Under § 109 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981
(OBRA), no household may become eligible to participate in the food
stamp program while any of its members is on strike, or receive an
increase in the allotment of food stamps it is already receiving
because the income of the striking member has decreased. Appellee
unions and union members brought suit in Federal District Court,
contending that § 109 is unconstitutional. The court granted
appellees summary judgment and issued a declaratory judgment,
holding the statute unconstitutional on the grounds that it
interferes with appellees' associational rights and strikers'
expressive rights under the First Amendment, and violates the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The Secretary of Agriculture appealed the decision
directly to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252.
Held:
1. Section 109 does not violate the First Amendment. Pp.
485 U. S.
364-369.
(a) The statute does not infringe the individual appellees'
right to associate with their families or the associational rights
of the individual appellees and their unions. It does not prohibit
individuals from dining together or associating together to conduct
a strike, nor in any other way "directly and substantially"
interfere with family living arrangements or workers' ability to
combine together to assert their lawful rights. Even if isolated
instances can be found in which a striking individual may have left
the other members of his household in order to increase their
allotment of food stamps or left his union for that purpose, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, it is "exceedingly unlikely" that §
109 will have any effect at all.
Cf. Lyng v. Castillo,
477 U. S. 635. The
Constitution does not require the Government to furnish funds to
maximize the exercise of the right of association or to minimize
any resulting economic hardship. Pp.
485 U. S.
364-368.
(b) The statute does not abridge appellees' right to express
themselves about union matters free of coercion by the Government.
Rather
Page 485 U. S. 361
than exacting payments from individuals, coercing particular
beliefs, or requiring appellees to participate in political
activities or support political views with which they disagree, §
109 merely declines to extend additional food stamp assistance to
strikers simply because the strike has caused a decline in their
income.
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.
S. 209, distinguished. The Constitution does not confer
an entitlement to such governmental funds as may be necessary for
individuals to realize all the advantages of their right to free
expression. P.
485 U. S.
369.
2. Section 109 does not violate the equal protection component
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, since it is
rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of
avoiding undue favoritism in private labor disputes. Although the
statute does work at least some discrimination against strikers and
their households, this Court must defer to Congress' view that the
disbursement of food stamps to such persons damages the program's
public integrity, and thus endangers its legitimate goals. The fact
that § 109 is harder on strikers than on "voluntary quitters" does
not render it irrational, since the neutrality concern does not
arise with respect to the latter persons. Congress' considered
efforts to avoid favoritism are evidenced by § 109's provisos
preserving prestrike eligibility and eligibility when a household
member has refused to accept employment because of a strike or
lockout. OBRA was also enacted for the legitimate purpose of
protecting the Government's fiscal integrity by cutting
expenditures, and, although this objective cannot be pursued by
discriminating against individuals or groups, the Constitution does
not permit this Court to disturb the judgment of Congress, the body
having discretion as to how best to spend money to improve the
general welfare, that passing § 109 along with its provisos was
preferable to undertaking other budget cuts in the food stamp
program. The contention that § 109 irrationally "strikes at the
striker through his family" is without merit, since the food stamp
program generally operates against the household of an ineligible
person, and the fact that the Act determines benefits on a
"household" rather than an individual basis is not constitutionally
significant. Pp.
485 U. S.
370-374.
648
F. Supp. 1234, reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined.
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
BLACKMUN, JJ., joined,
post, p.
485 U. S. 374.
KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
Page 485 U. S. 362
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
A 1981 amendment to the Food Stamp Act states that no household
shall become eligible to participate in the food stamp program
during the time that any member of the household is on strike or
shall increase the allotment of food stamps that it was receiving
already because the income of the striking member has decreased. We
must decide whether this provision is valid under the First and the
Fifth Amendments.
I
In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), Pub.L.
97-35, 95 Stat. 357, Congress enacted a package of budget cuts
throughout the Federal Government. Among the measures contained in
OBRA were more than a dozen specific changes in the food stamp
program,
id. §§ 101-117. [
Footnote 1] One of them was the amendment at issue in
Page 485 U. S. 363
this case, § 109 of OBRA, which is set out in the margin.
[
Footnote 2] The Committee
Reports estimated that this measure alone would save a total of
about $165 million in fiscal years 1982, 1983, and 1984. H.R.Rep.
at 12; S.Rep. at 63.
In 1984, two labor unions and several individual union members
brought suit against the Secretary of Agriculture in District
Court, contending that § 109 is unconstitutional and requesting
declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs moved for a
preliminary injunction, and the Secretary moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that Congress' action was well within its
constitutional prerogatives. After a hearing, the District Court
denied both motions.
648
F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (DC 1986) (Appendix).
Both sides conducted discovery and filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. On November 14, 1986, the District Court granted
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and issued a declaratory
judgment, holding the statute unconstitutional.
648 F.
Supp. 1234. Specifically, the District Court found that the
amendment to the Food Stamp Act was unconstitutional on three
different grounds. First, it interferes or threatens to interfere
with the First Amendment rights of the individual plaintiffs to
associate with their families, with their unions, and with fellow
union members, as
Page 485 U. S. 364
well as the reciprocal rights under the First Amendment of the
union plaintiffs to their members' association with them. Second,
it interferes with strikers' First Amendment right to express
themselves about union matters free of coercion by the Government.
Third, it violates the equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As the basis for its
conclusion on the equal protection claim, the District Court
mentioned several somewhat related deficiencies in the amendment:
it betrays an animus against an unpopular political minority, it
irrationally treats strikers worse than individuals who quit a job,
and it impermissibly directs the onus of the striker's actions
against the rest of his family.
Id. at 1239-1241. The
Secretary appealed the decision directly to this Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1252, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 481 U.S. 1036
(1987). We now reverse.
II
We deal first with the District Court's holding that § 109
violates the associational and expressive rights of appellees under
the First Amendment. These claimed constitutional infringements are
also pressed as a basis for finding that appellees' rights of
"fundamental importance" have been burdened, thus requiring this
Court to examine appellees' equal protection claims under a
heightened standard of review.
Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U. S. 374,
434 U. S. 383
(1978). Since we conclude that the statute does not infringe either
the associational or expressive rights of appellees, we must reject
both parts of this analysis.
A
The challenge to the statute based on the associational rights
asserted by appellees is foreclosed by the reasoning this Court
adopted in
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.
S. 635 (1986). There we considered a constitutional
challenge to the definition of "household" in the Food Stamp Act, 7
U.S.C. § 2012(i), which treats parents, siblings, and children who
live together, but not more distant relatives or unrelated
persons
Page 485 U. S. 365
who do so, as a single household for purposes of defining
eligibility for food stamps. Although the challenge in that case
was brought solely on equal protection grounds, and not under the
First Amendment, the Court was obliged to decide whether the
statutory classification should be reviewed under a stricter
standard than mere rational basis review because it "
directly
and substantially' interfere[s] with family living arrangements and
thereby burden[s] a fundamental right." 477 U.S. at 477 U. S. 638.
The Court held that it did not, explaining that the definition of
"household" does not
"order or prevent any group of persons from dining together.
Indeed, in the overwhelming majority of cases, it probably has no
effect at all. It is exceedingly unlikely that close relatives
would choose to live apart simply to increase their allotment of
food stamps, for the costs of separate housing would almost
certainly exceed the incremental value of the additional
stamps."
Ibid.; see also id. at
477 U. S. 643
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (stating that rational basis review is
applicable);
ibid. (WHITE, J., dissenting) (same).
The same rationale applies in this case. As was true of the
provision at issue in
Castillo, it is "exceedingly
unlikely" that § 109 will "prevent any group of persons from dining
together."
Id. at
477 U. S. 638. Even if isolated instances can be found
in which a striking individual may have left the other members of
the household in order to increase their allotment of food stamps,
[
Footnote 3] "in the
overwhelming majority of cases, [the statute] probably has no
effect at all."
Ibid. The statute certainly does not
"order" any individuals not to dine together;
Page 485 U. S. 366
nor does it in any other way "
directly and substantially'
interfere with family living arrangements." Ibid.
The statute also does not infringe the associational rights of
appellee individuals and their unions. We have recognized that
"one of the foundations of our society is the right of
individuals to combine with other persons in pursuit of a common
goal by lawful means,"
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.
S. 886,
458 U. S. 933
(1982), and our recognition of this right encompasses the
combination of individual workers together in order better to
assert their lawful rights.
See, e.g., Railroad Trainmen v.
Virginia, 377 U. S. 1,
377 U. S. 5-6
(1964). But in this case, the statute at issue does not
"
directly and substantially' interfere" with appellees' ability
to associate for this purpose. Lyng, supra, at
485 U.S. 638. [Footnote 4] It does not "order"
appellees not to associate together for the purpose of conducting a
strike, or for any other purpose, and it does not "prevent" them
from associating together or burden their ability to do so in any
significant manner. As we have just stated with respect to the
effect of this statute on an individual's decision to remain in or
to leave his or her household, it seems "exceedingly unlikely" that
this statute will prevent individuals from continuing to associate
together in unions to promote their lawful objectives. 477 U.S. at
477 U. S.
638.
Prior cases indicate that § 109 has no unconstitutional impact
on the right of individuals to associate for various purposes.
Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
335 U. S. 525,
335 U. S.
530-531 (1949), for example, held that, where a State
forbids employers to restrict employment to members of a union,
enforcement of that state policy does not abridge
Page 485 U. S. 367
the associational rights of unions or their members, despite
their claim that a closed shop "is
indispensable to the right
of self-organization and the association of workers into unions.'"
Similarly, in Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary
Club, 481 U. S. 537,
481 U. S. 548
(1987), we held that requiring Rotary Clubs to admit women "does
not require the clubs to abandon or alter" any of their activities
or their basic goals, and therefore did not abridge the members'
associational rights. Both of those cases upheld state laws that
exerted a much more direct and substantial threat to associational
freedoms than the statute at issue here. [Footnote 5]
Page 485 U. S. 368
Any impact on associational rights in this case results from the
Government's refusal to extend food stamp benefits to those on
strike, who are now without their wage income. Denying such
benefits makes it harder for strikers to maintain themselves and
their families during the strike and exerts pressure on them to
abandon their union. Strikers and their union would be much better
off if food stamps were available, but the strikers' right of
association does not require the Government to furnish funds to
maximize the exercise of that right.
"We have held in several contexts [including the First
Amendment] that a legislature's decision not to subsidize the
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right."
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,
461 U. S. 540,
461 U. S. 549
(1983). Exercising the right to strike inevitably risks economic
hardship, but we are not inclined to hold that the right of
association requires the Government to minimize that result by
qualifying the striker for food stamps.
In
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory,
431 U. S. 471
(1977), we upheld a statute that denied unemployment compensation
benefits to workers who are thrown out of work as a result of a
labor dispute other than a lockout, saying that the case "does not
involve any discernible fundamental interest."
Id. at
431 U. S. 489.
[
Footnote 6] Although the
complaining worker there was a nonstriking employee of a parent
company that found it necessary to close because its subsidiary was
on strike, it is clear enough that the same result would have
obtained had the striking employees themselves applied for
compensation.
Page 485 U. S. 369
B
For the same reasons, we cannot agree that § 109 abridges
appellees' right to express themselves about union matters free of
coercion by the Government. Appellees rely on
Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209
(1977). But we do not read either
Abood or the First
Amendment as providing support for this claim. In
Abood,
the challenged state law required certain employees to pay a fee to
their representative union. We ruled that this law violated the
First Amendment insofar as it allowed those funds to be used to
promote political and ideological purposes with which the employees
disagreed and to which they objected, because, by its terms, the
employees were "compelled to make . . . contributions for political
purposes."
Id. at
431 U. S. 234. We based this conclusion on our
observation that
"at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an
individual should be free to believe as he will, and that, in a
free society, one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his
conscience, rather than coerced by the State."
Id. at
431 U. S.
234-235. By contrast, the statute challenged in this
case requires no exaction from any individual; it does not "coerce"
belief; and it does not require appellees to participate in
political activities or support political views with which they
disagree. It merely declines to extend additional food stamp
assistance to striking individuals simply because the decision to
strike inevitably leads to a decline in their income. And this
Court has explicitly stated that, even where the Constitution
prohibits coercive governmental interference with specific
individual rights, it "
does not confer an entitlement to such
funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that
freedom.'" Regan, supra, at 461 U. S. 550,
quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297,
448 U. S. 318
(1980). [Footnote 7]
Page 485 U. S. 370
III
Because the statute challenged here has no substantial impact on
any fundamental interest and does not "affect with particularity
any protected class,"
Hodory, supra, at
431 U. S. 489,
[
Footnote 8] we confine our
consideration to whether the statutory classification "is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest."
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.
S. 528,
413 U. S. 533
(1973). We have stressed that this standard of review is typically
quite deferential; legislative classifications are "presumed to be
valid,"
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U. S. 307,
427 U. S. 314
(1976), largely for the reason that "the drawing of lines that
create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an
unavoidable one."
Ibid.; see Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U. S. 471,
397 U. S. 485
(1970).
Appellant submits that this statute serves three objectives.
Most obvious, given its source in OBRA, is to cut federal
expenditures. Second, the limited funds available
Page 485 U. S. 371
were to be used when the need was likely to be greatest, an
approach which Congress thought did not justify food stamps for
strikers. Third was the concern that the food stamp program was
being used to provide one-sided support for labor strikes; the
Senate Report indicated that the amendment was intended to remove
the basis for that perception and criticism. S.Rep. at 62.
We have little trouble in concluding that § 109 is rationally
related to the legitimate governmental objective of avoiding undue
favoritism to one side or the other in private labor disputes. The
Senate Report declared:
"Public policy demands an end to the food stamp subsidization of
all strikers who become eligible for the program solely through the
temporary loss of income during a strike. Union strike funds should
be responsible for providing support and benefits to strikers
during labor-management disputes."
Ibid. It was no part of the purposes of the Food Stamp
Act to establish a program that would serve as a weapon in labor
disputes; the Act was passed to alleviate hunger and malnutrition
and to strengthen the agricultural economy. 7 U.S.C. § 2011. The
Senate Report stated that "allowing strikers to be eligible for
food stamps has damaged the program's public integrity," and thus
endangers these other goals served by the program. S.Rep. at 62.
Congress acted in response to these problems.
It would be difficult to deny that this statute works at least
some discrimination against strikers and their households. For the
duration of the strike, those households cannot increase their
allotment of food stamps, even though the loss of income occasioned
by the strike may well be enough to qualify them for food stamps or
to increase their allotment if the fact of the strike itself were
ignored. Yet Congress was in a difficult position when it sought to
address the problems it had identified. Because a striking
individual faces an immediate and often total drop in income during
a strike, a single controversy pitting an employer against its
employees can
Page 485 U. S. 372
lead to a large number of claims for food stamps for as long as
the controversy endures. It is the disbursement of food stamps in
response to such a controversy that constitutes the source of the
concern, and of the dangers to the program, that Congress believed
it was important to remedy. We are not free in this instance to
reject Congress' views about "what constitutes wise economic or
social policy."
Dandridge, supra, at
397 U. S.
486.
It is true that in terms of the scope and extent of their
ineligibility for food stamps, § 109 is harder on strikers than on
"voluntary quitters." [
Footnote
9]
See 648 F. Supp. at 1253-1254 (Appendix A);
compare 7 CFR § 273.1(g) (1987) with
id. §
273.7(n). But the concern about neutrality in labor disputes does
not arise with respect to those who, for one reason or another,
simply quit their jobs. As we have stated in a related context,
even if the statute "provides only
rough justice,' its
treatment . . . is far from irrational." Hodory, 431 U.S.
at 431 U. S. 491.
Congress need not draw a statutory classification to the
satisfaction of the most sharp-eyed observers in order to meet the
limitations that the Constitution imposes in this setting. And we
are not authorized to ignore Congress' considered efforts to avoid
favoritism in labor disputes, which are evidenced also by the two
significant provisos contained in the statute. The first proviso
preserves eligibility for the program of any household that was
eligible to receive stamps "immediately prior to such strike." 7
U.S.C. § 2015(d)(3). The second proviso makes clear that the
statutory ineligibility for food stamps does not apply
"to any household that does not contain a member on strike, if
any of its members refuses to accept employment at a plant or site
because of a strike or lockout."
Ibid. In light of all this, the statute is
Page 485 U. S. 373
rationally related to the stated objective of maintaining
neutrality in private labor disputes.
In view of the foregoing, we need not determine whether either
of the other two proffered justifications for § 109 would alone
suffice. But it is relevant to note that protecting the fiscal
integrity of Government programs, and of the Government as a whole,
"is a legitimate concern of the State."
Hodory, supra, at
431 U. S. 493.
This does not mean that Congress can pursue the objective of saving
money by discriminating against individuals or groups. But our
review of distinctions that Congress draws in order to make
allocations from a finite pool of resources must be deferential,
for the discretion about how best to spend money to improve the
general welfare is lodged in Congress, rather than the courts.
Bowen v. Owens, 476 U. S. 340,
476 U. S. 345
(1986). "Fiscal considerations may compel certain difficult choices
in order to improve the protection afforded to the entire benefited
class."
Harris v McRae, 448 U.S. at
448 U. S. 355
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). In OBRA, Congress had already found it
necessary to restrict eligibility in the food stamp program and to
reduce the amount of deductions that were allowed to recipients.
Rather than undertaking further budget cuts in these or other
areas, and in order to avoid favoritism in labor disputes, Congress
judged that it would do better to pass this statute along with its
provisos. The Constitution does not permit us to disturb that
judgment in this case.
Appellees contend, and the District Court held, that the
legislative classification is irrational because of the "critical"
fact that it "impermissibly strikes at the striker through his
family." 648 F. Supp. at 1240. This, however, is nothing more than
a description of how the food stamp program operates as a general
matter, a fact that was acknowledged by the District Court.
Ibid. Whenever an individual takes any action that hampers
his or her ability to meet the program's eligibility requirements,
such as quitting a job or failing to comply with the
work-registration requirements, the entire household
Page 485 U. S. 374
suffers accordingly. We have never questioned the
constitutionality of the entire Act on this basis, and we just
recently upheld the validity of the Act's definition of "household"
even though that definition embodies the basic fact that the Act
determines benefits "on a
household,' rather than an individual
basis." Lyng, 477 U.S. at 477 U. S. 636.
That aspect of the program does not violate the Constitution any
more so today.
The decision of the District Court is therefore
Reversed.
JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
[
Footnote 1]
Included were such fundamental changes as redefining the
requirements to constitute a family unit, reducing the gross income
eligibility standard (except for the elderly and the disabled), and
adjusting the levels of deductions that are allowed to recipients.
§§ 101, 104(a), 105, 106, 115. The Committee Reports estimated that
these changes in the food stamp program would save several billion
dollars in fiscal years 1982, 1983, and 1984. H.R.Rep. No. 97-158,
pp. 11-13 (1981) (hereafter H.R.Rep.); S.Rep. No. 97-139, pp. 52-70
(1981) (hereafter S.Rep.).
[
Footnote 2]
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a household shall
not participate in the food stamp program at any time that any
member of the household, not exempt from the work registration
requirements . . . is on strike as defined in section 142(2) of
title 29, because of a labor dispute (other than a lockout) as
defined in section 152(9) of title 29:
Provided, That a
household shall not lose its eligibility to participate in the food
stamp program as a result of one of its members going on strike if
the household was eligible for food stamps immediately prior to
such strike, however, such household shall not receive an increased
allotment as the result of a decrease in the income of the striking
member or members of the household:
Provided further, That
such ineligibility shall not apply to any household that does not
contain a member on strike, if any of its members refuses to accept
employment at a plant or site because of a strike or lockout."
OBRA, § 109, 96 Stat. 361, 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(3).
[
Footnote 3]
The District Court did not find that any individuals had left
their households in order to increase their allotment of food
stamps. It found instead only that some individuals
"have been told by state agencies or have learned that they can
avoid household disqualification by having the striker leave the
household."
648
F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (DC 1986). Appellees note that one
striker's spouse and children left the household after he was
denied food stamps, and that the couple was subsequently divorced.
Affidavit of Mark Dyer, �� 4-8, App. 25-26; Deposition of Mark
Dyer,
id. at 82-83.
[
Footnote 4]
The District Court found that one individual quit his job and
abandoned his union membership in order to receive food stamps, and
another individual left a picket line to seek other work, and lost
his union membership. 648 F. Supp. at 1237. Some other strikers
have voted to ratify or accept collective bargaining agreements
that were less favorable than they wished, motivated by lack of
wages as a result of being out of work and, to a lesser degree,
lack of food stamps.
Ibid.
[
Footnote 5]
It is clear from previous decisions that associational rights
"are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but
also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference,"
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516,
361 U. S. 523
(1960), and that these rights can be abridged even by government
actions that do not directly restrict individuals' ability to
associate freely.
See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.
S. 169,
408 U. S. 183
(1972). But none of these cases indicates that the statute
challenged here "will affect in any significant way the existing
members' ability to carry out their various purposes."
Board of
Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at
481 U. S. 548.
The Court has found, for example, that compulsory disclosure of the
membership lists of an organization, which led to harassment,
physical threats, and economic reprisals against those individuals,
worked "a substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner's
members of their right to freedom of association."
NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449,
357 U. S. 462
(1958). We also have held that the First Amendment "restricts the
ability of the State to impose liability on an individual solely
because of his association with another" when the individual lacks
the specific intent to further any illegal aims that may be
promoted by other members of a group.
NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886,
458 U. S.
919-920 (1982). The facts of this case, however, do not
demonstrate any "significant" interference with appellees'
associational rights of the magnitude found in decisions like
Patterson and
Claiborne Hardware. Exposing the
members of an association to physical and economic reprisals or to
civil liability merely because of their membership in that group
poses a much greater danger to the exercise of associational
freedoms than does the withdrawal of a government benefit based not
on membership in an organization, but merely for the duration of
one activity that may be undertaken by that organization.
[
Footnote 6]
The decision in
Hodory was based on the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and not on the First
Amendment, but our application of rational basis review to the
constitutional claim raised in that case indicated that fundamental
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment were not implicated
there.
[
Footnote 7]
Appellees rely heavily on
Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U. S. 398
(1963), in which we held that a State violated the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment when it denied unemployment benefits
to a woman whose religious beliefs did not allow her to work on
Saturday. That decision, however,
"was decided in the significantly different context of a
constitutionally imposed 'governmental obligation of neutrality'
originating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment."
Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464,
432 U. S. 475,
n. 8 (1977). The reasoning of
Sherbert has not been
applied in other contexts, and is inapposite here, as shown by our
decision in
Hodory, which found no fundamental rights to
be infringed by a State's denial of unemployment benefits to a man
who was unable to work as a result of a labor dispute.
[
Footnote 8]
We reject the proposition that strikers as a class are entitled
to special treatment under the Equal Protection Clause.
City of
Charlotte v. Firefighters, 426 U. S. 283,
426 U. S. 286
(1976);
Hodory, 431 U.S. at
431 U. S. 489.
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.
S. 528 (1973), does not counsel otherwise. There we
upheld an equal protection challenge to a provision of the Food
Stamp Act, and concluded that "a bare congressional desire to harm
a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest."
Id. at
413 U. S. 534
(emphasis in original). This statement is merely an application of
the usual rational basis test: if a statute is not rationally
related to any legitimate governmental objective, it cannot be
saved from constitutional challenge by a defense that relates it to
an
illegitimate governmental interest. Accordingly, in
Moreno itself, we examined the challenged provision under
the rational basis standard of review.
Id. at
413 U. S.
533.
[
Footnote 9]
For example, one who voluntarily quits a job is disqualified for
food stamps for 90 days. Thereafter, he is eligible as long as he
registers for work and cannot find a job. 7 CFR § 273.7(n)(1)(v)
(1987). The striker, unless he quits his job, is disqualified for
as long as he is on strike. § 273.1(g).
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE BLACKMUN
join, dissenting.
The Court today declares that it has "little trouble" in
concluding that Congress' denial of food stamps to the households
of striking workers is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental objective.
Ante at
485 U. S. 371.
The ease with which the Court reaches this conclusion is reflected
in the brevity of its Fifth Amendment analysis: the Court gives
short shrift to appellees' equal protection challenge to the
striker amendment, even though this argument was the centerpiece of
appellees' case in their briefs and at oral argument. I believe
that the Court's dismissive approach has caused it to fail to
register the full force of appellees' claim. After canvassing the
many absurdities that afflict the striker amendment, I conclude
that it fails to pass constitutional muster under even the most
deferential scrutiny. I therefore would affirm the judgment
below.
I
The thrust of appellees' equal protection challenge is that the
striker amendment to the Food Stamp Act -- § 109 of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
codified at 7 U.S.C. §
2015(d)(3) -- singles them out for special punitive
Page 485 U. S. 375
treatment without reasonable justification. As the Court
observes, this Fifth Amendment challenge to an allegedly arbitrary
legislative classification implicates our least intrusive standard
of review -- the so-called "rational basis" test, which requires
that legislative classifications be "
rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest.'" [Footnote 2/1] Ante at 485 U. S. 370,
quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.
S. 528, 413 U. S. 533
(1973). The Court fails to note, however, that this standard of
review, although deferential, "`is not a toothless one.'"
Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181,
429 U. S. 185
(1976), quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.
S. 495, 427 U. S. 510
(1976). The rational basis test contains two substantive
limitations on legislative choice: legislative enactments must
implicate legitimate goals, and the means chosen by the legislature
must bear a rational relationship to those goals. In an alternative
formulation, the Court has explained that these limitations amount
to a prescription that "all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike." Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
473 U. S. 432,
473 U. S. 439
(1985); see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.
S. 202, 457 U. S. 216
(1982); Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71,
404 U. S. 76
(1971).
In recent years, the Court has struck down a variety of
legislative enactments using the rational basis test. In some
cases, the Court found that the legislature's goal was not
legitimate.
See, e.g., Hooper v. Bernalillo County
Assessor, 472 U. S. 612
(1985);
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S.
55 (1982). In other cases, the Court found that the
classification employed by the legislature did not rationally
further the legislature's goal.
See, e.g., Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U. S. 56
(1972);
Reed v. Reed, supra, at
404 U. S. 76-77.
In addition, the Court on occasion has combined these two
approaches, in essence concluding that the lack of a rational
relationship between
Page 485 U. S. 376
the legislative classification and the purported legislative
goal suggests that the true goal is illegitimate.
See, e.g.,
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, at
473 U. S. 450;
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, supra, at
413 U. S. 534.
The Court's failure today to take seriously appellees' challenge or
to address systematically the irrationalities they identify in the
striker amendment is difficult to reconcile with these
precedents.
The Secretary asserts that the striker amendment is rationally
related to three legitimate governmental goals. First, the
Secretary points out that denying food stamps to households
containing a striker will reduce federal expenditures. Second, the
Secretary contends that the striker amendment channels limited
public funds to the most needy. Finally, the Secretary maintains
that the striker amendment fosters governmental neutrality in
private labor disputes. Although the asserted goals are legitimate,
it is difficult to discern a rational relationship between them and
the striker amendment. The arguments of the Secretary and the Court
seeking to establish such a relationship are fraught with pervasive
inconsistencies.
A
The Secretary's argument that the striker amendment will save
money proves far too much. According to the Secretary's reasoning,
the exclusion of any unpopular group from a public benefit program
would survive rational basis scrutiny, because exclusion always
would result in a decrease in governmental expenditures. Although
it is true, as the Court observes, that preserving the fiscal
integrity of the Government "'is a legitimate concern of the
State,'"
ante at
485 U. S. 373,
quoting
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory,
431 U. S. 471,
431 U. S. 493
(1977), this Court expressly has noted that "a concern for the
preservation of resources standing alone can hardly justify the
classification used in allocating those resources."
Plyler v.
Doe, supra, at
457 U. S. 227.
We have insisted that such classifications themselves be rational,
rather than
Page 485 U. S. 377
arbitrary.
See Reed v. Reed, supra, at
404 U. S. 76;
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618,
394 U. S. 633
(1968). Our cases thus make clear that something more than an
invocation of the public fisc is necessary to demonstrate the
rationality of selecting strikers, rather than some other group, to
suffer the burden of cost-cutting legislation. [
Footnote 2/2]
B
Perhaps recognizing this necessity, the Secretary defends the
singling out of strikers and their households as rationally related
to the goal of channeling resources to those persons most
"
genuinely in need.'" Brief for Appellant 17, quoting 119
Cong.Rec. 24929 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Young). As a threshold
matter, however, households denied food stamps because of the
presence of a striker are as "needy" in terms of financial
resources as households that qualify for food stamps: the former
are denied food stamps despite the fact that they meet the
financial eligibility requirements of 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1982 ed. and
Supp. IV), even after strike-fund payments are counted as household
income. This point has particular poignancy for the infants and
children of a striking worker. Their need for nourishment is in no
logical way diminished by the striker's action. The denial to these
children
Page 485 U. S.
378
of what is often the only buffer between them and
malnourishment and disease cannot be justified as a targeting of
the most needy: they are the most needy. The record below bears
witness to this point in a heartbreaking fashion. [Footnote 2/3]
The Secretary argues, however, that the striker amendment is
related to need at least in the sense of willingness to work, if
not in the strict sense of financial eligibility. Because the Food
Stamp Act generally excludes persons unwilling to work -- and their
households -- the Secretary argues that it is consistent to exclude
strikers and their households as well, on the ground that strikers
remain "unwilling to work," at least at the struck business, for
the duration of the strike. In the Secretary's eyes, a striker is
akin to an unemployed worker who, day after day, refuses to accept
available work. One flaw in this argument is its false factual
premise. It is simply not true, as the Secretary argues, that a
striker always has a job that "remains available to him." Reply
Memorandum for Appellant 4. Many strikes result in the complete
cessation of a business' operations, so that the decision of an
individual striker to return to work would be unavailing. Moreover,
many of the businesses that continue to operate during a strike
hire permanent replacements for the striking workers. In this
situation as well, a striker no longer has the option of returning
to work. In fact, the record in this case reveals that a number of
appellees were
Page 485 U. S. 379
denied food stamps even though they had been permanently
replaced by their employers. [
Footnote
2/4]
But even if it were true that strikers always can return to
their jobs, the Secretary's "willingness to work" rationale falls
apart in light of the glaring disparity between the treatment of
strikers and the treatment of those who are unwilling to work for
other reasons. People who voluntarily quit their jobs are not
disqualified from receiving food stamps if, after notice and a
hearing, they can demonstrate that they quit with "good cause." 7
CFR §§ 273.7(n)(1)(i), (vi) (1987). [
Footnote 2/5] Moreover, even if the state agency
determines that the quit was without good cause, the voluntary
quitter is disqualified only for a period of 90 days, and the
quitter's household is disqualified only if the quitter was the
"head of household." § 273.7(n)(1)(v). In contrast, a striker is
given no opportunity to demonstrate that the strike was for "good
cause," even though strikers frequently allege that unfair labor
practices by their employer precipitated the strike. [
Footnote 2/6] In addition, strikers and
their entire households, no matter how minimal the striker's
contribution to the household's income may have been, are
disqualified for the duration of the strike, even if the striker is
permanently replaced or business operations temporarily cease.
Page 485 U. S. 380
In a similar vein, the striker amendment expressly distinguishes
between strikers and nonstrikers in conditioning eligibility for
food stamps on willingness to accept struck work. Unemployed
workers may refuse to accept otherwise appropriate employment at a
business involved in a strike or a lockout and still remain
eligible to receive food stamps -- as long as they are not
themselves on strike. Only strikers, though they may be as "willing
to work" in every salient respect, must give up their eligibility
for food stamps if they refuse to cross a picket line. [
Footnote 2/7] The Secretary's "willingness
to work" argument provides no justification for this especially
harsh treatment of strikers and their households.
C
Unable to explain completely the striker amendment by the
"willingness to work" rationale, the Secretary relies most heavily
on yet a third rationale: the promotion of governmental neutrality
in labor disputes. Indeed, the Court relies solely on this
explanation in rejecting appellees' equal protection challenge to
the amendment. According to the Secretary and the Court, this last
goal rationalizes the discrepancies in the treatment of strikers
and voluntary quitters, and of strikers and nonstrikers unwilling
to cross a picket line. As the Court explains it, excluding
strikers from participation in the food stamp program avoids "undue
favoritism to one side or the other in private labor disputes" by
preventing
Page 485 U. S. 381
governmental "
subsidization'" of strikes. Ante at
485 U. S. 371,
quoting S.Rep. No. 97-139, p. 62 (1981). The Court notes that we
accepted a version of this governmental neutrality argument "in a
related context" in Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v.
Hodory, 431 U. S. 471
(1977). See ante at 485 U. S.
372.
As a threshold matter, the Court's reliance on
Hodory
to support the Secretary's argument is misplaced. In
Hodory, we upheld a statute that denied unemployment
compensation benefits to workers who became unemployed as a result
of a labor dispute other than a lockout. The Court reasoned that
the denial was rationally related to the goal of maintaining
governmental neutrality in labor disputes because the unemployment
compensation at issue was partially funded by employer
contributions. We recognized that
"[t]he employer's costs go up with every laid-off worker who is
qualified to collect unemployment. The only way for the employer to
stop these rising costs is to settle the strike so as to return the
employees to work. Qualification for unemployment compensation thus
acts as a lever increasing the pressures on an employer to settle a
strike."
431 U.S. at
431 U. S. 492.
The reasoning of
Hodory is completely inapplicable to the
food stamp context. Employer contributions form no part of food
stamp benefits, which are funded instead by general public
revenues; receipt of food stamps by strikers therefore places no
special or coercive burden on the strikers' employer.
More important, the "neutrality" argument on its merits is both
deceptive and deeply flawed. Even on the most superficial level,
the striker amendment does not treat the parties to a labor dispute
evenhandedly: forepersons and other management employees who may
become temporarily unemployed when a business ceases to operate
during a strike remain eligible for food stamps. Management's
burden during the course of the dispute is thus lessened by the
receipt of public funds, whereas labor must struggle unaided. This
disparity cannot be justified by the argument that the strike is
labor's "fault," because strikes are often a direct response
Page 485 U. S. 382
to illegal practices by management, such as failure to abide by
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or refusal to
bargain in good faith.
On a deeper level, the "neutrality" argument reflects a
profoundly inaccurate view of the relationship of the modern
Federal Government to the various parties to a labor dispute. Both
individuals and businesses are connected to the Government by a
complex web of supports and incentives. On the one hand,
individuals may be eligible to receive a wide variety of health,
education, and welfare-related benefits. On the other hand,
businesses may be eligible to receive a myriad of tax subsidies
through deductions, depreciation, and credits, or direct subsidies
in the form of Government loans through the Small Business
Administration (SBA). Businesses also may receive lucrative
Government contracts and invoke the protections of the Bankruptcy
Act against their creditors. None of these governmental subsidies
to businesses is made contingent on the businesses' abstention from
labor disputes, even if a labor dispute is the direct cause of the
claim to a subsidy. For example, a small business in need of
financial support because of labor troubles may seek a loan from
the SBA.
See 15 U.S.C. § 661
et seq. And a
business that claims a net operating loss as a result of a strike
or a lockout presumably may carry the loss back three years and
forward five years in order to maximize its tax advantage.
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 172, 381, 382. In addition, it appears
that businesses may be eligible for special tax credits for hiring
replacement workers during a strike under the Targeted Jobs Tax
Credit program.
See BNA Daily Labor Report No. 68, p. A-6
(April 10, 1987). When viewed against the network of governmental
support of both labor and management, the withdrawal of the single
support of food stamps -- a support critical to the continued life
and health of an individual worker and his or her family -- cannot
be seen as a "neutral" act. Altering the backdrop of
governmental
Page 485 U. S. 383
support in this one-sided and devastating way amounts to a
penalty on strikers, not neutrality.
D
In
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
473 U. S. 432
(1985), we concluded that the insubstantiality of each of the
city's asserted justifications for the ordinance at issue suggested
that the ordinance in fact rested "on an irrational prejudice
against the mentally retarded."
Id. at
473 U. S. 450.
The successive failure of each of the Secretary's purported
rationales for the striker amendment likewise suggests that the
enactment at issue here rests on public animus toward strikers.
This conclusion draws substantial support from the legislative
history of the precursors of the 1981 amendment. Beginning in 1968,
four years after the enactment of the Food Stamp Act, Congress
considered at regular intervals proposals similar or identical to
the striker amendment eventually passed in 1981. Such proposals
were considered and rejected in 1968, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974,
and 1977. Each time a proposal was discussed on the floor of the
House, Representatives decried the "antiunion" and "antistrike"
animus that motivated it. [
Footnote
2/8] In 1977, the House
Page 485 U. S. 384
Committee on Agriculture reviewed the history of such proposals
and rejected the most recent one, explaining its decision as
follows:
"The real purpose of the amendment . . . was not to restore some
government neutrality allegedly lost because strikers are eligible
for food stamps but, on the contrary, to use a denial of food
stamps as a pressure on the worker -- or more accurately on his
family -- to help break a strike. . . ."
"The amendment was an effort to increase the power of management
over workers, using food as a weapon in collective bargaining."
H.R.Rep. No. 95-464, p. 129 (1977)
I am mindful that the views expressed on the floor of the House
and in the 1977 Committee Report were from those opposed to the
striker amendment. But the evidence of animus is not limited to
statements by the amendment's opponents. Rather, supporters of the
striker amendment likened strikers to "hippies" and "commune
residents" -- groups whose exclusion from the food stamp program
this Court struck down 15 years ago in
Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528
(1973). [
Footnote 2/9] The
exhortation by the sponsor of the 1971 version of the striker
amendment to his colleagues to "say to strikers what we have said .
. . to hippies," 117 Cong.Rec. 21673 (1971) (remarks of Rep.
Michel), strongly suggests that the same sort of hostility informed
the two amendments, although the striker amendment was not
Page 485 U. S. 385
enacted into law until 1981. [
Footnote 2/10] Our warning in
Moreno that "a
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest," 413 U.S. at
413 U. S. 534,
would seem directly applicable to the instant case. I find the
Court's refusal to heed that warning both inexplicable and
ill-considered.
II
I agree with the Court that "[i]t was no part of the purposes of
the Food Stamp Act to establish a program that would serve as a
weapon in labor disputes."
Ante at
485 U. S. 371.
The striker amendment under consideration today, however, seems to
have precisely that purpose -- one admittedly irreconcilable with
the legitimate goals of the food stamp program. No other purpose
can adequately explain the especially harsh treatment reserved for
strikers and their families by the 1981 enactment. Because I
conclude that the striker amendment cannot survive even rational
basis scrutiny, I would affirm the District Court's invalidation of
the amendment. I dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Because I conclude that the striker amendment fails the
deferential rational basis test, I see no need to address whether
stricter scrutiny should apply to protect the First Amendment
interests asserted by appellees, although I am unconvinced by the
Court's treatment of that issue as well.
[
Footnote 2/2]
In addition, there is substantial reason to question the
invocation of the public fisc in this case. Statistics available to
Congress at the time of the enactment of the striker amendment
indicated that strikers rarely met the financial eligibility
requirements of the food stamp program, and thus rarely
participated in the program. A Government Accounting Office study
found that, in four out of five periods studied, 89 to 96 percent
of strikers did not participate in the food stamp program. In the
fifth period, which included the 1978 coal strike, 64 percent of
strikers did not participate. 127 Cong.Rec. 12157 (1981) (remarks
of Sen. Levin). The strikers who do participate in the food stamp
program apparently account for only a very small percentage of
total program outlays. Statistical information collected by the
House Committee on Agriculture in 1975 indicated that households
containing strikers accounted for only 0.2 to 0.3 percent of
non-public-assistance households participating in the food stamp
program. H.R.Rep. No. 95-464, p. 128 (1977).
[
Footnote 2/3]
See Declaration of Donald A. Bivens, App. 8 ("My two
younger children were sick a great deal during the period of the
strike, and I believe it was, in part, due to a lack of
nourishment"); Declaration of Johnie B. Blake,
id. at 11
(finding it "nearly impossible to get adequate food for [household
of] seven people" during strike); Affidavit of Barm Combs,
id. at 20 ("My daughter Jennifer Ann, who has serious
kidney problems, was missing needed medical treatment and
medication"); Declaration of Robert J. Shorb, Jr.,
id. at
47 ("[O]ur children were in danger of not having enough to eat.
Therefore, we had to send them to live with their grandparents in
New York State, so that they would get enough nourishment").
[
Footnote 2/4]
See Declaration of Ray Westfall,
id. at 51;
Supplemental Declaration of Johnie B. Blake,
id. at 14-15;
Affidavit of Donald Gibson,
id. at 34; Affidavit of Zola
Higgins,
id. at 37.
[
Footnote 2/5]
"Good cause" as defined in the applicable regulations includes,
inter alia, "[d]iscrimination by an employer based on age,
race, sex, color, handicap, religious beliefs, national origin or
political beliefs," 7 CFR § 273.7(n)(3)(i) (1987), "[w]ork demands
or conditions that render continued employment unreasonable, such
as working without being paid on schedule," § 273.7(n)(3)(ii), or
work conditions under which "[t]he degree of risk to health and
safety is unreasonable," § 273.7(i)(2)(i), incorporated by
reference in § 273.7(n)(3)(vi).
[
Footnote 2/6]
See, e.g., Affidavit of Zola Higgins, App. 36-37;
Affidavit of Paul David Michel,
id. at 39-40; Declaration
of Ray Westfall,
id. at 51-52.
[
Footnote 2/7]
In addition, strikers may not become eligible for food stamps
even if they demonstrate their "willingness to work" by registering
for and accepting alternative interim employment. Indeed, the fact
that strikers had been subject to the same work registration and
acceptance requirements as all other food stamp applicants prior to
the enactment of the striker amendment casts considerable doubt on
the Secretary's argument that the amendment's purpose was to ensure
that food stamp recipients are "willing to work."
Cf.
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.
S. 528,
413 U. S. 537
(1973) (existence of fraud provisions prior to the amendment
denying food stamps to households containing unrelated persons
"necessarily casts considerable doubt upon the proposition that the
1971 amendment could rationally have been intended to prevent those
very same abuses").
[
Footnote 2/8]
See, e.g., 116 Cong.Rec. 42019 (1970) (decrying "the
apparent antistrike aspect" of the proposed amendment) (remarks of
Rep. Conyers); 117 Cong.Rec. 21675 (1971) ("This amendment cannot
be justified by any public good that could come of it; none can. It
is at its base mean-spirited, vindictive and vengeful") (remarks of
Rep. Foley); 118 Cong.Rec. 23376 (1972) ("Those seeking to pass
this amendment are simply opposed to strikes . . . and hope to
assist the employer in breaking a strike with this cruel
amendment") (remarks of Rep. Koch); 119 Cong.Rec. 24931 (1973)
("This amendment is punitive, antilabor, antiunion, unfair, and
discriminatory") (remarks of Rep. Foley);
id. at 24934 ("I
think it would be unconstitutional . . . for us to say that we can
cut out a segment of our society just because they are doing
something that some other segment of our society does not like")
(remarks of Rep. Casey); 120 Cong.Rec. 20614 (1974) (noting that
voluntary quitters, convicted felons, and alcoholics may receive
food stamps, and that the striker amendment "only draws the line
against one small group of people") (remarks of Rep. O'Hara).
[
Footnote 2/9]
See 117 Cong.Rec. 21673 (1971) (We should "say to
strikers what we have said to students, to hippies, and others --
. . . if you are one of the voluntarily poor, you must look to
your own resources for help'") (remarks of Rep. Michel); 119
Cong.Rec. 24931 (1973) ("[I]n the early history of the program,
food stamps for strikers, college students, hippies, and commune
residents never entered into the minds of food stamp proponents")
(remarks of Rep. Goodling).
[
Footnote 2/10]
The remarks of Representatives over the years admittedly express
the views of different Congresses from the one that eventually
passed the 1981 striker amendment. Nonetheless, the length of time
over which the same proposal was considered and the frequent
references over the years by Representatives to former colloquies
on the matter,
see, e.g., 117 Cong.Rec. 21672 (1971)
(remarks of Rep. Michel) (referring to 1970 debate); 119 Cong.Rec.
24933 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Casey) (referring to 1971 debate);
H.R.Rep. No. 95-464, pp. 122-127 (1977) (canvassing the amendment's
legislative history from 1968 to 1977), strongly suggest that these
earlier discussions informed the 1981 decision.