In 1981, the federal statute authorizing the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program was amended to provide that
a family receiving nonrecurring lump-sum income is ineligible for
benefits for the number of months that the income would satisfy the
family's standard of need. In 1983, respondent's husband received a
lump-sum Social Security disability payment, which was expended
within two days to pay family bills. Respondent reported the
receipt and expenditure of the lump-sum payment to her Minnesota
Department of Human Services (Department) caseworker and was
advised that, under the 1981 amendment, her family would be
ineligible for benefits for the next several months. The family
continued to receive benefits while respondent's administrative
appeal was pending, but the Department ultimately concluded that
the federal statute must be enforced even though respondent had not
received advance notice of the new lump-sum rule. Respondent then
intervened in a pending class action in Federal District Court; the
court held that the Department's implementation of the new lump-sum
rule without adequate notice to AFDC applicants and recipients
violated a federal notice regulation that, as promulgated by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) before the 1981
amendment was enacted, requires that individuals be given
"information in written form, and orally as appropriate, about . .
. conditions of eligibility." The Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court's judgment in pertinent part.
Held: The federal notice regulation was not violated by
the Department. Pursuant to the regulation, the Department has
distributed two printed brochures that generally describe the AFDC
program and the recipient's duty to report all household income
monthly. When the 1981 amendment was enacted, the Department sent a
letter to all AFDC recipients advising them of the major changes in
the program and alerting them to the new lump-sum rule. The plain
language of the federal regulation does not require that
information be disseminated regarding every specific change in
eligibility requirements. Moreover, the plain language of the
notice provision and of other provisions in the same section of
the
Page 485 U. S. 416
regulations establishes that only applicants, and not
recipients, are addressed by the requirement that individuals be
given information about the program. Further, even as to
applicants, the notice provision requires only that printed
information about access to AFDC benefits be available, and that
such information may be transmitted orally as well. Finally, the
Secretary believes it appropriate to rely on an oral explanation of
the consequences of receiving a lump-sum payment when the recipient
reports it to the family's caseworker. In sum, the notice
regulation simply requires the State to publish a general
description of the basic structure of the AFDC program and its
availability. Pp.
485 U. S.
423-432.
801 F.2d 288, reversed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and SCALIA, JJ., joined.
O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, and in which
MARSHALL, J., joined as to the last paragraph,
post, p.
485 U. S. 432.
KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
Page 485 U. S. 417
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1981, Congress amended the statute authorizing the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program to provide that a
family receiving nonrecurring lump-sum income is ineligible for
benefits for the number of months that the income would satisfy the
family's standard of need. § 2304 of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, 95 Stat. 845,
as amended,
[
Footnote 1] 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(17) (1982 ed. and Supp. III);
see generally Lukhard v.
Reed, 481 U. S. 368,
481 U. S.
371-373 (1987) (plurality opinion);
see also
id. at
371 U. S.
384-386 (Powell, J., dissenting). [
Footnote 2] In this case, the United
Page 485 U. S. 418
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the
Minnesota Department of Human Services (the Department) could not
enforce that amendment against respondent, and the class she
represents, because it had not given them the notice required by a
regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (the Secretary), 45 CFR § 206.10(a)(2)(i) (1987). We
granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' interpretation
of the Secretary's regulation as well as its remedial decision in
favor of an injunction barring the Department from recouping
payments made to respondent during her period of ineligibility.
Because we conclude that the regulation was not violated, we do not
reach the remedy question.
I
On October 31, 1983, respondent's husband received a retroactive
Social Security disability payment of $5,752. Respondent used the
entire lump sum to pay a $3,863.75 arrearage on the family's home
mortgage, an overdue car repair bill of $1,366, and a legal fee of
$150, and the remainder to purchase clothing for her children and
to pay other bills. Within two days, the entire sum had been
expended. [
Footnote 3]
On November 2, 1983, respondent reported the receipt (and the
expenditure) of the Social Security payment to her caseworker and
was advised that, under the 1981 amendment, her family would be
ineligible for benefits for the next several months. [
Footnote 4] She immediately filed an
administrative appeal,
Page 485 U. S. 419
and her family continued to receive benefits while the appeal
was pending.
See 45 CFR § 205.10(a)(6)(i) (1987). The
Appeals Referee decided that the benefits should not be terminated,
because the Jenkinses had not received any advance notice of the
new lump-sum rule, App. 69-73, but the Department's Deputy
Commissioner reversed.
Id. at 73-76. While expressing
disagreement with the policy implemented by the 1981 amendment, he
concluded that the federal statute must be enforced even though the
lack of advance notice had produced a "harsh result." [
Footnote 5]
When the administrative review proceedings terminated in August,
the Jenkins family was again eligible for benefits. The
Department's decision, however, meant that benefits had been
improperly paid for the period between October, 1983, and May,
1984. Accordingly, as required by the federal statute,
see
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(22) (1982 ed. and Supp. III);
see also
45 CFR § 233.20(a)(13) (1987), in due course the Department
Page 485 U. S. 420
ordered recoupment of the wrongfully paid benefits by deducting
1% from each future AFDC monthly payment, in accordance with state
law,
see Minn.Stat. § 256.73, subd. 6 (1986).
Shortly after the conclusion of the state administrative
proceedings, respondent intervened in an action already pending in
Federal District Court challenging the Department's lump-sum policy
on various grounds. [
Footnote
6] In her complaint in intervention, App. 14, 20, respondent
added an allegation that the Department's implementation of the new
lump-sum rule without adequate notice to AFDC applicants and
recipients violated the Secretary's regulation. The District Court
certified
Page 485 U. S. 421
a class [
Footnote 7] and
entered summary judgment in its favor on the notice issue.
Slaughter v. Levine, 598 F.
Supp. 1035, 1049-1052 (Minn.1984).
The District Court awarded two forms of relief. First, it
required the Department to prepare a written notice that adequately
explained the lump-sum policy and to distribute it to all current
AFDC recipients and all future applicants.
Id. at 1055.
Second, it ordered the Department to notify all class members who
had been injured by the Department's violation that they might
apply for corrective payments from their local welfare agencies.
Ibid. The court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment
prevented it from ordering any repayment of benefits that had been
improperly denied,
ibid., or from enjoining the Department
from recouping overpayments to families like the Jenkinses.
Slaughter v. Levine, 621 F.
Supp. 509, 513-514 (Minn.1985). For the purposes of relief, the
District Court determined that members of the class who did not
expend any portion of their lump-sum payments before they received
notice of the current lump-sum policy had not been injured by the
Department's violation of the federal notice regulation. 598 F.
Supp. at 1055. [
Footnote 8]
Page 485 U. S. 422
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's judgment insofar as it found a violation of the notice
regulation and denied monetary relief to members of the class.
Slaughter v. Levine, 801 F.2d 288 (CA8 1986) (case below).
It concluded, however, that the District Court should have enjoined
the Department from recouping any amounts that were treated as
"overpayments" under the post-1981 policy if they would have been
proper under the pre-1981 lump-sum rule. In explaining its basic
holding, the Court of Appeals pointed out that advance notice to
lump-sum recipients was necessary to achieve the purposes of the
1981 amendment, [
Footnote 9]
and that to impose the new rule on a family that assumed that the
old rule was still in effect "would be truly Kafkaesque." [
Footnote 10] The dissenting judge
did not believe
Page 485 U. S. 423
that either the statute or the notice regulation conditioned the
implementation of the new rule on advance notice to the small
percentage of AFDC beneficiaries affected by it. He construed the
regulation as simply requiring "the state to publicize generally in
written form, and orally as appropriate, the AFDC program and its
availability."
Id. at 303 (Fagg, J., dissenting). Because
of the significance of the Court of Appeals' holding for States'
administration of welfare laws, we granted certiorari, 482 U.S. 926
(1987).
II
The Secretary's notice regulation, which was first adopted in
1971 and later amended in 1978 and 1979, now provides:
"Applicants shall be informed about the eligibility requirements
and their rights and obligations under the program. Under this
requirement individuals are given information in written form, and
orally as appropriate, about coverage, conditions of eligibility,
scope of the program, and related services available, and the
rights and responsibilities of applicants for and recipients of
assistance. Specifically developed bulletins or pamphlets
explaining the rules regarding eligibility and appeals in simple,
understandable terms are publicized and available in quantity."
45 CFR § 206.10(a)(2)(i) (1987).
Pursuant to this regulation, the Department has prepared and
distributed two brief printed brochures. The first contains four
pages and generally describes the AFDC program, the application
process, the benefit levels, and the applicant's basic procedural
rights. The pamphlet states that the
"information in this brochure will help you decide if you wish
to apply for AFDC, but it is not intended to cover all program
rules. . . . You are urged to contact your welfare office for
specific information as to the eligibility rules and limitations
for AFDC. Since these can and do change from time to
Page 485 U. S. 424
time, you should inquire with your welfare office for up-to-date
information."
App. 29.
The second brochure is a six-page booklet entitled "Monthly
Reporting: What AFDC Households Must Know"; it explains the
recipient's duty to report all of the household income each month.
Although some of the intricacies of the AFDC program are explained,
it does not comment specifically on the lump-sum rule. In addition
to using pamphlets such as these, the Department relies on its
caseworkers to provide applicants and recipients with oral advice
about the aspects of the program that are relevant to specific
situations.
When the 1981 amendment was enacted, the Department did not
prepare a new pamphlet. It did, however, on September 18, 1981,
send a letter to all AFDC recipients advising them that there had
been 19 major changes in the AFDC program. The paragraph commenting
on the new lump-sum rule was not a model of clarity, [
Footnote 11] but presumably it at
least alerted the reader to the existence of the new rule. Since
the letter was just mailed to those already receiving AFDC
benefits, however, it did not provide any notice to a family that
did not apply for benefits until a later date. Such a family might
not learn about the operation of the lump-sum rule until it
reported the receipt of a payment to a caseworker; if, as was true
in the Jenkins' case, the money had already been
Page 485 U. S. 425
spent, it would obviously be too late for the family to budget
the use of that money to replace its normal AFDC checks.
The question for us to decide is not whether advance written
notice is desirable, or, indeed, whether such notice is necessary
to accomplish the purposes of the 1981 statute. The question is
whether the preexisting regulation was intended to forestall the
implementation of a congressionally mandated program change until
the state agencies provided all AFDC recipients with notice of the
change. Although such a rule might well represent sound policy, we
do not believe that a fair reading of the text of § 206.10(a)(2)(i)
conveys that message.
It is true that the regulation requires that individuals be
given "information in written form, and orally as appropriate,
about . . . conditions of eligibility," but that is hardly how one
would write a command stating that every such condition must be
identified and explained before it may be enforced. The reference
to "information" in both written and oral form "about" various
aspects of the program seems to require, instead, merely a general
descriptive statement regarding AFDC benefits. Thus, the plain
language of the regulation does not require that information be
disseminated regarding every specific change in eligibility
requirements.
Indeed, it is doubtful whether the notice requirement even
applies to AFDC
recipients. [
Footnote 12] The notice provision appears
Page 485 U. S. 426
in a section that contains various rules regarding
"[a]pplication, determination of eligibility and furnishing of
assistance," 45 CFR § 206.10 (1987). The section speaks to how one
may apply for benefits, general conditions of eligibility, the time
frame within which States must determine eligibility, basic rules
about the furnishing of assistance to recipients, and general
procedures for redetermining eligibility due to changed
circumstances. The regulation in question in this case, §
206.10(a)(2)(i), both on its face and in context of the section as
a whole, quite plainly speaks to how general information about the
program must be provided to individuals seeking assistance, that
is, to program applicants.
See § 206.10(b)(1) (defining
"applicant"). The very next provision in the section, in fact,
states that
"[p]rocedures shall be adopted which are designed to assure that
recipients make timely and accurate reports of any change
in circumstances which may affect their eligibility or the amount
of assistance."
§ 206.10(a)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). In other words, the
drafters of this regulation wrote separately about two types of
information that must be communicated: in § 206.10 (a)(2)(i), about
providing applicants with program information, and, in §
206.10(a)(2)(ii), about developing procedures for recipients
themselves to provide information about changed circumstances that
might affect their benefits. The requirement of § 206.10(a)(2)(i)
that information be given to applicants in "written form, and
orally as appropriate," seems in fact to require no mailing of
information at all, but rather simply explains that printed
information about access to AFDC benefits, such as pamphlets,
booklets, and flyers, be
Page 485 U. S. 427
available, and that such information may be transmitted orally
as well. [
Footnote 13]
Respondent contends that the notice provision applies to
recipients of AFDC benefits, as well as applicants. She points to §
206.10(a)(1)(iii), which provides that
"[a]n applicant may be assisted, if he so desires, by an
individual(s) of his choice (who need not be a lawyer) in the
various aspects of the application process and the redetermination
of eligibility and may be accompanied by such individual(s) in
contacts with the agency and when so accompanied may also be
represented by them."
Since "redetermination of eligibility" involves "a review of
factors affecting AFDC eligibility and payment amount," §
206.10(b)(4), and thus clearly applies to recipients, respondent
contends that "applicant" is used in § 206.10(a)(1)(iii) to include
recipients as well, and therefore must have the same inclusive
meaning throughout § 206.10, including the notice provision.
Page 485 U. S. 428
We are unpersuaded. The term "recipients" is used in various
other provisions in the section, and appears simply to have been
inadvertently omitted at this juncture. The definition of the term
"applicant," understood in the context of eligibility
"redetermination," makes this omission apparent. An "applicant"
is
"a person who has, directly, or through his authorized
representative, or where incompetent or incapacitated, through
someone acting responsibly for him, made application for public
assistance from the agency administering the program, and whose
application has not been terminated."
§ 206.10(b)(1). Since redetermination of benefits affects only
those who have already been "determined to be eligible," §
206.10(a)(9), and an "applicant," by definition, has not yet been
determined to be eligible, it would therefore be impossible for an
applicant's case to be redetermined. Thus, it is plain that §
206.10(a)(1)(iii) omitted the word "recipient" when referring to
redetermination. [
Footnote
14]
Thus, a reading of the plain language of the notice provision
and other provisions in the same section reveals that
Page 485 U. S. 429
only applicants, and not recipients, are addressed by the
requirement that individuals be given information about the
program. Further, even as to applicants, the notice provision
requires only that general program information be available, in
"written form" and "orally as appropriate." [
Footnote 15]
The Secretary, who is responsible for enforcing the regulation,
does not agree with the strict interpretation adopted by the
District Court. Rather, he believes that it is generally
appropriate to rely on an oral explanation of the consequences of
receiving a lump-sum payment when the recipient reports it to the
family's caseworker. [
Footnote
16] We recognize that
Page 485 U. S. 430
the Secretary had not taken a position on this question until
this litigation. However, when it is the Secretary's regulation
that we are construing, and when there is no claim in this Court
that the regulation violates any constitutional or statutory
mandate, we are properly hesitant to substitute an alternative
reading for the Secretary's unless that alternative reading is
compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other
indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of the
regulation's promulgation.
Finally, respondent's emphasis on the harsh result in this
particular case [
Footnote
17] is actually, in large part, a criticism of the
Page 485 U. S. 431
lump-sum rule itself. The record indicates that, even if
respondent had known about the rule, she would have been
hard-pressed not to use most of the $5,752 payment to avoid a
foreclosure of the mortgage on the family home and to make promised
payments to other creditors. Further, even though the rule,
combined with the absence of advance notice, may have produced a
"Kafkaesque" result for the Jenkins family, it is not irrational to
assume that most needy families will realize that the receipt of a
large lump sum may affect their future eligibility for benefits,
and that it would be prudent to inform their caseworkers of the
development before spending the money. Moreover, the harshness of
the result is somewhat mitigated by the facts that the family's
benefits continued during the administrative appeal, and that the
recoupment process only subtracts 1% of each monthly AFDC check,
and the further fact that, if AFDC benefits are actually
terminated, a family may be immediately eligible for another form
of public assistance, albeit a less generous one. In all
Page 485 U. S. 432
events, since the regulation was written long before the
lump-sum rule was enacted, it clearly was not designed to forestall
the harsh consequences suffered by the Jenkinses.
In the final analysis, our decision rests on our agreement with
the Secretary and the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals that
the regulation simply requires the State to publish a general
description of the basic structure of the AFDC program and its
availability. We would require a much more precise mandate to the
States to permit courts to interfere with the workings of
governmental benefits programs by ordering the taking of certain
affirmative steps. [
Footnote
18]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
[
Footnote 1]
The statute was amended again in § 2632 of the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1141, to give States the option of
recalculating the period of ineligibility caused by receipt of a
lump sum in three situations not relevant here.
[
Footnote 2]
Examples of "lump-sum income" are provided in the federal
regulation that implements Congress' directive:
"When the AFDC assistance unit's income, after applying
applicable disregards, exceeds the State need standard for the
family because of receipt of nonrecurring earned or unearned lump
sum income (including for AFDC, title II and other retroactive
monthly benefits, and payments in the nature of a windfall,
e.g., inheritances or lottery winnings, personal injury
and worker compensation awards, to the extent it is not earmarked
and used for the purpose for which it is paid,
i.e.,
monies for back medical bills resulting from accidents or injury,
funeral and burial costs, replacement or repair of resources,
etc.), the family will be ineligible for aid for the full number of
months derived by dividing the sum of the lump sum income and other
income by the monthly need standard for a family of that size. . .
."
45 CFR § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F) (1987).
[
Footnote 3]
Under the lump-sum rule that had been in effect prior to 1981,
the family had an incentive to spend the entire amount in October
to avoid having any unspent amount treated as a "resource" in
future months, because excessive resources, like excessive income,
would make the family ineligible for AFDC benefits.
See Lukhard
v. Reed, 481 U. S. 368,
481 U. S.
371-373 (1987) (plurality opinion).
[
Footnote 4]
As the Appeals Referee later stated in his findings of fact
(which were adopted on appeal by the Deputy Commissioner,
see App. 73):
"The need standard for the [Jenkins] family unit is $724 per
month. Because of recoupment of a past overpayment, it did not
actually receive that amount each month. It received $688 each
month. The County Agency considered that, through its error,
overpayments were made in the amount of $724 monthly for the months
of October and November, 1983. It determined that eligibility would
not exist through the month of March, 1984, and that, if
eligibility existed for April, 1984, it would not be for a full
grant."
Id. at 71.
[
Footnote 5]
He stated, in part:
"While the County Agency should have advised the Petitioner of
the lump sum rule and how any Worker's Compensation or Disability
payments would be treated, the question does arise regarding
whether the recipients could have acted any differently if they
had known."
"The Federal policy regarding the treatment of lump sum payments
is punitive, and ignores the basic purposes of the AFDC Program. We
do not like the Order in this case, and would do anything to avoid
the harsh result. The State Agency must comply with Federal
Regulations as those regulations have been interpreted by legal
counsel. Neither our legal counsel nor State Agency staff believes
this is a good policy, but we have verified our interpretation with
the Federal Agency on numerous occasions. The effect of the Federal
policy is to deprive children of the minimum support available in
an already insufficient AFDC grant. It does not please us to affirm
the termination of the Petitioner's grant, but we see no
alternative within current Federal policy."
Id. at 75 (emphasis in original).
[
Footnote 6]
The original plaintiffs contended that the policy (1) violates
the Social Security Act because it fails to take into account the
actual availability of lump-sum funds in determining AFDC
eligibility, (2) violates the Act because it is improperly applied
to those members of the class who cannot, despite good faith
efforts, make their lump sums last for the entire period of
ineligibility, (3) creates an irrational, irrebuttable presumption
that the lump-sum payment would be available for use by the family
during the entire period of ineligibility, (4) violates due process
because it applies without advance notice, (5) results in the
"punishment" of needy children for their parents' improvidence, and
(6) violates equal protection principles by treating an AFDC
recipient more harshly than a family that received, and spent, a
lump sum immediately before applying for an AFDC grant.
See Complaint, 1 Record A-12 - A-15. The District Court
rejected each of these arguments, except (4), which it did not
reach due to its holding that advance notice was required by the
Secretary's regulation.
Slaughter v.
Levine, 598 F.
Supp. 1035, 1045-1049, 1052-1055 (Minn.1984). The Department
had also filed a third-party complaint against the Secretary,
claiming that 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17) (1982 ed. and Supp. III) does
not apply to unavailable lump sums, and that HHS' lump-sum
regulations are invalid to the extent that they require States to
consider unavailable lump sums; these claims were rejected. 598 F.
Supp. at 1045-1049. The Department also asked for, and was granted,
a District Court order that the Secretary pay the federal share of
any benefits paid to class members as a result of the court's
decision.
Slaughter v. Levine, 605 F.
Supp. 1242, 1249-1250 (Minn.1985). The Secretary filed an
appeal from this order, but subsequently withdrew it.
See
Slaughter v. Levine, 801 F.2d 288, 294, n. 8 (CA8 1986) (case
below).
[
Footnote 7]
It defined the class as follows:
"[T]hose individuals in the State of Minnesota who are otherwise
eligible for AFDC benefits and who have been, or will be, found
ineligible for AFDC benefits for a predetermined number of months
as a consequence of receipt of lump sum income by one of the
members of an AFDC assistance unit of which they have been a
member, and whose lump sum has or will become unavailable to them
in whole or in part prior to their re-eligibility for
benefits."
598 F. Supp. at 1041.
[
Footnote 8]
Because the remaining named plaintiff from the initial complaint
had not spent any of her lump-sum funds prior to receipt of notice
of the Department's policy, plaintiffs' counsel conceded that she
was not an adequate representative of the class. For that reason,
although respondent was an intervenor, she became the class
representative.
See 605 F. Supp. at 1245-1247, and n.
3.
[
Footnote 9]
"[A] lump-sum recipient without notice of the new rule is very
likely to spend most or all of a lump sum before learning of the
rule's strict budgeting requirements, particularly when the
recipient is familiar with the prior policy. Consequently, the net
result of failing to give adequate advance notice of the new
lump-sum rule is to frustrate the very goal Congress sought to
further in enacting the rule: encouraging recipients to budget lump
sums so that they serve to replace the family's monthly AFDC
check."
801 F.2d at 295-296 (footnote omitted).
[
Footnote 10]
"The importance of advance notice is heightened by the fact that
the effects of the lump-sum rule on an AFDC recipient can be
peculiarly drastic. In general, the AFDC program's
income-and-asset-related eligibility requirements reduce or cut off
eligibility only if the resource is actually available to the
recipient. However, the new lump-sum rule diverges from the norm,
cutting off eligibility without regard, except in very limited
circumstances, to whether the lump sum is actually available. Thus,
under the operation of most eligibility requirements, there is no
point at which a family will not have either the basic support
provided by the AFDC program or other financial resources that
equal or surpass the AFDC standard of need. In contrast, under the
lump-sum rule, where a family exhausts its lump sum before its
ineligibility period expires, the family may well be left for
months with insufficient resources to provide for basic
necessities. To impose this situation on a family that had no
advance notice of the new lump-sum rule and operated on the
altogether reasonable assumption that the old policy still governed
would be truly Kafkaesque."
Id. at 296 (footnotes omitted).
[
Footnote 11]
The first change described in the letter was the new lump-sum
rule. The letter stated:
"
Lump Sum Money: When a family receives lump-sum money
such as an inheritance, a Social Security back payment, insurance
settlement, gift, etc., the money will be deducted from the AFDC
grant, whether or not it has already been spent. If the lump sum
added to other family income totals more than the AFDC maximum for
that size family, the family will be ineligible for the month in
which the lump sum was received (and possibly for a number of
following months), whether or not the money is spent before the
period of ineligibility has gone by. If the family already received
an AFDC grant that month, the grant would be 'recouped' by the
welfare agency."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 97-98.
[
Footnote 12]
Respondent objects that the Department did not raise this
contention below. Although it did not elaborate on the point, the
Department did, though, comment that
"[b]asically, [the regulation] is
directed toward new
applicants, requiring that the state publicize the
availability of the AFDC program through the use of pamphlets."
Brief for Appellant in No. 855143-MN (CA8), p. 24 (emphasis
added). Moreover, the Department raised the argument in the
petition for a writ.of certiorari,
see Pet. for Cert. 11,
and respondent did not object, in her brief in opposition, that the
Department had not raised the claim below. Thus, in accordance with
our rule that
"[n]onjurisdictional defects of this sort should be brought to
our attention
no later than in respondent's brief in
opposition to the petition for certiorari,"
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.
S. 808,
471 U. S. 816
(1985) (emphasis in original), "we consider it within our
discretion to deem the defect waived."
Ibid. Finally, the
issue in this case, as raised by respondent's complaint, is the
meaning of the notice provision of the federal regulations. Whether
or not the provision covers recipients as well as applicants is
germane to that interpretive quest, regardless of whether one of
the parties points us in that direction.
[
Footnote 13]
Petitioner also points out that, although the notice provision
originally referred simply to "applicants,"
see 36
Fed.Reg. 3860, 3864 (1971), in 1978 it underwent a temporary
metamorphosis. The Secretary published a notice of proposed
rulemaking, 41 Fed.Reg. 56832 (1976), to respond to
"reports from recipient group representatives that some State
and local agencies have not made printed or oral information about
the public assistance programs available to persons seeking
information unless they are applicants."
43 Fed.Reg. 6949 (1978). Accordingly, the notice provision
was
"revised to specify that information concerning the program
shall be provided to any person who requests it, and applicants and
all persons who inquire about the programs shall be informed of the
eligibility requirements and the rights and obligations of
individuals under the programs."
Id. at 6950. The next year, without explanation, the
notice provision was shifted back to its original, and current,
form.
See 44 Fed.Reg. 17940, 17943 (1979). We agree with
petitioner that this history provides strong support for the
conclusion that the current provision does not extend beyond
applicants. It also tends to buttress our reasoning in the text
that the notice provision was intended simply as a requirement that
general program information be made available to applicants upon
request, and not as a mandate to States to provide specific,
unrequested information about particular changes in eligibility
requirements to current benefits recipients, or, as we also discuss
in the text, to applicants.
[
Footnote 14]
The Secretary's comments accompanying the regulations as
originally promulgated strongly support this conclusion. As
originally proposed in 1970, the redetermination provision read
"[a]n applicant
or recipient may be assisted if he so
desires by other individuals of his choice in the various aspects
of the application process and the redetermination of eligibility.
. . ."
35 Fed.Reg. 18402 (1970) (emphasis added). When the provision
was adopted several months later, the reference to "recipients" was
eliminated, even though the reference to "redetermination of
eligibility" was retained. 36 Fed.Reg. 3860, 3864 (1971). The
Secretary's explanatory comments continued to acknowledge the
distinction between applicants and recipients, but did not explain
the deletion of the term "recipients" from the text of the rule
itself:
"[N]otice of proposed rulemaking was published . . . to provide
that applicants for and recipients of public assistance may be
accompanied by other individuals in their contacts with the agency,
if they so wish."
Id. at 3860. Thus, the history of these regulations
supports the conclusion in the text that the word "recipient" was
inadvertently omitted when referring to redetermination, and,
accordingly, that "applicant," as used in the notice provision,
means simply "applicant," and nothing more.
[
Footnote 15]
The lump-sum rule is only one of many conditions of eligibility
for AFDC benefits that are meticulously described in 40 pages of
the Code of Federal Regulations and in 66 pages of Minnesota's
recently revised AFDC rules and regulations.
See 45 CFR
pt. 233 (1987); Minn. Rules, ch. 9500.2000
et seq. (1987).
The conditions are subject to frequent alteration, with many
changes such as the new lump-sum rule affecting only a small
minority of AFDC recipients. Unquestionably it would be wise
(assuming that it were feasible and not too expensive) to precede
every such change with adequate advance notice, but the regulation
itself does not unambiguously impose any such requirement on state
welfare agencies.
[
Footnote 16]
In rebutting the argument that the Secretary's views are due
deference from us, respondent points to the Secretary's response to
an interrogatory put to him by petitioner's predecessor as
third-party plaintiff, a response upon which the Court of Appeals
relied:
"Federal regulations at 45 CFR § 206.10(a)(2)(i) and (ii)
require a State agency to inform AFDC applicants and recipients
about eligibility requirements and their rights and obligations
under the AFDC Program. Under these requirements, States are fully
expected to establish policies to ensure that individuals are
provided information in written form, and orally as appropriate,
about coverage, conditions of eligibility, scope of the program and
related services available.
This would include generally
advising applicants and recipients of their obligation to report
receipt of lump-sum income, the operation of the lump-sum rule, and
the effect on eligibility for assistance."
App. 89 (emphasis added). While the highlighted sentence indeed
indicates that individuals must be advised to report receipt of
lump-sum income, it does not specify whether such advisement must
be made in specific mailings --
i.e., a letter to
recipients telling them to report receipt of lump-sum income as
soon as it is received and before the normal monthly reporting, if
necessary -- or whether such advisement could be satisfied through
the general notice telling individuals to report all of their
income, including lump-sum income, on a usual, monthly basis. In
fact, in response to a separate interrogatory, the Secretary
explained:
"A State has considerable latitude in the development of
procedures it shall adopt to ensure effective administration of the
AFDC program.
Provisions at 45 CFR § 206.10(a)(2)(i) do not
require a State to publicize the lump-sum rule or any other
eligibility requirements in specifically developed pamphlets or
bulletins."
Id. at 90-91 (emphasis added). This second answer tends
to support our reading of the first answer, namely, that it is
inconclusive on the question whether States must notify individuals
in advance to report lump-sum income immediately upon its receipt,
or, for that matter, whether States must notify individuals in
advance about the effect of the new lump-sum rule.
[
Footnote 17]
Respondent deems this case particularly harsh because of an
earlier incident involving her family. When the Department sent its
September, 1981, letter explaining the new lump-sum rule, the
Jenkinses were receiving AFDC benefits, and received a lump-sum
payment later that year. However, because of obligations incurred
in other litigation, the Department had not yet implemented the new
lump-sum rule, and respondent's lump-sum payment was treated under
the old rule. Accordingly, respondent contends, she had every
reason to believe that the old lump-sum rule was still in effect
when her husband received the October, 1983, Social Security
payment. However, respondent fails to note during this argument
that she swore to an affidavit that stated:
"The welfare department apparently says that I got a letter in
September of 1981 explaining the new lump sum rule. I have been
shown a copy of the letter, and don't remember receiving it."
Id. at 111. Respondent cannot have it both ways: either
she received the letter and can argue that, because the new
lump-sum rule was not applied to her late 1981 lump-sum payment,
she had good cause to believe the new rule was not going to go into
effect; or, she did not receive the letter and cannot invoke this
equitable argument. Respondent's affidavit admission forecloses the
former argument.
The latter argument -- that respondent did not receive the 1981
letter (or that she received it but did not understand it) and that
therefore she acted in 1983 under the general assumption that,
absent notice of the new lump-sum rule, the old lump-sum rule was
still in effect -- carried some weight with both the District Court
and the Court of Appeals.
See Slaughter v. Levine, 598
F.Supp. at 1050-1051;
Slaughter v. Levine, 801 F.2d at
295-296. We are sympathetic with the plight of those AFDC
recipients in this situation, and can only reiterate that our
decision today is an endorsement of neither the new lump-sum rule
nor the absence of notice thereof. Instead, our authority is merely
to determine whether the pertinent provision of the regulations
requires advance written notice to individuals explaining the
workings of the new lump-sum rule. As we have explained, 45 CFR §
206.10(a)(2)(i) (1987) simply does not provide the specific mandate
that respondent seeks.
[
Footnote 18]
Our decision, of course, means that the Department may recoup
the overpayment made to respondent.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, and with whom
JUSTICE MARSHALL joins as to the last paragraph, concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part.
The Court's approach to this case is summarized in its statement
that
"when it is the Secretary's regulation that we are construing,
and when there is no claim in this Court that the regulation
violates any constitutional or statutory mandate, we are properly
hesitant to substitute an alternative reading for the Secretary's
unless that alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's
plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent at
the time of the regulation's promulgation."
Ante at
485 U. S. 430.
I agree with this proposition, but I disagree with the Court's
application of it here. In the course of this litigation, the
Secretary took what I believe
Page 485 U. S. 433
are two inconsistent positions. Because I regard the Secretary's
later position as far less reasonable than his earlier position, I
would hold him to his earlier and better interpretation.
In November, 1982, respondent Kathryn Jenkins applied for AFDC
benefits. Mrs. Jenkins' husband is disabled, they have five minor
children, and the family was found eligible for benefits. In
October, 1983, Mr. Jenkins received a retroactive Social Security
disability payment. The family immediately used the bulk of this
lump-sum payment to pay their overdue bills. Under the provisions
of a federal statute adopted in 1981, using the lump-sum payment in
this way rendered the family ineligible for any AFDC benefits
during the next several months. Mrs. Jenkins promptly reported
receipt of the lump sum, and its expenditure, to her caseworker.
The caseworker informed her of the ineligibility rule, and a
written notice followed the next day. Mrs. Jenkins took an
administrative appeal of the decision to suspend her benefits, and
monthly payments continued while the appeal was pending. The
Minnesota Department of Human Services (the Department) ultimately
upheld the ineligibility determination and ordered recoupment of
payments the Jenkins family had received during the appeal
process.
The federal regulation at issue in this case provides that
applicants for AFDC benefits "shall be informed about the
eligibility requirements and their rights and obligations under the
program." 45 CFR § 206.10(a)(2)(i) (1987). The regulation goes on
to specify that applicants are to be given information, "in written
form, and orally as appropriate," about certain aspects of the
program, including "the rights and responsibilities of applicants
for and recipients of assistance."
Ibid. A natural reading
of this language suggests that applicants should be provided with
information sufficient to enable them to exercise their rights and
fulfill their responsibilities under the program. Thus, at the very
least, the regulation suggests that applicants should be given
enough written information
Page 485 U. S. 434
to warn them of the circumstances under which they should seek
further oral explanations of the program's operation and
requirements. A reasonable person would be unlikely to suspect that
a lump-sum payment should not be used to pay off the family's
outstanding debts. For that reason, the Department's failure to
notify applicants for AFDC benefits of the new rule was sure to
affect some persons in a manner that the Court of Appeals called
"truly Kafkaesque."
Slaughter v. Levine, 801 F.2d 288, 296
(CA8 1986) (opinion below).
The Secretary contends that the notice regulation at issue does
not require any warning about the effects of the lump-sum rule
until after an AFDC recipient reports receipt of a lump sum to the
appropriate state agency. By that time, as the incident with the
Jenkins family suggests, it may well be too late for warnings to be
of any use. As the Court emphasizes, however, the language of the
regulation is so general that one could hardly conclude that the
Secretary's interpretation is strictly incompatible with that
language. Thus, if all we had before us was the regulation itself
and the Secretary's interpretation of it, I might have to agree
that we should defer to the Secretary's construction of his own
regulation. In answer to an interrogatory filed in this very case,
however, the Secretary took a different position than the one he
now maintains:
"Federal regulations at 45 CFR § 206.10(a)(2)(i) and (ii)
require a State agency to inform AFDC applicants and recipients
about eligibility requirements and their rights and obligations
under the AFDC Program. Under these requirements, States are fully
expected to establish policies to ensure that individuals are
provided information in written form, and orally as appropriate,
about coverage, conditions of eligibility, scope of the program and
related services available.
This would include generally
advising applicants and recipients of their obligation to report
receipt of lump sum income, the operation
Page 485 U. S. 435
of the lump sum rule, and the effect on eligibility for
assistance."
App. 89 (emphasis added).
*
Unlike the majority,
see ante at
485 U. S.
429-430, n. 16, I cannot reconcile the highlighted
sentence with the Secretary's current position. I read that
sentence to imply that individuals who may be affected by the
lump-sum rule should be given enough information, in advance, to
warn them against using lump-sum income in the normal way,
viz., to pay one's outstanding debts. That is a far more
reasonable position than the one the Secretary later adopted, and I
would hold him to his earlier and better interpretation.
Cf.
Bowen v. American Hospital Assn., 476 U.
S. 610,
476 U. S. 646,
n. 34 (1986) (plurality opinion):
"The fact that the agency's interpretation 'has been neither
consistent nor longstanding . . . substantially diminishes the
deference to be given to [the agency's] present interpretation of
the statute.'
Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U. S.
397,
442 U. S. 412, n. 11 [1979]
(citing
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S.
125,
429 U. S. 143 (1976))."
Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals to the extent
that it found a violation of the federal notice regulation.
The relief granted in this case, however, was too broad. The
District Court ordered the Department "to forthwith
Page 485 U. S. 436
prepare a notice explaining the lump sum policy."
Slaughter
v. Levine, 598 F.
Supp. 1035, 1055 (Minn.1984). Not only was this notice to be
provided to all applicants, it was also to be mailed to all current
AFDC recipients and provided again to all recipients each six
months.
Ibid. The District Court also specified that the
notice "should provide a thorough explanation of the mechanics of
the [lump-sum] rule."
Ibid.
The Secretary has never suggested an interpretation of the
notice regulation that would justify such elaborate procedures.
First, although I believe that the Secretary did conclude that
affected persons should be notified of the lump-sum rule, he never
suggested that
repeated notifications were called for. The
Department in fact mailed a letter about the new rule to all
then-current AFDC recipients shortly before the rule went into
effect. That letter was sufficient notice to the individuals who
received it. Furthermore, the Secretary answered an interrogatory
in this case with the following statement:
"A State has considerable latitude in the development of
procedures it shall adopt to ensure effective administration of the
AFDC program. Provisions at 45 CFR § 206.10(a)(2)(i) do not require
a State to publicize the lump sum rule or any other eligibility
requirements in specifically developed pamphlets or bulletins."
App. 90-91.
Reading this statement in light of the regulation and the other
answer quoted above, I conclude that the Secretary interpreted his
regulation to require, as to future applicants, only that the
Department add a general statement about the new lump-sum rule to
its informational materials as soon as reasonably practicable.
Because the Department failed to advise applicants about the
lump-sum rule for several years after it came into effect, the
District Court could also have required the Department to cure that
error by informing the affected recipients about the rule. To the
extent that the
Page 485 U. S. 437
District Court required the Department to go further, however,
by giving repeated written notice and by distributing "specifically
developed pamphlets or bulletins," that court unduly infringed the
discretion that the regulation was intended to leave in the
responsible state agencies.
The District Court was also mistaken in ordering the Department
to provide, in writing, a "thorough explanation of the mechanics"
of the lump-sum rule. The Secretary quite reasonably argues that
such a requirement could easily prove counterproductive because of
the complexity of the mechanics involved. Indeed, the detailed
explanation given in the Department's letter of September 1981,
quoted
ante at
485 U. S. 424,
n. 11, which might not be immediately intelligible even to a
trained lawyer, suggests that oral explanations of the rule's
operation would be the best way to provide effective notice. Had
the Department taken reasonable steps to inform all AFDC applicants
of the need to seek an oral explanation at the appropriate time,
the purpose of the regulation would have been satisfied. In my
view, a simple statement like the following would suffice:
"Anytime you receive a lump-sum payment (such as an inheritance,
a Social Security back payment, an insurance settlement, a gift,
etc.), you should inform your caseworker
before you spend
the money or use it to pay off your debts."
The Court of Appeals also concluded that the Department could be
enjoined from recouping the payments that were made to respondent
Jenkins during the period that her family was ineligible under the
provisions of the new lump-sum rule. The court reasoned that, "[b]y
failing to comply with the notice regulation, [the Department]
failed to institute a legal change in its eligibility rules." 801
F.2d at 301-302. This conclusion was clearly inconsistent with
federal law. In adopting the new lump-sum rule, Congress provided
that it "shall become effective on October 1, 1981," or that, if
conforming changes in state law were necessary, then it "will
become effective" as of the first month after the first state
legislative
Page 485 U. S. 438
session ending on or after October 1, 1981. Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub.L. 97-35, § 2321, 95 Stat. 859-860.
For Minnesota, the result was an effective date of February 1,
1982.
See 801 F.2d at 303 (dissenting opinion below).
Congress gave no indication whatsoever that the effective date for
the new lump-sum rule could be delayed by the action or inaction of
state agencies. Whether or not Jenkins received notice in accord
with the Secretary's regulation, therefore, the lump-sum rule
applied to her when her husband received the retroactive disability
payment in 1983. The Department was accordingly required by federal
law to recoup the overpayments that she received during her appeal
of the Department's decision to apply the new lump-sum rule in her
case.
See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(22) (1982 ed., Supp. III); 45
CFR § 233.20 (a)(13)(i) (1987).
In sum, my disagreement with the Court's decision is relatively
narrow. I would hold that the federal notice regulation, as
interpreted by the Secretary, requires the Department to give
applicants for AFDC benefits written notice at least of the
existence of the lump-sum rule and of the need for recipients to
consult with a social worker before spending any lump sum they
might receive. I therefore think that the District Court could
properly have ordered the Department to take reasonable steps to
include this information in its standard bulletins or pamphlets,
and to take reasonable steps to provide the same information to
AFDC recipients who were improperly deprived of this information
when they applied for benefits. To the extent that the Court of
Appeals approved additional relief in this case, I agree that its
judgment must be reversed.
* The regulation at 45 CFR § 206.10(a)(2)(i) (1987) refers only
to "applicants," not to "recipients." The regulation at 45 CFR §
206.10(a)(2)(ii) (1987) says:
"Procedures shall be adopted which are designed to assure that
recipients make timely and accurate reports of any change in
circumstances which may affect their eligibility or the amount of
assistance."
In the answer quoted in the text, the Secretary seems to have
read the two provisions to require that applicants be informed
about the lump-sum rule, and to require that recipients who were
not informed about the rule when they were applicants also be
informed. While this is not the only possible interpretation of the
regulations, it is not unreasonable: if new applicants need to be
informed about the new lump-sum rule, certainly current recipients
would have an even greater need to be alerted to the fact that the
old rule was being changed. In any event, just before the new
lump-sum rule was to take effect, the Department did in fact notify
all AFDC recipients about the new rule.