Under the nonclaim provision of Oklahoma's Probate Code,
creditors' claims against an estate are generally barred unless
they are presented to the executor or executrix within two months
of the publication of notice of the commencement of probate
proceedings. Appellee executrix published the required notice in
compliance with the terms of the nonclaim statute and a probate
court order, but appellant, the assignee of a hospital's claim for
expenses connected with the decedent's final illness, failed to
file a timely claim. For this reason, the probate court denied
appellant's application for payment, and both the State Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting appellant's
contention that, in failing to require more than publication
notice, the nonclaim statute violated due process. That contention
was based upon
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U. S. 306,
which held that state action that adversely affects property
interests must be accompanied by such notice as is reasonable under
the particular circumstances, balancing the State's interest and
the due process interests of individuals, and
Mennonite Board
of Missions v. Adams, 462 U. S. 791,
which generally requires actual notice to an affected party whose
name and address are "reasonably ascertainable."
Held: If appellant's identity as a creditor was known
or "reasonably ascertainable" by appellee (a fact which cannot be
determined from the present record), the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by
Mullane and
Mennonite, requires that appellant be given notice by mail
or such other means as is certain to ensure actual notice.
Appellant's claim is properly considered a property interest
protected by the Clause. Moreover, the nonclaim statute is not
simply a self-executing statute of limitations.
Texaco, Inc. v.
Short, 454 U. S. 516,
distinguished. Rather, the probate court's intimate involvement
throughout the probate proceedings -- particularly the court's
activation of the statute's time bar by the appointment of an
executor or executrix -- is so pervasive and substantial that it
must be considered state action. Nor can there be any doubt that
the statute may "adversely affect" protected property interests,
since untimely claims such as appellant's are completely
extinguished. On balance, satisfying creditors'
Page 485 U. S. 479
substantial, practical need for actual notice in the probate
setting is not so cumbersome or impracticable as to unduly burden
the State's undeniably legitimate interest in the expeditious
resolution of the proceedings, since mail service (which is already
routinely provided at several points in the probate process) is
inexpensive, efficient, and reasonably calculated to provide actual
notice, and since publication notice will suffice for creditors
whose identities are not ascertainable by reasonably diligent
efforts or whose claims are merely conjectural. Pp.
485 U. S.
484-491.
733 P.2d 396,
reversed and remanded.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, STEVENS, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ.,
joined. BLACKMUN, J., concurred in the result. REHNQUIST, C.J.,
filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
485 U. S.
492.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves a provision of Oklahoma's probate laws
requiring claims "arising upon a contract" generally to be
presented to the executor or executrix of the estate within two
months of the publication of a notice advising creditors of the
commencement of probate proceedings. Okla.Stat., Tit. 58, § 333
(1981). The question presented is whether this provision of notice
solely by publication satisfies the Due Process Clause.
I
Oklahoma's Probate Code requires creditors to file claims
against an estate within a specified time period, and generally
bars untimely claims.
Ibid. Such "nonclaim statutes" are
almost universally included in state probate codes.
See
Uniform Probate Code § 3-801, 8 U.L.A. 351 (1983); Falender, Notice
to Creditors in Estate Proceedings: What Process is Due?, 63 N.
C.L.Rev. 659, 667-668 (1985). Giving creditors a limited time in
which to file claims against the estate serves the State's interest
in facilitating the administration
Page 485 U. S. 480
and expeditious closing of estates.
See, e.g., State ex rel.
Central State Griffin Memorial Hospital v.
Reed, 493 P.2d 815,
818 (Okla.1972). Nonclaim statutes come in two basic forms. Some
provide a relatively short time period, generally two to six
months, that begins to run after the commencement of probate
proceedings. Others call for a longer period, generally one to five
years, that runs from the decedent's death.
See Falender,
supra, at 664-672. Most States include both types of
nonclaim statutes in their probate codes, typically providing that
if probate proceedings are not commenced and the shorter period
therefore never is triggered, then claims nonetheless may be barred
by the longer period.
See, e.g., Ark.Code Ann. §§
28-50-101(a), (d) (1987) (three months if probate proceedings
commenced; five years if not); Idaho Code § 15-3-803(a)(1)(2)
(1979) (four months; three years); Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 473.360(1), (3)
(1986) (six months; three years). Most States also provide that
creditors are to be notified of the requirement to file claims
imposed by the nonclaim statutes solely by publication.
See Uniform Probate Code § 3-801, 8 U.L.A. 351 (1983);
Falender,
supra, at 660, n. 7 (collecting statutes).
Indeed, in most jurisdictions, it is the publication of notice that
triggers the nonclaim statute. The Uniform Probate Code, for
example, provides that creditors have four months from publication
in which to file claims. Uniform Probate Code § 3-801, 8 U.L.A. 351
(1983).
See also, e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14-3801
(1975); Fla.Stat. § 733.701 (1987); Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-801
(1978).
The specific nonclaim statute at issue in this case, Okla.Stat.,
Tit. 58, § 333 (1981), provides for only a short time period, and
is best considered in the context of Oklahoma probate proceedings
as a whole. Under Oklahoma's Probate Code, any party interested in
the estate may initiate probate proceedings by petitioning the
court to have the will proved. § 22. The court is then required to
set a hearing date on the petition, § 25, and to mail notice of the
hearing "to all heirs,
Page 485 U. S. 481
legatees and devisees, at their places of residence," §§ 25, 26.
If no person appears at the hearing to contest the will, the court
may admit the will to probate on the testimony of one of the
subscribing witnesses to the will. § 30. After the will is admitted
to probate, the court must order appointment of an executor or
executrix, issuing letters testamentary to the named executor or
executrix if that person appears, is competent and qualified, and
no objections are made. § 101.
Immediately after appointment, the executor or executrix is
required to "give notice to the creditors of the deceased." § 331.
Proof of compliance with this requirement must be filed with the
court. § 332. This notice is to advise creditors that they must
present their claims to the executor or executrix within two months
of the date of the first publication. As for the method of notice,
the statute requires only publication: "[S]uch notice must be
published in some newspaper in [the] county once each week for two
(2) consecutive weeks." § 331. A creditor's failure to file a claim
within the 2-month period generally bars it forever. § 333. The
nonclaim statute does provide certain exceptions, however. If the
creditor is out of State, then a claim "may be presented at any
time before a decree of distribution is entered." § 333. Mortgages
and debts not yet due are also excepted from the 2-month time
limit.
This shorter type of nonclaim statute is the only one included
in Oklahoma's Probate Code. Delays in commencement of probate
proceedings are dealt with not through some independent, longer
period running from the decedent's death,
see, e.g.,
Ark.Code Ann. § 28-50-101(d) (1987), but by shortening the notice
period once proceedings have started. Section 331 provides that, if
the decedent has been dead for more than five years, then creditors
have only one month after notice is published in which to file
their claims. A similar l-month period applies if the decedent was
intestate. § 331.
Page 485 U. S. 482
II
H. Everett Pope, Jr., was admitted to St. John Medical Center, a
hospital in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in November 1978. On April 2, 1979,
while still at the hospital, he died testate. His wife, appellee
JoAnne Pope, initiated probate proceedings in the District Court of
Tulsa County in accordance with the statutory scheme outlined
above. The court entered an order setting a hearing. Record 8.
After the hearing, the court entered an order admitting the will to
probate and, following the designation in the will,
id. at
2, named appellee as the executrix of the estate.
Id. at
12. Letters testamentary were issued,
id. at 13, and the
court ordered appellee to fulfill her statutory obligation by
directing that she "immediately give notice to creditors."
Id. at 14. Appellee published notice in the Tulsa Daily
Legal News for two consecutive weeks beginning July 17, 1979. The
notice advised creditors that they must file any claim they had
against the estate within two months of the first publication of
the notice.
Id. at 16.
Appellant Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc., is a
subsidiary of St. John Medical Center and the assignee of a claim
for expenses connected with the decedent's long stay at that
hospital. Neither appellant nor its parent company filed a claim
with appellee within the 2-month time period following publication
of notice. In October, 1983, however, appellant filed an
Application for Order Compelling Payment of Expenses of Last
Illness.
Id. at 28. In making this application, appellant
relied on Okla.Stat., Tit. 58, § 594 (1981), which indicates that
an executrix "must pay . . . the expenses of the last sickness."
Appellant argued that this specific statutory command made
compliance with the 2-month deadline for filing claims unnecessary.
The District Court of Tulsa County rejected this contention, ruling
that even claims pursuant to § 594 fell within the general
requirements of the nonclaim statute. Accordingly, the court denied
appellant's application. App. 3.
Page 485 U. S. 483
The District Court's reading of § 594's relationship to the
nonclaim statute was affirmed by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals.
Id. at 7. Appellant then sought rehearing, arguing for the
first time that the nonclaim statute's notice provisions violated
due process. In a supplemental opinion on rehearing, the Court of
Appeals rejected the due process claim on the merits.
Id.
at 15.
Appellant next sought review in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
That court granted certiorari and, after review of both the § 594
and due process issues, affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment.
With respect to the federal issue, the court relied on
Estate
of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, Inc., 700 S.W.2d
86, 88-89 (Mo.1985), to reject appellant's contention that our
decisions in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U. S. 306
(1950), and
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,
462 U. S. 791
(1983), required more than publication notice.
733 P.2d 396
(1987). The Supreme Court reasoned that the function of notice in
probate proceedings was not to "
make a creditor a party to the
proceeding'" but merely to "`notif[y] him that he may become one if
he wishes.'" Id. at 400 (quoting Estate of Busch,
supra, at 88). In addition, the court distinguished probate
proceedings because they do not directly adjudicate the creditor's
claims. 733 P.2d at 400-401. Finally, the court agreed with
Estate of Busch that nonclaim statutes were self-executing
statutes of limitations, because they "ac[t] to cut off potential
claims against the decedent's estate by the passage of time," and
accordingly do not require actual notice. 733 P.2d at 401. See
also Gibbs v. Estate of Dolan, 146 Ill.App.3d 203, 496 N.E.2d
1126 (1986) (rejecting due process challenge to nonclaim statute);
Gano Farms, Inc. v. Estate of Kleweno, 2 Kan.App.2d 506,
582 P.2d
742 (1978) (same); Chalaby v. Driskell, 237 Ore. 245,
390 P.2d 632 (1964) (same); William B. Tanner Co. v. Estate of
Fessler, 100 Wis.2d 437, 302 N.W.2d
414 (1981) (same); New York Merchandise Co. v.
Stout, 43 Wash. 2d
825, 264 P.2d
863 (1953)
Page 485 U. S. 484
(same). This conclusion conflicted with that reached by the
Nevada Supreme Court in
Continental Insurance Co. v.
Moseley, 100 Nev. 337,
683 P.2d 20
(1984), after our decision remanding the case for reconsideration
in light of
Mennonite, supra. 463 U.S. 1202 (1983). In
Moseley, the Nevada Supreme Court held that, in this
context, due process required "more than service by publication."
100 Nev. at 338, 683 P.2d at 21. We noted probable jurisdiction,
484 U.S. 813 (1987), and now reverse and remand.
III
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra,
at
339 U. S. 314,
established that state action affecting property must generally be
accompanied by notification of that action:
"An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections."
In the years since
Mullane, the Court has adhered to
these principles, balancing the "interest of the State" and "the
individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."
Ibid. The focus is on the reasonableness of
the balance, and, as
Mullane itself made clear, whether a
particular method of notice is reasonable depends on the particular
circumstances.
The Court's most recent decision in this area is
Mennonite,
supra, which involved the sale of real property for delinquent
taxes. State law provided for tax sales in certain circumstances
and for a 2-year period following any such sale during which the
owner or any lienholder could redeem the property. After expiration
of the redemption period, the tax sale purchaser could apply for a
deed. The property owner received actual notice of the tax sale and
the redemption period. All other interested parties were given
notice by publication. 462 U.S. at
462 U. S.
792-794. In
Mennonite, a mortgagee of property
that had been sold and on which the redemption
Page 485 U. S. 485
period had run complained that the State's failure to provide it
with actual notice of these proceedings violated due process. The
Court agreed, holding that
"actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a
proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property
interests of
any party, whether unlettered or well versed
in commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably
ascertainable."
Id. at
462 U. S. 800
(emphasis in original). Because the tax sale had "immediately and
drastically diminishe[d] the value of [the mortgagee's] interest,"
id. at
462 U. S. 798,
and because the mortgagee could have been identified through
"reasonably diligent efforts,"
id. at
462 U. S. 798,
n. 4, the Court concluded that due process required that the
mortgagee be given actual notice.
Applying these principles to the case at hand leads to a similar
result. Appellant's interest is an unsecured claim, a cause of
action against the estate for an unpaid bill. Little doubt remains
that such an intangible interest is property protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. As we wrote in
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U. S. 422,
455 U. S. 428
(1982), this question
"was affirmatively settled by the
Mullane case itself,
where the Court held that a cause of action is a species of
property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause."
In
Logan, the Court held that a cause of action under
Illinois' Fair Employment Practices Act was a protected property
interest, and referred to the numerous other types of claims that
the Court had previously recognized as deserving due process
protections.
See id. at
455 U. S.
429-431, and nn. 4-5. Appellant's claim, therefore, is
properly considered a protected property interest.
The Fourteenth Amendment protects this interest, however, only
from a deprivation by state action. Private use of state-sanctioned
private remedies or procedures does not rise to the level of state
action.
See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U. S. 149
(1978). Nor is the State's involvement in the mere running of a
general statute of limitations
Page 485 U. S. 486
generally sufficient to implicate due process.
See Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516
(1982).
See also Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, supra, at
436 U. S. 166.
But when private parties make use of state procedures with the
overt, significant assistance of state officials, state action may
be found.
See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U. S. 922
(1982);
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.
S. 337 (1969). The question here is whether the State's
involvement with the nonclaim statute is substantial enough to
implicate the Due Process Clause.
Appellee argues that it is not, contending that Oklahoma's
nonclaim statute is a self-executing statute of limitations.
Relying on this characterization, appellee then points to
Short, supra. Appellee's reading of
Short is
correct -- due process does not require that potential plaintiffs
be given notice of the impending expiration of a period of
limitations -- but in our view, appellee's premise is not.
Oklahoma's nonclaim statute is not a self-executing statute of
limitations.
It is true that nonclaim statutes generally possess some
attributes of statutes of limitations. They provide a specific time
period within which particular types of claims must be filed, and
they bar claims presented after expiration of that deadline. Many
of the state court decisions upholding nonclaim statutes against
due process challenges have relied upon these features and
concluded that they are properly viewed as statutes of limitations.
See, e.g., Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, Inc.,
700 S.W.2d at 89;
William B. Tanner Co. v. Estate of
Fessler, 100 Wis.2d 437,
302 N.W.2d
414 (1981).
As we noted in
Short, however, it is the
"self-executing feature" of a statute of limitations that makes
Mullane and
Mennonite inapposite.
See
454 U.S. at
454 U. S. 533,
454 U. S. 536.
The State's interest in a self-executing statute of limitations is
in providing repose for potential defendants and in avoiding stale
claims. The State has no role to play beyond enactment of the
limitations period. While this enactment obviously
Page 485 U. S. 487
is state action, the State's limited involvement in the running
of the time period generally falls short of constituting the type
of state action required to implicate the protections of the Due
Process Clause.
Here, in contrast, there is significant state action. The
probate court is intimately involved throughout, and without that
involvement, the time bar is never activated. The nonclaim statute
becomes operative only after probate proceedings have been
commenced in state court. The court must appoint the executor or
executrix before notice, which triggers the time bar, can be given.
Only after this court appointment is made does the statute provide
for any notice; § 331 directs the executor or executrix to publish
notice "immediately" after appointment. Indeed, in this case, the
District Court reinforced the statutory command with an order
expressly requiring appellee to "immediately give notice to
creditors." The form of the order indicates that such orders are
routine. Record 14. Finally, copies of the notice and an affidavit
of publication must be filed with the court. § 332. It is only
after all of these actions take place that the time period begins
to run, and in every one of these actions, the court is intimately
involved. This involvement is so pervasive and substantial that it
must be considered state action subject to the restrictions of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Where the legal proceedings themselves trigger the time bar,
even if those proceedings do not necessarily resolve the claim on
its merits, the time bar lacks the self-executing feature that
Short indicated was necessary to remove any due process
problem. Rather, in such circumstances, due process is directly
implicated and actual notice generally is required.
Cf.
Mennonite, 462 U.S. at
462 U. S.
793-794 (tax sale proceedings trigger 2-year redemption
period);
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., supra, at
455 U. S. 433,
455 U. S. 437
(claim barred if no hearing held 120 days after action commenced);
City of New York v. New York, N. H. & H.R. Co.,
344 U. S. 293,
344 U. S. 294
(1953) (bankruptcy proceedings trigger specific time period
Page 485 U. S. 488
in which creditors' claims must be filed). Our conclusion that
the Oklahoma nonclaim statute is not a self-executing statute of
limitations makes it unnecessary to consider appellant's argument
that a 2-month period is somehow unconstitutionally short.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 22 (advocating constitutional
requirement that the States provide at least one year). We also
have no occasion to consider the proper characterization of
nonclaim statutes that run from the date of death, and which
generally provide for longer time periods, ranging from one to five
years.
See Falender, 63 N.C.L.Rev. at 667-669. In sum, the
substantial involvement of the probate court throughout the process
leaves little doubt that the running of Oklahoma's nonclaim statute
is accompanied by sufficient government action to implicate the Due
Process Clause.
Nor can there be any doubt that the nonclaim statute may
"adversely affect" a protected property interest. In appellant's
case, such an adverse effect is all too clear. The entire purpose
and effect of the nonclaim statute is to regulate the timeliness of
such claims and to forever bar untimely claims, and by virtue of
the statute, the probate proceedings themselves have completely
extinguished appellant's claim. Thus, it is irrelevant that the
notice seeks only to advise creditors that they may become parties,
rather than that they are parties, for if they do not participate
in the probate proceedings, the nonclaim statute terminates their
property interests. It is not necessary for a proceeding to
directly adjudicate the merits of a claim in order to "adversely
affect" that interest. In
Mennonite itself, the tax sale
proceedings did not address the merits of the mortgagee's claim.
Indeed, the tax sale did not even completely extinguish that claim,
it merely "diminishe[d] the value" of the interest. 462 U.S. at
462 U. S. 798.
Yet the Court held that due process required that the mortgagee be
given actual notice of the tax sale.
See also Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S.
1 (1978) (termination of utility service);
Schroeder
v. City of New York, 371 U. S. 208
(1962) (condemnation proceeding);
City of New
Page 485 U. S. 489
York v. New York, N. H. & H.R. Co., supra,
(Bankruptcy Code's requirement of "reasonable notice" requires
actual notice of deadline for filing claims).
In assessing the propriety of actual notice in this context,
consideration should be given to the practicalities of the
situation and the effect that requiring actual notice may have on
important state interests.
Mennonite, supra, at
462 U. S.
798-799;
Mullane, 339 U.S. at
339 U. S.
313-314. As the Court noted in
Mullane,
"[c]hance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an
advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a
newspaper."
Id. at
339 U. S. 315.
Creditors, who have a strong interest in maintaining the integrity
of their relationship with their debtors, are particularly unlikely
to benefit from publication notice. As a class, creditors may not
be aware of a debtor's death or of the institution of probate
proceedings. Moreover, the executor or executrix will often be, as
is the case here, a party with a beneficial interest in the estate.
This could diminish an executor's or executrix's inclination to
call attention to the potential expiration of a creditor's claim.
There is thus a substantial practical need for actual notice in
this setting.
At the same time, the State undeniably has a legitimate interest
in the expeditious resolution of probate proceedings. Death
transforms the decedent's legal relationships, and a State could
reasonably conclude that swift settlement of estates is so
important that it calls for very short time deadlines for filing
claims. As noted, the almost uniform practice is to establish such
short deadlines, and to provide only publication notice.
See,
e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14-3801 (1975); Ark.Code Ann. §
28-50-101(a) (1987); Fla.Stat. § 733.701 (1987); Idaho Code §
15-3-803(a) (1979); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 473.360(1) (1986); Utah Code
Ann. § 75-3-801 (1978).
See also Uniform Probate Code §
3-801, 8 U.L.A. 351 (1983); Falender, at 660, n. 7 (collecting
statutes). Providing actual notice to known or reasonably
ascertainable creditors, however, is not inconsistent with the
goals reflected in nonclaim statutes. Actual notice need not be
inefficient or
Page 485 U. S. 490
burdensome. We have repeatedly recognized that mail service is
an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is reasonably
calculated to provide actual notice.
See, e.g., Mennonite,
462 U.S. at
462 U. S. 799,
462 U. S. 800;
Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444,
456 U. S. 455
(1982);
Mullane, supra, at
339 U. S. 319. In
addition,
Mullane disavowed any intent to require
"impracticable and extended searches . . . in the name of due
process." 339 U.S. at
339 U. S.
317-318. As the Court indicated in
Mennonite,
all that the executor or executrix need do is make "reasonably
diligent efforts," 462 U.S. at
462 U. S. 798,
n. 4, to uncover the identities of creditors. For creditors who are
not "reasonably ascertainable," publication notice can suffice. Nor
is everyone who may conceivably have a claim properly considered a
creditor entitled to actual notice. Here, as in
Mullane,
it is reasonable to dispense with actual notice to those with mere
"conjectural" claims. 339 U.S. at
339 U. S.
317.
On balance then, a requirement of actual notice to known or
reasonably ascertainable creditors is not so cumbersome as to
unduly hinder the dispatch with which probate proceedings are
conducted. Notice by mail is already routinely provided at several
points in the probate process. In Oklahoma, for example, § 26
requires that "heirs, legatees, and devisees" be mailed notice of
the initial hearing on the will.
Accord, Uniform Probate
Code § 3-403, 8 U.L.A. 274 (1983). Indeed, a few States already
provide for actual notice in connection with short nonclaim
statutes.
See, e.g., Calif.Prob.Code Ann. §§ 9050, 9100
(West Supp.1988); Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 147.010, 155.010, 155.020
(1987); W.Va.Code §§ 44-2-2, 44-2-4 (1982). We do not believe that
requiring adherence to such a standard will be so burdensome or
impracticable as to warrant reliance on publication notice
alone.
In analogous situations, we have rejected similar arguments that
a pressing need to proceed expeditiously justifies less than actual
notice. For example, while we have recognized that, in the
bankruptcy context, there is a need for prompt administration of
claims,
United Savings Assn. of Texas
v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 484
U.S.
Page 485 U. S. 491
365,
484 U. S.
375-376 (1988), we also have required actual notice in
bankruptcy proceedings.
Bank of Marin v. England,
385 U. S. 99
(1966);
City of New York v. New York, N. H. & H.R.
Co., 344 U. S. 293
(1953).
See also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., supra, at
339 U. S.
318-319 (trust proceedings). Probate proceedings are not
so different in kind that a different result is required here.
Whether appellant's identity as a creditor was known or
reasonably ascertainable by appellee cannot be answered on this
record. Neither the Oklahoma Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals
nor the District Court considered the question. Appellee of course
was aware that her husband endured a long stay at St. John Medical
Center, but it is not clear that this awareness translates into a
knowledge of appellant's claim. We therefore must remand the case
for further proceedings to determine whether "reasonably diligent
efforts,"
Mennonite, supra, at
462 U. S. 798,
n. 4, would have identified appellant and uncovered its claim. If
appellant's identity was known or "reasonably ascertainable," then
termination of appellant's claim without actual notice violated due
process.
IV
We hold that Oklahoma's nonclaim statute is not a self-executing
statute of limitations. Rather, the statute operates in connection
with Oklahoma's probate proceedings to "adversely affect"
appellant's property interest. Thus, if appellant's identity as a
creditor was known or "reasonably ascertainable," then the Due
Process Clause requires that appellant be given "[n]otice by mail
or other means as certain to ensure actual notice."
Mennonite,
supra, at
462 U. S. 800.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Oklahoma Supreme Court is reversed
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN concurs in the result.
Page 485 U. S. 492
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
In
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.
S. 516 (1982), the Court upheld against challenge under
the Due Process Clause an Indiana statute providing that severed
mineral interests which had not been used for a period of 20 years
lapsed and reverted to the surface owner unless the mineral owner
filed a statement of claim in the appropriate county office. In the
present case, Oklahoma has enacted a statute providing that a
contractual claim against a decedent's estate is barred if not
presented as a claim within two months of the publication of notice
advising creditors of the commencement of probate proceedings. The
Court holds the Oklahoma statute unconstitutional.
Obviously there is a great difference between the 20-year time
limit in the Indiana statute and the 2-month time limit in the
Oklahoma statute, but the Court does not rest the constitutional
distinction between the cases on this fact. Instead, the
constitutional distinction is premised on the absence in
Texaco, Inc., of the "significant state action" present in
this case. In the words of the Court:
"The nonclaim statute becomes operative only after probate
proceedings have been commenced in state court. The court must
appoint the executor or executrix before notice, which triggers the
time bar, can be given. Only after this court appointment is made
does the statute provide for any notice; § 331 directs the executor
or executrix to publish notice 'immediately' after
appointment."
Ante at
454 U. S.
487.
Just why the due process implications of these two cases should
turn upon the "activity" of the Oklahoma probate court is not made
clear. Surely from the point of view of the claimant -- for whom,
after all, the Due Process Clause is designed to benefit -- the
difference between having the time bar to his claim activated by a
notice published by a court-appointed executor, as it was here, and
having the time bar
Page 485 U. S. 493
activated by acquisition of the mineral interest, as it was in
Indiana, makes little if any difference.
The owner of a mineral interest in Indiana who neither made any
use of it for 20 years, nor filed a statement of claim, would lose
a quiet title action brought in the Indiana courts against him by
the surface owner because those courts would apply the 20-year
statute of limitations. The appellant in the present case lost a
suit in the Oklahoma courts because those courts applied the
2-month statute of limitations contained in the Oklahoma probate
statute. Why there is "state action" in the latter case, but not in
the former, remains a mystery which is in no way elucidated by the
Court's opinion. The factual differences which the Court points
out, showing that the probate court is "intimately involved" in the
application of the Oklahoma nonclaim statute, seem to me
trivial.
Probate proceedings have been traditionally uncontested and
administrative, designed to transfer assets from someone who has
died to his successors. Before making these transfers, probate
codes universally require that the estate settle the debts of the
decedent, and to do this it is necessary that claims against the
estate be marshaled and proved.
Ante at
485 U. S.
479-480. Once the debts of the estate are paid, the
necessary steps can be taken to distribute the remainder of the
property.
Occasionally there may be a disputed claim against the estate,
which is then in most jurisdictions tried like any other civil
suit. Occasionally there may be a dispute over the validity of the
will, with a resultant will contest. Occasionally there may be
objections to the account of the executor or the administrator,
which are then in most jurisdictions heard and decided by the
probate court. But by and large, the typical probate proceeding --
and the one involved in the instant case seems to have followed
that pattern -- is uncontested, and the publication of notice to
creditors simply shortens the otherwise applicable statute of
limitations.
Page 485 U. S. 494
The "intimate involvement" of the probate court in the present
case was entirely of an administrative nature.
Would this Court have struck down the Indiana mineral lapse
statute involved in
Texaco, Inc., if that statute had
provided -- as an
additional protection to mineral owners
-- that a state official should publish notice to all mineral
owners of the effect of the operation of the lapse statute? I find
it difficult to believe that would be the case, and yet the thrust
of the Court's reasoning today points in that direction. Virtually
meaningless state involvement, or lack of it, rather than the
effect of the statute in question on the rights of the party whose
claim is cut off, is held dispositive.
The Court observes that, in Oklahoma, it is the court-ordered
publication of notice that triggers the running of the statute of
limitations. This judicial involvement, the Court concludes, is
inconsistent with the "self-executing feature," of the time bar in
Texaco, Inc. Ante at
485 U. S. 487.
This reading of the term "self-executing" is, I believe, out of
context and contrary to common sense. That term refers only to the
absence of a judicial or other determination that itself
extinguishes the claimant's rights. This is made clear by the
Texaco, Inc., Court's juxtaposition of "the self-executing
feature of the [Indiana] statute and a subsequent judicial
determination that a particular lapse did in fact occur." 454 U.S.
at
454 U. S. 533.
Certainly the Oklahoma provision is more like the former than the
latter, and there is no reason to conclude that the perfunctory
administrative involvement of the Oklahoma probate court triggers a
greater level of due process protection.
Appellant also claims that the 2-month period provided by
Oklahoma law, even if deemed to be a statute of limitations, is too
short to afford due process. The Court does not reach that
question, and neither do I.