Under § 706(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Act), a complainant must file a discrimination charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of
the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice, or
within 300 days if the proceedings are initially instituted with a
state or local agency having "authority to grant or seek relief."
Under § 706(c), no charge may be filed with the EEOC until 60 days
have elapsed from the initial filing of the charge with an
authorized state or local agency, unless that agency's proceedings
"have been earlier terminated." This Court has held that, in light
of § 706(c)'s deferral period, a charge must be filed with, or
referred by the EEOC to, the state or local agency within 240 days
of the alleged discriminatory event in order to ensure that it may
be filed within § 706(e)'s extended 300-day limit, unless the state
or local agency terminates its proceedings before 300 days.
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807. The
Colorado Civil Rights Division (CCRD) and the EEOC have entered
into a worksharing agreement, which provides that each will process
certain categories of charges, and that the CCRD waives § 706(c)'s
60-day deferral period with respect to those charges processed by
the EEOC, but retains jurisdiction to act on such charges after the
EEOC's proceedings conclude. Alleging that, 290 days earlier,
respondent had discharged her because of her sex in violation of
Title VII, Suanne Leerssen filed a charge with the EEOC, which
undertook the initial charge processing pursuant to the worksharing
agreement. The CCRD informed Leerssen that it had waived its right
in this regard, but retained jurisdiction under the agreement.
Respondent refused to comply with the EEOC's administrative
subpoena, and the District Court denied enforcement of the subpoena
on the ground that the EEOC lacked jurisdiction because the charge
was not timely filed within § 706(e)'s 300-day period. The Court of
Appeals agreed, and therefore affirmed, although it rejected
respondent's contention that the 300-day period was inapplicable
because Leerssen had not filed the charge with the CCRD within the
180-day limitations period provided by state law.
Page 486 U. S. 108
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is
remanded.
803 F.2d 581, reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
to Parts I, II-A, and III, concluding that:
1. A state agency's decision to waive § 706(c)'s 60-day period,
pursuant to a worksharing agreement with the EEOC, "terminates" the
agency's proceedings within the meaning of § 706(c), so that the
EEOC may immediately deem the charge filed and begin to process it.
Respondent's contention, and the Court of Appeals' holding, that
the CCRD did not "terminate" its proceedings because it retained
jurisdiction to act on the EEOC's resolution of the charge must be
rejected in favor of the EEOC's position that a state agency
"terminates" its proceedings when it declares that it will not
proceed, if it does so at all, for a specified interval of time,
since the interpretation of ambiguous language in the Act by the
EEOC, the agency having primary enforcement responsibility, is
entitled to deference where it is reasonable. The reasonableness of
the EEOC's interpretation of "terminate" in its statutory context
is more than amply supported by the legislative history of Title
VII's deferral provisions, the purposes of those provisions, and
the language of other sections of the Act. Pp.
486 U. S.
114-116.
2. A complainant who files a charge that is untimely under state
law is nonetheless entitled to § 706(e)'s extended 300-day federal
filing period. That section's "authority to grant or seek relief"
phrase does not preclude this conclusion on the theory that a state
or local agency lacks the requisite authority in the absence of a
timely filing under state law, since the phrase refers merely to
enabling legislation establishing such agencies, not to state
limitations requirements. Rather, the reasoning of
Oscar Mayer
& Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, is
entirely apposite, even though that case involved the filing
provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, since those
provisions are virtually
in haec verba with the Title VII
provisions at issue here. Thus, the failure to file a timely state
law claim does not automatically preclude application of Title
VII's 300-day period, since the Act contains no express requirement
of timely state filing, and such a requirement should not be
imported in light of the Act's remedial purposes and the fact that
laypersons, rather than lawyers, are expected to initiate the
process, and would be confused by an additional state law filing
requirement. Moreover, such a requirement would embroil the EEOC in
complicated state law issues which it has neither the time nor the
expertise to determine. Thus,
Mohasco's 240-day filing
rule applies in such cases. Pp.
486 U. S.
122-125.
MARSHALL, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, and III, in
which BRENNAN,
Page 486 U. S. 109
WHITE, BLACKMUN, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and an opinion with
respect to Parts II-B and II-C, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, and
BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment,
post, p.
486 U. S. 125.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,
and SCALIA, J., joined,
post, p.
486 U. S. 126.
KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
JUSTICE MARSHALL announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A,
and III, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-B and II-C, in
which JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN
joined.
This case raises two questions regarding the time limits for
filing charges of employment discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et
seq. The primary question presented is whether a state
agency's decision to waive its exclusive 60-day period for initial
processing of a discrimination charge, pursuant to a worksharing
agreement with the EEOC, "terminates" the
Page 486 U. S. 110
agency's proceedings within the meaning of § 706(c) of Title
VII, 78 Stat. 260,
as amended in 1972, 86 Stat. 104, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), so that the EEOC immediately may deem the
charge filed. In addition, we must decide whether a complainant who
files a discrimination charge that is untimely under state law is
nonetheless entitled to the extended 300-day federal filing period
of § 706(e) of Title VII, 78 Stat. 260,
as amended in
1972, 86 Stat. 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
I
The time limit provisions of Title VII as interpreted by this
Court, establish the following procedures for filing discrimination
charges with the EEOC. As a general rule, a complainant must file a
discrimination charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the
occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice. § 706(e),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). [
Footnote
1] If a complainant initially institutes proceedings with a
state or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from
the practice charged, the time limit for filing with the EEOC is
extended to 300 days.
Ibid.
In order to give States and localities an opportunity to combat
discrimination free from premature federal intervention,
Page 486 U. S. 111
the Act provides that no charge may be filed with the EEOC until
60 days have elapsed from initial filing of the charge with an
authorized state or local agency, unless that agency's proceedings
"have been earlier terminated." § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c).
[
Footnote 2] The EEOC's
referral of a charge initially filed with the EEOC to the
appropriate state or local agency properly institutes the agency's
proceedings within the meaning of the Act, and the EEOC may hold
the charge in "
suspended animation'" during the agency's 60-day
period of exclusive jurisdiction. Love v. Pullman Co.,
404 U. S. 522,
404 U. S.
525-526 (1972). In light of the 60-day deferral period,
a complainant must file a charge with the appropriate state or
local agency, or have the EEOC refer the charge to that agency,
within 240 days of the alleged discriminatory event in order to
ensure that it may be filed with the EEOC within the 300-day limit.
See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.
S. 807, 447 U. S. 814,
n. 16 (1980). If the complainant does not file within 240 days, the
charge still may be timely filed with the
Page 486 U. S. 112
EEOC if the state or local agency terminates its proceedings
before 300 days.
See ibid.
The central question in this case is whether a state agency's
waiver of the 60-day deferral period, pursuant to a worksharing
agreement with the EEOC, constitutes a "termination" of its
proceedings so as to permit the EEOC to deem a charge filed and to
begin to process it immediately. This question is of substantial
importance because the EEOC has used its statutory authority to
enter into worksharing agreements with approximately three-quarters
of the 109 state and local agencies authorized to enforce state and
local employment discrimination laws.
See § 709(b), 86
Stat. 107-108, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b) (authorizing the EEOC to
"enter into written agreements" with state and local agencies to
promote "effective enforcement" of the Act); Brief for Petitioner 4
(EEOC has entered into worksharing agreements with approximately 81
of 109 authorized state and local agencies).
These worksharing agreements typically provide that the state or
local agency will process certain categories of charges, and that
the EEOC will process others, with the state or local agency
waiving the 60-day deferral period in the latter instance.
See,
e.g., Worksharing Agreement between Colorado Civil Rights
Division and EEOC, App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a-49a. In either
instance, the nonprocessing party to the worksharing agreement
generally reserves the right to review the initial processing
party's resolution of the charge and to investigate the charge
further after the initial processing party has completed its
proceedings.
See, e.g., id. at 47a. Whether a waiver of
the 60-day deferral period pursuant to a worksharing agreement
constitutes a "termination" of a state or local agency's
proceedings will determine not only when the EEOC may initiate its
proceedings, but also whether an entire class of charges may be
timely filed with the EEOC in the first instance.
The facts of the instant case concretely reflect what is at
stake. On March 26, 1984, Suanne Leerssen filed a charge of
Page 486 U. S. 113
discrimination with petitioner EEOC. She alleged that, 290 days
earlier, respondent Commercial Office Products Company had
discharged her because of her sex in violation of Title VII. On
March 30, the EEOC sent a copy of Leerssen's charge and a charge
transmittal form to the Colorado Civil Rights Division (CCRD),
which is authorized by the State to process charges of employment
discrimination. The form stated that the EEOC would initially
process the charge, pursuant to the worksharing agreement between
the EEOC and the CCRD.
The CCRD returned the transmittal form to the EEOC, indicating
on the form that the CCRD waived its right under Title VII to
initially process the charge. On April 4, the CCRD sent a form
letter to Leerssen explaining that it had waived its right to
initial processing, but stating that it still retained jurisdiction
to act on the charge after the conclusion of the EEOC's
proceedings. If the CCRD's waiver "terminated" its proceedings,
then Leerssen's charge was filed with the EEOC just under the
300-day limit. If the waiver was not a "termination," however, then
the charge was not timely filed with the EEOC, because the 60-day
deferral period did not expire until well after the 300-day
limit.
The timeliness issue was raised in this case when the EEOC
issued an administrative subpoena for information relevant to
Leerssen's charge. Respondent refused to comply with the subpoena,
maintaining that the EEOC lacked jurisdiction to investigate the
charge because it was not timely filed. The EEOC commenced an
action in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado seeking judicial enforcement of the subpoena. The District
Court agreed with respondent and dismissed the EEOC's enforcement
action, holding that the EEOC lacked jurisdiction over Leerssen's
charge because it was not timely filed.
See Civil Action
No. 85-K-1385 (June 6, 1985), App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 803 F.2d
581 (1986). As a threshold matter, the Court of Appeals
Page 486 U. S. 114
rejected respondent's contention that the extended 300-day
federal filing period was inapplicable because Leerssen had failed
to file her charge with the CCRD within the State's own 180-day
limitations period.
Id. at 585-586, and n. 3. The Court of
Appeals agreed with the District Court, however, that Leerssen's
charge was not filed within the 300-day period, and that the EEOC
therefore lacked jurisdiction over the charge. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that a state agency "terminates" its proceedings within
the meaning of § 706(c) only when it "completely surrenders its
jurisdiction over a charge."
Id. at 587. Because the CCRD
retained jurisdiction over Leerssen's charge, reserving the right
to act at the conclusion of the EEOC's proceedings, it did not
"finally and unequivocally terminate its authority" over the charge
as the plain language of the statute required.
Id. at 590.
The Court of Appeals expressly disagreed with the decision of the
First Circuit in
Isaac v. Harvard University, 769 F.2d 817
(1985). The First Circuit had upheld the EEOC's view that a waiver
of the right to initially process a charge constitutes a
"termination," reasoning that the language of the Act is ambiguous,
and that the history and purposes of the Act support the EEOC's
construction. Judge McKay dissented from the opinion of the Court
of Appeals in this case, arguing that the EEOC should prevail for
the reasons offered by the First Circuit.
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the First
and-the Tenth Circuits, 482 U.S. 926 (1987), and we now
reverse.
II
A
First and foremost, respondent defends the judgment of the Court
of Appeals on the ground that the language of the statute
unambiguously precludes the conclusion that the CCRD's waiver of
the deferral period "terminated" its proceedings. According to
respondent, "terminated" means only "completed" or "ended." Brief
for Respondent 14. Respondent
Page 486 U. S. 115
urges that this definition is met only when a state agency, in
the words of the Court of Appeals, "completely relinquish[es] its
authority to act on the charge at that point
or in the
future." 803 F.2d at 589, n. 13 (emphasis in original).
Because the CCRD retained authority to reactivate its proceedings
after the EEOC's resolution of the charge, respondent maintains
that the CCRD did not "terminate"
Page 486 U. S. 116
its proceedings within the meaning of the Act.
We cannot agree with respondent and the Court of Appeals that
"terminate" must mean "to end for all time." Rather, we find
persuasive the determination of the First Circuit that the
definition of "termination" also includes "cessation in time." The
First Circuit noted that this definition is included in both
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2359 (1976)
(definition of "terminate") and Black's Law Dictionary 1319 (5th
ed.1979) (definition of "termination").
See Isaac, 769
F.2d at 820, 821, n. 5. Moreover, the First Circuit correctly
observed that common usage of the words "terminate," "complete," or
"end" often includes a time element, as in "ending negotiations
despite the likely inevitability of their resumption" or
"terminating work on the job-site knowing that it will resume the
next day."
Id. at 821. These observations support the
EEOC's contention that a state agency "terminates" its proceedings
when it declares that it will not proceed, if it does so at all,
for a specified interval of time.
To be sure, "terminate" also may bear the meaning proposed by
respondent. Indeed, it may bear that meaning more naturally or more
frequently in common usage. But it is axiomatic that the EEOC's
interpretation of Title VII, for which it has primary enforcement
responsibility, need not be the best one by grammatical or any
other standards. Rather, the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous
language need only be reasonable to be entitled to deference.
See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.
S. 750,
441 U. S. 761
(1979). The reasonableness of the EEOC's interpretation of
"terminate" in its statutory context is more than amply supported
by the legislative history of the deferral provisions of Title VII,
the purposes of those provisions, and the language of other
sections of the Act, as described in detail below. Deference is
therefore appropriate.
B
The legislative history of the deferral provisions of Title VII
demonstrates that the EEOC's interpretation of § 706(c) is far more
consistent with the purposes of the Act than respondent's contrary
construction.
The deferral provisions of § 706 were enacted as part of a
compromise forged during the course of one of the longest
filibusters in the Senate's history. The bill that had passed the
House provided for "deferral" to state and local enforcement
efforts only in the sense that it directed the EEOC to enter into
agreements with state agencies providing for the suspension of
federal enforcement in certain circumstances.
See H.R.
7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 708, 110 Cong.Rec. 2511-2512 (1964).
The House bill further directed the EEOC to rescind any agreement
with a state agency if the EEOC determined that the agency was no
longer effectively exercising its power to combat discrimination.
See ibid. In the Senate, this bill met with strenuous
opposition on the ground that it placed the EEOC in the position of
monitoring state enforcement efforts, granting States exclusive
jurisdiction over local discrimination claims only upon the EEOC's
determination that state efforts were effective.
See, e.g.,
id. at 6449 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). The bill's opponents
voiced their concerns against the backdrop of the federal-state
civil rights conflicts of the early 1960's, which no doubt
intensified their fear of "the steady and deeper intrusion of the
Federal power."
See id. at 8193 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen).
These concerns were resolved by the "Dirksen-Mansfield substitute,"
which proposed the 60-day deferral
Page 486 U. S. 117
period now in § 706(c) of the Act.
See 110 Cong.Rec. at
11926-11935.
The proponents of the Dirksen-Mansfield substitute identified
two goals of the deferral provisions, both of which fully support
the EEOC's conclusion that States may, if they choose, waive the
60-day deferral period but retain jurisdiction over discrimination
charges by entering into worksharing agreements with the EEOC.
First, the proponents of the substitute deferral provisions
explained that the 60-day deferral period was meant to give States
a "reasonable opportunity to act under State law before the
commencement of any Federal proceedings."
Id. at 12708
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey). [
Footnote 3] Nothing in the waiver provisions of the
worksharing agreements impinges on the opportunity of the States to
have an exclusive 60-day period for processing a discrimination
charge. The waiver of that opportunity in specified instances is a
voluntary choice made through individually negotiated agreements,
not an imposition by the Federal Government. Indeed, eight
worksharing States and the District of Columbia filed a brief as
amici in this case, explaining their satisfaction with the
operation of the waiver provisions of the worksharing
agreements:
"By clarifying primary
Page 486 U. S. 118
responsibility for different categories of charges, worksharing
agreements benefit both the EEOC and the states."
Brief for Colorado
et al. as
Amici Curiae 5.
Moreover, most worksharing agreements are flexible, permitting
States to express interest in cases ordinarily waived under the
agreement and to call upon the EEOC to refrain from assuming
jurisdiction in such cases.
See, e.g., Worksharing
Agreement Between CCRD and EEOC, App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a.
In contrast, respondent's argument that States should not be
permitted to waive the deferral period because its creation
reflected a congressional preference for state as opposed to
federal enforcement is entirely at odds with the voluntarism
stressed by the proponents of deferral. Congress clearly foresaw
the possibility that States might decline to take advantage of the
opportunity for enforcement afforded them by the deferral
provisions. It therefore gave the EEOC the authority and
responsibility to act when a State is "unable or unwilling" to
provide relief. 110 Cong.Rec. 12725 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey). This Court, too, has recognized that Congress envisioned
federal intervention when "States decline, for whatever reason, to
take advantage of [their] opportunities" to settle grievances in "a
voluntary and localized manner."
Oscar Mayer & Co. v.
Evans, 441 U.S. at
441 U. S. 761.
As counsel for the EEOC explained, deferral was meant to work as "a
carrot, but not a stick," affording States an opportunity to act,
but not penalizing their failure to do so other than by authorizing
federal intervention.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11. The waiver
provisions of worksharing agreements are fully consistent with this
goal.
In addition to providing States with an opportunity to forestall
federal intervention, the deferral provisions were meant to promote
"time economy and the expeditious handling of cases." 110 Cong.Rec.
9790 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). [
Footnote 4] Respondent's proposed interpretation of §
706(c),
Page 486 U. S. 119
adopted by the Court of Appeals, is irreconcilable with this
purpose, because it would result in extraordinary inefficiency
without furthering any other goal of the Act. The EEOC would be
required to wait 60 days before processing its share of
discrimination claims under a worksharing agreement, even though
both the EEOC and the relevant state or local agency agree that the
State or locality will take no action during that period. Or, in an
effort to avoid this pointless 60-day delay, state and local
agencies could abandon their worksharing agreements with the EEOC
and attempt to initially process all charges during the 60-day
deferral period, a solution suggested by respondent.
See
Brief for Respondent 29-30. Such a solution would create an
enormous backlog of discrimination charges in States and
localities, preventing them from securing for their citizens the
quick attention to discrimination claims afforded under worksharing
agreements. Or, in another scenario proposed by respondent,
see
id. at 29, n. 29, state or local agencies could rewrite their
worksharing agreements with the EEOC to provide for "termination"
of state or local proceedings in accordance with respondent's
definition of that term -- complete relinquishment of jurisdiction.
This solution would prevent a pointless 60-day delay, but it would
also preclude a State's reactivation of a discrimination charge
upon the conclusion of federal proceedings. [
Footnote 5] Requiring that States completely
Page 486 U. S. 120
relinquish authority over claims in order to avoid needless
delay turns on its head the dual purposes of the deferral
provisions: deference to the States and efficient processing of
claims. As the
amici States observe, such a
requirement
"frustrates the congressional intent to ensure state and local
agencies the opportunity to employ their expertise to resolve
discrimination complaints."
Brief for Colorado
et al. as
Amici Curiae
1.
The most dramatic result of respondent's reading of the deferral
provisions is the preclusion of any federal relief for an entire
class of discrimination claims. All claims filed with the EEOC in
worksharing States more than 240 but less than 300 days after the
alleged discriminatory event, like Leerssen's claim in this case,
will be rendered untimely because the 60-day deferral period will
not expire within the 300-day filing limit. [
Footnote 6] Respondent's interpretation thus
requires the 60-day deferral period -- which was passed on behalf
of state and local agencies -- to render untimely a claim filed
within the federal 300-day limit, despite the joint efforts of the
EEOC and the state or local agency to avoid that result. As
petitioner epigrammatically observes, a claim like Leerssen's that
is filed with the EEOC within the last 60 days of the federal
filing period is "too early until it is too late." Brief for
Petitioner 25. This severe consequence, in conjunction with the
pointless delay described above, demonstrates that respondent's
interpretation of the language of § 706(c) leads to "absurd or
futile results . . .
plainly at variance with the policy of the
legislation as a whole,'" which this Court need not and should not
countenance. United States v.
American
Page 486 U. S. 121
Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.
S. 534,
310 U. S. 543
(1940), quoting
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.
S. 178,
260 U. S. 194
(1922).
C
The EEOC's construction of § 706(c) also finds support in other,
related sections of Title VII. These sections reinforce our reading
of the legislative history that the 1964 Congress did not intend to
preclude the operation of the waiver provisions of the worksharing
agreements now widely in force.
Section 706(d) provides that, when a member of the EEOC, rather
than an individual complainant, files a discrimination charge in a
State or locality with concurrent jurisdiction,
"the Commission shall, before taking any action with respect to
such charge, notify the appropriate State or local officials and,
upon request, afford them a reasonable time, but not less than
sixty days . . .
unless a shorter period is requested, to
act."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (emphasis added). This language clearly
permits state and local agencies to waive the 60-day deferral
period, and thus authorize the EEOC to take immediate action in
cases arising under § 706(d). There is every reason to believe that
Congress intended the same result in § 706(c), notwithstanding the
variance in language. The legislative history of the deferral
provisions reflects the legislators' understanding that the time
limits of §§ 706(c) and (d) were the same.
See, e.g., 110
Cong.Rec. 12690 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Saltonstall);
id.
at 15896 (remarks of Rep. Celler). Moreover, this Court already has
recognized, in
Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. at
404 U. S.
526-527, n. 6, that
"the difference in wording between [the two sections] seems to
be only a reflection of the different persons who initiate the
charge."
We concluded in
Love that "[t]here is no reason
Page 486 U. S. 122
to think" that Congress meant to permit the EEOC to hold a claim
in abeyance during the deferral period under § 706(d), but not
under § 706(c) -- even though the former section expressly
authorizes such action and the latter section does not.
Ibid. Similarly, in the instant case, there is no reason
to think that Congress meant to make the deferral period waivable
by States under § 706(d) when the EEOC files a claim, but mandatory
under § 706(c) when an individual files a claim.
The EEOC's interpretation of § 706(c) also finds support in
provisions of the Act calling for formal cooperation between the
EEOC and state and local agencies. Section 705(g)(1) gives the EEOC
the power "to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize
regional, State, local, and other agencies." 78 Stat. 258, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(1). Section 709(b) specifies that,
"[i]n furtherance of such cooperative efforts, the Commission
may enter into written agreements with such State or local
agencies."
86 Stat. 108, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b). These sections clearly
envision the establishment of some sort of worksharing agreements
between the EEOC and state and local agencies, and they in no way
preclude provisions designed to avoid unnecessary duplication of
effort or waste of time. Because the EEOC's interpretation of the
"termination" requirement of § 706(c) is necessary to give effect
to such provisions in most of the existing worksharing agreements,
we find that interpretation more consistent with the cooperative
focus of the Act than respondent's contrary construction.
III
In the alternative, respondent argues in support of the result
below that the extended 300-day federal filing period is
inapplicable to this case because the complainant failed to file
her discrimination charge with the CCRD within Colorado's 180-day
limitations period. Respondent reasons that the extended 300-day
filing period applies only when "the person aggrieved has initially
instituted proceedings with a state or local agency with authority
to grant or seek
Page 486 U. S. 123
relief" from the practice charged, § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e), and that, in the absence of a timely filing under state
law, a state agency lacks the requisite "authority to grant or seek
relief." The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument below, as has
every other Circuit to consider the question, [
Footnote 7] on the ground that the words
"authority to grant or seek relief" refer merely to enabling
legislation that establishes state or local agencies, not to state
limitations requirements. We join the Circuits in concluding that
state time limits for filing discrimination claims do not determine
the applicable federal time limit.
Although respondent is correct that this Court's opinion in
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.
S. 750 (1979), did not decide the precise issue we
address today,
see Brief for Respondent 36, the reasoning
of
Oscar Mayer provides significant guidance. In
Oscar
Mayer, we found in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA) context that a complainant's failure to file a claim
within a state limitations period did not automatically render his
federal claim untimely. We reasoned that the federal statute
contained no express requirement of timely state filing, 441 U.S.
at
441 U. S. 759,
and we declined to create such a requirement in light of the
remedial purpose of the ADEA and our recognition that it is a
"
statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained
lawyers, initiate the process.'" Id. at 441 U. S. 761,
quoting Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. at 404 U. S. 527.
In the instant case, we decide the separate question whether, under
Title VII, untimely filing under state law automatically precludes
the application of the extended 300-day federal filing period, but
the reasoning of Oscar Mayer is entirely apposite. As we
noted in Oscar Mayer itself, the filing provisions of the
ADEA and Title VII are "virtually in haec verba," the
former
Page 486 U. S. 124
having been patterned after the latter. 441 U.S. at
441 U. S. 755.
Title VII, like the ADEA, contains no express reference to
timeliness under state law. In addition, the policy considerations
that militate against importing such a hurdle into the federal ADEA
scheme are identical in the Title VII context: Title VII also is a
remedial scheme in which laypersons, rather than lawyers, are
expected to initiate the process.
The importation of state limitations periods into § 706(e) not
only would confuse lay complainants, but also would embroil the
EEOC in complicated issues of state law. In order for the EEOC to
determine the timeliness of a charge filed with it between 180 and
300 days, it first would have to determine whether the charge had
been timely filed under state law, because the answer to the latter
question would establish which of the two federal limitations
periods should apply. This state law determination is not a simple
matter. The EEOC first would have to determine whether a state
limitations period was jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional. And if
the limitations period was nonjurisdictional, like Colorado's in
this case, the EEOC would have to decide whether it was waived or
equitably tolled. The EEOC has neither the time nor the expertise
to make such determinations under the varying laws of the many
deferral States, and has accordingly construed the extended 300-day
period to be available regardless of the state filing.
See
52 Fed.Reg. 10224 (1987). In contrast to the difficulties presented
by respondent's argument, our broadly worded statement in
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807
(1980), a case presenting a related issue regarding the application
of the extended 300-day federal filing period, that a complainant
"need only file his charge within 240 days of the alleged
discriminatory employment practice in order to ensure that his
federal rights will be preserved,"
id. at
447 U. S. 814,
n. 16, establishes a rule that is both easily understood by
complainants and easily administered by the EEOC. We reaffirm that
rule today.
Page 486 U. S. 125
Because we find that the extended 300-day federal limitations
period is applicable to this case and that the CCRD's waiver of the
60-day deferral period "terminated" its proceedings within that
300-day limit, we conclude that Leerssen's claim was timely filed
under Title VII. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 706(e) provides:
"A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred
and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place and
circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be
served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten
days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment
practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially
instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority
to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal
proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof,
such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved
within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice
that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under
the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such
charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local
agency."
86 Stat. 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
[
Footnote 2]
Section 706(c) provides:
"In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice
occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which
has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment
practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local
authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to
institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving
notice thereof, no charge may be filed under [subsection (b)] of
this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty
days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local
law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, provided
that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and
twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such
State or local law. If any requirement for the commencement of such
proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other than a
requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the
facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be
deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection
at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the
appropriate State or local authority."
86 Stat. 104, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c).
[
Footnote 3]
This point was made by other Senators, and has been emphasized
by this Court in our previous Title VII cases.
See, e.g.,
110 Cong.Rec. 12688 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Saltonstall) (deferral
provisions preserve "the opportunity and authority of the State and
local governments to work out their own problems if they are
willing to do so");
id. at 14313 (remarks of Sen. Miller)
(deferral provisions "giv[e] the States the opportunity to carry
out their responsibilities first");
Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver, 447 U. S. 807,
447 U. S. 821
(1980) (deferral provisions "give state agencies an opportunity to
redress the evil at which the federal legislation was aimed, and to
avoid federal intervention unless its need was demonstrated");
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.
S. 750,
441 U. S. 755
(1979) (deferral provisions "give state agencies a limited
opportunity to resolve problems of employment discrimination and
thereby to make unnecessary, resort to federal relief by victims of
the discrimination");
Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.
S. 522,
404 U. S. 526
(1972) (deferral provisions "give state agencies a prior
opportunity to consider discrimination complaints").
[
Footnote 4]
Respondent's contrary contention that the compromise provisions
represented Congress' choice of deferral over efficiency,
see Brief for Respondent 24, finds no support in the
comments of Senator Dirksen, the chief architect of the compromise.
His remarks make clear that he believed the compromise would
promote efficiency while respecting state prerogatives.
See,
e.g., 110 Cong.Rec. 8193 (1964) (deferral provisions will
"assure individual complainants that they will have fair and
expeditious consideration of their grievances").
[
Footnote 5]
Reactivation of state proceedings after the conclusion of
federal proceedings serves the useful function of permitting States
to enforce their discrimination laws when these laws are more
protective than Title VII. For example, Title VII does not give the
EEOC jurisdiction to enforce the Act against employers of fewer
than 15 employees or against bona fide private membership clubs. §
701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Each year, the CCRD reactivates four
to five charges in which the EEOC has determined after
investigation that it lacks jurisdiction. Brief for Colorado
et
al. as
Amici Curiae 7.
[
Footnote 6]
All of the worksharing States, with the possible exception of
Oklahoma and Tennessee, retain jurisdiction over a charge when they
waive the 60-day deferral period. Brief for Petitioner 27, n. 24.
Hence, none of these States "terminates" its proceedings by its
waiver under respondent's interpretation of that term.
[
Footnote 7]
See
Gilardi v. Schroeder, 833 F.2d 1226, 1230-1231 (CA7
1987);
Mennor v. Fort Hood National Bank, 829 F.2d 553,
556 (CA5 1987);
Maurya v. Peabody Coal Co., 823 F.2d 933,
935 (CA6 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1067 (1988);
EEOC v. Shamrock Optical Co., 788 F.2d 491, 493-494 (CA8
1986);
Thomas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 764 F.2d
768 771 (CA11 1985);
Howze v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 750 F.2d 1208, 1211 (CA3 1984).
JUSTICE O'CONNOR concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.
I join Parts I and III of the Court's opinion. I also join Part
II-A, in which the Court correctly concludes that, in light of the
statute's language, structure, and legislative history, sufficient
ambiguity exists to warrant deference to the agency's construction
of the word "terminated" in § 706(c). Indeed, deference is
particularly appropriate on this type of technical issue of agency
procedure. But while I agree with much of what the majority says in
Parts II-B and II-C in indicating that the agency's construction is
reasonable, in my view the majority goes too far by suggesting that
the agency's position is the only one permissible. For example, the
majority labels the respondent's position "absurd,"
ante
at 120, which of course implies that we would refuse to countenance
an agency decision to adopt such an approach.
See, e.g., NLRB
v. Food and Commercial Workers, 484 U.
S. 112,
484 U. S. 123
(1987) (agency given deference only "as long as its interpretation
is rational and consistent with the statute");
Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U. S. 837,
467 U. S. 844
(1984) (agency regulations given deference "unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute"). Any
such implication is incorrect. As the dissent concisely points out,
post at
486 U. S.
126,
Page 486 U. S. 126
and n. 1, the agency could quite reasonably conclude that the
statutory language warrants giving the word "terminated" what the
Court recognizes is its more natural reading,
ante at
486 U. S.
115.
In short, I believe the result in this case is correct solely
due to the traditional deference accorded the EEOC in
interpretation of this statute. Because Parts II-B and II-C could
be read to go beyond this view, I join only Parts I, II-A, and III
of the Court's opinion, and in the judgment.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA
join, dissenting.
In my opinion, the Court's decision is not faithful to the plain
language of the statute, [
Footnote
2/1] to the legislative compromise
Page 486 U. S. 127
that made it possible to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
[
Footnote 2/2] or to our prior
interpretation of the very provision the Court construes today.
[
Footnote 2/3] Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
In a deferral State, § 706(c) of Title VII, 86 Stat. 104, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), provides that
"no charge may be filed . . . before the expiration of sixty
days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local
law, unless such proceedings have been earlier
terminated"
(emphasis added). The Court reasons that, as used in § 706(c),
"termination" might mean a temporary "cessation in time," and thus
is sufficiently ambiguous to require deference to the EEOC's
interpretation.
Ante at
486 U. S.
115-116. I doubt that Congress chose the word
"terminated" to convey something other than absolute finality,
which the majority recognizes is the meaning the word bears "more
naturally or more frequently in common usage."
Ante at
486 U. S. 115.
The context in which the word "terminate" is used may inform the
reader that the termination being referred to is an ending at or
for a particular time. This is true of the examples given by the
majority.
See ante at
486 U. S. 115.
In the phrase "terminating work on the job-site knowing that it
will resume the next day," it is the words used after the word
"terminating" that convey the promise of future events, not the
word "terminating" itself. The context in which "terminate" is used
in § 706(c), however, negates the possibility that future activity
by the State was contemplated, because Congress provided that state
proceedings must have been
earlier terminated.
The majority seeks to construe the statute in a manner that
preserves an opportunity for a State to reactivate its proceedings
upon the conclusion of federal proceedings. Although such an
advantage may be prudent, it is not conferred by the statute, and
the failure to afford it does not "tur[n] on its head" the purposes
of the statute.
See ante at
486 U. S. 120.
That the statute operates to prevent concurrent jurisdiction over
claims filed over 240 days after the prohibited practice occurred
does not frustrate congressional intent to protect state
enforcement efforts. What is being denied is not state, but
federal, intervention.
[
Footnote 2/2]
See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.
S. 807,
447 U. S.
819-822 (1980). Although it is perfectly clear that
nothing in the legislative history contains any suggestion that
complainants in deferral States were to be allowed to proceed with
less diligence than those in nondeferral States (who must file
within 180 days), the Court assumes that the entire class of claims
filed after 240 days is entitled to specially favored treatment.
See ante at
486 U. S.
120-121;
Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811,
822-826, 829-830 (CA7 1972).
[
Footnote 2/3]
In
Mohasco, supra, at
447 U. S. 821,
we stated:
"Congress chose to prohibit the filing of any federal charge
until after state proceedings had been completed or until 60 days
had passed, whichever came sooner."