In 1982, petitioner ETSI Pipeline Project entered into a 40-year
contract with petitioner Secretary of the Interior to withdraw up
to a certain amount of water per year from Lake Oahe, a reservoir
located on the Missouri River in South Dakota, for use in an
interstate coal slurry pipeline. Respondents Missouri, Iowa, and
Nebraska filed suit in Federal District Court to enjoin performance
of the contract, alleging that, under the Flood Control Act of 1944
(Act), the Interior Secretary lacked authority to execute a
contract to provide water from the reservoir for industrial uses
without obtaining the approval of the Secretary of the Army.
Pursuant to the Act, the Oahe Reservoir was built by the Corps of
Engineers, now part of the Department of the Army (successor of the
Department of War), which has always maintained and operated the
reservoir. The Act was directed to both flood control and
navigation matters that concerned the War Department and
reclamation and irrigation problems that concerned the Interior
Department, thus also implicating the tensions between the Upper
Missouri River Basin States' interests in irrigation and
reclamation and the interests of the Lower Basin States (including
respondents) in flood control. The District Court ruled for
respondents, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The Secretary of the Interior exceeded the
authority Congress delegated to him by the Act. Pp.
484 U. S.
505-517.
(a) In light of the Act's provisions specifying the powers of
the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Interior --
particularly the former's authority as to the use and disposal of
water at any reservoir under the Army Department's control -- as
well as the Act's general background, the Interior Secretary does
not possess the authority to execute a contract to provide water
from an Army reservoir for industrial use without obtaining the
Army Secretary's approval. Under the Act's language, if the
Interior Secretary wishes to remove water from an Army reservoir
for any purpose, the approval of the Army Secretary must be
secured. As long as ample water remains in the Oahe Reservoir for
the purposes embodied in the Act, and absent any allocation for
Page 484 U. S. 496
irrigation pursuant to the Act's terms -- the record supporting
the District Court's findings that there was no such allocation or
use of the reservoir's water for irrigation -- the Army Secretary
has exclusive authority to contract to remove water for industrial
use. Pp.
484 U. S.
505-509.
(b) There is no merit to petitioners' contention that the Act's
provisions approving general comprehensive plans for projects to be
operated by both the Interior and Army Departments represent
congressional approval of any functional division of authority
between those Departments and allows the Interior Secretary
unilaterally to remove water from Army reservoirs for irrigation
purposes and for other related uses. Such contention is wide of the
mark in view of the Act's specific jurisdictional provisions
discussed above as to the use of Army reservoirs, and is grounded
on a misuse of the legislative history. There is no indication that
control over individual reservoirs was to be divided among various
Departments of the Federal Government. Nor is petitioners' argument
supported by a provision of the Act stating that reclamation and
power developments to be undertaken by the Interior Secretary shall
be governed by federal reclamation laws, which authorize him to
reallocate water under his control for industrial use. Such
provision of the Act applies only to projects that the Interior
Department itself may undertake under the Act. But as the District
Court found, the reservoir project engineered by the Army at Oahe
is neither a power development nor a reclamation development
undertaken by the Interior Secretary. Moreover, there is no merit
to petitioners' contention that, although the Interior Department
must consult with the Army Department before withdrawing water for
industrial use from the Oahe Reservoir, the Interior Department can
proceed without the Army Department's approval as long as the
latter does not object. Pp.
484 U. S.
509-515.
(c) It is unnecessary to consider petitioners' contention that
deference to the Interior Secretary's interpretation of the Act is
appropriate here, and their related arguments about the history of
relations between the Army and Interior Departments under the Act,
for even if the Interior Department's interpretation would be
entitled to any deference in these circumstances, the Executive
Branch is not permitted to administer the Act in a manner that is
inconsistent with the administrative structure that Congress
enacted into law. The Act speaks directly to the dispute, and
congressional intent as expressed in the Act indicates clearly that
the Interior Secretary may not enter into a contract to withdraw
water from an Army reservoir for industrial use without the
approval of the Army Department. Pp.
484 U. S.
515-517.
787 F.2d 270, affirmed.
Page 484 U. S. 497
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
other Members joined, except KENNEDY, J., who took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We must decide whether, in the circumstances of this case, the
Secretary of the Interior has exceeded the authority Congress
delegated to him by the Flood Control Act of 1944.
I
The dispute centers on Lake Oahe, an enormous reservoir located
on the Missouri River in South Dakota, with a capacity of more than
23 million acre-feet of water. In 1982, ETSI
Page 484 U. S. 498
Pipeline Project entered into a contract with the Secretary of
the Interior to withdraw up to 20,000 acre-feet of water from Lake
Oahe per year for 40 years. [
Footnote 1] South Dakota already had granted ETSI a state
permit to use this water in a coal slurry pipeline that would
transport coal from Wyoming to the southeastern United States. Soon
after the contract was signed, the States of Missouri, Iowa, and
Nebraska brought suit in District Court to enjoin performance of
the contract, alleging that the manner in which the contract was
approved violated several federal statutes. In particular, the
plaintiffs contended that the Interior Secretary lacks statutory
authority under the Flood Control Act of 1944 (Act), 58 Stat. 887,
to execute a contract to provide water from Lake Oahe for
industrial uses without obtaining the approval of the Secretary of
the Army. [
Footnote 2]
The District Court ruled for the plaintiffs.
Missouri v.
Andrews, 586 F.
Supp. 1268 (Neb.1984). It concluded that the Oahe Dam was not a
reclamation or power development that was undertaken by the
Interior Secretary, pursuant to clear statutory authority. Instead,
the dam was built by the Corps of Engineers, now part of the
Department of the Army (formerly the Department of War, but renamed
by Act of July 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 495), which has always maintained
and operated the reservoir. No block of water in Lake Oahe has been
specifically set aside for use by the Interior Department, and the
Interior Secretary has not constructed any works at Lake Oahe. On
these facts, the District Court held
Page 484 U. S. 499
that the Act does not empower the Interior Secretary to furnish
water from Lake Oahe for industrial use.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting.
Missouri v. Andrews, 787 F.2d 270 (CA8 1986). It upheld
the District Court's conclusion that Lake Oahe is not a reclamation
development undertaken by the Interior Secretary, primarily because
the Army built the reservoir and controls its operation.
Accordingly, the Interior Secretary cannot contract on his own to
withdraw water from the reservoir for industrial use. Neither the
language nor the legislative history of the Act was thought to
support the claim that the Interior Secretary was ceded broad
authority over water in this reservoir, even water that it claims
has been designated as available for future irrigation purposes.
Indeed, the language of the Act and its legislative history were
found to be convincing enough on this point that the Court of
Appeals refused to defer to the Interior Secretary's contrary
interpretation.
The Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc by
an equally divided vote of the judges. We granted certiorari, 480
U.S. 905 (1987), and we now affirm.
II
A
The Missouri River Basin is a watershed that covers a vast area
in the midwestern United States. The topography of this area,
however, reveals two distinct regions that experience very
different water problems. The upper part of the Basin, which
includes large sections of Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, and
South Dakota, is mostly arid or semiarid; there, the Missouri River
and its tributaries are important because they represent a major
resource for developing the agricultural and industrial potential
of the area. The lower part of the Basin, which includes territory
in Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, and Missouri, is more humid, and there
the rivers are used chiefly for navigation, though the critical
problem in
Page 484 U. S. 500
this region is to control flooding.
See generally M.
Ridgeway, The Missouri Basin's Pick-Sloan Plan 47-55 (1955). In the
early 1940's, Congress focused its attention on the water problems
of the Missouri River Basin, prompted especially by severe floods
that had devastated the lower Basin in 1943 and 1944.
At the behest of Congress, the Army Corps of Engineers prepared
a report that described a comprehensive plan to develop the entire
Basin, known as the Pick Plan for its author, a colonel in the
Corps. The Pick Plan proposed the construction of 12
multiple-purpose reservoirs and related works, including 5
reservoirs on the main stem of the Missouri River, at an
approximate initial cost of $480 million, though it was estimated
that to carry out the entire proposal might cost close to $1
billion. The Pick Plan stressed flood control as its primary
objective, but noted that its comprehensive list of projects
"would also provide for the most efficient utilization of the
waters of the Missouri River Basin for all purposes, including
irrigation, navigation, power, domestic and sanitary purposes,
wildlife, and recreation,"
as well as other intangible benefits. H.R. Doc. No. 475, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess., 29 (1944) (H.R. Doc.). The report estimated the
gross storage capacity of the Oahe Reservoir at about 6 million
acre-feet of water.
At almost the same time, the Interior Department's Bureau of
Reclamation independently completed its own plan to develop the
Basin, which it had begun earlier, known as the Sloan Plan after
the Montana engineer who prepared much of its analysis. The Sloan
Plan proposed a total of 90 reservoirs, many of them on the smaller
tributary streams, and included 3 reservoirs on the main stem of
the Missouri River, at a projected cost of $1.2 billion, with much
of that figure to be repayable. The Sloan Plan was also a
comprehensive proposal, though it emphasized use of the water for
irrigating land, especially in the upper part of the Basin. It
estimated that the Oahe Reservoir would hold 19,600,000 acre-feet
of
Page 484 U. S. 501
water. The Sloan Plan also contained a section comparing its
provisions to those in the Pick Plan and suggesting modifications
to the Pick Plan "which appear necessary to satisfy water use
requirements throughout the Missouri River Basin." S. Doc. No.191,
78th Cong., 2d Sess., 120 (1944) (S. Doc.). This section concluded
that, though "the capacity of individual reservoirs, as well as
aggregate capacities, remain to be determined in greater detail,"
the "Army and Reclamation plans on storage needs for all purposes
can be composed."
Id. at 122-123.
The Pick and Sloan Plans differed with one another not only in
their primary objectives, but also in several other important
respects, such as the amount of expenditures and the number of
projects. The engineering features of the two plans also were
dissimilar. On the main stem of the Missouri River, the two plans
called for different numbers of reservoirs of divergent sizes, and
thus for inconsistent amounts of total water storage. Even where
the two plans agreed on the need for a particular reservoir at a
particular location, which they did at Oahe and at Fort Randall,
they envisioned those projects very differently; as noted above,
for example, the Sloan Plan proposed that Lake Oahe would hold more
than three times as much water as called for in the Pick Plan, at
an additional cost of more than $20 million.
Obviously Congress could not proceed with both plans at once. In
order to arrive at a single set of projects for development of the
Basin, a Committee composed of two representatives each from the
Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation was appointed to
review the engineering features of the two plans. This Committee
essentially combined the determinations made by the Corps about the
projects that would be needed for flood control and navigation and
the determinations made by the Bureau about the additional projects
that would be needed for irrigation. After meeting for two days,
the Committee produced an engineering report that recommended most
of the specific
Page 484 U. S. 502
developments that had been set out in the Sloan Plan, but
provided for six main-stem reservoirs on the Missouri River. The
Oahe Reservoir was to be created by construction of a high dam and
to have a gross storage capacity of 19 million acre-feet of water.
The stated purposes of Lake Oahe were to allow
"the irrigation of 750,000 acres of land in the James River
Basin, as well as to provide useful storage for flood control,
navigation, the development of hydroelectric power, and other
purposes."
S. Doc. No. 247, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1944). As had been
proposed in the Sloan Plan, the irrigation of the James River Basin
was to be made possible by construction of a system of long canals,
including one canal approximately 125 miles long.
See S.
Doc., at 115-116. With a single set of projects before it at last,
Congress enacted the Flood Control Act of 1944 less than two months
later.
B
In the Act, Congress accomplished three distinct tasks. First,
it authorized certain specific projects to be undertaken by
approving the "general comprehensive plans set forth in [the Pick
and Sloan Plans] as revised and coordinated by Senate Document
247." § 9(a), 58 Stat. 891. It directed that
"the initial stages recommended are hereby authorized and shall
be prosecuted by the War Department and the Department of the
Interior as speedily as may be consistent with budgetary
requirements."
Ibid. Second, Congress appropriated funds to pay for
the initial work done on those projects. Two separate allotments
were authorized: $200 million "for the partial accomplishment of
the works to be undertaken under said expanded plan by the Corps of
Engineers," § 9(d), and another $200 million "for the partial
accomplishment of the works to be undertaken under said plans by
the Secretary of the Interior." § 9(e).
Third, Congress adopted an administrative framework within which
these projects were to go forward. This task involved several areas
of potential controversy. The Act
Page 484 U. S. 503
evoked federalism concerns because the States were anxious to
keep control over the development of their lands and the use of
valuable water resources. In response, Congress declared a policy
of
"recogniz[ing] the interests and rights of the States in
determining the development of the watersheds within their borders
and likewise their interests and rights in water utilization and
control."
§ 1, as set forth in 33 U.S.C. § 701-1 (1952 ed.). The Act also
implicated the tensions between the Upper Basin States and the
Lower Basin States, whose interests in the use and control of the
water were markedly different. Congress addressed this problem by
providing that, when the Department of War undertook additional
works not authorized by the Act, it would be required to consult
and share information with the affected States and the Secretary of
the Interior, depending on whether the works were located west of
the 97th and 98th meridians. §§ 1(a) and (b). All projects proposed
by the Interior Secretary that would involve construction of "works
for irrigation" were made subject to a similar requirement, without
regard to geographical location. § 1(c).
Finally, and most directly relevant to this case, the Act
required Congress to deal with the administrative jurisdictions of
several agencies of the Federal Government. Among the interested
agencies were not only the Departments of War and Interior, but
also the Department of Agriculture and the Federal Power
Commission, both of whom joined the Interior Department in
submitting comments on the Pick Plan, and both of whose interests
were also touched on by the Act. H.R. Doc., at 1-3, 10-13; Act, §§
2, 5, 11-15, 58 Stat. 889, 890, 903-907. The crucial provisions
here, however, were the sections that set forth the specific
authority allotted to War and Interior, the two key Departments
affected by the Act. In relevant part, those five central sections
of the Act state as follows:
(1) "The Chief of Engineers, under the supervision of the
Secretary of War, is authorized to construct, maintain, and
Page 484 U. S. 504
operate public park and recreational facilities in reservoir
areas under the control of the War Department, and to permit the
construction, maintenance, and operation of such facilities. The
Secretary of War is authorized to grant leases of lands, including
structure or facilities thereon, in reservoir areas for such
periods and upon such terms as he shall deem reasonable." § 4, 16
U.S.C. § 460d (1946 ed.).
(2) "Electric power and energy generated at reservoir projects
under the control of the War Department and in the opinion of the
Secretary of War not required in the operation of such projects
shall be delivered to the Secretary of the Interior, who shall
transmit and dispose of such power and energy." § 5, 16 U.S.C. §
825s (1946 ed.).
(3) "That the Secretary of War is authorized to make contracts
with States, municipalities, private concerns, or individuals, at
such prices and on such terms as he may deem reasonable, for
domestic and industrial uses for surplus water that may be
available at any reservoir under the control of the War
Department." § 6, 33 U.S.C. § 708 (1946 ed.).
(4) "Hereafter, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War to
prescribe regulations for the use of storage allocated for flood
control or navigation at all reservoirs constructed wholly or in
part with Federal funds provided on the basis of such purposes, and
the operation of any such project shall be in accordance with such
regulations." § 7.
See 33 U.S.C. § 709 (1946 ed.).
(5) "Hereafter, whenever the Secretary of War determines, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of the Interior that any dam or
reservoir project operated under the direction of the Secretary of
War may be utilized for irrigation purposes, the Secretary of the
Interior is authorized to construct, operate, and maintain, under
the provisions of [the Federal reclamation laws,] . . . such
additional works in connection therewith as he may deem necessary
for irrigation purposes. . . . Dams and reservoirs operated under
the direction of the Secretary of War may be utilized hereafter
for
Page 484 U. S. 505
irrigation purposes only in conformity with the provisions of
this section." § 8.
See 43 U.S.C. § 390 (1946 ed.).
III
A
In light of these specific provisions, as well as the general
background to the Act, it is beyond question that the Interior
Secretary does not possess the authority that is claimed in this
case: to execute a contract to provide water from an Army reservoir
for industrial uses without obtaining the approval of the Secretary
of the Army. Nobody has disputed that Lake Oahe, one of the six
main-stem reservoirs on the Missouri River, was constructed by, and
has been operated and maintained by, the Army Secretary, and the
District Court found this to be true as a matter of fact. 586 F.
Supp. at 1273-1274. The Act says explicitly that such reservoirs
are "under the control of" or "under the direction of" the Army
Secretary. §§ 4-6, 8. Only two provisions of the Act provide for
the Interior Secretary to exercise any authority whatsoever at Army
reservoirs, and in both instances the Act clearly states that the
Interior Secretary's authority is subordinate to that of the Army
Secretary, who does, after all, "control" those reservoirs. The
Interior Secretary is authorized to "transmit and dispose of"
electric power and energy generated at Army reservoirs, but only
when that energy is "in the opinion of the Secretary of [the Army]
not required in the operation of such projects." § 5. The Interior
Secretary is also authorized to recommend to the Army Secretary
that an Army reservoir "be utilized for irrigation purposes," and
to "construct, operate, and maintain . . . such additional works in
connection therewith as he may deem necessary for irrigation
purposes." § 8. But this authority only comes into play if the Army
Secretary "determines" that "any dam or reservoir project operated
under [the Secretary's] direction" may be used for such purposes.
Ibid. The language of the Act is plain in every respect,
and the conclusion
Page 484 U. S. 506
is unavoidable that, if the Interior Secretary wishes to remove
water from an Army reservoir for any purpose, the approval of the
Army Secretary must be secured.
The precise authority claimed by the Interior Secretary in this
case is to enter into a contract, without the approval of the Army,
to remove from Lake Oahe water that is claimed to be available for
irrigation, and to allow that water to be devoted to industrial
use. Nowhere does the Act provide any support for this claimed
authority, and in fact it is directly inconsistent with §§ 6 and 8
of the Act, which show that only the Army Secretary has that
independent authority in this instance. Section 6 gives the Army
Secretary the authority
"to make contracts with States, municipalities, private
concerns, or individuals . . . for domestic and industrial uses for
surplus water that may be available at any reservoir"
under the Secretary's control, "
Provided, That no
contracts for such water shall adversely affect then existing
lawful uses of such water." The language of the Act is plain
enough: "surplus water" is all water that can be made available
from the reservoir without adversely affecting other lawful uses of
the water. As long as ample water remains in Lake Oahe for the
purposes embodied in the Act, and absent any allocation for
irrigation pursuant to § 8, the Army Secretary has exclusive
authority to contract to remove water for industrial uses. In this
light, two of the District Court's factual findings take on special
significance. First, the District Court found no evidence "which
would show that specific storage space in Oahe Reservoir was
assigned to irrigation," and "there is no evidence that separate
allocations were made at Oahe." 586 F. Supp. at 1277. Second,
"there is no evidence that any Oahe water ever has been used for
irrigation, or will be in the near future."
Id. at 1274.
In light of these facts, and the plain provisions of § 8, the
Interior Secretary had no authority to dispose of Lake Oahe water.
The Army Secretary might have, but has not done so. [
Footnote 3]
Page 484 U. S. 507
Section 8 details the procedures for utilizing water from Lake
Oahe for irrigation, and only when these procedures are followed
does the Interior Secretary have any authority to deal with Lake
Oahe water. The Interior Secretary may recommend to the Army
Secretary that an Army reservoir be utilized at least in part for
irrigation purposes. If the Army Secretary determines that the
reservoir may be used for this purpose, then the Interior
Secretary
"is authorized to construct, operate, and maintain, under the
provisions of [the Federal reclamation laws,] . . . such additional
works in connection therewith as he may deem necessary for
irrigation purposes."
Congress must grant "specific authorization" for the
construction of any such additional works. Water from Army
reservoirs "may be utilized hereafter for irrigation purposes only
in conformity with the provisions of this section."
Page 484 U. S. 508
§ 8. It may be recalled at this point that the Sloan Plan, which
had envisioned the use of a substantial amount of water from Lake
Oahe for irrigation of the James River Basin, was consistent with
this approach; the Sloan Plan provided for the construction of
massive additional works for irrigation comprising a system of long
canals. S. Doc., at 115-116. By this means, Interior would be
permitted to withdraw water from Army reservoirs through these
additional works for use in irrigation, which would then bring that
water under its control, and under the federal reclamation laws,
the Interior Secretary may reallocate irrigation water from
irrigation projects to other purposes when he sees fit, as long as
"it will not impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation
purposes." 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1946 ed.). [
Footnote 4] In this case, the District Court found that
the Interior Department did begin initial construction on
irrigation works at Lake Oahe, but Congress later authorized the
Department to cancel construction, which it did. 586 F. Supp. at
1274. As already stated, the District Court found that no water
from Lake Oahe has ever been used for irrigation,
ibid.,
and we are unaware of any such plans in the near future. Under
these circumstances, the Interior Secretary is not "in conformity
with the provisions of" § 8, and therefore has no authority under
the Act to withdraw water from Lake Oahe, whether for irrigation or
otherwise. It is likely that
Page 484 U. S. 509
Lake Oahe contains surplus water, but that water is subject to
disposal by the Army, not by Interior. [
Footnote 5]
B
The petitioners seek to avert this conclusion by pointing to §§
9(a) and (c) of the Act. Section 9(a) approves the "general
comprehensive plans" set out in the Pick Plan and the Sloan Plan,
as revised and coordinated by the final Senate Document, and
authorizes the initial stages of those projects to be "prosecuted
by the War Department and the Department of the Interior as
speedily as may be consistent with budgetary requirements." The
petitioners contend that this statement represents congressional
approval of various aspects of the functional division of authority
between the Army and Interior Departments that had been suggested
in those plans; in particular, the petitioners suggest that this
provision allows the Interior Secretary unilaterally to remove
water from Army reservoirs for irrigation purposes and for other
related uses.
This contention is both wide of the mark and grounded on a
misuse of the legislative history. To begin with, it would be
surprising if Congress had followed up the five sections of the Act
in which it explicitly established the jurisdiction of Army and
Interior over specific uses of Army reservoirs, the last section of
which established jurisdiction over the use of those reservoirs for
irrigation, with a provision in which it indirectly
Page 484 U. S. 510
made further refinements in how water could be used for
irrigation, and yet did not offer the slightest indication that it
was doing so. In any event, there is no reason to think that § 9(a)
incorporates into the Act any additional indications about the
proper division of authority between Army and Interior. On the
contrary, its location in § 9 of the Act indicates that this
provision was not intended as anything more than authorization for
the two Departments to begin working on the projects listed in the
final Senate Document. The other parts of § 9 merely harmonize the
Act with existing laws and set out separate appropriations for Army
and Interior to begin "the partial accomplishment of the works to
be undertaken under said expanded plans," §§ 9(d) and (e), which
indicates that this entire section of the Act encompasses only the
necessary ministerial details to allow action to begin on the
specified projects.
If there were any room for believing that § 9(a) implicitly
modified the jurisdictional provisions that were plainly set forth
in the preceding sections of the Act, or for doubting that it
instead approved a different division of authority from that
suggested in the Pick Plan and the Sloan Plan, one item in the
legislative history puts this supposition entirely to rest. The
original House version of the Act included language almost
identical to the suggestions made in the two plans,
see
infra at
484 U. S.
511-512, which obliged the Interior Secretary "to
prescribe regulations" for the use of water stored in Army
reservoirs for irrigation. Hearings on H.R. 4485 before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 78th Cong., 2d
Sess., 2 (1944). Secretary Ickes testified at the Senate Hearings
on the proposed bill that this approach did not relate very well to
the reclamation laws because it "disregards the problem of
allocating costs for multiple-purpose facilities serving other uses
in addition to irrigation."
Id. at 458. He proposed
replacing that approach instead with the language currently
contained in § 8 of the Act, which was eventually enacted by
Congress.
Id. at 313. As noted
Page 484 U. S. 511
above, § 8 now provides that Army controls the main-stem
reservoir projects and Interior controls all such additional
irrigation works as it may "construct, operate, and maintain" at
the site of those main-stem projects. One need not draw all the
inferences that may be justified by this piece of legislative
history in order to make it decisive here, for, at the very least,
it directly refutes the notion that the other sections of the Act
were intended to effect no changes in the division of authority
between Army and Interior that had been suggested in the Pick Plan
and the Sloan Plan.
Moreover, even if § 9(a) had been intended to adopt every aspect
of the functional division of authority between the two Departments
that had been proposed in the Pick and Sloan Plans, this section
would not provide Interior with the authority to withdraw water
unilaterally from Lake Oahe for irrigation and other uses in flat
contradiction of § 8 of the Act. Contrary to the petitioners'
argument in this case, nothing in those two plans indicates that
control over individual reservoirs was to be divided among various
departments of the Federal Government. The Pick Plan, for example,
emphasized that, although the Department of War was willing to
coordinate its activities with Interior in order to serve "the
broad and important interests and responsibilities" of both
agencies, "[i]t is essential, however, that the main-stem projects
be built, operated, and maintained by the Corps of Engineers." H.R.
Doc. at 3-4. The War Department noted that, although it would
retain control of those reservoir projects, it accepted that
"utilization of storage reserved for irrigation" in those
reservoirs "should be in accordance with [Interior] regulations."
Id. at 4. [
Footnote 6]
But this accession is not
Page 484 U. S. 512
at all the same as dividing control between the two agencies
over the reservoir projects or the water stored in those projects,
which was not contemplated in the Pick Plan. The Sloan Plan
basically agreed with the approach set out in the Pick Plan,
recognizing that the agency
"with primary interest in the dominant function of any feature
proposed in the plan should construct and operate that feature,
giving full recognition, in the design, construction, and
operation, to the needs of other agencies with minor
interests."
S. Doc., at 11. The Sloan Plan recognized that the "dominant
function" of Lake Oahe and the other main-stem reservoir projects
would be flood control and navigation, and therefore these projects
would come under the jurisdiction of the Army and its Corps of
Engineers.
Id. at 4. [
Footnote 7] Even if Congress had intended to write the
jurisdictional structure suggested in the Pick Plan and the Sloan
Plan directly into law, therefore, it would not have extended to
Interior the unilateral authority that has been claimed in this
case.
The petitioners also point to § 9(c) of the Act as lending
support to its argument. That section states that "the reclamation
and power developments to be undertaken by the
Page 484 U. S. 513
Secretary of the Interior under said plans shall be governed by
the Federal Reclamation Laws." As noted already, under the
reclamation laws, the Interior Secretary is authorized to
reallocate water under his control for industrial use as he sees
fit.
See n 4,
supra. By its terms, however, § 9(c) applies only to "the
reclamation and power developments" undertaken by the Interior
Secretary under the Act: that is, to the "transmission lines and
related facilities" that § 5 authorizes the Interior Secretary "to
construct or acquire" for transmitting and disposing of electric
power, and to the "irrigation works" that § 8 authorizes the
Interior Secretary "to construct, operate, and maintain" under the
reclamation laws. This provision merely stipulates that the
reclamation laws, which typically apply to other Interior projects,
see 43 U.S.C. § 371
et seq. (1946 ed.), also
apply to all the projects that Interior may undertake under the
Flood Control Act. But as the District Court found, and as is
readily apparent, the reservoir project engineered by the Army at
Oahe is neither a "power development" nor a "reclamation
development" that has been undertaken by the Interior Secretary.
586 F. Supp. at 1273-1278. [
Footnote 8] On the facts of this case, § 9(c)
Page 484 U. S. 514
clearly does not extend any authority to Interior to withdraw
water from Lake Oahe by other means than those stated in the Act.
[
Footnote 9]
Not only do the language, structure, and legislative history of
the Act fail to support the petitioners in this case, but the
substance of their position is also difficult to fathom. The
Page 484 U. S. 515
petitioners claim that the administrative structure established
in the Act divides authority over Lake Oahe between Army and
Interior in a novel fashion that is considerably different from
what appears on the face of the Act. One possibility, which the
petitioners disavow, is that Interior has the ultimate authority to
use water from the reservoir for irrigation purposes and Army has
the ultimate authority to use water from the reservoir for flood
control and navigational purposes. This approach obviously would
founder, and could give rise to endless squabbles, unless the water
in the reservoir has been allocated between these uses, yet the
District Court explicitly found "no evidence that separate
allocations were made at Oahe," and "one wonders how the Interior
Department is to control what cannot be identified." 586 F. Supp.
at 1277. The position actually urged by the petitioners is even
less straightforward than the foregoing: they argue that the Act
requires Interior
to consult with Army before
withdrawing any water for industrial use from Lake Oahe, and
does not allow Interior to withdraw water
if Army
objects, and yet the Act
does not require Interior
to obtain the approval of Army in order to withdraw water
for industrial use. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15. The Army's authority
over Lake Oahe is thus to be understood as most closely analogous
to an executive veto over legislation: Interior must offer its
proposal to the Army, and cannot proceed on its own if the Army
objects, but can proceed even without Army approval as long as Army
does not object. This would be, to say the least, a most unusual
approach to administrative jurisdiction, one that gains no support
from the text of the Act and one that we are unwilling to read into
the Act as an implicit modification of its otherwise sensible and
intelligible provisions.
C
The petitioners finally contend that this Court should defer to
the Interior Secretary's interpretation of the authority granted to
him under the Act, which the Army apparently
Page 484 U. S. 516
has acquiesced in at least for the purposes of this litigation.
The petitioners also point to what they describe as a tradition of
cooperation between these two Departments in the Missouri River
Basin, including a period between 1975 and 1978 when they entered
into a joint agreement that allowed the Interior Secretary, "both
on his own behalf and as agent for the Secretary of the Army, [to]
contract for the marketing of water for industrial uses" from the
six main-stem reservoirs. [
Footnote 10] The District Court disagreed with this
historical account of the relations between Interior and the Army
on this subject, and concluded that, when "the chief attorneys for
the two departments affected by a statute disagree, neither enjoys
any deference." 586 F. Supp. at 1280. The Court of Appeals
discussed this issue very briefly, but the gist of its holding was
simply that Interior's interpretation did not even constitute a
reasonable reading of the Act. 787 F.2d at 287. [
Footnote 11]
It is unnecessary to consider the petitioners' contention that
deference to the Interior Secretary is appropriate in this case and
their related arguments about the history of relations between Army
and Interior under the Act, for even if Interior's interpretation
of the Act would be entitled to any
Page 484 U. S. 517
deference in these circumstances, the Executive Branch is not
permitted to administer the Act in a manner that is inconsistent
with the administrative structure that Congress enacted into law.
As this Court has stated in a recent opinion on the proper limits
of deference to an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers:
"If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U. S. 837,
467 U. S.
842-843 (1984). The Flood Control Act speaks directly to
the dispute in this case, and congressional intent as expressed in
the Act indicates clearly that the Interior Secretary may not enter
into a contract to withdraw water from an Army reservoir for
industrial use without the approval of the Department of the Army.
That is "the end of the matter."
Id. at
467 U. S.
842.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
* Together with No. 86-941,
Hodel, Secretary of the
Interior, et al. v. Missouri et al., also on certiorari to the
same court.
[
Footnote 1]
Although the contract states that the Interior Secretary entered
into it "after consultation with the Secretary of the Army," App.
226, no party has disputed the fact that the Secretary of the Army
did not expressly approve or sign the contract, which was signed on
behalf of the United States by a regional director for the Interior
Department's Bureau of Reclamation.
Id. at 234.
[
Footnote 2]
This case also has involved several procedural issues, as well
as ancillary issues about the validity of the contract. Those other
issues are not before this Court. Neither is there any issue
presented here as to the relative interests of the United States
and South Dakota in Lake Oahe water.
[
Footnote 3]
At one time, the Army took the view that the only "surplus
water" in the main-stem reservoirs was the water that neither was
held in the reservoirs nor was run through the generators to
produce hydroelectric power -- in other words, that no "surplus
water" existed in the reservoirs themselves -- apparently because
it assumed that all water contained in the reservoirs "is otherwise
being used" for specified purposes. Army Memorandum, Marketing of
Missouri River Water for Coal Gasification, AR900407 (Dec. 16,
1974), App. 133. More recently, however, the Army has abandoned
this assumption and recognized that "this interpretation of what
constitutes surplus water is unnecessarily narrow." Memorandum from
Susan Crawford, General Counsel of Army, to Assistant Secretary of
Army, Proposed Contracts for Municipal and Industrial Water
Withdrawals from Main Stem Missouri Reservoirs 2 (March 13, 1986),
App. to Brief for Respondent States 14a. Its current position is
that § 6 of the Act gives the Army Secretary the same authority
over "water he determines is not needed to fulfill a project
purpose in Army reservoirs" that the Interior Department possesses
over water contained in its own reservoir projects, namely, the
authority to withdraw water for industrial use if to do so would
not impair the efficiency of the project for its other stated
purposes. Memorandum of Crawford 4, App. to Brief for Respondent
16a.
See also Army Circular EC 1105-2-181, pp. 3-4 (Oct.
30, 1987). This view is consistent with the language of the Act,
for if the term "surplus water" could never include any of the
water stored in the reservoirs themselves, then the caveat Congress
enacted in § 6 -- that this grant of authority shall not "adversely
affect then existing lawful uses of such water" -- would have been
irrelevant, because this grant of authority could never adversely
affect any existing or projected uses of such water.
[
Footnote 4]
See also 43 U.S.C. § 521 (1946 ed.). Under that
section, the Interior Secretary,
"in connection with the operations under the reclamation law is
hereby authorized to enter into contract to supply water from any
project irrigation system for other purposes than irrigation . . .
:
Provided . . . That no water shall be furnished for the
uses aforesaid if the delivery of such water shall be detrimental
to the water service for such irrigation project."
The Interior Secretary's determination that the sale of water
does not impair the irrigation purpose of a project under his
control has been accorded broad deference.
See, e.g.,
Environmental Defense Fund v. Morton, 420 F.
Supp. 1037 (Mont.1976),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848 (CA9
1979).
[
Footnote 5]
Nothing in today's decision, it should be emphasized, prevents
the water in Lake Oahe from being put to beneficial use for
industrial or other purposes. Of the 23 million acre-feet of water
stored in this reservoir, by far the most part was projected for
potential use in irrigation. As the District Court found, however,
none of this water has been allotted for irrigation, no works have
been constructed to make use of this water for irrigation, and none
of this water has ever been used for irrigation or is likely to be
used for that purpose in the foreseeable future. 586 F. Supp. at
1274, 1277. On these facts, there is considerable leeway for the
Army Secretary to designate some of this water for industrial use
without "adversely affect[ing]" the "existing lawful uses of such
water." Act, § 6. Certainly if the Executive Branch as a whole
wishes to put the water in this reservoir to beneficial use, it may
do so simply by complying with the terms of the Act.
[
Footnote 6]
In its comments on the Pick Plan, Interior endorsed this
approach, stating that the Army
"Corps of Engineers should construct, operate, and maintain any
feature in which flood control and navigation are dominant
considerations, and the [Interior's] Bureau of Reclamation should
construct, operate, and maintain any feature in which the functions
of irrigation, restoration of surface and ground water levels, and
power are dominant,"
though the two Departments would "advise and consult with" one
another to the extent that these interests overlapped in features
controlled by one or the other Department. H.R. Doc., at 7.
[
Footnote 7]
The self-styled "joint engineering report" contained in the
final Senate Document that effected a reconciliation of the Pick
and Sloan Plans did not shed any further light on how the
administrative jurisdictions of the two Departments were to be
circumscribed, but merely observed that the engineering features of
the two plans were brought into agreement by applying the
principles that the Army Corps of Engineers
"should have the responsibility for determining main stem
reservoir capacities and capacities of tributary reservoirs for
flood control and navigation,"
and the Bureau of Reclamation
"should have the responsibility for determining the reservoir
capacities on the main stem and tributaries of the Missouri River
for irrigation."
S. Doc. No. 247, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1944). This passage
seems to be nothing more than an explanation of how the final
number of projects and the amount of their storage capacities were
reached by the representatives of the two Departments.
[
Footnote 8]
The petitioners contend that the term "reclamation . . .
developmen[t]" in § 9(c) can encompass either the entire reservoir
project at Oahe or the activities that Interior might undertake to
dispose of water stored at Oahe for irrigation. Neither suggestion
is tenable. The construction of the main-stem dam and reservoir
project at Oahe was undertaken and controlled by the Army, and the
District Court found this to be true as a matter of fact; thus Oahe
cannot be a "reclamation . . . developmen[t] to be undertaken by
the Secretary of the Interior." And the suggestion that the term
"reclamation . . . developmen[t]" may refer to activities, rather
than projects, is wrong for several reasons. First, the whole term
is "reclamation and power developments to be undertaken by the
Secretary of the Interior." These developments, which were set out
more specifically in the Pick and Sloan Plans, plainly refer to the
only developments that the Act identifies Interior as undertaking:
the "power developments" ("transmission lines and related
facilities") identified in § 5, and the "reclamation developments"
("irrigation works") identified in § 8. Second, the term
"reclamation . . . developmen[t]" used in § 9(c) of the Act is
linked by petitioners to § 9(c) of the Reclamation Project Act of
1939, 53 Stat. 1193, as set forth in 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1946
ed.), which is said to give Interior the authority to contract to
dispose of this water, yet that statutory section itself limits
Interior's authority by stating that such authority may not be used
to "impair the efficiency
of the project for irrigation
purposes."
Ibid. (emphasis added). Thus, this same account
relates the terms "development" and "project." Third, the integral
nature of the relation between these two terms is shown by further
consideration of the Reclamation Project Act § 2(i), 43 U.S.C. §
485a(i) (1946 ed.), which defines the term "development unit"
as
"a part of a project which, for purposes of orderly engineering
or reclamation development, is designated as a development unit by
order of the Secretary."
Thus, a "reclamation development" is a designated part of a
"reclamation project" under the Reclamation Project Act, for
administrative purposes, and the two terms are used almost
synonomously in that Act.
See § 485f(b).
[
Footnote 9]
Petitioners suggest that their reading of the Act is supported
by Congress' enactment of § 212 of the Reclamation Reform Act of
1982, 43 U.S.C. § 39011. That provision, however, works no change
in any of the substantive provisions of the Flood Control Act, and
specifically does not purport to modify § 8 of the Act, which
states the manner in which water may be withdrawn from Lake Oahe
for use in irrigation. Section 212(a) merely was intended
"to eliminate the shadow of applicability of the reclamation law
to Corps of Engineers projects in any case in which the intent of
Congress concerning such applicability is not clearly and
explicitly set forth in statutory language,"
S.Rep. No. 97-373, p. 16 (1982), which it was not in § 8 of the
Act. Section 212(b) simply ensures that the Interior
Secretary's
"authority to contract with water user entities for the
irrigation water deliveries from Corps of Engineers projects, and
to collect appropriate charges for those deliveries, continues in
effect."
Ibid. It says nothing about when and how the Interior
Secretary possesses and exercises the authority to enter into such
contracts, which is prescribed in § 8 of the Act. Even more to the
point, § 212 does not indicate in any way that the Interior
Secretary has the authority to enter into a contract to withdraw
water from an Army reservoir for industrial use, which is the
precise authority asserted in this case.
[
Footnote 10]
This "Memorandum of Understanding" declared that the Army
Secretary "shall retain all operational and managerial control over
said reservoirs." Memorandum of Understanding Between Secretary of
Interior and Secretary of Army, AR900072 (Feb. 24, 1975), App. 136.
Over the four years it was in effect, no contracts were executed
under it, and the agreement was allowed to expire in 1978. It also
appears, by all accounts, that the contract at issue in this case
is the only instance of the Interior Secretary exercising
unilateral authority to withdraw water for industrial uses from a
reservoir project controlled by the Army.
[
Footnote 11]
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals mentioned
various reasons why the Interior Secretary's interpretation of the
Act might not be entitled to deference even if it were a reasonable
interpretation. But since, in the end, the District Court, like the
Court of Appeals, concluded that the agency's decision was not
"reasonable," 586 F. Supp. at 1280, its additional comments, like
those of the Court of Appeals, were pure dictum, and there is no
reason to address them here.