Petitioners in these cases are honorably discharged veterans who
did not exhaust their "GI Bill" educational assistance benefits
within 10 years following their military service, as required by 38
U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1). Under that section, veterans may obtain an
extension of the delimiting period if they were prevented from
using their benefits earlier by "a physical or mental disorder
which was not the result of [their] own willful misconduct."
Petitioners sought to continue receiving benefits after the
expiration of the 10-year period on the ground that they were
disabled by alcoholism during much of that period. The Veterans'
Administration (VA) found that, under its regulation defining
"primary" alcoholism (that which is unrelated to an underlying
psychiatric disorder) as "willful misconduct," petitioners were not
entitled to the requested extensions. Petitioners filed separate
federal court actions to review the VA's decisions. In No. 86-622,
the District Court held that it was not foreclosed from exercising
jurisdiction by 38 U.S.C. § 211(a), which bars judicial review of
"the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact
under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration
providing benefits for veterans." The court then concluded that
alcoholism is a handicap within the meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, and that the VA therefore violated § 504 of that Act,
which requires that federal programs not discriminate against
handicapped persons solely because of their handicap. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on the ground that § 211(a)
barred judicial review of the Rehabilitation Act claim. In No.
86-737, the District Court held that judicial review was not
foreclosed by § 211(a), and then invalidated the VA's alcoholism
regulation as being contrary to the Rehabilitation Act. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that
judicial review was not foreclosed by § 211(a), but reversed on the
merits, holding that, consistently with the Rehabilitation Act, the
VA could reasonably conclude,
Page 485 U. S. 536
pursuant to its regulation, that primary alcoholism is a
"willfully caused handicap."
Held:
1. The question whether the VA's alcoholism regulation violates
the Rehabilitation Act is not foreclosed from judicial review by §
211(a). The presumption in favor of judicial review of
administrative action may be overcome only upon a showing of clear
and convincing evidence of a contrary legislative intent. The
prohibitions of § 211(a) are aimed at review only of those
decisions of law or fact that arise in the administration by the VA
of a statute providing benefits for veterans. The text and
legislative history of § 211(a) provide no clear and convincing
evidence of any congressional intent to preclude a suit claiming
that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a statute applicable to all
federal agencies, has invalidated an otherwise valid regulation
issued by the VA and purporting to have the force of law. The
present cases involve the issue whether the law sought to be
administered is valid in light of a subsequent statute whose
enforcement is not the exclusive domain of the VA. Permitting these
cases to go forward will not undermine § 211(a)'s purposes. Pp.
485 U. S.
541-545.
2. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is not violated by the
VA's characterizing, for purposes of 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1),
petitioners' primary alcoholism as "willful misconduct" precluding
the allowance of petitioners' requested time extensions. Congress
did not use the term "willful misconduct" inadvertently in 1977
when it amended § 1662(a)(1) to create the exception to the
delimiting period. The same term had long been used in other
veterans' benefits statutes, and the VA had long construed the term
as encompassing primary alcoholism. The legislative history
confirms that Congress intended that the VA apply the same test of
"willful misconduct" in granting extensions of time under §
1662(a)(1). In 1978, when § 504 was amended to extend its
discrimination prohibition to programs conducted by federal
agencies, Congress did not affirmatively evince any intent to
repeal § 1662(a)(1)'s "willful misconduct" provision. Moreover,
petitioners have not overcome the cardinal rule that repeals by
implication are not favored. The 1978 legislation did not expressly
contradict the more narrow and specific 1977 legislation, and is
not rendered meaningless, even with respect to those who claim to
have been handicapped as a result of alcoholism, if the "willful
misconduct" provision of § 1662(a)(1) is allowed to retain the
import originally intended by Congress. There is no inconsistency
between § 504 and a conclusive presumption that alcoholism not
motivated by mental illness is necessarily "willful." Pp.
485 U. S.
545-551.
Page 485 U. S. 537
No. 86-622, 791 F.2d 226, reversed and remanded; No. 86-737, 253
U.S. App.D.C. 126, 792 F.2d 194, affirmed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and in
Parts I and II of which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.,
joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined,
post, p.
485 U. S. 552.
SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ., took no part in the consideration or
decision of the cases.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases arise from the Veterans' Administration's refusal to
grant two recovered alcoholics extensions of time in which to use
their veterans' educational benefits. We must decide whether the
Veterans' Administration's decision is subject to judicial review
and, if so, whether that decision violates § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which
requires that federal programs not discriminate against handicapped
individuals solely because of their handicap. [
Footnote 1]
Page 485 U. S. 538
I
Veterans who have been honorably discharged from the United
States Armed Forces are entitled to receive educational assistance
benefits under the Veterans' Readjustment Benefit Act of 1966 ("GI
Bill") to facilitate their readjustment to civilian life.
See 38 U.S.C. § 1661. These benefits generally must be
used within 10 years following discharge or release from active
duty. § 1662(a)(1). Veterans may obtain an extension of the 10-year
delimiting period, however, if they were prevented from using their
benefits earlier by "a physical or mental disability which was not
the result of [their] own willful misconduct."
Ibid.
Petitioners are honorably discharged veterans who did not
exhaust their educational benefits during the decade following
their military service. They sought to continue to receive benefits
after the expiration of the 10-year delimiting period on the ground
that they had been disabled by alcoholism during much of that
period. The Veterans' Administration determined that petitioners'
alcoholism constituted "willful misconduct" under 38 CFR §
3.301(c)(2) (1987), [
Footnote
2] and accordingly denied the requested extensions.
Page 485 U. S. 539
Petitioner Traynor sought review of the Veterans'
Administration's decision in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York. The District Court held that it
was not foreclosed from exercising jurisdiction over the case by 38
U.S.C. § 211(a), which bars judicial review of
"the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or
fact under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration
providing benefits for veterans, [
Footnote 3]"
because the complaint "requires us to examine constitutional and
statutory questions, and not merely issues of VA policy."
Traynor v. Walters, 606 F.
Supp. 391, 396 (1985). The court rejected Traynor's claim that
the Veterans' Administration's refusal to extend his delimiting
period violated the Due Process Clause and the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment. [
Footnote 4] However, the court concluded that alcoholism
is a handicap within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, and
that the Veterans' Administration therefore had engaged in the sort
of discrimination on the basis of handicap that is forbidden by
that Act.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed on the ground that § 211(a) barred judicial review
Page 485 U. S. 540
of the Rehabilitation Act claim.
Traynor v. Walters,
791 F.2d 226 (1986). The court reasoned that, while
"many veterans have in the service of our country suffered
injuries that qualify them as 'handicapped individual[s]' for
purposes of [the Rehabilitation Act],"
Congress evinced no intent in enacting that statute "to grant to
handicapped' veterans the judicial review traditionally denied
all other veterans" under § 211(a). Id. at 229. [Footnote 5]
Meanwhile, petitioner McKelvey sought review of the Veterans'
Administration's decision in the District Court for the District of
Columbia. The District Court exercised jurisdiction over McKelvey's
claims on the ground that § 211 (a) permits judicial review of
decisions rejecting claims that Veterans' Administration
regulations of general applicability violate a federal statute that
is "completely independent of the complex statutory and regulatory
scheme for dispersing veterans' benefits."
McKelvey v.
Walters, 596 F.
Supp. 1317, 1321 (1984). The court then invalidated 38 CFR §
3.301(c) (2) (1987) as contrary to the Rehabilitation Act. The
court ordered the Veterans' Administration to determine without
resort to the regulation whether McKelvey had suffered a disability
attributable to his own misconduct.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit agreed that judicial review was not foreclosed by § 211(a),
which was held to apply only to claims "resolved by an actual
decision of the Administrator.'" 253 U.S.App.D.C. 126, 130, 792
F.2d 194, 198 (1986) (per curiam) (quoting Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 367
(1974)). The court found that no such decision had been rendered by
the Veterans' Administration as to the validity of 38 CFR
Page 485 U. S. 541
§ 3.301(c)(2) (1987) under the Rehabilitation Act. [
Footnote 6] On the merits, however, the
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Veterans'
Administration could, consistently with the Rehabilitation Act,
distinguish between veterans who are at least to some extent
responsible for their disabilities and veterans who are not.
[
Footnote 7] With respect to
alcoholism, this distinction could be effected by means of §
3.301(c)(2), said the court, because the Veterans' Administration
could reasonably conclude that alcoholism is a "willfully caused
handicap" unless attributable to an underlying psychiatric
disorder. 253 U.S.App.D.C. at 132-133, 792 F.2d at 200-201. The
court expressed disagreement with
Tinch v. Walters, 765
F.2d 599 (CA6 1985), which had invalidated the regulation in light
of the Rehabilitation Act.
See 253 U.S.App.D.C. at 133, n.
4, 792 F.2d at 201, n. 4.
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflicts between the
Courts of Appeals as to whether Veterans' Administration decisions
challenged under the Rehabilitation Act are subject to judicial
review and, if so, whether that Act bars the Veterans'
Administration from characterizing petitioners' alcoholism as
"willful misconduct" for purposes of 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1). 480
U.S. 916 (1987).
II
We must first consider whether § 211(a)'s bar against judicial
review of
"the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or
fact under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration
providing benefits for veterans"
extends
Page 485 U. S. 542
to petitioners' claim that the Veterans' Administration
regulation defining primary alcoholism as "willful misconduct"
discriminates against handicapped persons in violation of the
Rehabilitation Act.
We have repeatedly acknowledged "the strong presumption that
Congress intends judicial review of administrative action."
Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians,
476 U. S. 667,
476 U. S. 670
(1986);
see also Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.
S. 560,
421 U. S. 567
(1976);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.
S. 159,
397 U. S.
166-167 (1970). The presumption in favor of judicial
review may be overcome "only upon a showing of
clear and
convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent." Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136,
387 U. S. 141
(1967) (citations omitted). We look to such evidence as
"'specific language or specific legislative history that is a
reliable indicator of congressional intent,' or a specific
congressional intent to preclude judicial review that is 'fairly
discernible in the detail of the legislative scheme.'"
Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, supra,
at
476 U. S. 673
(quoting
Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,
467 U. S. 340,
467 U. S. 349,
467 U. S. 351
(1984)).
In
Johnson v. Robison, supra, we held that the federal
courts could entertain constitutional challenges to veterans'
benefits legislation. We determined that "neither the text nor the
scant legislative history of § 211(a)" provided the requisite
"clear and convincing" evidence of congressional intent to
foreclose judicial review of challenges to the constitutionality of
a law administered by the Veterans' Administration. 415 U.S. at
415 U. S.
373-374. In that case, the Veterans' Administration,
acting under 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(21), 1652(a)(1), and 1661(a), denied
educational benefits to a conscientious objector who had completed
the required alternative civilian service. The claimant brought
suit in the District Court, challenging those statutory sections on
First and Fifth Amendment grounds. The District Court denied a
motion to dismiss based on § 211(a), and gave judgment to the
plaintiff.
Page 485 U. S. 543
Robison v. Johnson, 352 F.
Supp. 848 (Mass.1973). We agreed that § 211(a) did not bar the
suit, but reversed the judgment on the merits. On the § 211(a)
issue, we reasoned that
"[t]he prohibitions [of § 211(a)] would appear to be aimed at
review only of those decisions of law or fact that arise in the
administration by the Veterans' Administration of a statute
providing benefits for veterans."
415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 367.
The questions of law presented in that case, however, arose under
the Constitution, rather than under the veterans' benefits statute,
and concerned whether there was a valid law on the subject for the
Veterans' Administration to execute. We went on to conclude that
the principal purposes of § 211(a) --
"(1) to insure that veterans' benefits claims will not burden
the courts and the Veterans' Administration with expensive and
time-consuming litigation, and (2) to insure that the technical and
complex determinations and applications of Veterans' Administration
policy connected with veterans' benefits decisions will be
adequately and uniformly made,"
id. at
415 U. S. 370
-- would not be frustrated if federal courts were permitted to
exercise jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the very
statute that was sought to be enforced. We noted that such
challenges
"cannot be expected to burden the courts by their volume, nor do
they involve technical consideration of Veterans' Administration
policy."
Id. at
415 U. S.
373.
The text and legislative history of § 211(a) likewise provide no
clear and convincing evidence of any congressional intent to
preclude a suit claiming that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a
statute applicable to all federal agencies, has invalidated an
otherwise valid regulation issued by the Veterans' Administration
and purporting to have the force of law. Section 211(a) insulates
from review decisions of law and fact "under any law administered
by the Veterans' Administration," that is, decisions made in
interpreting or applying a particular provision of that statute to
a particular set of facts.
Id. at
415 U. S. 367.
But the cases now before us involve the issue whether the law
sought to be administered is valid in light of
Page 485 U. S. 544
a subsequent statute whose enforcement is not the exclusive
domain of the Veterans' Administration. [
Footnote 8] There is no claim that the regulation at
issue is inconsistent with the statute under which it was issued;
and there is no challenge to the Veterans' Administration's
construction of any statute dealing with veterans' benefits, except
to the extent that its construction may be affected by the
Rehabilitation Act. Nor is there any reason to believe that the
Veterans' Administration has any special expertise in assessing the
validity of its regulations construing veterans' benefits statutes
under a later passed statute of general application. Permitting
these cases to go forward will not undermine the purposes of §
211(a) any more than did the result in
Johnson. It cannot
be assumed that the availability of the federal courts to decide
whether there is some fundamental inconsistency between the
Veterans' Administration's construction of veterans' benefits
statutes, as reflected in the regulation at issue here, and the
admonitions of the Rehabilitation Act will enmesh the courts in
"the technical and complex determinations and applications of
Veterans' Administration policy connected with veterans' benefits
decisions" or "burden the courts and the Veterans' Administration
with expensive and time-consuming litigation."
Id. at
415 U. S. 370.
[
Footnote 9] Of course, if
Page 485 U. S. 545
experience proves otherwise, the Veterans' Administration is
fully capable of seeking appropriate relief from Congress.
Accordingly, we conclude that the question whether a Veterans'
Administration regulation violates the Rehabilitation Act is not
foreclosed from judicial review by § 211(a). We therefore turn to
the merits of petitioners' Rehabilitation Act claim.
III
Congress historically has imposed time limitations on the use of
"GI Bill" educational benefits. Veterans of World War II were
required to use their benefits within nine years after their
discharge from military service, while Korean Conflict veterans had
eight years in which to use their benefits.
See S.Rep. No.
93-977, p. 13 (1974) (letter to Hon. Vance Hartke from Veterans'
Administrator Johnson). The delimiting period under the current "GI
Bill" was raised from 8 years to 10 years in 1974. Pub.L. 93-337, §
2(1), 88 Stat. 292, 38 U.S.C. §§ 1712(b)(1), (2). In 1977, Congress
created an exception to this 10-year delimiting period for veterans
who delayed their education because of "a physical or mental
disability which was not the result of [their] own willful
misconduct." Pub.L. 95-202, Tit. II, § 203(a)(1), 91 Stat. 1429, 38
U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1).
Congress did not use the term "willful misconduct" inadvertently
in § 1662(a)(1). The same term had long been used in other
veterans' benefits statutes. For example, veterans are denied
compensation for service-connected disabilities that are "the
result of the veteran's own willful misconduct." 38 U.S.C. § 310.
See also § 521 (compensation for disabilities not
connected with military service). The Veterans' Administration had
long construed the term "willful misconduct" for purposes of these
statutes as encompassing primary alcoholism (
i.e.,
alcoholism that is not "secondary to and a manifestation of an
acquired psychiatric disorder").
See n 2,
supra.
Page 485 U. S. 546
"It is always appropriate to assume that our elected
representatives, like other citizens, know the law."
Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677,
441 U. S.
696-697 (1979). Hence, we must assume that Congress was
aware of the Veterans' Administration's interpretation of "willful
misconduct" at the time that it enacted § 1662(a)(1), and that
Congress intended that the term receive the same meaning for
purposes of that statute as it had received for purposes of other
veterans' benefits statutes.
See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U. S. 479,
473 U. S. 489
(1985);
Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co. v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs, 461 U.
S. 624,
461 U. S. 633
(1983);
Bob Jones University v. United States,
461 U. S. 574,
461 U. S.
586-587, and n. 10 (1983). In these cases, however, we
need not rely only on such assumptions. The legislative history
confirms that Congress intended that the Veterans' Administration
apply the same test of "willful misconduct" in granting extensions
of time under § 1662(a)(1) as the agency already was applying in
granting disability compensation under § 310 and § 521.
Specifically, the Report of the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee
on the 1977 legislation states:
"In determining whether the disability sustained was a result of
the veteran's own 'willful misconduct,' the Committee intends that
the same standards be applied as are utilized in determining
eligibility for other VA programs under title 38. In this
connection, see 38 CFR, part III, paragraphs 3.1(n) and 3.301, and
VA Manual M21-1, section 1404."
S.Rep. No. 95-468, pp. 69-70 (1977). The cited regulations
include 38 CFR § 3.301(c)(2) (1987), the regulation that
characterizes primary alcoholism as "willful misconduct." The
Veterans' Administration Manual provision states,
inter
alia, that "[b]asic principles for application in deciding
cases involving alcoholism are stated in Administrator's Decision
No. 988," the decision on which § 3.301(c)(2) is based. VA Manual
M21-1, change 132, subch. I, § 14.04c (Jan. 29, 1976).
See
n 2,
supra. These
sources set forth
Page 485 U. S. 547
the criteria for determining whether a veteran's alcoholism is
the result of "willful misconduct." These criteria therefore are
among the "standards" that, according to the Senate Report,
Congress intended to be utilized in determining eligibility for
extended educational benefits.
It is thus clear that the 1977 legislation precluded an
extension of time to a veteran who had not pursued his education
because of primary alcoholism. If Congress had intended instead
that primary alcoholism not be deemed "willful misconduct" for
purposes of § 1662(a)(1), as it had been deemed for purposes of
other veterans' benefits statutes, Congress most certainly would
have said so.
It was the same Congress that one year later extended § 504's
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of handicap to "any
program or activity conducted by any Executive agency." Pub.L.
95-602, Tit. IV, §§ 119, 122(d)(2), 92 Stat. 2982, 2987, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794. Yet, in enacting the 1978 Rehabilitation Act amendments,
Congress did not affirmatively evince any intent to repeal or amend
the "willful misconduct" provision of § 1662(a)(1). Nor did
Congress anywhere in the language or legislative history of the
1978 amendments expressly disavow its 1977 determination that
primary alcoholism is not the sort of disability that warrants an
exemption from the time constraints of § 1662(a)(1).
Accordingly, petitioners can prevail under their Rehabilitation
Act claim only if the 1978 legislation can be deemed to have
implicitly repealed the "willful misconduct" provision of the 1977
legislation or forbade the Veterans' Administration to classify
primary alcoholism as willful misconduct. They must thereby
overcome the "
cardinal rule . . . that repeals by implication
are not favored.'" Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.
S. 535, 417 U. S.
549-550 (1974) (quoting Posadas v. National City
Bank, 296 U. S. 497,
296 U. S. 503
(1936); Wood v. United
States, 16 Pet. 342, 41 U. S. 363
(1842); Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 393 U.
S. 186, 393 U. S. 193
(1968)).
"It is a basic principle of statutory construction
Page 485 U. S. 548
that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific
subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more
generalized spectrum,"
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.
S. 148,
426 U. S. 153
(1976), unless the later statute "
expressly contradict[s] the
original act'" or unless such a construction "`is absolutely
necessary . . . in order that [the] words [of the later statute]
shall have any meaning at all.'" Ibid. (quoting T.
Sedgwick, The Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and
Constitutional Law 98 (2d ed. 1874)).
"The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among
congressional enactments, and, when two statutes are capable of
coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly
expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each
as effective."
Morton v. Mancari, supra, at
417 U. S.
551.
As we have noted, the 1978 legislation did not expressly
contradict the more "narrow, precise, and specific" 1977
legislation. Moreover, the 1978 legislation is not rendered
meaningless, even with respect to those who claim to have been
handicapped as a result of alcoholism, if the "willful misconduct"
provision of § 1662(a)(1) is allowed to retain the import
originally intended by Congress.
First, the "willful misconduct" provision does not undermine the
central purpose of § 504, which is to assure that handicapped
individuals receive "evenhanded treatment" in relation to
nonhandicapped individuals.
Alexander v. Choate,
469 U. S. 287,
469 U. S. 304
(1985);
Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U. S. 397,
442 U. S. 410
(1979). This litigation does not involve a program or activity that
is alleged to treat handicapped persons less favorably than
nonhandicapped persons.
Cf. School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U. S. 273
(1987);
Southeastern Community College, supra. Rather,
petitioners challenge a statutory provision that treats disabled
veterans more favorably than able-bodied veterans: the former may
obtain extensions of time in which to use their educational
benefits so long as they did not become
Page 485 U. S. 549
disabled as a result of their own "willful misconduct"; the
latter are absolutely precluded from obtaining such extensions
regardless of how compelling their reasons for having delayed their
schooling might be. In other words, § 1662(a)(1) merely provides a
special benefit to disabled veterans who bear no responsibility for
their disabilities that is not provided to other disabled veterans
or to any able-bodied veterans.
There is nothing in the Rehabilitation Act that requires that
any benefit extended to one category of handicapped persons also be
extended to all other categories of handicapped persons. Hence, the
regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare in 1977 with regard to the application of § 504 to
federally funded programs provide that
"exclusion of a specific class of handicapped persons from a
program limited by Federal statute or executive order to a
different class of handicapped persons"
is not prohibited. 42 Fed.Reg. 22676, 22679 (1977), promulgating
45 CFR § 84.4(c) (1986). [
Footnote 10] It is therefore not inconsistent with the
Rehabilitation Act for only those veterans whose disabilities are
not attributable to their own "willful misconduct" to be granted
extensions of the 10-year delimiting period applicable to all other
veterans. Congress is entitled to establish priorities for the
allocation of the limited resources available for veterans'
benefits,
cf. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of
Chicago, 394 U. S. 802,
394 U. S. 809
(1969), and thereby to conclude that veterans who bear some
responsibility for their disabilities have no stronger claim to an
extended eligibility period than do able-bodied veterans. Those
veterans are not, in the words of § 504, denied benefits
Page 485 U. S. 550
"solely by reason of [their] handicap," but because they engaged
with some degree of willfulness in the conduct that caused them to
become disabled.
Furthermore, § 1662(a)(1) does not deny extensions of the
delimiting period to all alcoholics, but only to those whose
drinking was not attributable to an underlying psychiatric
disorder. It is estimated by some authorities that mental illness
is responsible for 20% to 30% of all alcoholism cases. Brief for
American Medical Association as
Amicus Curiae 7. Each
veteran who claims to have been disabled by alcoholism is entitled
under § 1662(a)(1) to an individualized assessment of whether his
condition was the result of a mental illness.
Petitioners, however, perceive an inconsistency between § 504
and the conclusive presumption that alcoholism not motivated by
mental illness is necessarily "willful." They contend that § 504
mandates an individualized determination of "willfulness" with
respect to each veteran who claims to have been disabled by
alcoholism. It would arguably be inconsistent with § 504 for
Congress to distinguish between categories of disabled veterans
according to generalized determinations that lack any substantial
basis. If primary alcoholism is not always "willful," as that term
has been defined by Congress and the Veterans' Administration, some
veterans denied benefits may well be excluded solely on the basis
of their disability. We are unable to conclude that Congress failed
to act in accordance with § 504 in this instance, however, given
what the District of Columbia Circuit accurately characterized
as
"a substantial body of medical literature that even contests the
proposition that alcoholism is a disease, much less that it is a
disease for which the victim bears no responsibility."
253 U.S.App.D.C. at 132-133, 792 F.2d at 200-201. Indeed, even
among many who consider alcoholism a "disease" to which its victims
are genetically predisposed, the consumption of alcohol is not
regarded as wholly involuntary.
See Fingarette, The Perils
of
Powell: In Search of a Factual Foundation for the
"Disease Concept of
Page 485 U. S. 551
Alcoholism," 83 Harv.L.Rev. 793, 802-808 (1970). As we see it, §
504 does not demand inquiry into whether factors other than mental
illness rendered an individual veteran's drinking so entirely
beyond his control as to negate any degree of "willfulness" where
Congress and the Veterans' Administration have reasonably
determined for purposes of the veterans' benefits statutes that no
such factors exist. [
Footnote
11]
In sum, we hold that a construction of § 1662(a)(1) that
reflects the original congressional intent that primary alcoholics
not be excused from the 10-year delimiting period for utilizing "GI
Bill" benefits is not inconsistent with the prohibition on
discrimination against the handicapped contained in § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. [
Footnote
12] Accordingly, since we "are not at liberty to pick and
choose among congressional enactments . . . when two statutes are
capable of co-existence,"
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at
417 U. S. 551,
we must conclude that the earlier, more specific provisions of §
1662(a)(1) were neither expressly nor implicitly repealed by the
later, more general provisions of § 504.
Page 485 U. S. 552
IV
This litigation does not require the Court to decide whether
alcoholism is a disease whose course its victims cannot control. It
is not our role to resolve this medical issue, on which the
authorities remain sharply divided. Our task is to decide whether
Congress intended, in enacting § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, to
reject the position taken on the issue by the Veterans'
Administration and by Congress itself only one year earlier. In our
view, it is by no means clear that § 504 and the characterization
of primary alcoholism as a willfully incurred disability are in
irreconcilable conflict. If petitioners and their proponents
continue to believe that this position is erroneous, their
arguments are better presented to Congress than to the courts.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in No. 86-737 is affirmed. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in No. 86-622 is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
* Together with No. 86-737,
McKelvey v. Turnage,
Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, et al., on certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794, provides, in pertinent part,
that
"[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by
any Executive agency."
[
Footnote 2]
The applicable regulation, 38 CFR § 3.301(c)(2) (1987),
provides:
"
Alcoholism: The simple drinking of alcoholic beverage
is not of itself willful misconduct. The deliberate drinking of a
known poisonous substance or under conditions which would raise a
presumption to that effect will be considered willful misconduct.
If, in the drinking of a beverage to enjoy its intoxicating
effects, intoxication results proximately and immediately in
disability or death, the disability or death will be considered the
result of the person's willful misconduct. Organic diseases and
disabilities which are a secondary result of the chronic use of
alcohol as a beverage, whether out of compulsion or otherwise, will
not be considered of willful misconduct origin."
This regulation was intended by the Veterans' Administration to
incorporate the principles of a 1964 administrative decision. 37
Fed.Reg. 20335, 20336 (1972) (proposed regulation); 37 Fed.Reg.
24662 (1972) (final regulation). The 1964 decision provided that
alcoholism that is "secondary to and a manifestation of an acquired
psychiatric disorder" would not be characterized as willful
misconduct. Administrator's Decision, Veterans' Administration No.
988, Interpretation of the Term "Willful Misconduct" as Related to
the Residuals of Chronic Alcoholism, Aug. 13, 1964, App. 142-143.
The Veterans' Administration refers to this type of alcoholism as
"secondary," and to alcoholism unrelated to an underlying
psychiatric disorder as "primary."
See ibid.; Veterans'
Administration Manual M21-1, change 149, subch. XI, § 50.32 (Dec.
23, 1979) (hereinafter VA Manual). Petitioners were found to have
suffered from primary alcoholism.
[
Footnote 3]
Title 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) provides, in pertinent part:
"[T]he decision of the Administrator on any question of law or
fact under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration
providing benefits for veterans and their dependents or survivors
shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court of
the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any
such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or
otherwise."
[
Footnote 4]
Petitioners have not raised constitutional claims before this
Court.
[
Footnote 5]
The dissent maintained that § 211(a) was inapplicable both
because the Rehabilitation Act neither provides benefits to
veterans nor is administered by the Veterans' Administration, and
because the Administrator had not issued a decision as to whether
the challenged regulation violated that Act. 791 F.2d at 232.
Neither the majority nor the dissent reached the merits of
Traynor's Rehabilitation Act claim.
[
Footnote 6]
The court acknowledged that the Veterans' Administration had
decided the Rehabilitation Act issue while the case was on appeal.
However, the court held that "Section 211(a)'s application is to be
determined firmly and finally as of the date that plaintiff
commences litigation." 253 U.S.App.D.C. at 131, 792 F.2d at 199.
Otherwise, the court reasoned,
"[t]he agency could allow a challenge to its action to proceed
in the district court secure in the knowledge that, if the VA lost
there, it could retroactively shield the action from judicial
review."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 7]
The panel was divided on both the jurisdictional issue and the
merits.
[
Footnote 8]
The President has designated the Department of Justice as the
federal agency responsible for coordinating and enforcing § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. Exec.Order No. 12250, 3 CFR 298 (1981).
[
Footnote 9]
Indeed, petitioners submit that, in the four Circuits that have
held that § 211(a) does not bar judicial review of statutory
challenges to Veterans' Administration regulations, only eight such
challenges have been filed.
See Brief for Petitioners
46-47, n. 32 (citing
American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO v. Nimmo, 711 F.2d 28 (CA4 1983);
Plato
v. Roudebush, 397 F.
Supp. 1295 (Md.1975);
Tinch v. Walters, 573 F.
Supp. 346 (ED Tenn.1983),
aff'd, 765 F.2d 599 (CA6
1985);
Taylor v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 1035 (ND
Ill.1974),
vacated and remanded, 528 F.2d 60 (CA7 1976);
Arnolds v. Veterans' Administration, 507 F.
Supp. 128 (ND Ill.1981);
Burns v.
Nimmo, 545 F.
Supp. 544 (Iowa 1982);
Waterman v. Cleland, No.
4-77-Civ. 70 (Minn., Oct. 24, 1978)).
[
Footnote 10]
We have previously recognized that the regulations promulgated
by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (later the
Department of Health and Human Services) to implement the
Rehabilitation Act "were drafted with the oversight and approval of
Congress,"
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,
480 U. S. 273,
480 U. S. 279
(1987), and therefore constitute "
an important source of
guidance on the meaning of § 504.'" Ibid. (quoting
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S. 287,
469 U. S. 304,
n. 24 (1985)).
[
Footnote 11]
Our decision in
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,
supra, is not to the contrary. In
Arline, we
recognized that the district courts should "in most cases"
undertake an individualized inquiry into whether a handicapped
person has been denied a job for which he is otherwise qualified.
480 U.S. at
480 U. S. 287.
In contrast to the instant case,
Arline did not involve a
handicapping condition as to which Congress had specifically
determined that no individualized inquiry was necessary. We might
well have reached a different conclusion in
Arline had the
employer relied on a congressional determination supported by
substantial medical evidence that all employees suffering from
acute tuberculosis pose a serious health threat to others in the
workplace.
[
Footnote 12]
If the position urged by the dissent were to prevail, the
Veterans' Administration would be hard-put to avoid making an
individualized determination as to whether a veteran's alcoholism
is sufficiently "willful" to disqualify him from disability
compensation under §§ 310 and 521. Such a requirement would saddle
the Government with additional administrative and financial burdens
that Congress could not have contemplated in extending § 504 to
federal programs.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL
join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, for I agree that,
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394,
as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794, the "final and conclusive" language
of 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) does not bar judicial review of petitioners'
claims. Similarly, I acknowledge the legality (a) of the 10-year
delimiting period imposed by 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a) upon veterans'
educational assistance, and (b) of that statute's alleviation of
the delimiting period in cases of disability except where that
disability is the result of a veteran's "own willful
misconduct."
Page 485 U. S. 553
My dispute with the Court centers in its upholding of the
regulation, 38 CFR § 3.301(c)(2) (1987), whereby the Veterans'
Administration (VA) presumes,
irrebuttably, that primary
alcoholism always is the result of the veteran's "own willful
misconduct." This is the very kind of broad social generalization
that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is intended to eliminate. The
petitioners in these cases ask only that their situations be given
individualized evaluation. Because I think this is what the
Rehabilitation Act clearly requires, I dissent from the Court's
conclusion to the contrary. [
Footnote
2/1]
I
Petitioner Eugene Traynor began drinking when he was eight or
nine years old. He drank with increasing frequency throughout his
teenage years, and was suffering alcohol-related seizures by the
time he was on active military duty in Vietnam. During the four
years following his honorable discharge in 1969, Mr. Traynor was
hospitalized repeatedly for alcoholism and related illnesses.
By the end of 1974, however, petitioner Traynor had conquered
his drinking problem. He attended college part-time beginning in
1977, and continued working toward his degree until the 10-year
period for using his veteran's educational benefits expired for him
in 1979. Mr. Traynor applied for the extension of time available
under 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1) to one whose disability had prevented
him from completing a program of education within the 10-year
period. Because he was unable to establish that his alcoholism was
due to an underlying psychiatric disorder, his condition was
labeled "primary alcoholism." Pursuant to the regulation cited
above, Mr. Traynor was presumed to have brought his alcoholism upon
himself through "willful misconduct." The requested extension
therefore was denied.
Page 485 U. S. 554
Petitioner James P. Mckelvey also started drinking as a child.
He was 13 when he began to develop the alcohol dependency that was
common among members of his family. His drinking problem plagued
him while he was in the Army, and he was hospitalized frequently
during the nine years that followed his honorable discharge in
1966. Despite his disability, however, Mckelvey managed, between
hospital stays, to attend two educational institutions under the
veterans' educational-benefits program.
Mr. Mckelvey took his last drink in 1975, only a year and a half
before his 10-year delimiting period expired. Like Traynor,
Mckelvey sought an extension under 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1) on the
ground that his alcoholism had prevented him from using, within the
period, the benefits to which he was entitled. And, like Traynor,
Mckelvey was denied the extension because his disability, primary
alcoholism, was conclusively presumed to have been caused by his
"own willful misconduct." The VA's regulation deprived each of
these veterans of any opportunity to establish that, in his
particular case, disabling alcoholism was not willfully
incurred.
II
The VA's reliance on its irrebuttable presumption that all
primary alcoholism is attributable to willful misconduct cannot be
squared with the mandate against discrimination contained in § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. Just last year, in
School Bd. of
Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U. S. 273
(1987), this Court explained in no uncertain terms that § 504 bars
the generic treatment of any group of individuals with handicaps
based on archaic or simplistic stereotypes about attributes
associated with their disabling conditions. Instead, § 504 requires
an individualized assessment of each person's qualifications, based
on "reasoned and medically sound judgments."
Id. at
480 U. S. 285.
In sanctioning the VA's irrebuttable presumption that any veteran
suffering from primary alcoholism
Page 485 U. S. 555
brought the ailment upon himself through willful misconduct, the
Court ignores the lesson of
Arline and the clear dictate
of the Rehabilitation Act.
In these cases, the Court is called upon not to make its own
medical judgments about the causes of alcoholism, but to interpret
§ 504. That statute sets forth a simple rule:
"No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps . . . shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by
any Executive agency. . . . [
Footnote
2/2]"
It is beyond dispute that petitioners, as alcoholics, were
handicapped individuals covered by the Act.
See 43
Fed.Reg. 2137 (1978) (guidelines issued by Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (later the Department of Health and Human
Services) reflecting the Attorney General's specific conclusion, 43
Op.Atty.Gen. No. 12, p. 2 (1977), that an alcoholic is covered by
the Act);
see also Brief for Respondents 33. Nor is it
disputed that § 504 of the Act prohibits federal agencies, such as
the VA, from denying benefits to petitioners solely because they
are alcoholics.
See, e.g., 38 CFR §§ 18.403(j)(1) and
(2)(i)(c) (1987).
In 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1), Congress declared that one whose
disability resulted from "willful misconduct" is not entitled to
the benefit of the extension-of-time provision. As stated above,
the VA, by its regulation, has established an irrebuttable
presumption that primary alcoholism is the result of willful
misconduct. This presumption appears to be a clear violation of §
504's mandate requiring individualized
Page 485 U. S. 556
assessment of each claimant's qualifications.
Arline,
480 U.S. at
480 U. S.
287-289.
Respondents argue, however, that a case-by-case assessment of
whether a claimant's alcoholism was the result of willful
misconduct is not necessary for two reasons. First, respondents
contend that Congress, in enacting the 1977 amendment (the
extension-of-time provision,
see 91 Stat. 1439) to §
1662(a), mandated a conclusive presumption that primary alcoholism
is caused by willful misconduct. Second, respondents contend that
the VA's determination that primary alcoholism always is due to
willful misconduct is reasonable, and that therefore the
presumption is not based on the kind of stereotyping that § 504
forbids. The Court today finds each of these arguments persuasive.
In my view, each patently is without merit.
III
The Court explains:
"As we see it, § 504 does not demand inquiry into whether
factors other than mental illness rendered an individual veteran's
drinking so entirely beyond his control as to negate any degree of
'willfulness' where Congress and the Veterans' Administration have
reasonably determined for purposes of the veterans' benefits
statutes that no such factors exist."
Ante at
485 U. S. 551.
As I see it, § 504 demands precisely the inquiry the Court says is
unnecessary. While Congress certainly has the authority to
determine that primary alcoholism always should be attributed to
willful misconduct, I find no support whatever for the Court's
conclusion that Congress made that determination when it amended §
1662(a) in 1977.
The Court is correct, of course,
see ante at
485 U. S. 546,
when it says that we must assume that Congress intended the term
"willful misconduct" in § 1662(a)(1) to have the same meaning it
had been given in other veterans' benefits statutes. Indeed, the
legislative history indicates that Congress did
Page 485 U. S. 557
"inten[d] that the same standards be applied as are utilized in
determining eligibility for other VA programs under title 38."
S.Rep. No. 95-468, pp. 69-70 (1977). If § 504 had not been amended
one year later to cover specifically all executive agency programs,
including the VA's benefits programs,
see Pub.L. 95-602,
§§ 119, 122(d)(2), 92 Stat. 2982, 2987, 29 U.S.C. § 794, there
would be little reason to question the application of the VA's
interpretation of the willful misconduct regulation to §
1662(a)(1).
But the Court goes further and finds that Congress' reference to
the VA's willful misconduct regulation in amending § 1662(a) is a
congressional adoption of the VA's rule. The Court
transforms Congress' uncontroversial statement that the willful
misconduct regulation should be given the same meaning throughout
the statutory scheme into a "specifi[c] determin[ation]" by
Congress that primary alcoholics are presumed to have engaged in
willful misconduct.
See ante at
485 U. S. 551,
n. 11;
see also ante at
485 U. S. 547
(Congress' "1977 determination that primary alcoholism is not the
sort of disability that warrants an exemption");
ante at
548 (Congress had "'narrow, precise, and specific'" intent to
exclude primary alcoholics in enacting § 1662(a)(1));
ante
at
485 U. S. 551
("original congressional intent [in amending § 1662(a)] that
primary alcoholics not be excused from the 10-year delimiting
period"). This magical transformation is the linchpin in the
Court's analysis, for unless Congress itself actually took a
position in 1977 endorsing the association of primary alcoholism
with willful misconduct, the subsequent amendment of § 504 in 1978
to include benefit programs like the VA's would simply be read to
impose new constraints on the VA's treatment of alcoholics. There
is nothing whatever that is inconsistent about Congress'
willingness, in 1977, to allow the VA to apply its own rules in
determining which alcoholic veterans were entitled to benefits, and
its decision, one year later, to require such determinations to
comply with the antidiscrimination provisions of § 504 then being
amended.
Page 485 U. S. 558
In order to escape § 504's requirements, the majority must
conclude that in 1977 Congress defined a primary alcoholic as not
"otherwise qualified," within the meaning of § 504, for the
extension of time available under § 1662(a)(1). The language of §
1662(a)(1) itself merely establishes that a willfully incurred
disability, as a general matter, does not entitle a veteran to the
extension of time. And the Senate Report upon which the Court
exclusively relies makes only passing reference to the relevant
regulations -- regulations which encompass the VA's entire policy
on the applicability of the willful misconduct provisions, not just
the application of that term to alcoholism. Finally, even those
portions of the regulations expressly addressed to alcoholism do
not state that primary alcoholism is to be equated with willful
misconduct. That interpretation is derived from a 1964
Administrator's Decision, which itself discusses the VA's
irrebuttable presumption only briefly. Administrator's Decision,
Veterans' Administration No. 988, Interpretation of the Term
"Willful Misconduct" as Related to the Residuals of Chronic
Alcoholism 1 (1964). [
Footnote
2/3]
Page 485 U. S. 559
See 37 Fed.Reg. 20335, 20336 (1972) (proposing
regulation and announcing that it was intended to incorporate
principles of the 1964 administrative issue).
Surely something more than two sentences quoted from a Senate
Report should be required before we interpret general statutory
language to conflict with the most natural reading of subsequent
specific legislation. It is only the Court's strained reading of §
1662(a)(1) to embrace a congressional "determination that primary
alcoholism is not the sort of disability that warrants an
exemption,"
ante at
485 U. S. 547,
that leads the Court to reject as a disfavored "implicit repeal" §
504's requirement that qualifications for the exemption be
determined on a case-by-case basis. The
"basic principle of statutory construction that a statute
dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not
submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized
spectrum,"
ante at
485 U. S.
547-548, has no application here, where the earlier
enactment is not narrowly or specifically addressed to the matter
treated generally in the subsequent enactment: federal agencies'
treatment of alcoholics. I have been no more successful than the VA
or the Court in turning up evidence that Congress
Page 485 U. S. 560
expressly considered, or intended, in amending § 1662 (a), to
adopt legislatively the VA's presumption that primary alcoholism
always is attributable to willful misconduct. I therefore see no
reason to defer to the VA's rule in interpreting a subsequent and
entirely separate congressional enactment that the VA has not been
empowered to administrate.
IV
I am reluctant to conclude that anything short of a
congressional determination linking all primary alcoholism to
willful misconduct could justify the VA's substitution of its
generic rule for the individualized assessment generally required
under § 504. It is conceivable that an agency legitimately could
eschew individualized assessments of disabled individuals'
qualifications if it were evident, as a matter of medical fact,
that a particular disqualifying characteristic always is associated
with a particular disability. [
Footnote
2/4] But it is not at all evident that an absolute correlation
exists between the condition of primary alcoholism and the
disqualifying factor of willful misconduct, as defined by the VA.
Nor has the VA successfully demonstrated that such an absolute
correlation is medically justified. The VA suggests that it is
enough that,
"although the policy may not produce in an individual case the
same conclusion another arbiter might reach, the VA policy provides
a
reasonable and
workable accommodation of modern
medico-psychological evidence."
Brief for Respondents 35 (emphasis added). This position is
unsatisfactory for several reasons.
Page 485 U. S. 561
A
The VA seems to suggest that generalizations about attributes
associated with individuals suffering from a particular disability
can be relied upon to assess those individuals' qualifications, as
long as the generalizations are shown to be reasonable. But
reliance on generalizations, even "reasonable" ones, is clearly
prohibited under
Arline. In that case, the Court ruled
that § 504 prevented the Nassau County School Board from
generalizing about the contagiousness of tuberculosis. 480 U.S. at
480 U. S.
281-286. Acknowledging that, in some cases,
contagiousness would justify altering or perhaps terminating a
tuberculosis sufferer's employment in order to avoid infecting
others,
id. at
480 U. S. 287,
n. 16, the Court nevertheless found impermissible a generalization
built on that less-than-perfect correlation between disability and
qualification. The Court explained:
"The fact that
some persons who have contagious
diseases may pose a serious health threat to others under certain
circumstances does not justify excluding from the coverage of the
Act
all persons with actual or perceived contagious
diseases. Such exclusion would mean that those accused of being
contagious would never have the opportunity to have their condition
evaluated in light of medical evidence and a determination made as
to whether they were 'otherwise qualified.' Rather, they would be
vulnerable to discrimination on the basis of mythology -- precisely
the type of injury Congress sought to prevent."
Id. at
480 U. S. 285
(emphasis in original). The myth to which the Court was referring
was not that some tuberculosis sufferers were contagious, but that
they
all were. The parallel myth in the present cases, of
course, is that
all primary alcoholics became disabled as
a result of their own willful misconduct. Just as § 504 entitles
each person suffering from tuberculosis to an individualized
determination, based on sound medical evidence, as to whether
Page 485 U. S. 562
that person is contagious, and therefore not "otherwise
qualified" for a job, 29 U.S.C. § 794, the statute entitles each
alcoholic veteran to an individualized determination, based on the
medical evidence in his own case, of the causes of his disability.
If this individualized assessment leads the adjudicator to conclude
that the particular veteran's alcoholism was brought on by willful
misconduct, that veteran will have been adjudicated to be not
"otherwise qualified" to collect the education benefits. But only
after this individualized inquiry has been conducted can the VA
deprive him of benefits available to all whose disabilities were
not caused by willful misconduct.
B
The VA's attempt to justify its reliance upon the irrebuttable
presumption that primary alcoholism is caused by willful misconduct
is further undermined by the meagerness of the medical support it
summons. Nothing in the record suggests that the VA based its
continuing reliance on the presumption, after § 504 was amended, on
any factual findings of the kind found to be required in
Arline. And its
post hoc rationalization of that
reliance in this litigation consists of a hodgepodge of medical
conclusions, some of only marginal relevance. For example, the VA
relies upon the comments of a number of "medical writers" who note
that "volition plays a significant role" in the treatment of
alcoholism.
See Brief for Respondents 43;
see id.
at 45-46, and nn. 32 and 33, citing, among others, G. Vaillant, The
Natural History of Alcoholism 299 (1983), and S. Zimberg, The
Clinical Management of Alcoholism 67-69, 118 (1982). While cure and
cause are likely to be somewhat related, the fact that alcoholism
is "highly treatable, but . . . will require great responsibility
from the patient," G. Vaillant,
supra, at 299, provides
little assistance in assessing whether the original onset of the
disability can always be ascribed to willful misconduct.
In contrast, ample evidence supports petitioners' contrary
contention that the degree of willfulness associated with the
Page 485 U. S. 563
onset of alcoholism varies from case to case. Recent medical
research indicates that the causes of primary alcoholism [
Footnote 2/5] are varied and complex, only
some of which conceivably could be attributed to a veteran's will.
[
Footnote 2/6] Indeed, even the VA
acknowledges that "alcoholism is not a unitary condition, [but
rather] has multiple forms and ranges of severity." Brief for
Respondents 34, and nn. 21, 22, citing, among others, Bohman,
Sigvardsson, & Cloninger, Maternal Inheritance of Alcohol
Abuse: Cross-Fostering Analysis of Adopted Women, 38 Archives
Gen.Psychiatry 965, 968 (1981) (describing genetically different
types of alcoholism, each producing a different form of the
condition); Cloninger, Bohman, & Sigvardsson, Inheritance of
Alcohol Abuse: Cross-Fostering Analysis of Adopted Men, 38 Archives
Gen.Psychiatry 861, 867 (1981) (identifying two types of alcohol
abuse with different genetic and environmental causes); G.
Vaillant,
supra, at 17 ("[A]lcohol abuse reflects a
multidetermined continuum of drinking behaviors
Page 485 U. S. 564
whose determinants are differently weighted for different people
and include culture, habits, social mores, and genes"). A
sensitivity to this case-to-case variation is precisely what § 504
requires of employers and federal agencies in their assessments of
the qualifications for employment or benefits of an individual with
handicaps. As the medical community's understanding of the causes
of alcoholism continues to develop, § 504 requires the VA to take
these new developments into account in making "sound medical
judgments" about the source of a particular veteran's alcoholism.
[
Footnote 2/7] Presumably, evidence
concerning the circumstances surrounding a veteran's development of
alcohol dependence -- including his age, home environment, and
psychological health [
Footnote 2/8]
-- always will be relevant to this assessment.
C
Finally, in asserting that its automatic association of primary
alcoholism with willful misconduct is supported by medical
evidence, the VA adopts, perhaps for purposes of this litigation
alone, a definition of willful misconduct which is inconsistent
with the definition articulated in the VA's own regulations and
practices. According to the VA, primary alcoholism is appropriately
attributed to willful misconduct because medical evidence suggests
that "many alcoholics are
not completely helpless" in
controlling their disability. Brief for Respondents 47 (emphasis
added). But a "not completely helpless" test is not the standard
the VA has established
Page 485 U. S. 565
for determining whether other disabilities are incurred
willfully.
The VA defines willful misconduct as "an act involving conscious
wrongdoing or known prohibited action," 38 CFR § 3.1(n) (1987),
and
"the intentional doing of something either with the knowledge
that it is likely to result in serious injury or with a wanton and
reckless disregard of its probable consequences."
VA Manual M21-1, change 239, subch. I, § 14.04a (Aug. 21, 1979).
[
Footnote 2/9] This definition of
willful misconduct is a far cry from a "not completely helpless"
standard. While some primary alcoholics may well owe their
disability to willful misconduct, as delineated by the regulation,
the VA has failed to demonstrate that
all primary
alcoholics had any awareness that their initial drinking was likely
to result in serious injury. Nor, in many cases, would it be
appropriate to describe one's gradual development of alcohol
dependency as evidence of "wanton and reckless disregard of
[drinking's] probable consequences." Indeed, I wonder how one
meaningfully can ascribe such intent and appreciation of long-range
consequences to a 9- or 13-year-old boy who follows the lead of his
adult role models in taking his first drinks. [
Footnote 2/10]
The awkwardness of attributing all primary alcoholism to willful
misconduct is made apparent in the Administrator's Decision No.
988, which elaborates on the meaning of the term in the context of
explaining why the VA does not bar recovery for those suffering
organic secondary effects of the continued use of alcohol:
Page 485 U. S. 566
"[The] development of the secondary condition does not meet the
definition of intentional wrongdoing with knowledge or wanton
disregard of its probable consequences. Secondary results are not
the usual and probable effects of drinking alcohol as a beverage.
By the time there is sufficient awareness of any probable
deleterious consequences, the process has developed to a point
where it is irreversible without professional help. At such time,
the person, by himself, may lack the capacity to avoid the
continued use of alcohol. While it is proper to hold a person
responsible for the direct and immediate results of indulgence in
alcohol, it cannot be reasonably said that he expects and
wills the disease and disabilities which sometimes appear
as secondary effects."
Decision No. 988, p. 2 (1964) (emphasis in original). All of
this surely can be said of some primary alcoholics, whose drinking
begins innocently enough and who feel only much later the effects
of a dependency so disabling that it requires repeated
hospitalization.
Individuals suffering from a wide range of disabilities,
including heart and lung disease and diabetes, usually bear some
responsibility for their conditions. And the conduct that can lead
to this array of disabilities, particularly dietary and smoking
habits, is certainly no less voluntary than the consumption of
alcohol. Nevertheless, the VA has expressed an unwillingness to
extend the definition of willful misconduct to all voluntary
conduct having some relation to the development of a disability. In
justifying the exclusion of secondary organic effects of
alcoholism, such as cirrhosis of the liver, from the reach of the
willful misconduct presumption, the VA has explained:
"[H]istorically, the question of willful misconduct has never
been raised in other related situations where personal habits or
neglect are possible factors in the incurrence of disability. For
example, the harmful effects of tobacco smoking on circulation and
respiration were
Page 485 U. S. 567
known long before tobacco was incriminated as a causative factor
in the high incidence of cancer, emphysema and heart disease. Yet
smoking has not been considered misconduct. It is unreasonable and
illogical to apply one set of rules with respect to alcohol and a
different one in a situation closely analogous."
Ibid.
In deferring to the VA's "reasonable" determination that all
primary alcoholism is attributable to willful misconduct, the Court
obscures the meaning of "willful misconduct" in a similar fashion.
The Court discusses the propriety of denying benefits to those who
"bear some responsibility for their disabilities," and suggests
that the attribution of all primary alcoholism to willful
misconduct is justified because "the consumption of alcohol is not
regarded as wholly involuntary."
Ante at
485 U. S. 549,
550. The degree of personal responsibility for their disability
attributed to alcoholics by the VA in its brief and echoed by the
Court in its opinion is clearly not of the magnitude contemplated
by the VA's general definition of willful misconduct.
V
Section 504 guarantees Eugene Traynor and James P. Mckelvey
federal benefits absent a demonstration that they, as individuals,
fail to satisfy the legitimate qualifications Congress has imposed
upon receipt of those benefits. The VA has failed to demonstrate
that any legislative or medical determinations justify its
conclusive presumption that Mr. Traynor's and Mr. McKelvey's
alcoholism was incurred willfully. Both cases therefore should be
remanded to the VA for individualized determinations, based on
"sound medical judgments" whether these men are "otherwise
qualified" to receive veterans' educational benefits beyond the
10-year period.
I dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
It perhaps is worth noting that, despite much comment in the
popular press, these cases are not concerned with whether
alcoholism, simplistically, is or is not a "disease."
[
Footnote 2/2]
Section 103(d)(2)(B) of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
1986, 100 Stat. 1810, struck the words "handicapped individual"
wherever they appeared in the 1973 Act and replaced them with the
words "individual with handicaps."
See H.R.Rep. No.
99-571, p. 17 (1986). Section 504, as quoted in the text above,
embraces the change effected by this 1986 amendment.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The regulation provides:
"If, in the drinking of a beverage to enjoy its intoxicating
effects, intoxication results proximately and immediately in
disability or death, the disability or death will be considered the
result of the person's willful misconduct. Organic diseases and
disabilities which are a secondary result of the chronic use of
alcohol as a beverage, whether out of compulsion or otherwise, will
not be considered of willful misconduct origin."
38 CFR § 3.301(c)(2) (1987).
On its face, the regulation does not appear to address the
condition of alcoholism itself, despite the fact that the paragraph
of the regulation, of which the above-quoted material is a part,
bears the title "Alcoholism." The condition of alcohol dependency
is neither an immediate effect of drinking, nor a secondary organic
disability resulting from the chronic use of alcohol. Alcoholism
seems to fall between the two categories set out in the regulation;
it is the condition of being a chronic alcohol user.
The Administrator's Decision from which the VA's irrebuttable
presumption is derived focuses on this same distinction: "The
proximate and immediate effects consisting of disabling injuries or
death resulting from a state of intoxication" are to be deemed
willful misconduct, but the
"remote, organic secondary effects of the continued use of
alcohol resulting in impairment of body organs or systems leading
to disability or death"
are not to be so deemed. Administrator's Decision, No. 988, p.
1. The Decision, however, also includes two sentences from which
the VA derives its current interpretation of the willful misconduct
regulation:
"In misconduct determinations, however, with respect to mental
disorders where the use of alcohol as a beverage has been involved,
a distinction has heretofore been recognized between alcoholism as
a primary condition (or as secondary to an underlying personality
disorder), and alcoholism as secondary to and a manifestation of an
acquired psychiatric disorder. If the latter condition is found the
resulting disability or death is not to be considered as willful
misconduct."
Ibid. While the VA's interpretation of its own
regulation and its antecedents would have been entitled to
deference,
see United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.
S. 864,
431 U. S. 872
(1977), Congress cannot be presumed to have codified this
less-than-apparent interpretation by a mere reference to the
relevant regulations.
[
Footnote 2/4]
For example, a blind person, by definition, cannot see. While
the Rehabilitation Act does not expressly recognize the absolute
correlation between the qualification of seeing and the condition
of blindness, it seems appropriate for an employer to rely on that
absolute correlation in making certain hiring decisions.
Presumably, an employer subject to § 504 could refuse to hire blind
individuals for jobs clearly requiring sighted employees without
first conducting an individualized assessment of each blind
applicant's qualifications.
[
Footnote 2/5]
The American Medical Association and American Psychiatric
Association (AMA/APA) and the National Council on Alcoholism, Inc.
(NCA), emphasize in their respective
amicus briefs that
the primary/secondary distinction is a crude one. A diagnosis of
alcoholism as primary or secondary may depend as much on the nature
of the facility in which the diagnosis is made as it does on the
alcoholic's true clinical history.
See Brief for NCA as
Amicus Curiae 18-19, n. 9. The primary/secondary
distinction is particularly difficult to apply to an alcoholic who,
like petitioners, began drinking as a child before underlying
psychiatric disorders could be diagnosed.
See Brief for
AMA/APA as
Amici Curiae 7. AMA/APA also emphasizes that
the distinction between the two kinds of alcoholism was developed,
and is properly used, only for treatment purposes, and reveals
little about the degree of willfulness involved in the onset of the
alcoholism.
Id. at 5.
[
Footnote 2/6]
Notable among the studies are those that suggest that heredity
plays a significant role in the development of primary, but not
secondary, alcoholism.
See, e.g., Schuckit, Genetic
Aspects of Alcoholism, 15 Annals Emergency Medicine 991, 992
(1986). Some evidence suggests that the genetic predisposition to
alcoholism can be attributed to a biochemical abnormality that
prevents proper metabolism of alcohol.
See App. 44
(affidavit of Dr. Anne Geller). From this it would appear that
there may be a more purely physiological explanation for the onset
of some cases of primary alcoholism than there is for most cases of
secondary alcoholism.
[
Footnote 2/7]
In light of this Court's emphasis, in
School Bd. of Nassau
County v. Arline, 480 U. S. 273
(1987), on the importance of basing assessments of a person's
qualifications on sound medical evidence, it is difficult to
understand the VA's suggestion that "citations to the medical
literature circa 1987" are not of great relevance to an analysis of
§ 504's application.
See Brief for Respondents 26.
[
Footnote 2/8]
AMA/APA notes that there is often a "psychological component in
the development of alcoholism" which may not "rise to the level of
psychiatric disorders." Brief for AMA/APA as
Amici Curiae
6.
[
Footnote 2/9]
Outside the alcoholism context, the Board of Veterans Appeals
has found willful misconduct when, for example, a veteran "placed
[a] gun to his head and pulled the trigger," No. 86-22-350 (Mar.
23, 1987); or intentionally put his arm through window glass, No.
85-31-331 (Feb. 14, 1986); or attempted to ride his motorcycle on
one wheel, No. 84-33-060 (May 13, 1985); or engaged in an
altercation, No. 81-10-510 (June 12, 1981); or drove about 100
miles per hour in a 25-mile-per-hour zone on a wet road at dusk,
No. 80-31-502 (June 5, 1981).
[
Footnote 2/10]
That puzzle, of course, would have to be worked out by the VA
when considering petitioners' claims on remand.