. S. 276
(1983)
Page 486 U. S. 576
(holding that continuous surveillance on public thoroughfares by
visual observation and electronic "beeper" does not constitute
seizure);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at
460 U. S. 497
(plurality opinion) (noting that mere approach by law enforcement
officers, identified as such, does not constitute seizure). Without
more, the police conduct here -- a brief acceleration to catch up
with respondent, followed by a short drive alongside him -- was not
"so intimidating" that respondent could reasonably have believed
that he was not free to disregard the police presence and go about
his business.
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. at
466 U. S. 216.
The police therefore were not required to have "a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting [respondent] of criminal
activity," in order to pursue him.
United States v.
Cortez, 449 U. S. 411,
449 U. S.
417-418 (1981).
III
Because respondent was not unlawfully seized during the initial
police pursuit, we conclude that charges against him were
improperly dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
Michigan Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The Magistrate did not independently consider whether the
codeine pills, if lawfully seized, established probable cause
justifying respondent's arrest. The Fourth Amendment issue before
us is therefore limited to the police conduct preceding and
including respondent's disposal of the packets.
[
Footnote 2]
In
Terrell, a police officer got out of his unmarked
car and "gave chase" on foot after allegedly observing the
defendant stick his hand in his pocket and run at the sight of the
officer. 77 Mich.App. at 678, 259 N.W.2d at 188. According to the
officer, the defendant ran into an apartment building where the
officer observed him drop a clear envelope containing a brown
powdery substance. Having determined that the package might contain
heroin, the officer arrested the defendant. At a pretrial hearing,
the trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the
envelope and its contents. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed,
finding that the police "investigatory pursuit" constituted a
seizure that was unjustified by any particularized suspicion that
the defendant was engaged in criminal activity.
Id. at
679-680, 259 N.W.2d at 188-189.
[
Footnote 3]
The Michigan Court of Appeals rested its holding on
People
v. Terrell, supra, and
People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich.
42,
378 N.W.2d
451 (1985),
cert. dism'd (in view of that respondent's
death), 478 U.S. 1017 (1986), both of which were to the effect that
the defendant in question had been seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In
Shabaz, the Michigan Supreme Court quoted "Michigan's
analogous [constitutional] provision," without elaboration, in a
footnote following a recitation of the Fourth Amendment. 424 Mich.
at 52, n. 4, 378 N.W.2d at 455, n. 4. The Supreme Court said
nothing to suggest that the Michigan Constitution's seizure
provision provided an independent source of relief, and the court's
entire analysis rested expressly on the Fourth Amendment and
federal cases. Similarly, in
Terrell, the Michigan Court
of Appeals stated that the suppression of evidence and dismissal of
charges against the defendant "was soundly based on existing law,
state and Federal," but made clear that the scope of the right in
question was defined "by the Fourth Amendment's general
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." 77
Mich.App. at 679, 259 N.W.2d at 188, citing
Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S. 1,
392 U. S. 20
(1968). In light of the bases for the courts' decisions in
Shabaz and
Terrell, we readily conclude that the
decision below likewise rests on the Michigan courts'
interpretation of the Federal Constitution, and not on any adequate
and independent state ground.
See Michigan v. Long,
463 U. S. 1032
(1983). The defense in effect concedes this.
See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 38-39.
[
Footnote 4]
Two justices of the Michigan Supreme Court would have granted
leave to appeal.
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a.
[
Footnote 5]
Three other Justices, otherwise in the majority, chose not to
reach the question whether the federal officers had seized
respondent. 446 U.S. at 560 (opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
[
Footnote 6]
At the preliminary hearing, the Magistrate interrupted the
State's attorney, who was asserting that the police were simply
performing routine patrolling duties, with the following:
"That would be fine until the Officer said we were chasing him
in the car, otherwise I would agree with you. My ears picked up
when the Officer said that, you know. He said we went around. I
asked him why were you chasing him in the car, why were you chasing
him, and he said because he was running, and we wanted to see where
he was going."
App. 29-30.
[
Footnote 7]
As Officer Peltier explained, the goal of the "chase" was not to
capture respondent, but "to see where he was going."
Id.
at 25. Of course, the subjective intent of the officers is relevant
to an assessment of the Fourth Amendment implications of police
conduct only to the extent that that intent has been conveyed to
the person confronted.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. at
446 U. S. 554,
n. 6 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
See also 3 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 9.2(h), p. 407 (2d ed.1987 and Supp.1988)
(uncommunicated intent of police irrelevant to determination of
whether seizure occurred).
[
Footnote 8]
The facts of this case are not identical to the facts involved
in both
Terrell and
Shabaz, upon which the
Michigan courts relied in finding a seizure in this case. In both
Terrell and
Shabaz, a police officer got out of
the car to chase the pedestrian suspect on foot, after which the
defendant abandoned the inculpatory evidence.
People v.
Terrell, 77 Mich.App. at 678, 259 N.W.2d at 188;
People v.
Shabaz, 424 Mich., at 47-48, 378 N.W.2d at 453. In
Shabaz, the State appears to have stipulated that the
chase, whose clear object was to apprehend the defendant,
constituted a seizure.
Id. at 52, 378 N.W.2d at 455. While
no similar stipulation was entered in
Terrell, the goal of
that chase appears to have been equally clear. We, of course,
intimate no view as to the federal constitutional correctness of
either of those Michigan state court cases.
[
Footnote 9]
The United States, which has submitted a brief as
amicus
curiae, suggests that, in some circumstances, police pursuit
"will amount to a stop from the outset or from an early point in
the chase, if the police command the person to halt and indicate
that he is not free to go." Brief for United States as
Amicus
Curiae 13. Of course, such circumstances are not before us in
this case. We therefore leave to another day the determination of
the circumstances in which police pursuit could amount to a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment.
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, concurring.
It is no bold step to conclude, as the Court does, that the
evidence should have been admitted, for respondent's unprovoked
flight gave the police ample cause to stop him. The Court instead
concentrates on the significance of the chase; and as to that it is
fair to interpret its opinion as finding no more than an absence of
improper conduct. We would do well to add that, barring the need to
inquire about hot pursuit,
Page 486 U. S. 577
which is not at issue here, neither "chase" nor "investigative
pursuit" need be included in the lexicon of the Fourth
Amendment.
A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when an individual remains in
the control of law enforcement officials because he reasonably
believes, on the basis of their conduct toward him, that he is not
free to go.
See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.
S. 210,
466 U. S. 215
(1984);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.
S. 544,
446 U. S. 554
(1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.). The case before us presented an
opportunity to consider whether even an unmistakable show of
authority can result in the seizure of a person who attempts to
elude apprehension and who discloses contraband or other
incriminating evidence before he is ultimately detained. It is at
least plausible to say that, whether or not the officers' conduct
communicates to a person a reasonable belief that they intend to
apprehend him, such conduct does not implicate Fourth Amendment
protections until it achieves a restraining effect. The Court's
opinion does not foreclose this holding, and I concur.