The National Fire Protection Association -- a private
organization that includes members representing industry, labor,
academia, insurers, organized medicine, firefighters, and
government -- sets and publishes product standards and codes
related to fire protection. Its National Electrical Code (Code),
which establishes requirements for the design and installation of
electrical wiring systems, is routinely adopted into law by a
substantial number of state and local governments, and is widely
adopted as setting acceptable standards by private
product-certification laboratories, insurance underwriters, and
electrical inspectors, contractors, and distributors. Throughout
the relevant period, the Code permitted the use of electrical
conduit made of steel. Respondent, a manufacturer of plastic
conduit, initiated a proposal before the Association to extend Code
approval to plastic conduit as well. The proposal was approved by
one of the Association's professional panels, and thus could be
adopted into the Code by a simple majority of the members attending
the Association's 1980 annual meeting. Before the meeting was held,
petitioner, the Nation's largest producer of steel conduit, members
of the steel industry, other steel conduit manufacturers, and
independent sales agents collectively agreed to exclude
respondent's product from the 1981 Code by packing the annual
meeting with new Association members whose only function was to
vote against respondent's proposal. After the proposal was defeated
at the meeting and an appeal to the Association's Board of
Directors was denied, respondent brought suit in Federal District
Court, alleging that petitioner and others had unreasonably
restrained trade in the electrical conduit market in violation of §
1 of the Sherman Act. The jury found petitioner liable, but the
court granted a judgment
n.o.v. for petitioner, reasoning
that it was entitled to antitrust immunity under the doctrine of
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U. S. 127. The
Court of Appeals reversed.
Held: Noerr antitrust immunity does not apply to
petitioner.
(a) The scope of
Noerr protection depends on the
source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive restraint at
issue. Where a restraint is the result of valid governmental
action, as opposed to private action,
Page 486 U. S. 493
those urging the governmental action enjoy absolute immunity
from antitrust liability for the anticompetitive restraint. In this
case, the relevant context is the standard-setting process of a
private association without official authority that includes
members having horizontal and vertical business relations and
economic incentives to restrain competition. Such an association
cannot be treated as a "quasi-legislative" body simply because
legislatures routinely adopt its Code, and thus petitioner does not
enjoy the immunity afforded those who merely urge the government to
restrain trade. Pp.
486 U. S.
499-502.
(b) Nor does
Noerr immunity apply to petitioner on the
theory that the exclusion of plastic conduit from the Code, and the
effect that exclusion had of its own force in the marketplace, were
incidental to a valid effort to influence governmental action.
Although, because a large number of governments routinely adopt the
Code into law, efforts to influence the Association's
standard-setting process are arguably the most effective means of
influencing legislation regulating electrical conduit, and although
Noerr immunity is not limited to "direct" petitioning of
government officials, the
Noerr doctrine does not immunize
every concerted activity that is genuinely intended to influence
governmental action. There is no merit to the argument that,
regardless of the Association's nonlegislative status, petitioner's
efforts to influence the Association must be given the same wide
berth accorded legislative lobbying or efforts to influence
legislative action in the political arena. Pp.
486 U. S.
502-504.
(c) Unlike the publicity campaign to influence legislation in
Noerr, petitioner's activity did not take place in the
open political arena, where partisanship is the hallmark of
decisionmaking, but took place within the confines of a private
standard-setting process. The validity of petitioner's efforts to
influence the Code is not established, without more, by
petitioner's literal compliance with the Association's rules, for
the hope of the Code's procompetitive benefits depends upon the
existence of safeguards sufficient to prevent the standard-setting
process from being biased by members with economic interests in
restraining competition. An association cannot validate the
anticompetitive activities of its members simply by adopting rules
that fail to provide such safeguards. At least where, as here, an
economically interested party exercises decisionmaking authority in
formulating a product standard for a private association that
comprises market participants, that party enjoys no
Noerr
immunity from any antitrust liability flowing from the effect the
standard has of its own force in the marketplace. Pp.
486 U. S.
505-510.
817 F.2d 938, affirmed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, SCALIA, and
KENNEDY, JJ.,
Page 486 U. S. 494
joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
O'CONNOR, J., joined.
Page 486 U. S. 495
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner contends that its efforts to affect the product
standard-setting process of a private association are immune from
antitrust liability under the
Noerr doctrine primarily
because the association's standards are widely adopted into law by
state and local governments.
Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.
S. 127 (1961) (
Noerr). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
Noerr immunity
did not apply. We affirm.
I
The National Fire Protection Association (Association) is a
private, voluntary organization with more than 31,500 individual
and group members representing industry, labor, academia, insurers,
organized medicine, firefighters, and government. The Association,
among other things, publishes product standards and codes related
to fire protection through a process known as "consensus standard
making." One of the codes it publishes is the National Electrical
Code (Code), which establishes product and performance requirements
for the design and installation of electrical wiring systems.
Revised every three years, the Code is the most influential
electrical code in the nation. A substantial number of state and
local governments routinely adopt the Code into law with little or
no change; private certification laboratories, such as Underwriters
Laboratories, normally will not list and label
Page 486 U. S. 496
an electrical product that does not meet Code standards; many
underwriters will refuse to insure structures that are not built in
conformity with the Code, and many electrical inspectors,
contractors, and distributors will not use a product that falls
outside the Code.
Among the electrical products covered by the Code is electrical
conduit, the hollow tubing used as a raceway to carry electrical
wires through the walls and floors of buildings. Throughout the
relevant period, the Code permitted using electrical conduit made
of steel, and almost all conduit sold was in fact steel conduit.
Starting in 1980, respondent began to offer plastic conduit made of
polyvinyl chloride. Respondent claims its plastic conduit offers
significant competitive advantages over steel conduit, including
pliability, lower installed cost, and lower susceptibility to short
circuiting. In 1980, however, there was also a scientific basis for
concern that, during fires in high-rise buildings, polyvinyl
chloride conduit might burn and emit toxic fumes.
Respondent initiated a proposal to include polyvinyl chloride
conduit as an approved type of electrical conduit in the 1981
edition of the Code. Following approval by one of the Association's
professional panels, this proposal was scheduled for consideration
at the 1980 annual meeting, where it could be adopted or rejected
by a simple majority of the members present. Alarmed that, if
approved, respondent's product might pose a competitive threat to
steel conduit, petitioner, the Nation's largest producer of steel
conduit, met to plan strategy with, among others, members of the
steel industry, other steel conduit manufacturers, and its
independent sales agents. They collectively agreed to exclude
respondent's product from the 1981 Code by packing the upcoming
annual meeting with new Association members whose only function
would be to vote against the polyvinyl chloride proposal.
Combined, the steel interests recruited 230 persons to join the
Association and to attend the annual meeting to
Page 486 U. S. 497
vote against the proposal. Petitioner alone recruited 155
persons -- including employees, executives, sales agents, the
agents' employees, employees from two divisions that did not sell
electrical products, and the wife of a national sales director.
Petitioner and the other steel interests also paid over $100,000
for the membership, registration, and attendance expenses of these
voters. At the annual meeting, the steel group voters were
instructed where to sit and how and when to vote by group leaders
who used walkie-talkies and hand signals to facilitate
communication. Few of the steel group voters had any of the
technical documentation necessary to follow the meeting. None of
them spoke at the meeting to give their reasons for opposing the
proposal to approve polyvinyl chloride conduit. Nonetheless, with
their solid vote in opposition, the proposal was rejected and
returned to committee by a vote of 394 to 390. Respondent appealed
the membership's vote to the Association's Board of Directors, but
the Board denied the appeal on the ground that, although the
Association's rules had been circumvented, they had not been
violated. [
Footnote 1]
In October, 1981, respondent brought this suit in Federal
District Court, alleging that petitioner and others had
unreasonably restrained trade in the electrical conduit market in
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 1. A
bifurcated jury trial began in March, 1985. Petitioner conceded
that it had conspired with the other steel interests to exclude
respondent's product from the Code, and that it had a pecuniary
interest to do so. The jury, instructed under the rule of reason
that respondent carried the burden of showing that the
anticompetitive effects of petitioner's actions outweighed any
procompetitive benefits of standard-setting,
Page 486 U. S. 498
found petitioner liable. In answers to special interrogatories,
the jury found that petitioner did not violate any rules of the
Association and acted, at least in part, based on a genuine belief
that plastic conduit was unsafe, but that petitioner nonetheless
did "subvert" the consensus standard-making process of the
Association. App. 23-24. The jury also made special findings that
petitioner's actions had an adverse impact on competition, were not
the least restrictive means of expressing petitioner's opposition
to the use of polyvinyl chloride conduit in the marketplace, and
unreasonably restrained trade in violation of the antitrust laws.
The jury then awarded respondent damages, to be trebled, of $3.8
million for lost profits resulting from the effect that excluding
polyvinyl chloride conduit from the 1981 Code had of its own force
in the marketplace. No damages were awarded for injuries stemming
from the adoption of the 1981 Code by governmental entities.
[
Footnote 2]
The District Court then granted a judgment
n.o.v. for
petitioner, reasoning that
Noerr immunity applied because
the Association was "akin to a legislature" and because
petitioner,
"by the use of methods consistent with acceptable standards of
political action, genuinely intended to influence the [Association]
with respect to the National Electrical Code, and to thereby
influence the various state and local legislative bodies which
adopt the [Code]."
App. to Pet. for
Page 486 U. S. 499
Cert. 28a, 30a. The Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting both
the argument that the Association should be treated as a
"quasi-legislative" body because legislatures routinely adopt the
Code and the argument that efforts to influence the Code were
immune under
Noerr as indirect attempts to influence state
and local governments. 817 F.2d 938 (CA2 1987). We granted
certiorari to address important issues regarding the application of
Noerr immunity to private standard-setting associations.
[
Footnote 3] 484 U.S. 814
(1987).
II
Concerted efforts to restrain or monopolize trade by petitioning
government officials are protected from antitrust liability under
the doctrine established by
Noerr, 365 U.
S. 127 (1961);
Mine Workers v. Pennington,
381 U. S. 657,
381 U.S. 669-672 (1965);
and
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U. S. 508
(1972). The scope of this protection depends, however, on the
source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive restraint at
issue. "[W]here a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the
result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private action,"
those urging the governmental action enjoy absolute immunity from
antitrust liability for the anticompetitive restraint.
Noerr,
supra, at
365 U. S. 136;
see also Pennington, supra, at
381 U. S. 671.
In addition, where, independent of any government action, the
anticompetitive restraint results directly from private action, the
restraint cannot form the basis for antitrust liability if it is
"incidental" to a valid effort to influence governmental action.
Noerr, supra, at
365 U. S. 143.
The validity of such efforts, and thus the applicability of
Noerr immunity, varies with the context and nature of the
activity. A publicity campaign directed at the general public,
seeking legislation or executive action, enjoys antitrust immunity
even when the campaign employs unethical
Page 486 U. S. 500
and deceptive methods.
Noerr, supra, at
365 U. S.
140-141. But in less political arenas, unethical and
deceptive practices can constitute abuses of administrative or
judicial processes that may result in antitrust violations.
[
Footnote 4]
California
Motor Transport, supra, at
404 U. S.
512-513.
In this case, the restraint of trade on which liability was
predicated was the Association's exclusion of respondent's product
from the Code, and no damages were imposed for the incorporation of
that Code by any government. The relevant context is thus the
standard-setting process of a private association. Typically,
private standard-setting associations, like the Association in this
case, include members having horizontal and vertical business
relations.
See generally 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law �
1477, p. 343 (1986) (trade and standard-setting associations
routinely treated as continuing conspiracies of their members).
There is no doubt that the members of such associations often have
economic incentives to restrain competition and that the product
standards set by such associations have a serious potential for
anticompetitive harm. [
Footnote
5]
See American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v.
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U. S. 556,
456 U. S. 571
(1982). Agreement on a product standard is, after all, implicitly
an agreement not to manufacture, distribute, or purchase certain
types of products. Accordingly, private standard-setting
associations have traditionally been objects of antitrust scrutiny.
See, e.g., ibid.; Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light
& Coke Co., 364 U. S. 656
(1961) (per curiam).
See also FTC v. Indiana Federation of
Dentists,
Page 486 U. S. 501
476 U. S. 447
(1986). When, however, private associations promulgate safety
standards based on the merits of objective expert judgments and
through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from
being biased by members with economic interests in stifling product
competition,
compare Hydrolevel, supra, at
456 U. S.
570-573 (noting absence of "meaningful safeguards"),
those private standards can have significant procompetitive
advantages. It is this potential for procompetitive benefits that
has led most lower courts to apply rule-of-reason analysis to
product standard-setting by private associations. [
Footnote 6]
Given this context, petitioner does not enjoy the immunity
accorded those who merely urge the government to restrain trade. We
agree with the Court of Appeals that the Association cannot be
treated as a "quasi-legislative" body simply because legislatures
routinely adopt the Code the Association publishes. 817 F.2d at
943-944. Whatever
de facto authority the Association
enjoys, no official authority has been conferred on it by any
government, and the decisionmaking body of the Association is
composed, at least in part, of persons with economic incentives to
restrain trade.
See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690,
370 U. S.
707-708 (1962).
See also id. at
370 U. S.
706-707;
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U. S. 773,
421 U. S.
791-792 (1975).
"We may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that [a
government] acts in the public interest. A private party, on the
other hand, may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its
own behalf."
Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U. S. 34,
471 U. S. 45
(1985). The dividing line between restraints resulting from
governmental action and those resulting from private action
Page 486 U. S. 502
may not always be obvious. [
Footnote 7] But where, as here, the restraint is imposed
by persons unaccountable to the public and without official
authority, many of whom have personal financial interests in
restraining competition, we have no difficulty concluding that the
restraint has resulted from private action.
Noerr immunity might still apply, however, if, as
petitioner argues, the exclusion of polyvinyl chloride conduit from
the Code, and the effect that exclusion had of its own force in the
marketplace, were incidental to a valid effort to influence
governmental action. Petitioner notes that the lion's share of the
anticompetitive effect in this case came from the predictable
adoption of the Code into law by a large number of state and local
governments.
See 817 F.2d at 939, n. 1. Indeed, petitioner
argues that, because state and local governments rely so heavily on
the Code and lack the resources or technical expertise to
second-guess it, efforts to influence the Association's
standard-setting process are the most effective means of
influencing legislation regulating electrical conduit. This claim
to
Noerr immunity has some force. The effort to influence
governmental action in this case certainly cannot be characterized
as a sham, given the actual adoption of the 1981 Code into a number
of statutes and local ordinances. Nor can we quarrel with
petitioner's contention that, given the widespread adoption of the
Code into
Page 486 U. S. 503
law, any effect the 1981 Code had in the marketplace of its own
force was, in the main, incidental to petitioner's genuine effort
to influence governmental action. [
Footnote 8] And, as petitioner persuasively argues, the
claim of
Noerr immunity cannot be dismissed on the ground
that the conduct at issue involved no "direct" petitioning of
government officials, for
Noerr itself immunized a form of
"indirect" petitioning.
See Noerr, 365 U.
S. 127 (1961) (immunizing a publicity campaign directed
at the general public on the ground that it was part of an effort
to influence legislative and executive action).
Nonetheless, the validity of petitioner's actions remains an
issue. We cannot agree with petitioner's absolutist position that
the
Noerr doctrine immunizes every concerted effort that
is genuinely intended to influence governmental action. If all such
conduct were immunized then, for example, competitors would be free
to enter into horizontal price agreements as long as they wished to
propose that price as an appropriate level for governmental
ratemaking or price supports.
But see Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R. Co., 324 U. S. 439,
324 U. S.
456-463 (1945). Horizontal conspiracies or boycotts
designed to exact higher prices or other economic advantages from
the government would be immunized on the ground that they are
genuinely intended to influence the government to agree to the
conspirators' terms.
But see Georgia v. Evans,
316 U. S. 159
(1942). Firms could claim immunity for boycotts or horizontal
output restrictions on the ground that they are intended to
dramatize the plight of their industry and spur legislative action.
Immunity might even be
Page 486 U. S. 504
claimed for anticompetitive mergers on the theory that they give
the merging corporations added political clout. Nor is it
necessarily dispositive that packing the Association's meeting may
have been the most effective means of securing government action,
for one could imagine situations where the most effective means of
influencing government officials is bribery, and we have never
suggested that that kind of attempt to influence the government
merits protection. We thus conclude that the
Noerr
immunity of anticompetitive activity intended to influence the
government depends not only on its impact, but also on the context
and nature of the activity.
Here petitioner's actions took place within the context of the
standard-setting process of a private association. Having concluded
that the Association is not a "quasi-legislative" body, we reject
petitioner's argument that any efforts to influence the Association
must be treated as efforts to influence a "quasi-legislature" and
given the same wide berth accorded legislative lobbying. That
rounding up supporters is an acceptable and constitutionally
protected method of influencing elections does not mean that
rounding up economically interested persons to set private
standards must also be protected. Nor do we agree with petitioner's
contention that, regardless of the Association's nonlegislative
status, the effort to influence the Code should receive the same
wide latitude given ethically dubious efforts to influence
legislative action in the political arena,
see Noerr,
supra, at
365 U. S.
140-141, simply because the ultimate aim of the effort
to influence the private standard-setting process was (principally)
legislative action. The ultimate aim is not dispositive. A
misrepresentation to a court would not necessarily be entitled to
the same antitrust immunity allowed deceptive practices in the
political arena simply because the odds were very good that the
court's decision would be codified -- nor for that matter would
misrepresentations made under oath at a legislative committee
hearing in the hopes of spurring legislative action.
Page 486 U. S. 505
What distinguishes this case from
Noerr and its progeny
is that the context and nature of petitioner's activity make it the
type of commercial activity that has traditionally had its validity
determined by the antitrust laws themselves. True, in
Noerr, we immunized conduct that could be characterized as
a conspiracy among railroads to destroy business relations between
truckers and their customers.
Noerr, supra, at
365 U. S. 142.
But we noted there:
"There are no specific findings that the railroads attempted
directly to persuade anyone not to deal with the truckers.
Moreover, all the evidence in the record, both oral and
documentary, deals with the railroads' efforts to influence the
passage and enforcement of laws. Circulars, speeches, newspaper
articles, editorials, magazine articles, memoranda and all other
documents discuss in one way or another the railroads' charges that
heavy trucks injure the roads, violate the laws and create traffic
hazards, and urge that truckers should be forced to pay a fair
share of the costs of rebuilding the roads, that they should be
compelled to obey the laws, and that limits should be placed upon
the weight of the loads-they are permitted to carry."
365 U.S. at
365 U. S.
142-143. In light of those findings, we characterized
the railroads' activity as a classic "attempt . . . to influence
legislation by a campaign of publicity," an "inevitable" and
"incidental" effect of which was "the infliction of some direct
injury upon the interests of the party against whom the campaign is
directed."
Id. at
365 U. S. 143. The essential character of such a
publicity campaign was, we concluded, political, and could not be
segregated from the activity's impact on business. Rather, the
plaintiff's cause of action simply embraced the inherent
possibility in such political fights "that one group or the other
will get hurt by the arguments that are made."
Id. at
365 U. S. 144.
As a political activity, special factors counseled against
regulating the publicity campaign under the antitrust laws:
Page 486 U. S. 506
"Insofar as [the Sherman] Act sets up a code of ethics at all,
it is a code that condemns trade restraints, not political
activity, and, as we have already pointed out, a publicity campaign
to influence governmental action falls clearly into the category of
political activity. The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they
are for the business world, are not at all appropriate for
application in the political arena. Congress has traditionally
exercised extreme caution in legislating with respect to problems
relating to the conduct of political activities, a caution which
has been reflected in the decisions of this Court interpreting such
legislation. All of this caution would go for naught if we
permitted an extension of the Sherman Act to regulate activities of
that nature simply because those activities have a commercial
impact and involve conduct that can be termed unethical."
Id. at
365 U. S.
140-141 (footnote omitted). In
Noerr, then, the
political context and nature of the activity precluded inquiry into
its antitrust validity. [
Footnote
9]
Here, the context and nature of the activity do not counsel
against inquiry into its validity. Unlike the publicity campaign in
Noerr, the activity at issue here did not take place in
the open political arena, where partisanship is the hallmark of
decisionmaking, but within the confines of a private
standard-setting process. The validity of conduct within that
process has long been defined and circumscribed by the antitrust
laws without regard to whether the private standards are likely to
be adopted into law.
See supra at 500. Indeed, because
private standard-setting by associations comprising firms with
horizontal and vertical business relations is permitted at all
under the antitrust laws only on the
Page 486 U. S. 507
understanding that it will be conducted in a nonpartisan manner
offering procompetitive benefits,
see ibid., the standards
of conduct in this context are, at least in some respects, more
rigorous than the standards of conduct prevailing in the partisan
political arena or in the adversarial process of adjudication. The
activity at issue here thus cannot, as in
Noerr, be
characterized as an activity that has traditionally been regulated
with extreme caution,
see Noerr, 365 U.S. at
365 U. S. 141,
or as an activity that "bear[s] little if any resemblance to the
combinations normally held violative of the Sherman Act,"
id. at
365 U. S. 136.
And petitioner did not confine itself to efforts to persuade an
independent decisionmaker,
cf. id. at
365 U. S. 138,
365 U. S. 139
(describing the immunized conduct as "mere solicitation"); rather,
it organized and orchestrated the actual exercise of the
Association's decisionmaking authority in setting a standard. Nor
can the setting of the Association's Code be characterized as
merely an exercise of the power of persuasion, for it in part
involves the exercise of market power. The Association's members,
after all, include consumers, distributors, and manufacturers of
electrical conduit, and any agreement to exclude polyvinyl chloride
conduit from the Code is in part an implicit agreement not to trade
in that type of electrical conduit.
Cf. id. at
365 U. S. 136.
Although one could reason backwards from the legislative impact of
the Code to the conclusion that the conduct at issue here is
"political," we think that, given the context and nature of the
conduct, it can more aptly be characterized as commercial activity
with a political impact. Just as the antitrust laws should not
regulate political activities "simply because those activities have
a commercial impact,"
id. at
365 U. S. 141,
so the antitrust laws should not necessarily immunize what are in
essence commercial activities simply because they have a political
impact. [
Footnote 10]
Page 486 U. S. 508
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.
S. 886 (1982), is not to the contrary. In that case, we
held that the First Amendment protected the nonviolent elements of
a boycott of white merchants organized by the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People and designed to make white
government and business leaders comply with a list of demands for
equality and racial justice. Although the boycotters intended to
inflict economic injury on the merchants, the boycott was not
motivated by any desire to lessen competition or to reap economic
benefits, but by the aim of vindicating rights of equality and
freedom lying at the heart of the Constitution, and the boycotters
were consumers who did not stand to profit financially from a
lessening of competition in the boycotted market.
Id. at
458 U. S.
914-915. Here, in contrast,
Page 486 U. S. 509
petitioner was at least partially motivated by the desire to
lessen competition, and, because of petitioner's line of business,
stood to reap substantial economic benefits from making it
difficult for respondent to compete [
Footnote 11]
Thus, in this case, the context and nature of petitioner's
efforts to influence the Code persuade us that the validity of
those efforts must, despite their political impact, be evaluated
under the standards of conduct set forth by the antitrust laws that
govern the private standard-setting process. The antitrust validity
of these efforts is not established, without more, by petitioner's
literal compliance with the rules of the Association, for the hope
of procompetitive benefits depends upon the existence of safeguards
sufficient to prevent the standard-setting process from being
biased by members with economic interests in restraining
competition. An association cannot validate the anticompetitive
activities of its members simply by adopting rules that fail to
provide such safeguards. [
Footnote 12] The issue of immunity in this case thus
collapses into the issue of antitrust liability. Although we do not
here set forth the rules of antitrust liability governing the
private standard-setting process, we hold that, at least where, as
here, an economically interested party exercises decisionmaking
authority in formulating a product standard for a private
association that comprises market participants, that
Page 486 U. S. 510
party enjoys no
Noerr immunity from any antitrust
liability flowing from the effect the standard has of its own force
in the marketplace.
This conclusion does not deprive state and local governments of
input and information from interested individuals or organizations
or leave petitioner without ample means to petition those
governments.
Cf. Noerr, 365 U.S. at
365 U. S.
137-138.
See also California Motor Transport,
404 U.S. at
404 U. S. 510.
Petitioner, and others concerned about the safety or competitive
threat of polyvinyl chloride conduit, can, with full antitrust
immunity, engage in concerted efforts to influence those
governments through direct lobbying, publicity campaigns, and other
traditional avenues of political expression. To the extent state
and local governments are more difficult to persuade through these
other avenues, that no doubt reflects their preference for and
confidence in the nonpartisan consensus process that petitioner has
undermined. Petitioner remains free to take advantage of the forum
provided by the standard-setting process by presenting and
vigorously arguing accurate scientific evidence before a
nonpartisan private standard-setting body. [
Footnote 13] And petitioner can avoid the
strictures of the private standard-setting process by attempting to
influence legislatures through other forums.
Page 486 U. S. 511
What petitioner may not do (without exposing itself to possible
antitrust liability for direct injuries) is bias the process by, as
in this case, stacking the private standard-setting body with
decisionmakers sharing their economic interest in restraining
competition.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Respondent also sought a tentative interim amendment to the
Code, but that was denied on the ground that there was not
sufficient exigency to merit an interim amendment. The Association
subsequently approved use of polyvinyl chloride conduit for
buildings of less than three stories in the 1984 Code, and for all
buildings in the 1987 Code.
[
Footnote 2]
Although the District Court was of the view that, at trial,
respondent relied solely on the theory that its injury "flowed from
legislative action," App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a, the Court of
Appeals determined that respondent was awarded damages only on the
theory
"that the stigma of not obtaining [Code] approval of its
products and [petitioner's] 'marketing' of that stigma caused
independent marketplace harm to [respondent] in those jurisdictions
permitting use of [polyvinyl chloride] conduit, as well as
those which later adopted the 1984 [Code], which permitted use of
[polyvinyl chloride] conduit in buildings less than three stories
high. [Respondent] did not seek redress for any injury arising from
the adoption of the [Code] by the various governments."
817 F.2d 938, 941, n. 3 (CA2 1987) (emphasis added). We decide
the case as it was framed by the Court of Appeals.
[
Footnote 3]
We also granted certiorari on the issue whether, if not immune
under
Noerr, petitioner's conduct violated the Sherman
Act, but we now vacate our grant of that issue as improvident.
[
Footnote 4]
Of course, in whatever forum, private action that is not
genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action is a mere
sham that cannot be deemed a valid effort to influence government
action.
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144;
California Motor
Transport, 404 U.S. at 511.
[
Footnote 5]
"Product standardization might impair competition in several
ways. . . . [It] might deprive some consumers of a desired product,
eliminate quality competition, exclude rival producers, or
facilitate oligopolistic pricing by easing rivals' ability to
monitor each other's prices."
7 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law � 1503, p. 373 (1986).
[
Footnote 6]
See 2 J. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade
Regulation §§ 6I.01[3], 6I.03, 6I.04, pp. 6I-6 to 6I-7, 6I-18 to
6I-29 (1981) (collecting cases). Concerted efforts to enforce
(rather than just agree upon) private product standards face more
rigorous antitrust scrutiny.
See Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.
S. 656,
364 U. S.
659-660 (1961) (per curiam).
See also Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.
S. 457 (1941).
[
Footnote 7]
See, e.g., California Motor Transport, supra, at
404 U. S. 513
(stating in dicta that "[c]onspiracy with a licensing authority to
eliminate a competitor" or "bribery of a public purchasing agent"
may violate the antitrust laws);
Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U. S. 657,
381 U. S. 671,
and n. 4 (1965) (holding that immunity applied, but noting that the
trade restraint at issue "was the act of a public official who is
not claimed to be a coconspirator" and contrasting
Continental
Ore);
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U. S. 690,
370 U. S.
707-708 (1962); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust
Law � 206 (1978) (discussing the extent to which
Noerr
immunity should apply to commercial transactions involving the
government).
See also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U. S. 773,
421 U. S.
791-792 (1975);
Continental Ore, supra, at
370 U. S.
706-707.
[
Footnote 8]
The effect, independent of government action, that the 1981 Code
had in the marketplace may to some extent have been exacerbated by
petitioner's efforts to "market" the stigma respondent's product
suffered by being excluded from the Code.
See 817 F.2d at
941, n. 3. Given our disposition
infra, we need not decide
whether, or to what extent, these "marketing" efforts alter the
incidental status of the resulting anticompetitive harm.
See
generally Noerr, 365 U.S. at
365 U. S. 142
(noting that, in that case, there were "no specific findings that
the railroads attempted directly to persuade anyone not to deal
with the truckers").
[
Footnote 9]
Similarly, in
California Motor Transport, any antitrust
review of the validity of the activity at issue was limited and
structured by the fact that there, the antitrust defendants were
"us[ing] the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies
and courts." 404 U.S. at
404 U. S. 511;
see also id. at
404 U. S.
512-513.
[
Footnote 10]
It is admittedly difficult to draw the precise lines separating
anticompetitive political activity that is immunized despite its
commercial impact from anticompetitive commercial activity that is
unprotected despite its political impact, and this is itself a case
close to the line. For that reason, we caution that our decision
today depends on the context and nature of the activity. Although
criticizing the uncertainty of such a particularized inquiry,
post at
486 U. S. 513,
the dissent does not dispute that the types of activity we describe
supra at
486 U. S.
503-504 could not be immune under
Noerr, and
fails to offer an intelligible alternative for distinguishing those
nonimmune activities from the activity at issue in this case.
Rather, the dissent states, without elaboration, that the sham
exception "is enough to guard against flagrant abuse,"
post at
486 U. S. 516,
apparently embracing the conclusion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the sham exception covers the
activity of a defendant who "genuinely seeks to achieve his
governmental result, but does so
through improper means."
Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc., 827 F.2d
458, 465, n. 5 (1987) (emphasis in original). Such a use of the
word "sham" distorts its meaning, and bears little relation to the
sham exception
Noerr described to cover activity that was
not genuinely intended to influence governmental action. 365 U.S.
at
365 U. S. 144.
See also P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law �
203.1a, pp. 13-14 (Supp.1987). More importantly, the Ninth
Circuit's approach renders "sham" no more than a label courts could
apply to activity they deem unworthy of antitrust immunity
(probably based on unarticulated consideration of the nature and
context of the activity), thus providing a certain superficial
certainty but no real "intelligible guidance" to courts or
litigants.
Post at 513. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the very activity the dissent deems protected was an
unprotected "sham." 827 F.2d at 465.
[
Footnote 11]
Although the absence of such anticompetitive motives and
incentives is relevant to determining whether petitioner's
restraint of trade is protected under
Claiborne Hardware,
we do not suggest that the absence of anticompetitive purpose is
necessary for
Noerr immunity. As the dissent points out,
in
Noerr itself, the major purpose of the activity at
issue was anticompetitive.
Post at
486 U. S.
512-513. Our statement that the "ultimate aim" of
petitioner "is not dispositive,"
supra at
486 U. S. 504,
stands only for the proposition that, at least outside the
political context, the mere fact that an anticompetitive activity
is also intended to influence governmental action is not, alone,
sufficient to render that activity immune from antitrust
liability.
[
Footnote 12]
Even petitioner's counsel concedes, for example, that
Noerr would not apply if the Association had a rule giving
the steel conduit manufacturers a veto over changes in the Code.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-42.
[
Footnote 13]
The dissent mistakenly asserts that we today hold that
Noerr immunity does not apply to mere efforts to persuade
others to exclude a competitor's product from a private code.
See post at
486 U. S.
514-516. Our holding is expressly limited to cases where
an
"economically interested party exercises
decisionmaking
authority in formulating a product standard for a private
association that comprises market participants."
Supra at
486 U. S. 509
(emphasis added);
see also supra at
486 U. S.
506-507 (relying in part on the distinction between
activity involving the exercise of decisionmaking authority and
market power and activity involving mere attempts to persuade an
independent decisionmaker).
Cf. Noerr, 365 U.S. at
365 U. S. 136.
The dissent also mistakenly asserts that this description
encompasses all private standard setting associations.
See
post at
486 U. S. 515.
In fact, many such associations are composed of members with
expertise, but no economic interest in suppressing competition.
See, e.g., Sessions, 827 F.2d at 461, and n. 2.
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, dissenting.
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127
(1961), held that the Sherman Act should not be construed to forbid
joint efforts by railway companies seeking legislation that would
disadvantage the trucking industry. These efforts for the most part
involved a public relations campaign, rather than direct lobbying
of the lawmakers, and were held not subject to antitrust challenge
because of the fundamental importance of maintaining the free flow
of information to the government and the right of the people to
seek legislative relief, directly or indirectly.
Mine Workers
v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657
(1965), and
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508
(1972), applied the rule to efforts to seek executive action and to
administrative and adjudicative proceedings.
The Court now refuses to apply the rule of these cases to the
participants in those private organizations, such as National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA), that regularly propound and publish
health and safety standards for a variety of products and
industries and then present these codes to state and local
authorities for the purpose of having them enacted into law. The
NFPA and those participating in the code-writing process will now
be subject to antitrust liability if their efforts have
anticompetitive effects and do not withstand scrutiny under the
rule of reason. Believing that this result is a misapplication of
the
Noerr decision and an improvident construction of the
Sherman Act, I respectfully dissent.
Page 486 U. S. 512
This case presents an even stronger argument for immunity than
did
Noerr itself. That decision turned on whether the
design or purpose of the conduct was to obtain or influence the
passage or enforcement of laws. The Court concedes that
petitioner's actions in this case constituted a "genuine effort to
influence governmental action,"
ante at
486 U. S. 503,
and that this was its "ultimate aim,"
ante at
486 U. S. 504.
In
Noerr, the publicity campaign was dispersed widely
among the public in a broad but necessary diluted attempt to move
public opinion in hopes that government officials would take note
and respond accordingly. The campaign apparently had some influence
on the passage of tax laws and other legislation favorable to the
railroads in New Jersey, New York, and Ohio, and procured the
Governor's veto of a bill that had been passed in Pennsylvania.
See 365 U.S. at
365 U. S. 130;
see also 155 F.
Supp. 768, 777-801 (ED Pa.1957). Here, the NFPA actually
drafted proposed legislation in the form of the National Electrical
Code (NEC) and presented it countrywide. Not only were petitioner's
efforts in this case designed to influence the passage of state
laws, but there was also a much greater likelihood that they would
be successful than was the case in
Noerr. This is germane
because it establishes a much greater likelihood that the "purpose"
and "design" of petitioner's actions in this case was the
"solicitation of governmental action with respect to the passage
and enforcement of laws," 365 U.S. at
365 U. S.
138.
Rather than directly confronting the severe damage that today's
decision does to the
Noerr doctrine, the majority asserts
that the "ultimate aim" of petitioner's efforts "is not
dispositive."
Ante at
486 U. S. 504.
That statement cannot be reconciled with the statements quoted
earlier from
Noerr, where it was held that, even if one of
the major purposes, or even the sole purpose, of the publicity
campaign was "to destroy the truckers as competitors," 365 U.S. at
365 U. S. 138,
those actions were immunized from antitrust liability because
ultimately they were "directed toward obtaining governmental
action,"
Page 486 U. S. 513
id. at
365 U. S. 140.
The majority later doubles back on this statement and suggests that
it is important in this case that
"petitioner was at least partially motivated by the desire to
lessen competition, and . . . stood to reap substantial economic
benefits from making it difficult for respondent to compete."
Ante at
486 U. S. 509.
It need hardly be said that all of this was also true in
Noerr. Nobody condones fraud, bribery, or
misrepresentation in any form, and other state and federal laws
ensure that such conduct is punishable. But the point here is that
conduct otherwise punishable under the antitrust laws either
becomes immune from the operation of those laws when it is part of
a larger design to influence the passage and enforcement of laws,
or it does not. No workable boundaries to the
Noerr
doctrine are established by declaring, and then repeating at every
turn, that everything depends on "the context and nature of" the
activity,
ante at
486 U. S. 504,
486 U. S. 505,
486 U. S. 506,
486 U. S. 509,
if we are unable to offer any further guidance about what this
vague reference is supposed to mean, especially when the result
here is so clearly wrong as long as
Noerr itself is
reputed to remain good law. One unfortunate consequence of today's
decision, therefore, is that district courts and courts of appeals
will be obliged to puzzle over claims raised under the doctrine
without any intelligible guidance about when and why to apply
it.
If there were no private code-writing organizations, and state
legislatures themselves held the necessary hearing and wrote codes
from scratch, then business concerns like Allied, together with
their friends, could jointly testify with impunity about the safety
of various products, even though they had anticompetitive motives
in doing so. This much the majority concedes, as it does that the
major purpose of the code-writing organizations is to influence
legislative action. These days it is almost a foregone conclusion
that the vast majority of the States will adopt these codes with
little or no change. It is untenable to consider the code-writing
process by such organizations as the NFPA as too far removed
Page 486 U. S. 514
from the legislative process to warrant application of the
doctrine announced in
Noerr and faithfully applied in
other cases. This was the view of Judge Sneed and his colleagues on
the Ninth Circuit in
Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg.,
Inc., 827 F.2d 458 (1987), and the reasons they gave for
applying
Noerr in this context are much more persuasive
than anything to the contrary the majority now has to offer.
The Court's decision is unfortunate for another reason. There
are now over 400 private organizations preparing and publishing an
enormous variety of codes and standards. State and local
governments necessarily, and as a matter of course, turn to these
proposed codes in the process of legislating to further the health
and safety of their citizens. The code that is at issue in this
case, for example, was adopted verbatim by 25 States and the
District of Columbia; 19 others adopted it with only minor changes.
It is the most widely disseminated and adopted model code in the
world today. There is no doubt that the work of these private
organizations contributes enormously to the public interest, and
that participation in their work by those who have the technical
competence and experience to do so should not be discouraged.
The Court's decision today will surely do just that. It must
inevitably be the case that codes such as the NEC will set
standards that some products cannot satisfy, and hence, in the name
of health and safety, will reduce or prevent competition, as was
the case here. Yet putative competitors of the producer of such
products will now think twice before urging in the course of the
code-making process that those products not be approved; for if
they are successful (or even if they are not), they may well become
antitrust defendants facing treble-damages liability unless they
can prove to a court and a jury that they had no evil motives, but
were merely "presenting and vigorously arguing accurate scientific
evidence before a nonpartisan private standard-setting body,"
ante at
486 U. S. 510
(though with the knowing and inevitable result of eliminating
competition). In this case, for example, even
Page 486 U. S. 515
if Allied had not resorted to the tactics it employed, but had
done no more than successfully argue in good faith the hazards of
using respondent's products, it would have inflicted the same
damage on respondent and would have risked facing the same
antitrust suit, with a jury ultimately deciding the health and
safety implications of the products at issue.
The Court's suggestion that its decision will not affect the
ability of these organizations to assist state and local
governments is surely wrong. The Court's holding is
"that at least where, as here, an economically interested party
exercises decisionmaking authority in formulating a product
standard for a private association that comprises market
participants, that party enjoys no
Noerr immunity from any
antitrust liability flowing from the effects the standard has of
its own force in the marketplace."
Ante at
486 U. S.
509-510. This description encompasses the structure and
work of all such organizations as we now know them. The Court is
saying, in effect, that where a private organization sets
standards, the participants can be sued under the antitrust laws
for
any effects those standards have in the marketplace
other than those flowing from their adoption into law. But
the standards will have
some effect in the marketplace
even where they are also adopted into law, through publicity and
other means, thus exposing the participants to liability.
Henceforth, therefore, any private organization offers such
standards at its peril, and without any of the breathing room
enjoyed by other participants in the political process.
The alternative apparently envisioned by the Court is that an
organization can gain the protection of the
Noerr doctrine
as long as nobody with any economic interest in the product is
permitted to "exercis[e] decisionmaking authority" (
i.e.,
vote) on its recommendations as to particular product standards.
Insisting that organizations like the NFPA conduct themselves like
courts of law will have perverse effects. Legislatures are willing
to rely on such organizations precisely because their standards are
being set by those who
Page 486 U. S. 516
possess an expert understanding of the products and their uses,
which are primarily, if not entirely, those who design,
manufacture, sell, and distribute them. Sanitizing such bodies by
discouraging the active participation of those with economic
interests in the subject matter undermines their utility.
I fear that exposing organizations like the NFPA to antitrust
liability will impair their usefulness by inhibiting frank and open
discussion of the health and safety characteristics of new or old
products that will be affected by their codes. The Court focuses on
the tactics of petitioner that are thought to have subverted the
entire process. But it is not suggested that, if there are abuses,
they are anything more than occasional happenings. The Court does
speculate about the terrible practices that applying
Noerr
in this context could lead us to condone in future cases,
ante at
486 U. S.
503-504, but these are no more than fantasies, since
nothing of the sort occurred in the wake of
Noerr itself.
It seems to me that today's decision is therefore an unfortunate
case of overkill.
Of course, the
Noerr immunity is not unlimited, and, by
its terms, is unavailable where the alleged efforts to influence
legislation are nothing but a sham. As the Ninth Circuit held, this
limitation is enough to guard against flagrant abuse. In any event,
occasional abuse is insufficient ground to render the entire
process less useful and reliable. I would reverse the judgment
below and remand for further proceedings.