Appellee Miller, an employee of appellant at an Ohio nuclear
production facility owned by the United States but operated by
appellant, a private contractor, received a workers' compensation
award from appellee Ohio Industrial Commission (Commission) for
injuries sustained in a fall allegedly caused by a bolt protruding
from the scaffold on which he was working. On the basis of a state
safety regulation prohibiting scaffolds from having projecting
parts, Miller then sought a supplemental award under a state
constitutional provision authorizing such an award when an injury
is caused by an employer's failure to comply with any specific
state safety requirement. The Commission denied the claim, but the
State Court of Appeals ordered the Commission to consider Miller's
supplemental application. The State Supreme Court affirmed, ruling
that federal law did not preempt Ohio from applying safety
requirements unrelated to radiation hazards to nuclear
facilities.
Held:
1. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), since
the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the application of the State's
additional award provision to the facility in question as against
the contention that such application violated the Supremacy Clause
of the Federal Constitution.
Cf. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of
Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434.
Application of the "pragmatic approach" utilized in
Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469,
420 U. S. 486,
compels the conclusion that the state court's judgment was "final"
within the meaning of § 1257, even though further proceedings
before the Commission are anticipated, since the judgment finally
determined the federal preemption question, and a reversal of that
judgment would preclude any further proceedings. Moreover, even if
appellant prevails before the Commission on nonfederal grounds, the
State Supreme Court's unreviewed decision might seriously erode
federal nuclear production policy by sanctioning direct state
regulation of nonradiological hazards at the only facility
producing nuclear fuel for the Navy, and has important implications
for the regulation of federally owned nuclear production facilities
in other States. Pp.
486 U. S.
178-180.
2. The Supremacy Clause does not bar Ohio from applying its
additional award provision to a private contractor operating a
federally owned nuclear production facility that performs a federal
function.
Page 486 U. S. 175
Such facilities are shielded from direct state regulation, even
though the federal function is carried out by a private contractor,
unless Congress provides "clear and unambiguous" authorization for
such regulation.
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.
S. 167. Even if the additional award provision is
sufficiently akin to direct state regulation to be potentially
barred by the Supremacy Clause, 40 U.S.C. § 290 -- which empowers
States to apply "workmen's compensation laws" to federal premises
to the same extent as such laws are applied to private facilities
-- unambiguously provides the requisite clear congressional
authorization for the application of the provision. The contention
that the above-quoted, undefined phrase applies only to typical
workers' compensation Acts, and not to the additional award
provision, cannot be squared with § 290's plain language, which
places no express limitation on the type of workers' compensation
scheme that is authorized, or with the statute's history, which
demonstrates that, at the time of its enactment, a substantial
number of States provided additional awards for violation of safety
regulations, a matter of which Congress was presumably aware. The
fact that, in enacting § 290, Congress rejected a proposal that
would have authorized States to apply their safety and insurance
laws directly to federal projects does not preclude, and is in fact
consistent with, the allowance of additional award provisions'
incidental regulatory effects, which are significantly less
intrusive than direct regulation on the operation of federal
projects. Pp.
486 U. S.
180-186.
26 Ohio St. 3d 110, 497 N.E.2d 76, affirmed.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and SCALIA, JJ.,
joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'CONNOR,
J., joined,
post, p.
486 U. S. 186.
KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
Page 486 U. S. 176
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented in this case is whether the Supremacy Clause
bars the State of Ohio from subjecting a private contractor
operating a federally owned nuclear production facility to a state
law workers' compensation provision that provides an increased
award for injuries resulting from an employer's violation of a
state safety regulation.
I
This case arises from an accident involving a worker at the
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, a nuclear production facility
located near Piketon, Ohio. The plant is owned by the United
States, but at all times relevant to this action it was operated by
a private company, appellant Goodyear Atomic Corporation, under
contract with the Department of Energy (DOE). On July 30, 1980,
appellee Esto Miller, a maintenance mechanic employed by Goodyear
at the Portsmouth plant, fell from a scaffold while performing
routine maintenance work and fractured his left ankle. His fall
apparently was caused when his glove caught on a bolt protruding
from the guardrail of the scaffolding. Miller applied to the Ohio
Industrial Commission for an award under the State's workers'
compensation program, for which Goodyear pays premiums to cover its
Portsmouth employees. He received about $9,000 in workers'
compensation.
After returning to work, Miller filed an application for an
additional award on the ground that his injury had resulted from
Goodyear's violation of a state safety requirement.
Page 486 U. S. 177
Miller alleged that his fall was caused by Goodyear's failure to
comply with Ohio Admin.Code § 4121:1-5-03(D)(2) (1987), which
provides that "[e]xposed surfaces [on scaffolds] shall be free from
sharp edges, burrs or other projecting parts." The Ohio
Constitution provides that, when an injury is caused by an
employer's failure to comply with a specific state safety
requirement, the Industrial Commission shall provide an additional
award of 15% to 50% of the benefits already received. Ohio Const.,
Art. II, § 35. The state insurance fund recoups these additional
payments by increasing the premium paid by the employer.
Ibid.
The Ohio Industrial Commission denied Miller's claim for a
supplemental award. The Commission held that
"the [Ohio] Codes of Specific Safety Requirements . . . may not
be applied to the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant under the
doctrine of federal preemption."
Claim No. 80-19975 (Mar. 8, 1983), App. 18. Miller filed a
mandamus action in the Ohio Court of Appeals, seeking an order
directing the Industrial Commission to consider his application.
The court held that
"[u]ntil it is clear that the federal government has preempted
the field of safety regulation for safety hazards unrelated to
radiation, . . . state specific safety regulations that give rise
to an award for violation thereof are equally applicable to an
entity that contracts with the federal government for operation of
a nuclear power facility owned exclusively by the federal
government."
No. 84AP-208 (July 25, 1985), App. 17. The court therefore
ordered the Industrial Commission to consider Miller's claim that
he was due an additional award because his injury was caused by a
violation of a state safety regulation.
A divided Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
State ex rel. Miller v. Ohio Industrial
Comm'n, 26 Ohio St.3d 110, 497 N.E.2d 76 (1986) (per curiam).
Relying on the federal preemption analysis of
Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238
(1984), the court held that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat.
919,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2011
et seq. (1982
ed. and Supp. IV),
Page 486 U. S. 178
did not preempt Ohio from applying workers' compensation safety
requirements unrelated to radiation hazards to nuclear facilities.
26 Ohio St.3d at 111-112, 497 N.E.2d at 77-78. In dissent, Justice
Wright agreed with Goodyear's separate claim, not addressed by the
majority, that, in the absence of clearly expressed authorization
from Congress, the Supremacy Clause barred the application of the
state workers' compensation safety requirements to a federally
owned facility. Justice Wright argued that Congress had not
provided the necessary clear authorization to justify the
application of the Ohio workers' compensation scheme.
Id.
at 112-115, 497 N.E.2d at 78-80. We noted probable jurisdiction of
Goodyear's appeal, 483 U.S. 1004 (1987), and now affirm the
judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court on different reasoning.
II
Although neither party contests our appellate jurisdiction over
this case, we must independently determine as a threshold matter
that we have jurisdiction.
See Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U. S. 294,
370 U. S.
305-306 (1962). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) gives this
Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments by the highest
court of a State where the validity of a state statute is drawn in
question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution
and the decision is in favor of its validity.
"[A] state statute is sustained within the meaning of § 1257(2)
when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts
as against the contention that such application is invalid on
federal grounds."
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.
S. 434,
441 U. S. 441
(1979). In this case, the additional award provision of Ohio's
workers' compensation statute, as applied to the Portsmouth
facility, was drawn in question on the ground that it violated the
Supremacy Clause, and the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the statute's
application.
The more difficult question is whether the judgment is "final"
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, even though further
proceedings are anticipated before the Ohio Industrial
Page 486 U. S. 179
Commission. The judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court requires that
the Industrial Commission consider appellee's claim that his injury
was caused by a failure to comply with a state safety regulation.
In
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.
S. 469 (1975), we recognized four situations in which
this Court views a judgment as final under § 1257 although further
state proceedings are contemplated. In the fourth category are
cases
"where the federal issue has been finally decided in the state
courts with further proceedings pending in which the party seeking
review here might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus
rendering unnecessary review of the federal issue by this Court,
and where reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be
preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of
action, rather than merely controlling the nature and character of,
or determining the admissibility of evidence in, the state
proceedings still to come. In these circumstances, if a refusal
immediately to review the state court decision might seriously
erode federal policy, the Court has entertained and decided the
federal issue, which itself has been finally determined by the
state courts for purposes of the state litigation."
Id. at
420 U. S.
482-483. We believe the present case falls within this
fourth category. The federal question whether the additional
workers' compensation award is barred by federal law has been
finally determined by the Ohio Supreme Court, and a reversal of the
Ohio Supreme Court's holding would preclude any further
proceedings. In addition, even if appellant prevails before the
Industrial Commission on nonfederal grounds, for example, if the
Commission determines that there was no violation of the state
safety regulation, the unreviewed decision of the Ohio Supreme
Court might seriously erode federal policy in the area of nuclear
production. The federal preemption analysis of the Ohio court
sanctions direct state regulation of
Page 486 U. S. 180
nonradiological hazards at the Portsmouth facility, the only
nuclear facility producing nuclear fuel for the Navy's nuclear
fleet. Moreover, the decision has important implications for the
regulation of federally owned nuclear production facilities in
other States. Following our "pragmatic approach" to the question of
finality,
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, supra, at
420 U. S. 486,
we therefore conclude that the Ohio decision on the federal issue
is a final judgment for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
III
It is well settled that the activities of federal installations
are shielded by the Supremacy Clause from direct state regulation
unless Congress provides "clear and unambiguous" authorization for
such regulation.
EPA v. State Water Resources Control
Board, 426 U. S. 200,
426 U. S. 211
(1976);
accord, Hancock v. Train, 426 U.
S. 167,
426 U. S.
178-179 (1976);
Mayo v. United States,
319 U. S. 441,
319 U. S. 445
(1943). As an initial matter, therefore, we consider whether the
federally owned Portsmouth facility is likewise shielded from
direct state regulation even though the facility is operated by a
private party under contract with the United States. [
Footnote 1] We believe this question was
answered in
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. at
426 U. S. 168,
in which we faced the issue whether a State could enforce its
pollution emission limitations against "federally owned or operated
installations" by requiring that such installations obtain a state
permit. One of the facilities at issue in Hancock was the Paducah
Gaseous Diffusion Plant,
Page 486 U. S. 181
which, like the Portsmouth facility, is a federally owned
nuclear production facility operated by a private contractor.
Id. at
426 U. S. 174,
n. 23. Nuclear production facilities such as the Paducah and
Portsmouth plants are authorized by statute to carry out a federal
mission, with federal property, under federal control. [
Footnote 2] The Court struck down the
permit requirement in
Hancock, reasoning that, without
clear congressional authorization, "
the federal function must
be left free' of [state] regulation." Id. at 426 U. S. 179,
quoting Mayo v. United States, supra, at 319 U. S. 447.
Hancock thus establishes that a federally owned facility
performing a federal function is shielded from direct state
regulation, even though the federal function is carried out by a
private contractor, unless Congress clearly authorizes such
regulation. [Footnote
3]
In this case, however, we are not presented with a direct state
regulation of the operation of the Portsmouth facility. Rather, the
case involves the imposition of a supplemental
Page 486 U. S. 182
award of workers' compensation, chargeable against Goodyear, for
an injury caused by Goodyear's failure to comply with a state
safety regulation. Appellant and the Solicitor General argue that
the application of the Ohio additional award provision is
nonetheless tantamount to a regulation of the Portsmouth facility,
and is thus invalid under the Supremacy Clause. We need not decide
this issue, however, for we conclude that, even if the provision is
sufficiently akin to direct regulation of the Portsmouth facility
to be potentially barred by the Supremacy Clause, ch. 822, 49
Stat.1938, 40 U.S.C. § 290, provides the requisite clear
congressional authorization for the application of the provision to
workers at the Portsmouth facility.
Section 290 provides in relevant part:
"Whatsoever constituted authority of each of the several States
is charged with the enforcement of and requiring compliances with
the State workmen's compensation laws of said States and with the
enforcement of and requiring compliance with the orders, decisions,
and awards of said constituted authority of said States shall have
the power and authority to apply such laws to all lands and
premises owned or held by the United States of America by deed or
act of cession, by purchase or otherwise, which is within the
exterior boundaries of any State and to all projects, buildings,
constructions, improvements, and property belonging to the United
States of America, which is within the exterior boundaries of any
State, in the same way and to the same extent as if said premises
were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State within whose
exterior boundaries such place may be. [
Footnote 4]
Page 486 U. S. 183
Both appellant and the Solicitor General concede that the
initial workers' compensation award received by respondent Miller
is authorized by § 290. They contend, however, that § 290 does not
authorize the supplemental award provided in Ohio's workers'
compensation statute when an employer violates a specific state
safety regulation. At bottom, appellant and the Solicitor General
argue that the phrase 'workmen's compensation laws' in § 290, which
is not defined, was not intended to include the additional award
provision in Ohio's workers' compensation statute. Appellant claims
that, in the absence of a precise definition, we should infer that
Congress envisioned the typical workers' compensation Act, under
which workers are automatically entitled to certain benefits when
they suffer a work-related injury, without regard to the employer's
fault. A State's authority to enforce its workers' compensation
laws under § 290, appellant continues, should be limited to such
standard awards."
We do not believe appellant's construction of § 290 can be
squared with the statute's language and history. Section 290
provides that a state authority charged with enforcing "workmen's
compensation laws," which in Ohio is the Industrial Commission,
"shall have the power and authority to apply such laws" to federal
premises "in the same way and to the same extent as if said
premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State." This
language places no express limitation on the type of workers'
compensation scheme that is authorized. [
Footnote 5] On its face, § 290 compels the same
workers'
Page 486 U. S. 184
compensation award for an employee injured at a federally owned
facility as the employee would receive if working for a wholly
private facility. In addition, at the time of the passage of § 290
in 1936, workers' compensation laws provided a wide variety of
compensation schemes that do not fit neatly within appellant's view
of the "typical" scheme. At least 15 States provided remedies in
addition to basic workers' compensation awards when an employee was
injured because of specified kinds of employer misconduct.
[
Footnote 6] Eight of these
States, including Ohio, provided supplemental awards when the
employer violated a specific safety regulation. [
Footnote 7] We generally
Page 486 U. S. 185
presume that Congress is knowledgeable about existing law
pertinent to the legislation it enacts.
See Director, OWCP v.
Perini North River Associates, 459 U.
S. 297,
459 U. S.
319-320 (1983). In the absence of affirmative evidence
in the language or history of the statute, we are unwilling to
assume that Congress was ignorant of the substantial number of
States providing additional workers' compensation awards when a
state safety regulation was violated by the employer. Indeed,
Congress appears to have recognized the diversity of workers'
compensation schemes when it provided that workers' compensation
would be awarded to workers on federal premises "in the same way
and to the same extent" as provided by state law. The meaning of
"workmen's compensation laws" in § 290, of course, is not
infinitely elastic. We need not address the outer boundaries of
that term in this case, however, because we believe it is clear
that Congress intended Ohio's statute and others of its ilk, which
were solidly entrenched at the time of the enactment of § 290, to
apply to federal facilities "to the same extent" that they apply to
private facilities within the State.
The only evidence in the legislative history of § 290 that
appellant and the Solicitor General muster in support of their
position is that Congress rejected a proposal that would have
authorized States to apply state safety and insurance laws directly
to federal projects.
See S.Rep. No. 2294, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess., 2 (1936). But Congress' reluctance to allow direct state
regulation of federal projects says little about whether Congress
was likewise concerned with the incidental regulatory effects
arising from the enforcement of a workers' compensation law, like
Ohio's, that provides an additional award when the injury is caused
by the breach of a safety regulation. The effects of direct
regulation on the operation of federal projects are significantly
more intrusive than the incidental regulatory effects of such an
additional award provision. Appellant may choose to disregard Ohio
safety regulations and simply pay an additional workers'
compensation
Page 486 U. S. 186
award if an employee's injury is caused by a safety violation.
We believe Congress may reasonably determine that incidental
regulatory pressure is acceptable, whereas direct regulatory
authority is not. [
Footnote 8]
Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. at
464 U. S. 256
(Congress was willing to accept regulatory consequences of
application of state tort law to radiation hazards even though
direct state regulation of safety aspects of nuclear energy was
preempted). Because the permission of incidental regulation is
consistent with the preclusion of direct regulation, the
legislative history relied on by appellant and the Solicitor
General does not undermine the plain language of § 290. We conclude
that the additional award provision of Ohio's workers' compensation
statute is unambiguously authorized by § 290, and therefore does
not run afoul of the Supremacy Clause. [
Footnote 9] Accordingly, the judgment of the Ohio Supreme
Court is Affirmed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
[
Footnote 1]
The Ohio Supreme Court in this case failed to consider the
fundamental distinction between state regulation of private
facilities and state regulation of federal facilities. When dealing
with state regulation of private facilities, analysis under the
Supremacy Clause centers on whether Congress has taken affirmative
action to preempt the state regulation in question.
See
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.,
471 U. S. 707,
471 U. S.
712-713 (1985). On the other hand, because the Supremacy
Clause immunizes the activities of the Federal Government from
state interference,
Mayo v. United States, 319 U.
S. 441,
319 U. S. 445
(1943), direct state regulation of federal facilities is allowed
only to the extent that Congress has clearly authorized such
regulation.
[
Footnote 2]
With certain limited exceptions, the DOE, as agent of the United
States, is the exclusive owner of all nuclear production
facilities.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2061(a);
see also
Department of Energy Organization Act, 91 Stat. 577, 42 U.S.C. §
7151(a) (transferring responsibility to DOE from the Energy
Research and Development Administration). The DOE is authorized to
contract with private parties to operate its facilities, but these
private contractors are subject to the direction and supervision of
the DOE.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2061(b); H.R.Rep. No. 2181, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1954) ("In connection with its own production
facilities, . . . the Commission is permitted to have the actual
operation carried on by other persons under contract to it and
under its direction and control"). This federal control over the
production of nuclear material is an important aspect of federal
nuclear energy policy.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2013(c).
[
Footnote 3]
Appellees and
amici argue that
Hancock should
be read as applying only to situations in which the state
regulation may act to prohibit the operation of the federally owned
facility. Although
Hancock involved a state regulation
requiring an operating permit, the central issue presented was the
power of the State to enforce its emissions regulations.
See
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. at
426 U. S. 181.
Under the Supremacy Clause, we discern no important difference
between the authority to order compliance with state regulations
and the authority to require a permit prior to operating a
facility. In both settings, the State is claiming the authority to
dictate the manner in which the federal function is carried
out.
[
Footnote 4]
Although the language and history of § 290 indicate that it is
addressed to federal enclaves, areas over which the United States
has assumed exclusive jurisdiction under U.S.Const., Art. I, § 8,
cl. 17,
see S.Rep. No. 2294, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936),
both appellant and the Solicitor General concede, and we agree,
that it authorizes the application of workers' compensation laws to
federal facilities like the Portsmouth plant that are not federal
enclaves.
[
Footnote 5]
There is no doubt that the supplemental award provision is an
integral part of the Ohio workers' compensation statute. The
provision was enacted in 1923 as an amendment to the existing
workers' compensation scheme. The amendment abolished the right to
bring an action at law when the employer failed to comply with
specific safety requirements, and substituted the additional
percentage award in the event of such a failure.
State ex rel.
Bailey v. Krise, 18 Ohio St.2d 191, 195-197, 249 N.E.2d 55,
58-59 (1969).
[
Footnote 6]
See 1925 Ariz.Sess.Laws, ch. 83, § 65 (option to sue if
injury from employer's "willful misconduct"); 1917 Cal.Stats., ch.
586, § 6(b) (50% increase in compensation, not to exceed $2,500, if
injury caused by serious and willful misconduct of employer); 1916
Ky.Acts, ch. 33, §§ 3, 29 (option to sue for intentional injury and
15% increase for intentional failure to comply with statute); 1911
Mass.Acts, ch. 751, pt. 2, § 3 (100% increase if injury caused by
employer's serious and willful misconduct); 1925 Mo.Laws, § 3 (15%
increase for failure to comply with any statute); 1929 N.M.Laws,
ch. 113, § 7 (50% increase if employer fails to provide safety
devices required by law); 1929 N.C.Sess.Laws, ch. 120, § 13 (10%
increase for willful failure to comply with any statutory
requirement); Ohio Const., Art. 2, § 35 (15% to 50% increase for
violation of specific safety requirement); 1921 Ore.Laws, ch. 311,
§ 6 (option to sue for intentional injury by employer); 1936
S.C.Acts, No. 610, § 13 (10% increase for willful failure to comply
with statute); 1917 Tex.Gen.Laws, ch. 103, § 5 (option to sue for
"willful act or omission" or "gross negligence" of employer); 1921
Utah Laws, ch. 67, § 1 (15% increase for willful failure to comply
with any statute); 1911 Wash.Laws, ch. 74, § 6 (option to sue for
intentional injury); 1913 W.Va.Acts, ch. 10, § 28 (option to sue
for intentional injury); 1915 Wis.Laws, ch. 378, § 1(h) (15%
increase for violation of statute);
see also 2A A. Larson,
Law of Workmen's Compensation § 69.10 (1987).
[
Footnote 7]
See 1916 Ky.Acts, ch. 33, § 29; 1925 Mo.Laws § 3; 1929
N.M.Laws, ch. 113, § 7;1929 N.C.Sess.Laws, ch. 120, § 13; Ohio
Const., Art. II, § 35; 1936 S.C.Acts, No. 610, § 13; 1921 Utah
Laws, ch. 67, § 1; 1915 Wis.Laws, ch. 378, § 1(h). For the present
versions of these laws,
see Ky.Rev.Stat. § 342.165 (1983);
Mo.Rev.Stat. § 287.120(4) (1986); N.M.Stat.Ann. § 52-1-10(B)
(1978); N.C.Gen.Stat. § 97-12 (1985); Ohio Const., Art. II, § 35;
S.C.Code § 42-9-70 (1976); Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-12 (1953);
Wis.Stat. § 102.57 (1985-1986).
[
Footnote 8]
Prior to enacting § 290, Congress had authorized recovery of
damages under state tort law by persons injured or killed on
federal enclaves.
See ch. 15, 45 Stat. 54, 16 U.S.C. §
457. Thus, at the time § 290 was enacted, Congress already had
evinced a willingness to have state law exert incidental regulatory
pressures on federal facilities.
[
Footnote 9]
Appellant also argues that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68
Stat. 919,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2011
et sea.
(1982 ed. and Supp. IV), and the DOE's health and safety
regulations promulgated under the 1954 Act, preempt the award of
additional compensation based on state health and safety
regulations. Nothing in the 1954 Act, however, expresses an intent
to repeal § 290 as applied to nuclear production facilities, nor
can we read the 1954 Act as implicitly repealing § 290, because the
two are not inconsistent. Section 290 is therefore as effective an
authorization to apply state workers' compensation laws after the
passage of the 1954 Act as before.
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, dissenting.
The Court's seminal decision in
McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), establishes the
principle that the
Page 486 U. S. 187
States may not exercise their sovereign powers so as to control
those instrumentalities of the United States which have been judged
necessary and proper to carry into effect federal laws and
policies. Although the narrow issue in that case involved only the
assertion by the State of Maryland of its power to tax a federal
bank, the Court laid down a more general construction of the
Supremacy Clause that has proved to be enduring in its force of
reason. As the Court stated:
"The attempt to use [state sovereign power] on the means
employed by the government of the Union, in pursuance of the
constitution, is itself an abuse, because it is the usurpation of a
power which the people of a single State cannot give."
Id. at
17 U. S. 430.
The contrary principle would be
"capable of arresting all the measures of the government, and of
prostrating it at the foot of the States. The American people have
declared their constitution, and the laws made in pursuance
thereof, to be supreme; but this principle would transfer the
supremacy, in fact, to the States."
Id. at
17 U. S. 432.
"The result," the Court concluded,
"is a conviction that the States have no power, by taxation
or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner
control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by
Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general
government."
Id. at
17 U. S. 436
(emphasis added).
Although, again, the narrow issue in
McCulloch
concerned only the power to tax, which, as the Court noted
"involves the power to destroy,"
id. at
17 U. S. 431,
the passages quoted above demonstrate that the decision was
formulated, explicitly, with sufficient breadth to apply to other
measures a State might impose that would "retard, impede, burden,
or in any manner control" the operations of federal
instrumentalities.
Id. at
17 U. S. 436.
And, clearly, the power to regulate also involves "the power to
destroy" if the regulatory web is spun too tightly around its
object. More commonly, however, the additional and perhaps
conflicting regulations imposed by a
Page 486 U. S. 188
State would simply burden the federal instrumentality, interfere
with its operations, and frustrate the federal objectives it is
designed to achieve. Nonetheless, the law has long been settled
that such regulation cannot be imposed on federal instrumentalities
by the States, under the Supremacy Clause, unless the Federal
Government directly indicates that it finds such impositions to be
consistent with the proper pursuit of its powers under federal law.
Hancock v. Train, 426 U. S. 167,
426 U. S.
178-179 (1976);
Mayo v. United States,
319 U. S. 441,
319 U. S.
447-448 (1943).
In this case, the State of Ohio seeks to require a federal
nuclear facility, which all concede to be the equivalent of any
other federal instrumentality, [
Footnote 2/1] to make a "bonus" money payment to workers
who are injured when the injury results from the facility's failure
to comply with "any specific [state] requirement for the protection
of the lives, health or safety of employees." Ohio Const., Art. II,
§ 35. Although the Court declines to decide whether this provision
of state law is tantamount to a regulation of the facility or to
some similarly impermissible imposition upon it,
ante at
182, I believe that no other view is tenable on the facts before
us.
Initially, the proper focus under the Supremacy Clause is not
the avowed purpose for which the State adopts a given provision,
but the actual effect of the provision on the operation of a
federal instrumentality and on its ability to achieve the
objectives of federal law and policy for which it has been created.
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637,
402 U. S.
651-652 (1971). The Court has held that even the general
framework of state workers' compensation laws may not be applied at
places that lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal
Government.
Murray v. Gerrick & Co., 291 U.
S. 315 (1934). And
Page 486 U. S. 189
yet, the provision of Ohio law at issue in this case is much
more specific in its application, and in its regulatory effect upon
this federal facility, than is the general framework of such laws.
The basic feature of the state statutory regimes for the
compensation of workers is that the common law governing the
relationship between employer and employee, whose doctrines had
become so disadvantageous to employees, is replaced by an automatic
entitlement of the employee to certain benefits when injured in the
course of employment.
See 1 A. Larson, Law of Workmen's
Compensation §§ 1.10-3.40 (1985). Unlike this basic scheme however,
which does not pressure the federal facility to alter its
operations in any specific respect to comply with particular state
regulations, the Ohio law exposes the facility to a special penalty
if it does not comply with "any specific [state] requirement for
the protection of the lives, health or safety of employees." Ohio
Const., Art. II, § 35. The specificity of these requirements is
much more intrusive on the management of the federal facility than
even a state workers' compensation law that would preserve the
employee's right to sue the employer for willful misconduct or for
intentional injury, as do the laws of several States. In terms of
the regulatory impact on the federal instrumentality, it is one
thing for the facility to know that it should manage its operations
so as to minimize the risk of injuries to its employees; it is
quite another to expose it to money penalties for failing to comply
with the whole panoply of specific state regulations that dictate
precise rules to govern very detailed aspects of employee health
and safety.
It is quite obvious that an attempt by the State of Ohio to
impose these same kinds of specific regulations on the federal
facility, directly, by obliging the facility to satisfy them all or
else to suspend operations, would run afoul of the Supremacy
Clause. The rule at issue here has a similar effect. Appellees
claim that the federal facility violated a provision in the code of
safety requirements, which the State of Ohio has
Page 486 U. S. 190
adopted by administrative rule. The provision sets out specific
restrictions on mobile work platforms and rolling platforms, and
says that "[e]xposed surfaces shall be free from sharp edges, burrs
or other projecting parts." Ohio Admin.Code § 4121:1-5-03(D)(2)
(1987). There are thousands of such requirements in the
administrative rules adopted by the Ohio Industrial Commission's
Division of Safety and Hygiene, which in their current version run
to well over 200 double-columned pages of meticulous prescriptions,
illustrated in minute detail with diagrams, graphs, and charts,
see Ohio Admin.Code, ch. 4121:1 (1987), and there are
countless other specific requirements in the State's other laws and
regulations. It will not do to say that the State of Ohio has not
attempted to regulate this facility directly, but simply has
exposed it to possible money payments for failure to comply with
these specific requirements, since such requirements are often
enforced by fines, rather than by enjoining specific conduct, and
in any event the apparent means of enforcing all of these rules is
through the workers' compensation awards permitted under state
law.
Nor does it make sense to say that the State of Ohio is not
fining the facility, but is only penalizing it in the form of
additional compensation to injured workers. It cannot matter that
the extra payment is made only in the event of an actual injury;
one might just as well argue that a regulatory fine would not be a
burden if it were imposed not every day, but only on the less
frequent occasions when inspections are held. Even more to the
point, if the amount of the money penalty were very large, the
direct compulsion that would be brought to bear upon the federal
facility to knuckle under and scrutinize its operations for
compliance with every jot and tittle of the state administrative
rules is apparent. The case is no different because the amount of
the extra "bonus" award in any given instance may be small. In
Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276
(1899), the contested provision involved nothing
Page 486 U. S. 191
more than whether the person in charge of an eating house at a
federal home for disabled veterans was required under state law to
put out a small printed sign that would read "oleomargarine sold
and used here" when he served oleomargarine to the inmates. The
state law was found to be invalid as applied to the federal
facility, under the Supremacy Clause, without regard to the plain
fact that the contested imposition was such a slight one, for the
principle remains the same in such a case. [
Footnote 2/2]
The mechanics of the Ohio provision, as interpreted by the Ohio
courts, reinforce both the obvious regulatory effect of this state
law and the important differences between such a provision and a
basic workers' compensation scheme. First, unlike workers'
compensation, which provides an award to every employee who is
injured on the job regardless of how the injury occurred, the
additional payment here is only available when the facility fails
to comply with a state regulatory "requirement." Even the
regulatory provisions embodied in federal laws and rules have been
held not to activate the extra money penalty afforded by state law.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Ish v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Ohio
St.3d 28, 482 N.E.2d 941 (1985);
State eX rel. Roberts v.
Industrial Comm'n, 10 Ohio St.3d 1, 460 N.E.2d 251 (1984).
Second, the necessity that the state requirement be "specific" in
its dictates has been strictly construed. It
"does not comprehend a general course of conduct or general
duties or obligations flowing from the relation of employer and
employee, but embraces such lawful, specific and definite
requirements or standards of conduct as are prescribed by statute
or by orders of the Industrial Commission."
State ex rel. Trydle v. Industrial Comm'n, 32 Ohio
St.2d 257, 291 N.E.2d 748,
Page 486 U. S. 192
750 (1972). The question of whether a particular safety
requirement is sufficiently "specific" to support an extra money
penalty has often been litigated in the Ohio courts, and such
awards are invalidated unless the claimant is able to demonstrate
that the specific requirement "demands that some particular and
definite act or thing be done."
State ex rel. Holdosh v.
Industrial Comm'n, 149 Ohio St. 179, 181-182, 78 N.E.2d 165,
166 (1948).
See also State ex rel. Rae v. Industrial
Comm'n, 136 Ohio St. 168, 24 N.E.2d 594 (1939);
Trydle,
supra; State ex rel. Jack Conie & Sons Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 56 Ohio St.2d 150, 382 N.E.2d 1366 (1978). In order to
secure the penalty award, the employee must show that the
regulatory requirement is "definite" in the sense that it leaves no
discretion to the employer -- does not make it at all "a matter of
his own choosing" -- how to comply with the specific requirement.
State ex rel. Fast & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 176
Ohio St.199, 201, 198 N.E.2d 666, 667 (1964).
Since this provision of Ohio law exacts a monetary penalty only
for failure to comply with state laws and regulations, and indeed
only for failure to comply with those state regulations which are
so specific that they dictate precisely what steps the employer
must take to avoid this increased financial exposure, the principal
effect of this provision can only be to induce the employer to
adhere to each of the various health and safety regulations that
the State has adopted. And therefore the impact of such a provision
on a federal instrumentality presents a very different problem, for
purposes of analysis under the Supremacy Clause, from that posed by
the mere application of a state workers' compensation scheme.
The Court today skirts these difficulties and rests its
disposition on the view that, no matter how extensive the actual
regulatory effect of this state law may be, Congress has sanctioned
its application to federal instrumentalities by enacting 40 U.S.C.
§ 290. The Court finds in this statute the "unambiguous"
Page 486 U. S. 193
and "clear congressional mandate" approving such state
regulation that we have required in past cases.
Kern-Limerick,
Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U. S. 110,
347 U. S. 122
(1954);
EPA v. State Water Resources Control Board,
426 U. S. 200,
426 U. S. 211
(1976). I disagree.
Section 290 authorizes each State to apply its "workmen's
compensation laws" to all
"property belonging to the United States of America, which is
within the exterior boundaries of any State, in the same way and to
the same extent as if said premises were under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the State."
The crux of the matter is whether Congress intended by this
provision to open up all federal instrumentalities to the kind of
potentially onerous regulation of their operations that is imposed
by the Ohio provision for money penalties. I do not believe that,
in authorizing the States to apply these compensation laws to
federal instrumentalities "in the same way and to the same extent"
as they apply to other employers, Congress had any purpose to
expose federal establishments to coercive financial pressure to
comply with a slew of detailed state regulations about how to carry
on their operations. Nothing in the statute or its background
suggests that Congress had such an intent, and certainly nothing at
all suggests that any such position was "clearly" or
"unambiguously" approved by Congress. I am unimpressed by the fact
that a small fraction of the States permitted such additional
awards at the time § 290 was passed; if the "clear congressional
mandate" approving such state regulations cannot be found in the
federal statute itself, then the obscure practices of a few States
at the time of enactment will not suffice to create one. Congress
need not explicitly disapprove every contrary aspect of the
workers' compensation laws of the several States in order to
refrain from giving them its "unambiguous" blessing.
Section 290 was enacted in response to the Court's decision in
Murray v. Gerrick & Co., 291 U.
S. 315 (1934), which had held that state workers'
compensation laws may not be applied
Page 486 U. S. 194
at all in areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal
Government. The purpose of the bill, as stated, was simply the
humanitarian one of "correcting this situation," in which workers
employed on federal projects were deprived of the benefits of
coverage purely because of an oddity of location. S.Rep. No. 2294,
74th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1936); H.R.Rep. No. 2656, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess., 1 (1936). As the Senate Report explained at greater
length:
"The purpose of the amended bill is to fill a conspicuous gap in
the workmen's compensation field by furnishing protection against
death or disability to laborers and mechanics employed by
contractors or other persons on Federal property."
S.Rep. No. 2294, at 1.
That Congress intended nothing more than to provide much-needed
coverage to these workers is shown by the single revealing item in
the scanty legislative history of the statute. The House version of
the bill not only would have extended coverage to these workers,
but also would have subjected federal property to state safety and
insurance regulations, and would have authorized state officers to
enter upon federal premises in furtherance of these aims. The
Senate struck out these latter provisions at the request of the
Executive Branch of the Federal Government, noting expressly that
they
"would not only produce conflicts of authority between State and
Federal officers, but would also mark a wide departure from the
well established principle that Federal officers should have
complete charge of any regulations pertaining to Federal
property."
S.Rep. No. 2294, at 2. As no such departure from normal practice
was intended by Congress, the Senate version of the bill was
enacted.
This background to the enactment of § 290 shows that Congress
did not intend to expose federal instrumentalities to the kind of
detailed and mandatory regulation that is provided by the Ohio law
at issue in this case. The Court's response on this point is simply
to assert that
"[t]he effects of direct regulation on the operation of federal
projects are significantly
Page 486 U. S. 195
more intrusive than the incidental regulatory effects of such an
additional award provision."
Ante at
486 U. S. 185.
In some instances, the Court may be correct that the effects of
direct regulation could be more intrusive than a provision for
penalty awards, but the question here is not whether these two
things are exactly the same, but simply whether the "regulatory
effects" of the penalty provision, which as set out above are far
from "incidental," are the kinds of effects that Congress did not
intend to sanction when it enacted § 290. These effects are clearly
impermissible under the rationale that the Senate articulated for
removing from the bill the two obnoxious provisions that had been
included in the House version. And even if I were to conclude that
Congress had acted ambiguously on this score, I would at least be
forced to conclude that Congress offered no "clear" or
"unambiguous" mandate for the kind of specific regulatory
compulsion that this Ohio law exerts upon this federal
facility.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The Court recognizes,
ante at
486 U. S.
180-181, and I agree, that under our precedents the
facility here, which is federally owned but is operated by a
private party under contract with the Federal Government, must be
treated as a federal instrumentality for the purpose of applying
the Supremacy Clause.
Hancock v. Train,
426 U.
S. 167,
426 U. S. 174,
n. 23 (1976).
[
Footnote 2/2]
If this point is thought to matter, however, it is worth noting
that Ohio's penalty scheme allows for larger money payments than
does any other State. 2A A. Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation §
69.10 (1987). The penalty award at issue in this case would amount
to somewhere between $1,328 and $4,429. Brief for Appellee Miller
3, n. 4.