The courts of appeals have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
of appeals "from all final decisions of the district courts." Under
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.
S. 541, and
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463, a
"collateral order" which does not actually end the district court
litigation is nevertheless considered to be final and immediately
appealable under § 1291 if,
inter alia, it resolves an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action
and is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
Petitioner, a resident of Belgium, was indicted in the Central
District of California for fraudulently inducing respondent to lend
money to a California real estate partnership engaged in renovating
a Kansas City townhouse complex. While on a trip to Switzerland,
petitioner was arrested under the applicable extradition treaty and
extradited to Los Angeles. One week before his criminal trial
commenced, respondent filed a civil suit against petitioner in the
same District, asserting various claims arising out of the
defaulted loan. About two weeks after his sentencing following his
conviction on the criminal charges, petitioner was served with the
civil summons and complaint. The District Court summarily denied
petitioner's motions to dismiss, which were based upon the argument
that petitioner was immune from civil process because his presence
in the United States resulted from extradition, and upon
forum
non conveniens grounds. The Court of Appeals dismissed
petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, citing
Cohen,
supra, and
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.
S. 511.
Held: Neither an order denying a motion to dismiss on
the ground that an extradited person is immune from civil process,
nor an order denying such a motion on
forum non conveniens
grounds, is a collateral order subject to immediate appeal as a
final judgment under § 1291. Pp.
486 U. S.
521-530.
(a) Assuming, without deciding, that the "principle of
specialty,"
see United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.
S. 407, immunizes petitioner from civil service of
process while his presence in this country is compelled by
extradition, petitioner's claim is nevertheless effectively
reviewable on appeal from final judgment, and thus is not
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Unlike
the qualified immunity claim
Page 486 U. S. 518
considered in
Mitchell, supra, the "essence" of
petitioner's claim of immunity under the principle of specialty is
not a right not to stand trial, which would be irretrievably lost
absent an immediate appeal. The principle of specialty operates to
ensure that the receiving state does not abuse the extraditing
state's extradition processes, and the conduct of a civil trial
does not significantly implicate the reviewing state's obligation
in that regard, since the state does not bring its coercive power
to bear in such circumstances, but simply provides a forum for the
resolution of a private dispute. Moreover, the defense of a civil
suit does not significantly restrict a defendant's liberty, since
he cannot be subjected to pretrial detention or required to post
bail, and is not even compelled to be present at trial.
Furthermore, a right not to stand trial is not entailed in the mere
assertion that the district court lacks personal jurisdiction
because of immunity from service of process. The right involved in
this challenge must be characterized as the right not to be subject
to a binding judgment, which may be effectively vindicated
following final judgment. Pp.
486
U.S. 522-527.
(b) The order denying the motion to dismiss on
forum non
conveniens grounds does not fall within the collateral order
doctrine, since the convenience-of-the-forum question is not
completely separate from the merits of the action. Although the
determination of that question may not require significant inquiry
into the facts and legal issues in some cases, in the main, a
district court ruling on such a motion will generally become
entangled in the merits of the case in assessing such questions as
the relative ease of access to the sources of proof, the
availability of witnesses, and the actual locus of the alleged
culpable conduct. Thus, such determinations are unsuited for
immediate appeal as of right under § 1291. This conclusion is
fortified by the availability of interlocutory review under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) of
forum non conveniens determinations in
appropriate cases. Pp.
486 U. S.
527-530.
Affirmed.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to determine whether two types of orders
by a district court are immediately appealable under
Page 486 U. S. 519
28 U.S.C. § 1291: first, an order denying a motion to dismiss
based on an extradited person's claim that he is immune from civil
service of process; and second, an order denying a motion to
dismiss on the ground of
forum non conveniens.
I
This case arises from a dispute over a loan. Petitioner, a real
estate broker in Brussels, encouraged respondent, also a Brussels
resident, to meet with one Alan Blair in the United States to
discuss a real estate investment. Blair is a resident of Los
Angeles. Following a business trip to Atlanta, respondent traveled
to Los Angeles, where he met petitioner, Blair, and others, to talk
about the investment. Blair described a real estate partnership
called Three B Investment Associates, which was renovating a
townhouse complex outside Kansas City known as Concorde Bridge
Townhouses. At petitioner's urging, respondent agreed to lend the
partnership $1 million for three years at 20% per annum interest,
secured by a mortgage on the Concorde Bridge complex. At the time,
the partnership did not have title to the Concorde Bridge complex,
but it held a contract to purchase the complex and had made a
substantial deposit.
The partnership, after making some scheduled payments,
eventually defaulted on its promissory note to respondent. The
mortgage proved worthless because the partnership had not acquired
title to the Concorde Bridge complex. Respondent retained American
counsel, claiming that he had been misled into believing that the
partnership held title to the Concorde Bridge Townhouses at the
time of the loan. Soon thereafter, United States prosecutors became
involved in the controversy. In October 1984, petitioner, Blair,
and another American were indicted in the Central District of
California on charges of wire fraud and causing the interstate
transportation of a victim of fraud. The indictment charged that
the three defendants had fraudulently induced respondent to lend
them $1 million by falsely representing that they
Page 486 U. S. 520
owned the Concorde Bridge complex through the real estate
partnership.
While on a trip to Geneva, petitioner was arrested pursuant to a
request from the United States Department of Justice under the
applicable extradition treaty with Switzerland.
See Treaty
between the United States and Switzerland for the Extradition of
Criminals, May 14, 1900, 31 Stat.1928, T.S. No. 354 (1900).
Petitioner was extradited and delivered to Los Angeles by United
States Marshals after legal proceedings in Swiss courts. Following
a jury trial, petitioner was found guilty on one count of wire
fraud and one count of causing the interstate transportation of a
victim of fraud. On January 22, 1986, petitioner was sentenced to a
prison term of one year and one day, which was satisfied by the
time he already had spent in pretrial confinement. The trial court
also ordered petitioner to pay respondent restitution of $34,501.26
and placed him on probation. Petitioner was ordered not to leave
the United States until the restitution order was satisfied.
[
Footnote 1] The conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
United States v. Van
Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424 (CA9 1987),
cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1042 (1988).
On November 12, 1985, one week before petitioner's criminal
trial commenced, respondent filed a civil suit against petitioner,
Blair, and others in the District Court for the Central District of
California. The complaint asserted a civil Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claim, a common law claim of fraud,
and other pendent state law claims arising out of the defaulted
loan. On February 5, 1986, about two weeks after his sentencing,
petitioner was served with the summons and complaint as he was
arriving at the office of his probation officer to keep a scheduled
appointment. Petitioner moved to dismiss the suit on two separate
grounds. First, he argued that, because his presence in the
Page 486 U. S. 521
United States was a result of extradition, he was immune from
civil process. Second, petitioner argued that the complaint should
be dismissed on the ground of
forum non conveniens. The
District Court summarily denied both motions. App. 221,
Biard
v. Blair, No. CV 85-7378 JSL (Nov. 17, 1986). The Court of
Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction in a
one-line order, citing this Court's decisions in
Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.
S. 541 (1949), and
Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U. S. 511
(1985). App. 234, No. 86-6735 (CA9, July 7, 1987). [
Footnote 2] We granted certiorari, 484 U.S.
942 (1987), and we now affirm.
II
The courts of appeals have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
of appeals "from all final decisions of the district courts . . .
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." A
party generally may not take an appeal under § 1291 until there has
been a decision by the District Court that "ends the litigation on
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment." [
Footnote 3]
Catlin
Page 486 U. S. 522
v. United States,
324 U. S. 229,
324 U. S. 233
(1945). In
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
supra, however, we recognized a "small class" of decisions
that are immediately appealable under § 1291 even though the
decision has not terminated the proceedings in the district court.
337 U.S. at
337 U. S. 546.
The Court stated that a decision is final and appealable for
purposes of § 1291 if it
"finally determine[s] claims of right separable from, and
collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require
that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated."
Ibid. The Court refined the "collateral order" doctrine
of
Cohen in
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463
(1978). In
Coopers & Lybrand, the Court held that to
come within the collateral order doctrine of
Cohen, the
order must satisfy each of three conditions: it must (1)
"conclusively determine the disputed question," (2) "resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action,"
and (3) "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment."
437 U.S. at
437 U. S. 468
(footnote omitted).
As petitioner acknowledges, the order of the District Court
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss on grounds of immunity from
civil process or
forum non conveniens did not end the
litigation on the merits. Therefore, the order is appealable as to
either ground only if the three requirements set out in
Coopers
& Lybrand are met.
A
In asserting the appealability of his claim of immunity from
civil process, petitioner principally relies on this Court's
decision in
Mitchell v. Forsyth, supra. The Court held in
Mitchell that the denial of a claim of qualified immunity
by the Attorney General was immediately appealable under the
Page 486 U. S. 523
collateral order doctrine. The crucial issue in
Mitchell was whether the order was effectively
unreviewable on appeal from final judgment.
See id. at
472 U. S. 525.
In holding that such an order was effectively unreviewable, the
Court reasoned that an "essential attribute" of qualified immunity
is "an entitlement not to stand trial under certain circumstances,"
and thus is "an
immunity from suit, rather than a mere
defense to liability."
Id. at
472 U. S. 525,
526. As with absolute immunity, the Court concluded, "[the
entitlement] is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted
to go to trial."
Id. at
472 U. S.
526.
Petitioner argues that, under
United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407
(1886), as well as under federal extradition statutes and the
extradition treaty between the United States and Switzerland, he is
immune from civil service of process while his presence in the
United States is compelled by extradition for criminal charges.
Petitioner further contends that his immunity under
Rauscher, like the immunity in
Mitchell, entails
the right not to stand trial, which cannot be effectively
vindicated on appeal from final judgment. In
Rauscher, the
Court stated the general "principle of specialty" in federal
extradition law:
"[A] person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of the
court by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty can only
be tried for one of the offences described in that treaty, and for
the offence with which he is charged in the proceedings for his
extradition, until a reasonable time and opportunity have been
given him, after his release or trial upon such charge, to return
to the country from whose asylum he had been forcibly taken under
those proceedings."
119 U.S. at
119 U. S. 430.
Petitioner argues that the principle of specialty requires not
merely that an extradited person be immune from criminal
prosecutions other than the offenses for which he was extradited,
but that he be generally "free from any judicial interference,"
including civil suit. Brief for Petitioner 18.
Page 486 U. S. 524
The issue on which we granted certiorari, however, and on which
the Court of Appeals based its decision, is not whether
petitioner's underlying claim of immunity is meritorious, but
whether the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss on grounds of
immunity from service of process is immediately appealable. For
purposes of determining appealability, therefore, we will assume,
but do not decide, that petitioner has presented a substantial
claim of immunity from civil service of process that warrants
appellate consideration. Making this assumption, we conclude that
petitioner's claim of immunity from service is effectively
reviewable on appeal from final judgment, and thus is not an
immediately appealable collateral order under
Cohen and
Coopers & Lybrand.
The critical question, following
Mitchell, is whether
"the essence" of the claimed right is a right not to stand trial.
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at
472 U. S. 525.
This question is difficult because, in some sense, all litigants
who have a meritorious pretrial claim for dismissal can reasonably
claim a right not to stand trial. But the final judgment rule
requires that, except in certain narrow circumstances in which the
right would be "irretrievably lost" absent an immediate appeal,
Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.
S. 424,
472 U. S. 431
(1985), litigants must abide by the district court's judgments, and
suffer the concomitant burden of a trial, until the end of
proceedings before gaining appellate review. As the Court stated in
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.
S. 850,
435 U. S. 860,
n. 7 (1978):
"Admittedly, there is value -- to all but the most unusual
litigant -- in triumphing before trial, rather than after it,
regardless of the substance of the winning claim. But this truism
is not to be confused with the quite distinct proposition that
certain claims (because of the substance of the rights entailed,
rather than the advantage to a litigant in winning his claim
sooner) should be resolved before trial."
Because of the important interests furthered by the final
judgment rule,
see n
3,
supra, and the ease with which certain
Page 486 U. S. 525
pretrial claims for dismissal may be alleged to entail the right
not to stand trial, we should examine the nature of the right
asserted with special care to determine whether an essential aspect
of the claim is the right to be free of the burdens of a trial.
We believe that, even if the principle of specialty shields
petitioner from service of process in a civil suit while he is
detained in the United States following his extradition and
conviction -- an issue on which we express no opinion -- the right
not to be burdened with a civil trial itself is not an essential
aspect of this protection. First, the principle of specialty
fundamentally bears on treaty obligations between states; the
principle operates to ensure that the receiving state does not
abuse the extradition processes of the extraditing state.
See
Rauscher, supra, at
119 U. S.
419-420; 1 M. Bassiouni, International Extradition:
United States Law and Practice, ch. 7, § 7, pp. 360-361 (2d
ed.1987). The conduct of a civil trial, prior to any attempt to
subject the defendant to a binding judgment of the court, does not
significantly implicate the receiving state's obligation under the
doctrine. Unlike a criminal prosecution, in which the coercive
power of the state is immediately brought to bear, the state's
involvement in the conduct of a private civil suit is minimal. The
state's role is simply to provide a forum for the resolution of a
private dispute. In the absence of an explicit agreement obligating
the United States to protect the extradited person from the burdens
of a civil suit, we believe that there is little potential that the
extraditing state, in this case Switzerland, will view the mere
conduct of a private civil trial as a breach of an obligation by
the United States not to abuse the extradition process. [
Footnote 4]
Page 486 U. S. 526
In addition, to the extent that the principle of specialty
protects an extradited person from the exercise of coercive power
by the receiving state on matters not anticipated by the
extradition, the defense of a civil suit does not significantly
restrict a defendant's liberty. Service of process merely requires
that a defendant appear through an attorney and file an answer to
the complaint to avoid default. There is no possibility that the
defendant will be subject to pretrial detention or be required to
post bail. The defendant is not even compelled to be present at
trial. We therefore conclude that a right not to stand trial in a
civil suit is not an essential aspect of a claim of immunity under
the principle of specialty.
Given that the principle of specialty provides no independent
support for petitioner's claim that he has a right not to stand
trial, the question becomes whether such a right is entailed in the
mere assertion that the district court lacks personal jurisdiction
because of immunity from service of process.
Cf. Rauscher,
119 U.S. at
119 U. S. 433
("[Court] did not have jurisdiction of the person at that time").
[
Footnote 5] In the context of
due process restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction,
this Court has recognized that the individual interest protected is
in
"not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with
which [the defendant] has established no meaningful 'contacts,
ties, or relations.'"
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.
S. 462,
471 U. S.
471-472 (1985), quoting
International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U. S. 310,
326 U. S. 319
(1945). Similarly, we believe petitioner's challenge to the
District Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction because he is
immune
Page 486 U. S. 527
from civil process should be characterized as the right not to
be subject to a binding judgment of the court. Because the right
not to be subject to a binding judgment may be effectively
vindicated following final judgment, we have held that the denial
of a claim of lack of jurisdiction is not an immediately appealable
collateral order.
See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. at
324 U. S. 236.
The Court of Appeals was therefore correct to conclude that the
District Court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss on the
ground of immunity from civil process is not immediately
appealable.
B
Petitioner also argues that the District Court's order denying
the motion to dismiss on the ground of
forum non
conveniens falls within the collateral order doctrine of
Cohen, and thus is immediately appealable under § 1291. We
conclude, however, as have the majority of the Courts of Appeals
that have considered the issue, [
Footnote 6] that the question of the convenience of the
forum is not "completely separate from the merits of the action,"
Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at
437 U. S. 468,
and thus is not immediately appealable as of right.
The requirement that the order be completely separate from the
merits is
"a distillation of the principle that there should not be
piecemeal review of 'steps towards final judgment in which they
will merge.'"
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp., 460 U. S. 1,
460 U. S. 12, n.
13 (1983), quoting
Cohen, 337 U.S. at
337 U. S. 546.
Allowing appeals
Page 486 U. S. 528
from interlocutory orders that involve considerations enmeshed
in the merits of the dispute would waste judicial resources by
requiring repetitive appellate review of substantive questions in
the case. In
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.
S. 501,
330 U. S. 508
(1947), the Court described various "[i]mportant considerations"
for district courts to balance in deciding whether a particular
forum is so inconvenient for the defendant as to warrant dismissal.
We believe these considerations make clear that, in assessing a
forum non conveniens motion, the district court generally
becomes entangled in the merits of the underlying dispute.
The Court in
Gulf Oil stated that district courts must
look into
"the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling . . . witnesses;
possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to
the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a
case easy, expeditious and inexpensive."
Ibid. To examine "the relative ease of access to
sources of proof," and the availability of witnesses, the district
court must scrutinize the substance of the dispute between the
parties to evaluate what proof is required, and determine whether
the pieces of evidence cited by the parties are critical, or even
relevant, to the plaintiff's cause of action and to any potential
defenses to the action. Public interest factors relevant to a
forum non conveniens determination -- such as the "local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home" and the
interest in having "the trial of a diversity case in a forum that
is at home with the state law that must govern the case,"
id. at
330 U. S. 509
-- also thrust the court into the merits of the underlying dispute.
To evaluate these factors, the court must consider the locus of the
alleged culpable conduct, often a disputed issue, and the
connection of that conduct to the plaintiff's chosen forum.
Cf.
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U. S. 235,
454 U. S.
259-260 (1981).
This list of considerations to be balanced is by no means
exhaustive, and some factors may not be relevant in the context
Page 486 U. S. 529
of a particular case. Moreover, the district court's inquiry
does not necessarily require extensive investigation, and may be
resolved on affidavits presented by the parties.
See id.
at
454 U. S.
258-259. As we previously have recognized, the district
court is accorded substantial flexibility in evaluating a
forum
non conveniens motion,
id. at
454 U. S. 249,
and "[e]ach case turns on its facts."
Williams v. Green Bay
& Western R. Co., 326 U. S. 549,
326 U. S. 557
(1946). It is thus undoubtedly true that, in certain cases, the
forum non conveniens determination will not require
significant inquiry into the facts and legal issues presented by a
case, and an immediate appeal might result in substantial savings
of time and expense for both the litigants and the courts. In
fashioning a rule of appealability under § 1291, however, we look
to categories of cases, not to particular injustices.
See
Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394,
354 U. S. 405
(1957) ("Appeal rights cannot depend on the facts of a particular
case");
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. at
435 U. S.
857-858, n. 6. [
Footnote
7] We believe that, in the main, the issues that arise in
forum non conveniens determinations will substantially
overlap factual and legal issues of the underlying dispute, making
such determinations unsuited for immediate appeal as of right under
§ 1291.
Our conclusion that the denial of a motion to dismiss on the
ground of
forum non conveniens is not appealable under §
1291 is fortified by the availability of interlocutory review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1292(b). Under § 1292(b), a district
Page 486 U. S. 530
court may certify a nonfinal order for interlocutory review when
the order
"involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and . . . an immediate
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation."
A court of appeals may then, in its discretion, determine
whether the order warrants prompt review.
See Coopers &
Lybrand, supra, at
437 U. S.
474-475. Section 1292(b) therefore provides an avenue
for review of
forum non conveniens determinations in
appropriate cases.
III
We hold that neither an order denying a motion to dismiss on
grounds that an extradited person is immune from civil process, nor
an order denying a motion to dismiss on the ground of
forum non
conveniens is a collateral order subject to appeal as a final
judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Court of Appeals therefore
lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's appeal. Accordingly,
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Petitioner's probation order has since been modified and he has
returned to Belgium after having provided security for the payment
of the restitution.
[
Footnote 2]
Although petitioner did not make a general appearance, the
District Court proceeded with the case after the appeal was filed
with the Court of Appeals. The District Court granted respondent's
motion for summary judgment and entered judgment for respondent on
the RICO claim for treble damages of $1.8 million, plus attorney's
fees of $75,000.
Biard v. Blair, No. CV 85-7378 JSL (JRx)
(Apr. 6, 1987), App. to Brief for Respondents, A-3.
[
Footnote 3]
The purposes behind the rule that a party must ordinarily raise
all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment are
by now well known:
"[The rule] emphasizes the deference that appellate courts owe
to the trial judge as the individual initially called upon to
decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in the course
of trial. Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the
independence of the district judge, as well as the special role
that individual plays in our judicial system. In addition, the rule
is in accordance with the sensible policy of"
"avoid[ing] the obstruction to just claims that would come from
permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate
appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give
rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment."
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,
449 U. S. 368,
449 U. S. 374
(1981), quoting
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.
S. 323,
309 U. S. 325
(1940).
[
Footnote 4]
Petitioner does not dispute that neither the extradition treaty
with Switzerland, Treaty between the United States and Switzerland
for the Extradition of Criminals, May 14, 1900, 31 Stat.1928, T.S.
No. 354 (1900), nor the relevant federal statutes governing
extradition matters,
see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3186, 3192, deal
explicitly with the protection of an extradited person from civil
suit.
[
Footnote 5]
As petitioner acknowledges, if he had been properly served in
Belgium or Switzerland prior to his extradition, or had been served
while in the United States on other business, then he could rightly
have been compelled to defend respondent's civil suit. Petitioner
thus does not contend that he never can be haled into court on the
same complaint in the same forum, but argues that he is immune from
service of process at this time and in this manner, "by taking
advantage of an extraditee's forced presence in this country."
See Reply Brief for Petitioner 5.
[
Footnote 6]
See Carlenstolpe v. Merck & Co., 819 F.2d 33, 36
(CA2 1987) ("[T]he determining factors in a
forum non
conveniens motion are
enmeshed' in the underlying cause of
action"); Partrederiet Treasure Saga v. Joy Manufacturing
Co., 804 F.2d 308, 310 (CA5 1986) (same); Rosenstein v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 769 F.2d 352, 354 (CA6 1985)
(same); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd.,
709 F.2d 190, 195 (CA3 1983) (same). Only one Circuit has held that
the denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non
conveniens is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
See Hodson v. A. H. Robins Co., 715 F.2d 142, 145, n. 2
(CA4 1983).
[
Footnote 7]
Petitioner argues that the
forum non conveniens
determination in this case is especially worthy of immediate review
because the District Court disposed of the motion summarily,
instead of making factual findings and articulating reasons for its
decision. Petitioner essentially claims that the District Court's
failure to explain its determination in this case is a clear abuse
of discretion, and such clear errors should be promptly appealable.
For the reasons stated in the text, we refuse to fashion an
exception from the general rule of nonappealibility for what
petitioner describes as "facially apparent reversible error," Brief
for Petitioner 35.
Cf. United States v. MacDonald, 435
U.S. at
435 U. S.
857-858, n. 6;
Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U. S. 463,
437 U. S. 476
(1978).