Petitioner was tried in state court on charges of murder and
armed robbery stemming from a 1981 store robbery during which his
accomplice and the storekeeper's mother were killed in a fight
after petitioner left the store. Although petitioner testified that
the mother had not even entered the store before he left, and that
he had not intended to kill or harm anyone, the jury was instructed
"that malice is implied or presumed from the use of a deadly
weapon." After his conviction and death sentence were affirmed by
the South Carolina Supreme Court, petitioner sought a writ of
habeas corpus from that court, arguing,
inter alia, that
the burden-shifting instruction given at trial was unconstitutional
under
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.
S. 510. While the habeas corpus application was pending,
petitioner also called to the state court's attention this Court's
subsequent decision in
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.
S. 307. After this Court summarily vacated the state
court's summary denial of the writ and remanded the case "for
further consideration in light of
Francis," the state
court, although acknowledging that the jury instruction suffered
from the same infirmities addressed in
Francis, denied
relief on state law grounds without considering whether
Francis might apply retroactively, and without discussing
Sandstrom.
Held: As a matter of federal law, petitioner's
conviction cannot stand in light of
Francis. Pp.
484 U. S.
215-218.
(a)
Sandstrom, which had been decided before
petitioner's trial took place, established that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits jury instructions that
have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of proof on
the critical question of intent in a criminal prosecution.
Francis was merely an application of that governing
principle. Accordingly, respondents' argument that a newly
announced constitutional rule should not generally be applied
retroactively to cases pending on collateral review cannot operate
to deny petitioner the benefit of
Francis. That argument
simply does not apply where the "new" holding is merely an
application of a rule that was well settled at the time of
conviction. Pp.
484 U. S.
215-217.
(b) The State's contention that it has the authority to
establish the scope of its own habeas corpus proceedings and to
refuse therein to apply a new rule of federal constitutional law
retroactively is rejected. since
Francis did not announce
a new rule and since the state court's opinion
Page 484 U. S. 212
does not place any limit on the issues it will entertain in
collateral proceedings. Having considered the merits of the federal
claim, that court has the duty to grant the relief that federal law
requires. Pp.
484 U. S.
217-218.
290 S.C. 231,
349 S.E.2d
84, reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner and an accomplice robbed a country store in South
Carolina in 1981. After petitioner left the store, a fight occurred
in which the accomplice and the storekeeper's mother were both
killed. Petitioner was convicted of murder and armed robbery, and
sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by
the South Carolina Supreme Court in 1982.
State v. Yates,
280 S.C. 29,
310 S.E.2d
805,
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124 (1983).
At his trial, petitioner testified that the victim had not even
entered the store before he left, and that he had not intended to
kill or to harm anyone. The jury, however, was instructed "that
malice is implied or presumed from the use of a deadly weapon."
[
Footnote 1] A few months after
petitioner's conviction was affirmed, the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that it was error to give such an instruction.
See
State v. Elmore, 279 S.C. 417,
308 S.E.2d
781 (1983). Thereafter, petitioner sought a writ of habeas
corpus from the South Carolina Supreme Court, arguing that the
burden-shifting instruction given at his trial was unconstitutional
under the state court's reasoning in
Elmore and under our
decision in
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.
S. 510 (1979). While the application for habeas corpus
was pending, we decided another
Page 484 U. S. 213
case involving a burden-shifting instruction,
Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U. S. 307
(1985), and petitioner promptly called that decision to the
attention of the State Supreme Court. The court denied the writ
without opinion.
Petitioner then sought a writ of certiorari in this Court. We
summarily vacated the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court
and remanded the case "for further consideration in light of
Francis v. Franklin."
Yates v. Aiken, 474 U.S.
896 (1985). On remand, the state court determined that the jury
instruction at petitioner's trial "suffered from the same
infirmities present in
Elmore and addressed in
Francis
v. Franklin." 290 S.C. 231, 233,
349 S.E.2d
84, 85 (1986). Nevertheless, the court held that petitioner was
not entitled to relief. As an explanation for its holding, the
court stated that its decision in
Elmore should not be
applied retroactively to invalidate a conviction that was final
when
Elmore was decided. The opinion did not consider
whether the decision in
Francis v. Franklin might apply
retroactively, and also did not discuss our decision in
Sandstrom v. Montana, on which petitioner had relied.
In dissent, Justice Finney reasoned that
Elmore and
Francis v. Franklin should be applied retroactively,
because an instruction that shifts the burden of proof on an
element of the offense -- particularly in a capital case --
substantially impairs the truthfinding function of the jury.
Moreover, he reasoned, given our decision in
Sandstrom v.
Montana in 1979, the case did not represent a significant
change in the law. [
Footnote
2]
Page 484 U. S. 214
We granted certiorari because we were concerned that the South
Carolina Supreme Court had not fully complied with our mandate. 480
U.S. 945 (1987). We now reverse.
I
Our order remanding the case for further consideration in the
light of
Francis v. Franklin was predicated entirely on
the fact that petitioner's challenge to the jury instruction
asserted a substantial federal question. Our opinion in
Francis explained why a challenge of this kind is
supported by the Federal Constitution:
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"
"protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged."
In re Winship, [
397 U.S.
358,
397 U. S. 364
(1970)]. This "bedrock,
axiomatic and elementary'
[constitutional] principle," id. at 397 U. S. 363,
prohibits the State from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury
charge that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of
persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of
a crime. Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, at 442 U. S.
520-524; Patterson v. New York, 432 U.
S. 197, 432 U. S. 210,
432 U. S. 215
(1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.
S. 684, 421 U. S.
698-701 (1975); see also Morissette v. United
States, 342 U. S. 246,
342 U. S.
274-275 (1952). The prohibition protects the
"fundamental value determination of our society," given voice in
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Winship that "it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."
397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 372.
See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513,
357 U. S.
525-526 (1958).
471 U.S. at
471 U. S.
313.
The portion of the state court's opinion concluding that the
instruction in petitioner's case was infirm for the reasons
"addressed
Page 484 U. S. 215
in
Francis" was responsive to our mandate, but the
discussion of the question whether the decision in
Elmore
should be applied retroactively was not. Our mandate contemplated
that the state court would consider whether, as a matter of federal
law, petitioner's conviction could stand in the light of
Francis. Since the state court did not decide that
question, we shall do so.
II
The South Carolina Attorney General submits that we should adopt
Justice Harlan's theory that a newly announced constitutional rule
should not be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral
review unless the rule places "certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe,"
Mackey v. United States,
401 U. S. 667,
401 U. S. 692
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), or
enunciates a procedural rule that is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,"
id. at
401 U. S. 693.
Under this theory, the Attorney General argues, petitioner would
not be entitled to the benefit of our ruling in
Franklin.
We have already endorsed Justice Harlan's retroactivity analysis
for cases pending on direct appeal,
see Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314,
479 U. S. 322
(1987);
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.
S. 537 (1982), and we have noted, as Justice Harlan did,
Mackey, supra, at
401 U. S. 682-687;
Desist v. United States,
394 U. S. 244,
394 U. S. 260
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting), the important distinction between
direct review and collateral review.
Compare Allen v.
Hardy, 478 U. S. 255
(1986) (holding that
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S.
79 (1986) does not apply retroactively to cases on
collateral review),
with Griffith, supra, at
479 U. S.
322-323 (holding that
Batson does apply
retroactively to cases pending on direct review);
see, e.g.,
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551
(1987) (right to appointed counsel on direct appeal not applicable
in collateral proceedings). To decide this case, however, it is not
necessary
Page 484 U. S. 216
to determine whether we should go further and adopt Justice
Harlan's reasoning as to the retroactivity of cases announcing new
constitutional rules to cases pending on collateral review.
Although Justice Harlan believed that most collateral attacks on
final judgments should be resolved by reference to the state of the
law at the time of the petitioner's conviction, he emphasized the
proposition that many "new" holdings are merely applications of
principles that were well settled at the time of conviction. As he
explained in
Desist:
"The theory that the habeas petitioner is entitled to the law
prevailing at the time of his conviction is, however, one which is
more complex than the Court has seemingly recognized. First, it is
necessary to determine whether a particular decision has really
announced a 'new' rule at all, or whether it has simply applied a
well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which is
closely analogous to those which have been previously considered in
the prior case law. . . . One need not be a rigid partisan of
Blackstone to recognize that many, though not all, of this Court's
constitutional decisions are grounded upon fundamental principles
whose content does not change dramatically from year to year, but
whose meanings are altered slowly and subtly as generation succeeds
generation. In such a context, it appears very difficult to argue
against the application of the 'new' rule in all habeas cases,
since one could never say with any assurance that this Court would
have ruled differently at the time the petitioner's conviction
became final."
394 U.S. at
394 U. S.
263-264.
This reasoning, which we previously have endorsed, [
Footnote 3] is controlling in this
case, because our decision in
Francis was
Page 484 U. S. 217
merely an application of the principle that governed our
decision in
Sandstrom v. Montana, which had been decided
before petitioner's trial took place. We explicitly so held in
Francis itself:
"The question before the Court in this case is almost identical
to that before the Court in
Sandstrom: whether the
challenged jury instruction had the effect of relieving the State
of the burden of proof enunciated in
Winship on the
'critical question of . . . state of mind,' 442 U.S. at
442 U. S. 521, by creating a
mandatory presumption of intent upon proof by the State of other
elements of the offense."
471 U.S. at 313.
"
Sandstrom v. Montana made clear that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State from making
use of jury instructions that have the effect of relieving the
State of the burden of proof enunciated in
Winship on the
critical question of intent in a criminal prosecution. 442 U.S. at
442 U. S. 521. Today we
reaffirm the rule of
Sandstrom and the wellspring due
process principle from which it was drawn. The Court of Appeals
faithfully and correctly applied this rule, and the court's
judgment is therefore affirmed."
Id. at
471 U. S.
326-327.
III
Respondents also argue that South Carolina has the authority to
establish the scope of its own habeas corpus proceedings, and to
refuse to apply a new rule of federal constitutional law
retroactively in such a proceeding. We reject this argument for two
reasons. First, as we have just explained,
Page 484 U. S. 218
Francis did not announce a new rule. Second, we do not
read the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion as having placed
any limit on the issues that it will entertain in collateral
proceedings. Since it has considered the merits of the federal
claim, it has a duty to grant the relief that federal law
requires.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
See App. 7; Tr. 1208.
[
Footnote 2]
"The doctrine against burden-shifting presumptions set out in
Francis
v. Franklin, [
471 U.S.
307 (1985)], is not a clear break with prior law. The United
States Supreme Court in
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S.
510 . . . (1979), decided prior to
Yates, held
that conclusive presumptions or instructions which shift the burden
of persuasion violate the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that,
in every criminal trial, the state is required to prove each
element of the criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Court went on to hold, concerning
Elmore-type errors, that
conclusive presumptions conflict with the presumption of innocence
with which the law endows the accused. These presumptions,
likewise, extend to every element of the crime and invade the
truthfinding function which, in a criminal case, the law assigns
solely to the jury."
290 S.C. at 239, 349 S.E.2d at 88-89.
[
Footnote 3]
We stated in
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.
S. 537,
457 U. S. 549
(1982):
"[W]hen a decision of this Court merely has applied settled
precedents to new and different factual situations, no real
question has arisen as to whether the later decision should apply
retrospectively. In such cases, it has been a foregone conclusion
that the rule of the later case applies in earlier cases, because
the later decision has not in fact altered that rule in any
material way."
See also Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.
S. 527 (1987) (per curiam);
Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U. S. 200
(1979);
Lee v. Missouri, 439 U. S. 461,
439 U. S. 462
(1979) (per curiam).