Petitioner was convicted of murder and criminal attempt to
commit theft in the Superior Court of Putnam County, Georgia. In
accordance with the jury's recommendation of death, the court
imposed the death penalty for the murder charge, and a 10-year
sentence for the attempted theft charge. While petitioner's direct
appeal was pending, an independent civil action involving a
challenge to voting procedures in Putnam County was brought in
Federal District Court, which found that a memorandum from the
District Attorney's Office to the Putnam County Jury Commissioners
was intentionally designed to result in underrepresentation of
black people and women in the master jury lists from which all
grand and traverse (petit) juries were drawn.
Bailey v.
Vining, Civ. Action No. 76-199 MAC (MD Ga., Aug. 17, 1978).
One of the plaintiffs' attorneys had uncovered the memorandum while
researching the case. The District Court in
Bailey
concluded that the master lists could not be used for any purpose
until the unconstitutional discrimination had been corrected, and
ordered the Jury Commissioners to reconstitute the lists in
conformity with the Constitution. Citing
Bailey,
petitioner's attorneys, on his direct appeal, raised a challenge to
the composition of the Putnam County juries that had indicted,
convicted, and sentenced petitioner. Affirming petitioner's
convictions and sentences, the Georgia Supreme Court rejected his
challenge to the jury on the ground that it came too late. After
exhausting his state remedies, petitioner sought a writ of habeas
corpus in Federal District Court on the basis of the jury
composition issue, before the same judge who had decided the
Bailey case. Granting the writ and noting the
Bailey decision, the court concluded that petitioner had
established sufficient cause for his failure to raise in the trial
court the jury challenge and sufficient prejudice to excuse the
procedural default. The Court of Appeals found the record
insufficiently developed for proper review of the question of
cause, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. On remand, the
District Court held a hearing at which it received testimony from
petitioner's trial lawyers, a lawyer who assisted petitioner's
lawyers in developing the jury challenge on direct appeal, and the
lawyer who discovered the memorandum in the
Bailey case.
The judge then reaffirmed his earlier conclusion that petitioner
had demonstrated adequate cause to excuse his
Page 486 U. S. 215
procedural default. The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that
it "disagreed" with the District Court's conclusion that the racial
disparity on the jury lists was concealed by county officials. The
Court of Appeals found instead that the memorandum was readily
discoverable in the public records, and that the lawyers had made a
considered tactical decision not to mount a jury challenge. In
light of its findings, the court concluded that petitioner had not
established cause for his failure to raise the constitutional
challenge in accordance with Georgia procedural law.
Held: The factual findings upon which the District
Court based its conclusion that petitioner had established cause
for his procedural default were not clearly erroneous, and should
not have been set aside by the Court of Appeals. Pp.
486 U. S.
221-229.
(a) Although a "tactical" or "intentional" decision to forgo a
procedural opportunity in state court normally cannot constitute
cause, the failure of counsel to raise a constitutional issue
reasonably unknown to him is a situation in which the cause
requirement is met. A showing that the factual or legal basis for a
claim was not reasonably available to counsel, or that some
interference by officials made compliance impracticable,
constitutes cause. The facts found by the District Court here
permitted the court's legal conclusion that petitioner had
established cause for his procedural default. If the District
Attorney's memorandum was not reasonably discoverable because it
was concealed by county officials, and if that concealment, rather
than tactical considerations, was the reason for the failure of
petitioner's lawyers to raise the jury challenge in the trial
court, then petitioner established ample cause to excuse his
procedural default. The Court of Appeals offered factual, rather
than legal, grounds for its reversal of the District Court's order,
concluding that neither of the two factual predicates for the
District Court's legal conclusion was supported by the record.
However, a federal appellate court may set aside a trial court's
factfindings only if they are "clearly erroneous," and must give
due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. The record viewed in its entirety
establishes that the Court of Appeals failed properly to apply the
"clearly erroneous" standard. Pp.
486 U. S.
221-223.
(b) The District Court's factual finding that the District
Attorney's memorandum was concealed by county officials, and
therefore was not reasonably available to petitioner's lawyers, was
not clearly erroneous. Based on the record, the District Court
permissibly could have concluded that the memorandum was discovered
by mere fortuity, and that it would not have been "readily
discoverable" had petitioner's trial attorneys investigated the
jury lists that were relevant to his trial. The Court of Appeals
identified no evidence in the record -- aside from the
Page 486 U. S. 216
fact that the memorandum eventually was discovered -- that
contradicted the District Court's conclusions about the concealment
and availability of the memorandum. Pp.
486 U. S.
223-224.
(c) The District Court's conclusion that petitioner's lawyers
did not deliberately bypass the jury challenge also was not clearly
erroneous. Although there is significant evidence in the record to
support the findings of fact favored by the Court of Appeals, there
is also significant evidence to support the District Court's
contrary conclusion. Where there are two permissible views of the
evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous. Here, the District Court reasonably could have concluded
that the trial lawyers' statements that they considered but
ultimately rejected a jury challenge simply were not credible. This
conclusion was also supported by the directly contradictory
testimony of two other witnesses at the habeas corpus hearing and
by events contemporaneous with the jury selection process. The
District Court's lack of precision about the bases for its factual
conclusions furnishes no excuse to ignore the dictates of the
clearly erroneous standard and to engage in impermissible appellate
factfinding. Pp.
486 U. S.
224-229.
816 F.2d 1502, reversed and remanded.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In considering petitioner's motion for a writ of habeas corpus,
the District Court concluded that petitioner successfully
established cause for his failure to raise in the state trial court
a constitutional challenge to the composition of the juries
Page 486 U. S. 217
that indicted him, convicted him, and sentenced him to death.
This case presents the question whether the factual findings upon
which the District Court based its conclusion were clearly
erroneous.
I
Petitioner Tony B. Amadeo was convicted of murder and criminal
attempt to commit theft in November, 1977, in the Superior Court of
Putnam County, Georgia. The jury returned a recommendation of death
for the murder charge, and the court imposed the death sentence. In
addition, the court imposed a 10-year sentence for the attempted
theft charge.
Nine months later, while petitioner was pursuing his direct
appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, an independent civil action in
federal court brought to light a scheme by the District Attorney
and the Jury Commissioners of Putnam County to underrepresent black
people and women on the master jury lists from which all grand and
traverse (petit) juries were drawn.
See Bailey v. Vining,
Civ. Action No. 76-199 MAC (MD Ga., Aug. 17, 1978).
Bailey
involved a challenge to the at-large voting procedures in Putnam
County. In the course of researching the case, one of the
plaintiffs' attorneys reviewed the master jury lists for a period
of 20 to 30 years and uncovered a handwritten memorandum on a sheet
of legal paper. The missive bore no caption or other designation,
no signature, no date, and no file stamp from the court Clerk's
office. Under the heading "Result," the sheet listed figures for
the number of black people and women to be placed on the master
jury lists that would result in their underrepresentation on grand
and traverse juries by a range of 5 to 11%. App. 4. The attorney
who discovered the memorandum asked the Clerk of the court where it
came from, and the Clerk responded that it was instructions from
the District Attorney's Office to the Jury Commissioners about the
master jury lists.
Id. at 45. According to the
Page 486 U. S. 218
Clerk, the Jury Commissioners followed the memorandum's
instructions. [
Footnote 1]
Id. at 9.
The District Court in
Bailey found that the memorandum
was intentionally designed to underrepresent black people and women
on grand and traverse juries without giving rise to a
prima
facie case of racial discrimination under this Court's opinion
in
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202,
380 U. S.
208-209 (1965) (underrepresentation of less than 10% is
insufficient to prove intentional discrimination), and the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in
Preston v. Mandeville, 428 F.2d 1392,
1393-1394 (1970) (13.3% underrepresentation constitutes
prima
facie case).
See App. 10, 78. Concluding that the
master jury lists could not be used for any purpose until the
discrimination had been corrected, the District Court ordered the
Jury Commissioners to reconstitute the lists in conformity with the
Constitution.
Bailey v. Vining, supra, at 7.
Citing the District Court's order in
Bailey,
petitioner's attorneys raised a challenge to the composition of the
Putnam County juries that had indicted, convicted, and sentenced
petitioner in their opening brief on direct appeal to the Georgia
Supreme Court. In addition, petitioner's attorneys filed a
supplemental brief devoted solely to the jury composition issue, in
which they argued that the challenge had not been waived in
Superior Court because they had not had any opportunity to discover
the purposeful discrimination.
See App. 14-18. The Georgia
Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed petitioner's convictions and
sentences, rejecting his challenge to the jury on the ground that
it "comes too late." [
Footnote
2]
Page 486 U. S. 219
Amadeo v. State, 243 Ga. 627, 629, 255 S.E.2d 718, 720,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979). Petitioner twice sought
a writ of habeas corpus in the state courts without success, and
this Court denied certiorari both times.
After exhausting his state remedies, petitioner sought a writ of
habeas corpus in Federal District Court. Petitioner's habeas
petition was heard by the same District Judge who had decided the
Bailey case. The court noted that
Bailey
established that the Putnam County Jury Commissioners had composed
the master jury lists so as deliberately to underrepresent black
citizens without giving rise to a
prima facie case of
intentional discrimination. App. 78. Accordingly, the court
concluded that "[c]learly, petitioner was indicted, tried and
sentenced by unconstitutionally composed juries."
Ibid.
The court went on to explain that, in light of the Georgia Supreme
Court's finding of waiver under state law, petitioner could assert
his constitutional claim in the federal habeas proceeding only if
he established cause and prejudice within the meaning of this
Court's decision in
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.
S. 536,
425 U. S. 542
(1976). Observing that petitioner's lawyers had raised the
discrimination claim as soon as the inculpatory evidence came to
light, the court found that they had engaged in no
"
sandbagging'" or "deliberate bypass" -- the principal concerns
behind the cause and prejudice requirement. Concluding that to
overlook the intentional discrimination in this case would result
in a "miscarriage of justice," the District Court found sufficient
cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default, and granted
the writ on the basis of petitioner's constitutional challenge.
App. 80.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case
for an evidentiary hearing.
Amadeo v. Kemp, 773 F.2d 1141
(1985). Acknowledging that neither party had requested a hearing
before the District Court, the Court of
Page 486 U. S. 220
Appeals nonetheless found the record insufficiently developed
for proper review of the question of cause. [
Footnote 3]
Id. at 1145. The Court of
Appeals requested that the District Court establish on remand
"[t]he specifics of the alleged unconstitutional method of
selecting the jurors and whether this method was so devious and
hidden as to be nondiscoverable."
Ibid.
On remand, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing at
which it received testimony from petitioner's two trial lawyers, a
lawyer who assisted petitioner's lawyers in developing the jury
challenge on direct appeal, and the lawyer who discovered the
memorandum in the
Bailey case. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the judge issued an oral order and memorandum opinion in
which he reaffirmed his earlier conclusion that petitioner had
demonstrated adequate cause to excuse his procedural default. App.
90-93. The court observed that the District Attorney had made no
attempt to deal honestly with petitioner's lawyers and reveal that
he had guided the Jury Commissioners' manipulation of the jury
lists.
Id. at 92. The court concluded that, in light of
all the circumstances of the case, "it was reasonable for
[petitioner's lawyers] at the time that they were appointed, to not
challenge the list,"
ibid., adding, "I don't think it was
a deliberate by-pass in any sense."
Id. at 93. The court
specifically found that, if petitioner's lawyers had known of the
District Attorney's memorandum, they would have challenged the
composition of the jury.
Id. at 92.
A divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
Amadeo v.
Kemp, 816 F.2d 1502 (1987). The court noted that the District
Court had found that the racial disparity on the jury lists was
concealed by county officials,
id. at 1507, but the court
stated simply that it "disagree[d] with that conclusion."
Ibid. The court found instead that
"[t]he memorandum detailing
Page 486 U. S. 221
the county's efforts to alter the racial composition of the
master jury lists . . . was readily discoverable in the county's
public records"
and that petitioner's lawyers "would have found the memorandum"
had they examined the records.
Ibid. The court further
found that petitioner's lawyers had "made a considered tactical
decision not to mount a jury challenge because they wanted to
preserve an advantageous jury venire,"
ibid., although the
court acknowledged that there had been conflicting testimony at the
evidentiary hearing on this point.
Id. at 1507, n. 9. In
light of these findings, the court concluded that petitioner had
not established cause for his failure to raise his constitutional
challenge in accordance with Georgia procedural law.
The dissenting judge argued as a threshold matter that the
majority ignored its obligation to defer to the trial court's
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
Id. at
1508, 1510, 1511. More broadly, the dissent maintained that,
"[w]here the state's efforts to conceal its misconduct cause an
issue to be ignored at trial, the state should not be allowed to
rely on its procedural default rules to preclude federal habeas
review."
Id. at 1513.
We granted certiorari, 484 U.S. 912 (1987), and we now
reverse.
II
In
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S.
72 (1977), this Court adopted the "cause and prejudice"
requirement of
Francis v. Henderson, supra, for all
petitioners seeking federal habeas relief on constitutional claims
defaulted in state court. The
Sykes Court did not
elaborate upon this requirement, but rather left open "for
resolution in future decisions the precise definition of the
cause'-and-`prejudice' standard." 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 87.
Although more recent decisions likewise have not attempted to
establish conclusively the contours of the standard, they offer
some helpful guidance on the question of cause. In Reed v.
Ross, 468 U. S. 1 (1984),
the Court explained that, although a "tactical" or "intentional"
decision
Page 486 U. S. 222
to forgo a procedural opportunity normally cannot constitute
cause,
id. at
468 U. S.
13-14,
"the failure of counsel to raise a constitutional issue
reasonably unknown to him is one situation in which the [cause]
requirement is met."
Id. at
468 U. S. 14. The
Court later elaborated upon
Ross and stated that
"the existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily
turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor
external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with
the State's procedural rule."
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478,
477 U. S. 488
(1986). We explained that
"a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not
reasonably available to counsel, or that 'some interference by
officials' made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause
under this standard."
Ibid. (citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals did not contest, nor could it, that the
facts found by the District Court in this case permitted the
District Court's legal conclusion that petitioner had established
cause for his procedural default. If the District Attorney's
memorandum was not reasonably discoverable because it was concealed
by Putnam County officials, and if that concealment, rather than
tactical considerations, was the reason for the failure of
petitioner's lawyers to raise the jury challenge in the trial
court, then petitioner established ample cause to excuse his
procedural default under this Court's precedents. The situation
described by the District Court fits squarely, indeed almost
verbatim, within our holdings in
Ross and
Carrier. First, the District Court essentially found that
the basis for petitioner's claim was "reasonably unknown" to
petitioner's lawyers,
Reed v. Ross, supra, at
468 U. S. 14,
because of the "objective factor" of "
some interference by
officials.'" Murray v. Carrier, supra, at 477 U. S. 488
(citation omitted). Second, the District Court's finding of no
deliberate bypass amounted to a conclusion that petitioner's
lawyers did not make a "tactical" or "intentional" decision to
forgo the jury challenge. Reed v. Ross, supra, at
468 U. S.
13-14.
Page 486 U. S. 223
Hence, the Court of Appeals offered factual, rather than legal,
grounds for its reversal of the District Court's order, concluding
that neither of the two factual predicates for the District Court's
legal conclusion was adequately supported by the record. The Court
of Appeals never identified the standard of review that it applied
to the District Court's factual findings. It is well settled,
however, that a federal appellate court may set aside a trial
court's findings of fact only if they are "clearly erroneous," and
that it must give "due regard . . . to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." Fed.Rule
Civ.Proc. 52(a);
see Anderson v. Bessemer City,
470 U. S. 564,
470 U. S.
573-576 (1985) (describing clearly erroneous review
generally);
Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.
S. 672, 683-684 (1948) (applying clearly erroneous
review in federal habeas proceeding). We have stressed that the
clearly erroneous standard of review is a deferential one,
explaining that,
"[i]f the district court's account of the evidence is plausible
in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals
may not reverse it even though convinced that, had it been sitting
as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence
differently."
Anderson v. Bessemer City, supra, at
473 U. S.
573-574. After considering the "record viewed in its
entirety" in the instant case, we conclude that the Court of
Appeals failed properly to apply this standard.
A
The first factual finding rejected by the Court of Appeals is
the District Court's conclusion that the District Attorney's
memorandum was concealed by county officials, and therefore was not
reasonably available to petitioner's lawyers. The Court of Appeals
acknowledged that the District Court had found these facts.
See 816 F.2d at 1507. But without examining the record or
discussing its obligations under Rule 52(a), the court simply
expressed disagreement and substituted its own factual findings for
those of the District Court.
See ibid. (finding that the
memorandum was "not concealed,"
Page 486 U. S. 224
but rather "was readily discoverable in the county's public
records").
Even assuming, somewhat generously, that the Court of Appeals
recognized and applied the appropriate standard of review, we
cannot agree that the District Court's factual findings were
clearly erroneous. The District Court's finding of concealment is
supported by the nature of the memorandum itself, which was part of
the documentary record before the court.
See App. 44. The
District Attorney's memorandum was handwritten, unsigned,
unstamped, and undesignated -- physical characteristics that
strongly belie the notion that the document was intended for public
consumption. Moreover, the attorney who originally discovered the
memorandum testified that he did so as part of a sweeping
investigation of 20 to 30 years' worth of jury lists.
Id.
at 42. He further testified that the memorandum was "not on the
first page of the materials that I was perusing, but somewhere
within the stack of materials that [the court Clerk] gave me."
Id. at 44. This testimony was not disputed, and the
District Court permissibly could have concluded that the memorandum
was discovered by mere fortuity, and that it would not have been
"readily discoverable" had petitioner's attorneys investigated the
jury lists that were relevant to petitioner's trial. Indeed, the
Court of Appeals identified no evidence in the record -- aside from
the fact that the memorandum eventually was discovered -- that
contradicted the District Court's conclusions about the concealment
and availability of the memorandum. The Court of Appeals therefore
should not have set aside as clearly erroneous the District Court's
findings on these matters.
B
The second factual finding rejected by the Court of Appeals is
the District Court's conclusion that petitioner's lawyers did not
deliberately bypass the jury challenge. Here the Court of Appeals
drew more heavily upon the record
Page 486 U. S. 225
below, citing testimony from the evidentiary hearing in the
District Court to the effect that petitioner's lawyers considered a
jury challenge, thought they could win it, but decided not to bring
the challenge because they were pleased with the jury ultimately
impaneled.
See 816 F.2d at 1506. The Court of Appeals
emphasized that petitioner is a white man with a history of
assaulting black people and that petitioner's lawyers therefore
were not eager to have more black people on the jury.
Ibid. The court also cited testimony from the lawyers that
they were satisfied with the jury venire because it contained
several members of a charismatic religious group that had seemed
sympathetic to petitioner.
Ibid. Most damaging to
petitioner's case on habeas was the court's reliance on the
statement of one of his lawyers that "
we made a tactical
decision, a knowing, tactical decision not to challenge the
array.'" Ibid., quoting 2 Record 13, App. 23.
In the face of this potent testimony from petitioner's trial
lawyers, petitioner argues that, even if the lawyers did consider
and deliberately bypass a jury challenge, the challenge that they
bypassed was not the same challenge that is now being pressed,
because the only argument available at the time of trial was a
statistical challenge, rather than a challenge based on direct
evidence of intentional discrimination. The dissenting Circuit
Judge also advanced this argument. 816 F.2d at 1510-1511 (Clark,
J., dissenting). In the alternative, petitioner argues that the
District Court's finding of no deliberate bypass was supported by
other testimony and evidence in the record, and thus should not
have been set aside by the Court of Appeals.
It is not necessary to address the merits of petitioner's first
argument, because we agree that the District Court's conclusion
that petitioner's lawyers did not deliberately bypass the jury
challenge was not clearly erroneous. Although there is significant
evidence in the record to support the findings of fact favored by
the Court of Appeals, there is also significant evidence in the
record to support the District Court's contrary
Page 486 U. S. 226
conclusion, as we describe in more detail below. We frequently
have emphasized that
"[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous."
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at
470 U. S. 574,
citing
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.
S. 338,
338 U. S. 342
(1949), and
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories,
Inc., 456 U. S. 844
(1982). We reaffirm that stricture today.
First, the District Court reasonably could have concluded that
the lawyers' statements that they considered but ultimately
rejected a jury challenge simply were not credible. Petitioner's
trial lawyers, who were no longer representing him when they
testified at the evidentiary hearing, had significant incentive to
insist that they had considered every possible angle: they had lost
a capital murder trial, and another lawyer had uncovered evidence
of serious constitutional error in the proceedings. Moreover, the
lawyers' statements that they thought they could win a jury
challenge if they brought it are open to serious doubt. For one
thing, the lawyers were quite wrong that they could have won a jury
challenge; the underrepresentation of blacks and women on the
master jury lists was engineered precisely to avoid a successful
statistical challenge. Absent the "smoking gun" of the memorandum
or some other direct evidence of discrimination, a statistical
challenge would have certainly failed. In addition, the lawyers,
when pressed, could offer no explanation for why they thought they
could win such a jury challenge. [
Footnote 4] Thus, it was reasonable for the District
Page 486 U. S. 227
Court to reject the lawyers' testimony and conclude that
"ignorance" of the strength of the jury challenge -- rather than
strategy -- was the true reason for the lawyers' failure to raise
the claim at trial. App. 93.
Second, the District Court's refusal to credit the testimony of
petitioner's lawyers was supported by the directly contradictory
testimony of two other witnesses. Christopher Coates, the lawyer
who discovered the memorandum in the
Bailey case,
testified that, when he told E. R. Lambert, one of petitioner's
lawyers, about the memorandum and the result in the
Bailey
case, Lambert said:
"'Well, we did not know that . . . I wish that we had known it,
because we were looking for every issue to raise, because it was a
serious case.'"
App. 47. In addition, C. Nelson Jarnagin, a lawyer who assisted
Lambert on appeal, testified that Lambert told him: "
I
f I'd known about this jury issue prior to trial, I would've raised
it.'"
Id. at 59-60. It was within the District Court's
discretion as factfinder to credit these statements over the
potentially self-interested testimony of petitioner's lawyers.
[
Footnote 5]
See Anderson
v. Bessemer City, supra, at
470 U. S. 575
(stressing the special deference accorded determinations regarding
the credibility of witnesses). Indeed, the Court of Appeals even
noted the conflict in the testimony before the District Court,
see 816 F.2d at 1507, n. 9, and its failure to defer to
the District Court's findings in light of this recognition is
difficult to fathom.
Finally, the District Court's conclusion that petitioner's
lawyers did not deliberately bypass the jury challenge was
supported by events contemporaneous with the jury selection
process. Petitioner's lawyers filed pretrial motions for a
Page 486 U. S. 228
change of venue and for a continuance to the next term of
Superior Court, both of which, if granted, would have resulted in
an entirely different jury venire.
See App. 61-65. Both
motions cited juror prejudice and claimed that a fair trial was not
possible in Putnam County at that time. The District Court
permissibly could have concluded that these motions and sworn
statements undercut the lawyers' statements that they were
completely satisfied with the jury venire they had drawn. Indeed,
the District Court might well have considered this evidence more
persuasive than the after-the-fact assessments of petitioner's
lawyers or the other witnesses.
To be sure, the District Court could have been more precise
about the bases for its factual conclusions. Indeed, had the
District Court identified the record evidence that supported its
findings or made clear that it was relying upon credibility
determinations, the Court of Appeals might have deferred to its
factual findings without dispute. The District Court's lack of
precision, however, is no excuse for the Court of Appeals to ignore
the dictates of Rule 52(a) and engage in impermissible appellate
factfinding.
See Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington,
475 U. S. 709,
475 U. S.
712-715 (1986). Because there is sufficient evidence in
the record considered in its entirety to support the District
Court's factual findings, the Court of Appeals should not have set
them aside. Respondent does not dispute that those factual findings
are sufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of cause.
[
Footnote 6] The Court
Page 486 U. S. 229
of Appeals thus erred in holding petitioner's jury challenge to
be procedurally barred from federal habeas review. Accordingly, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The Jury Commissioners were able to determine the race of
prospective jurors because the master jury lists were drawn from
the list of registered voters in Putnam County, which was
maintained on a racially segregated basis.
See Bailey v.
Vining, Civ. Action No. 76-199 MAC (MD Ga. Aug. 17, 1978), p.
9.
[
Footnote 2]
Georgia law requires that a known challenge to the composition
of the grand jury be raised before indictment,
see Sanders v.
State, 235 Ga. 425, 425-426,
219 S.E.2d
768, 771 (1975), and that a challenge to the composition of the
traverse jury be raised before
voir dire commences,
see Spencer v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1458, 1463-1464 (CA11 1986)
(en banc).
[
Footnote 3]
Noting that the State apparently had conceded that the Putnam
County jury selection procedures were unconstitutional, the Court
of Appeals found the prejudice requirement to be satisfied. 773
F.2d at 1145, n. 6.
[
Footnote 4]
See App. 28:
"THE COURT: But I mean what led you to believe you would win if
you challenged [the jury] . . . ?"
"WITNESS PRIOR: I can't answer that; I think we just had a
general knowledge that it probably wasn't statistically right, and
I don't know -- I don't think we had any investigation to back that
up."
See also id. at 39 (witness Lambert offering no
specific answer to the same question).
[
Footnote 5]
To be sure, the testimony of these two witnesses was hearsay,
and Jarnagin's statement was prompted by a leading question on
redirect examination. Nonetheless, no objection to either statement
was made at the hearing, and the State does not argue that the
District Court's admission of the statements was "plain error"
under Federal Rule of Evidence 103(d) .
[
Footnote 6]
Respondent seems to argue, however, that even if cause is found
to be established, petitioner suffered no cognizable prejudice.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 57-58. This argument is
irreconcilable with respondent's predecessor's failure to dispute
in either the District Court or the Court of Appeals that the
finding in
Bailey of intentional racial discrimination in
the composition of the master jury lists satisfies the requirement
of prejudice.
See 2 Record 67;
Amadeo v. Kemp,
773 F.2d 1141, 1145, n. 6 (CA11 1985). Having conceded this point
in both courts below, respondent will not be heard to dispute it
here.
See Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.
S. 463,
439 U. S. 476,
n. 20 (1979) (alternative ground for affirmance must be properly
raised below).