STEFFEN v. OHIO, 485 U.S. 916 (1988)
U.S. Supreme Court
STEFFEN v. OHIO , 485 U.S. 916 (1988)485 U.S. 916
David Joseph STEFFEN v. OHIO.
No. 87-5323
Supreme Court of the United States
February 29, 1988 Rehearing Denied April 25, 1988.
See 485 U.S. 1030.
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins and Justice BLACKMUN joins as to Part II, dissenting.
I
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 2950, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case. But even if I did not hold this view, I would grant this petition in order to address the important unresolved issue whether an instruction that reduces a jury's sense of responsibility over a death sentence is nonetheless per se constitutional if it is accurate and nonmisleading, even when the instruction serves no legitimate state penological interest.
II
In this case, petitioner was sentenced to death in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The trial court had instructed the jury:
Court follows certain additional procedures required by laws of this State. Therefore, even if you recommend the death penalty, the law requires the Court to decide whether or not the defendant, David Joseph Steffen, will actually be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment." Pet. for Cert. 6.
The Ohio Supreme Court characterized this as an "instruction to the jury that their recommendation of death would not be binding on the court, and that the final responsibility for the imposition of the death penalty rests with the court." 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 113, 509 N.E.2d 383, 387 (1987 ). The Ohio Supreme Court then rejected petitioner's argument that "such an instruction impermissibly reduces the jury's sense of responsibility and increases the likelihood of a recommendation of death," ibid., relying upon State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 489 N.E.2d 795 (1986), a prior Ohio Supreme Court case that had rejected the same challenge to a substantially similar instruction. Although Buell went out of its way to " emphatically emphasize [that] the better procedure would be to have no comment by the prosecutor or by the trial judge on the question of who bears the ultimate responsibility," the court concluded that the instruction was neither an inaccurate nor a misleading statement of Ohio law and held that the instruction was thus constitutional. Id., at 144, 489 N.E.2d at 813.
I have no cause to second-guess the conclusion that this
instruction accurately reflects the state of Ohio law, as
authoritatively construed by the Ohio Supreme Court itself. I note,
however, that although an Ohio jury's recommendation of death is
not binding on a trial court, a trial court cannot impose the death
sentence when the jury recommends life imprisonment. Ohio Rev.Code
Ann. 2929.03(D)(2) (1987). Ohio's statutory scheme thus
contemplates that juries will bear a crucial responsibility in
deciding whether Ohio will impose a death sentence: making their
recommendation necessary, if not sufficient, to any sentence of
death. The question this case presents is whether an instruction
stressing the preliminary nature of a jury's decision can so
minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for its decision and so
increase the likelihood of a recommendation of death as to be
unconstitutional despite the accuracy of the instruction. This
question is particularly sharpened here, where the state court
evidently concedes that the instruction serves no valid state
interest and in- [485
U.S. 916 , 918]
U.S. Supreme Court
STEFFEN v. OHIO , 485 U.S. 916 (1988) 485 U.S. 916 David Joseph STEFFEN v. OHIO.No. 87-5323 Supreme Court of the United States February 29, 1988 Rehearing Denied April 25, 1988. See 485 U.S. 1030. On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins and Justice BLACKMUN joins as to Part II, dissenting. I Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 2950, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case. But even if I did not hold this view, I would grant this petition in order to address the important unresolved issue whether an instruction that reduces a jury's sense of responsibility over a death sentence is nonetheless per se constitutional if it is accurate and nonmisleading, even when the instruction serves no legitimate state penological interest. II In this case, petitioner was sentenced to death in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The trial court had instructed the jury:
Page 485 U.S. 916 , 917 Court follows certain additional procedures required by laws of this State. Therefore, even if you recommend the death penalty, the law requires the Court to decide whether or not the defendant, David Joseph Steffen, will actually be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment." Pet. for Cert. 6.