After the Secretary of Health and Human Services denied
respondent's application for supplemental security income (SSI)
benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, respondent
appealed to the District Court, which reversed the denial and
awarded her past-due benefits. The court also ordered the Secretary
to pay attorney's fees to respondent's attorney out of the past-due
benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: A district court does not have the authority to
order the Secretary to withhold a portion of past-due SSI benefits
for the payment of attorney's fees received in judicial proceedings
under Title XVI. Pp.
485 U. S.
75-79.
799 F.2d 370, reversed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
other Members joined, except KENNEDY, J., who took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether, under Title XVI of the Social
Security Act, a district court has the authority to order the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to withhold a portion of
past-due supplemental security income benefits for the payment of
attorney's fees.
After the Secretary of Health and Human Services denied Mary
Alice Galbreath's application for supplemental security income
(SSI) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security
Page 485 U. S. 75
Act, she appealed to a Federal District Court. The District
Court reversed the denial, and the Secretary accordingly paid
Galbreath her full $7,954 in past-due benefits. Galbreath's
attorney, Anthony W. Bartels, then moved for attorney's fees equal
to 25% of the past-due benefits. The District Court determined that
the amount requested was reasonable and, relying on 42 U.S.C. §
406(b)(1), ordered the Secretary "to compute, certify, and pay"
Bartels his requested fee of $1,988.50 out of the the past-due
benefits awarded Galbreath. The Secretary appealed, arguing that §
406(b)(1) applies only to cases under Title II of the Social
Security Act, and that the relevant statutes and regulations do not
permit withholding past-due SSI benefits for payment of attorney's
fees in Title XVI cases. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed. 799 F.2d 370 (1986). We granted certiorari to
resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals,
* 481 U.S. 1036
(1987), and now reverse.
Title II is an insurance program. Enacted in 1935, it provides
old-age, survivor, and disability benefits to insured individuals
irrespective of financial need.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 403, 423
(1982 ed. and Supp. III). Title XVI is a welfare program. Enacted
in 1972, it provides SSI benefits to financially needy individuals
who are aged, blind, or disabled regardless of their insured
status.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (1982 ed. and Supp.
III).
Until 1965, Title II contained no provision expressly
authorizing a district court to award fees to a claimant's
attorney. In 1965, however, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) implicitly authorized district
courts to order the payment of attorney's fees out of
Page 485 U. S. 76
past-due benefits.
See Celebrezze v. Sparks, 342 F.2d
286 (1965). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a court reviewing a decision
of the Secretary has the power to enter "a judgment affirming,
modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary." The court
in
Sparks reasoned that, where a statute gives a court
jurisdiction, it must be presumed, absent any indication to the
contrary, that the court was intended to exercise all the powers of
a court, including the power to provide for payment of attorney's
fees out of any recovery. 342 F.2d at 288-289. Later in 1965,
Congress effectively codified
Sparks by adding a new
subsection (b)(1) to 42 U.S.C. § 406 that allows withholding of
past-due benefits to pay attorney's fees incurred in judicial
proceedings under Title II. Social Security Amendments of 1965,
Pub.L. 89-97, § 332, 79 Stat. 403. Subsection (b)(1) provides:
"Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant
under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an
attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment
a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25
percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant
is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Secretary may,
notwithstanding the provisions of section 405(i) of this title,
certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of,
and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits."
In 1968, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) by adding two
sentences giving the Secretary similar withholding authority to pay
attorney's fees incurred in Title II administrative proceedings.
Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub.L. 90-248, § 173, 81 Stat.
877.
Thus, the District Court's order in this case would clearly be
valid if this were a Title II case. When Congress enacted Title XVI
in 1972, however, it provided no similar authority to withhold
past-due benefits for attorney's fees. This omission is
particularly telling because Congress incorporated
Page 485 U. S. 77
many other provisions of Title II into Title XVI. In particular,
while incorporating almost every other provision of § 406 into
Title XVI, Congress left out the provisions in § 406(b)(1) and §
406(a) that authorized judicial withholding and administrative
withholding. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub.L. 92-603, §
301, 86 Stat. 1476-1477, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2). This
omission does not appear to have been inadvertent. Indeed, with
respect to administrative proceedings, the House Report
specifically noted and explained the omission of withholding
authority by twice stating:
"Where an individual who has requested a hearing is represented
before the Secretary by an attorney . . . there would be no
withholding of attorney fees from such individual's benefits. Your
committee believes that to withhold such fees would be contrary to
the purpose of the program."
H.R.Rep. No. 92-231, pp. 156, 187 (1971). The Senate Report also
indicates the omission of administrative withholding authority was
intentional.
See S.Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 392 (1972) ("Where
an individual who has requested a hearing is represented before the
Secretary by an attorney . . . there would be no withholding of
attorney fees from the individual's benefits"). Although the
legislative history offered no explanation specifically linked to
the omission of judicial withholding authority, it is fair to
assume that this omission also reflected Congress' view that
withholding past-due SSI benefits would be inconsistent with the
purpose of the program. Given the extreme financial need of SSI
beneficiaries, this view is not irrational. Nor would it be odd for
Congress to conclude that withholding past-due benefits from
financially needy individuals under Title XVI would cause greater
hardship than withholding past-due benefits from insured
individuals under Title II. We thus conclude that, as originally
enacted, Title XVI evidenced a congressional intent not to allow
the withholding of past-due
Page 485 U. S. 78
SSI benefits to pay attorney's fees incurred in judicial
proceedings.
Respondent and the courts finding judicial withholding authority
under Title XVI do not dispute the conclusion that Congress
intended to disallow judicial withholding when it enacted Title XVI
in 1972. Rather, they contend that courts possess inherent
authority to order withholding, and that a 1976 amendment to 42
U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) -- the judicial review provision of Title XVI
-- demonstrates Congress' intent to allow that authority to be
exercised. As enacted in 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (1970 ed.,
Supp. IV) provided:
"The final determination of the Secretary after a hearing under
paragraph (1) shall be subject to judicial review as provided in
Section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Secretary's
final determinations under Section 405 of this title;
except
that the determination of the Secretary after such hearing as to
any fact shall be final and conclusive and not subject to review by
any court."
Pub.L. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat. 1476 (emphasis added). The 1976
amendment simply deleted the italicized portion of the statute. Act
of Jan. 2, 1976, Pub.L. 94-202, 89 Stat. 1135. The clear and
expressed intent was to make the Secretary's factual findings under
Title XVI subject to judicial review, just as they were under Title
II. Nothing in the legislative history mentions withholding
benefits to pay attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals below and
other courts have nonetheless reasoned that, because Congress
intended to make judicial review under Title XVI the same as
judicial review under Title II, courts adjudicating Title XVI cases
must have the same inherent authority to order withholding under §
405(g) that, under
Sparks, courts adjudicating Title II
cases had even before § 406(b)(1) was added.
We find this analysis unpersuasive. On its face, the deletion of
a provision making factual findings unreviewable
Page 485 U. S. 79
bears no apparent relation to whether withholding of past-due
benefits should be allowed. Indeed, the deletion does not even
purport to address cases involving legal, rather than factual,
disputes, and we can hardly imagine that Congress meant to change
the ban on withholding without addressing both kinds of cases. The
courts that have concluded that the 1976 amendment authorizes
judicial withholding rely on statements in the legislative history
indicating Congress' intent to make judicial review under Title II
and Title XVI "virtually identical," to "provide the same rights to
. . . judicial review" under both Titles, and "to apply the same
rules of judicial review to Title XVI cases as apply to Title II
cases." S.Rep. No. 94-550, pp. 1, 3-4 (1975). None of these
statements suggests that Congress intended to allow withholding of
past-due benefits. Rather, they simply state the obvious point that
removing the provision barring review under Title XVI of the
Secretary's factual determinations makes the scope of issues
reviewable under Title XVI and Title II the same. Even assuming
courts have inherent authority under
Sparks to withhold a
portion of past-due SSI benefits to pay attorney's fees in Title
XVI cases, we see no reason why Congress cannot divest courts of
that authority if it so chooses. In originally enacting Title XVI,
Congress manifested its intent, by selective incorporation and
legislative history, to disallow the withholding of past-due SSI
benefits to pay attorney's fees incurred in Title XVI cases. Until
Congress sees fit to override its original decision by amending
Title XVI in a way that manifests an intent to allow withholding,
that original decision stands.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
*
Compare Howard v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 185 (CA7 1987)
(withholding not permitted);
McCarthy v. Secretary of Health
and Human Services, 793 F.2d 741 (CA6 1986) (same);
Motley
v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 1253 (CA4 1986) (same),
with Clay v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 823 F.2d 679 (CA1
1987) (withholding is permitted);
Reid v. Heckler, 735
F.2d 757 (CA3 1984) (same); and the decision below.