Although as a general rule all issues, whether of law or fact,
ought to be disposed of in some way by the court below, yet, under
the particular circumstances of this case, which presented the
appearance upon the record of a demurrer which had not been
disposed of, this Court will presume that the demurrer had been
withdrawn or overruled.
The thirty-second section of the Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 91,
forbids a reversal of the judgment on account of the omission of
the clerk to record such waiver or overruling.
The statutes of jeofails examined.
Where there are special and general counts in a declaration, and
a demurrer is filed which affects only the special counts, and the
party goes to trial upon the general issue plea to the general
counts, a verdict and judgment so obtained will not be set aside
because the demurrer was undisposed of. A statute of Mississippi,
where the cause was tried, allows one good count to sustain a
judgment.
Where the plea was bad, and the demurrer was to a replication to
this bad plea, the first fault in pleading was committed by the
defendant, and judgment against him was properly given.
This was a suit brought by Jemison against Townsend to recover a
sum of money which Jemison had paid for him to the Mississippi
Union Bank, at Macon. The consideration appears to have been, that
Townsend should take up a note at the Commercial Bank of Columbus,
for which he, Townsend, was bound for one John B. Jones, but in
what manner Townsend's taking up the latter note would benefit
Jemison did not appear from any part of the record.
Page 48 U. S. 707
On 21 May, 1842, the suit was commenced by issuing a summons,
which was endorsed as follows:
"This action of assumpsit is brought to recover the sum of
$4,000, with interest at 10 percent (paid for defendant) from 27
January, 1840, to Mississippi Union Bank; defendant agreed to pay
for plaintiff same amount in the Commercial Bank of Columbus,
Mississippi, in consideration that plaintiff would pay same amount
for him to the Mississippi Union Bank at Macon; this action is
brought to recover said sum of money, defendant having failed to
comply with his promise."
"HARRIS & HARRISON,
Plaintiff's Attorneys"
The declaration originally filed was amended, and on 6 December,
1842, the amended declaration was filed, which contained three
special counts and the general money counts. The first of the three
special counts was as follows, the other two being similar in
substance.
"Robert Jemison, who is a citizen of the State of Alabama, by
leave of the court for that purpose first had and obtained, by
attorney, complains of Thomas Townsend, who is a citizen of the
Northern District of the State of Mississippi, and who was summoned
to answer the said plaintiff of a plea of trespass on the case in
assumpsit. For that whereas, heretofore, to-wit, on 20 March, A.D.
1840, at, to-wit, in said district, in consideration that the said
defendant was then and there bound, and liable by note in writing,
to the Commercial Bank of Columbus, Mississippi, for one John B.
Jones, as his security for about the sum of nine thousand eight
hundred and six 50/100 dollars, besides interest thereon; and was
also indebted to the Mississippi Union Bank, at its branch in
Macon, in the county of Noxubee, about the sum of three thousand
dollars, on a note of four thousand dollars, executed by the said
defendant and others, payable at Jackson, at the banking house of
the said Mississippi Union Bank at Jackson, and in consideration
that the said plaintiff would take up the said last-mentioned note
to the Mississippi Union Bank, and would also take up the note of
the said Jones in the Commercial Bank of Columbus, Mississippi, on
which the said Townsend was liable as security as aforesaid, except
an amount equal to the amount of said Townsend's liability to the
said Mississippi Union Bank, and release the said Townsend from the
balance of his said liability to the said Commercial Bank, he, the
said defendant, then and there agreed with the said plaintiff, to
pay on his said liability, in the said Commercial Bank of Columbus,
Mississippi, the same amount which the said plaintiff might take up
for him, the said Townsend, in the said Mississippi Union Bank.
Page 48 U. S. 708
And the said plaintiff avers that afterwards, to-wit, on 10 May,
in the year 1840, he did take up the said Townsend's note, in the
said Mississippi Union Bank above stated, according to the said
agreement, amounting to the sum of three thousand and ninety 41/100
dollars. And the said plaintiff further avers that he did then and
there, to-wit, on the same day and year last named, at, to-wit, in
said district, take up the notes of the said John B. Jones, in the
said Commercial Bank of Columbus, Mississippi, on which the said
Townsend was security as aforesaid, according to his said
agreement. And the said plaintiff in fact says,"
&c.
The subsequent pleadings were as follows:
"And the said defendant, by attorney, comes and defends the
wrong and injury, when &c., and says he did not undertake or
promise in manner and form as the said plaintiff hath above thereof
complained against him; and of this he puts himself upon the
country &c."
"COCKE, SMITH & GHOLSON,
for Defendant"
"And the plaintiff doth the like."
"HARRIS & HARRISON,
Plaintiff's Attorneys"
"And for further plea in this behalf, the said defendant, as to
the first, second, and third counts of the said declaration, says,
that the said plaintiff ought not to have or maintain his action,
because he says that, by an act to prevent frauds and perjuries, it
is enacted, that no action shall be brought whereby to charge the
defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default,
or miscarriage of any other person, unless such promise or
agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, shall be in writing,
and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other
person by him thereunto lawfully authorized. And the said defendant
avers that the said plaintiff hath brought his action to charge the
defendant for the debt of John B. Jones, and for no other purpose
whatever; and that there is no agreement in writing touching the
promise of the said defendant, as alleged in said counts of said
declaration, to answer for the debt of the said John B. Jones, or
any memorandum or note thereof signed by the said defendant, or any
other person by him thereunto lawfully authorized. And this he is
ready to verify, wherefore he prays judgment &c."
"COCKE, SMITH & GHOLSON,
for Defendant"
Plaintiff's replication to defendant's above-stated pleas, filed
at December term, 1842, in the words and figures following,
to-wit:
Page 48 U. S. 709
"The United States of America, district court for Northern
District of Mississippi, December term, 1842."
"ROBERT JEMISON"
"v. No. 108"
"THOMAS TOWNSEND"
"And the said plaintiff, as to the said plea of the said
defendant by him secondly above pleaded, saith, that he, the said
plaintiff, by reason of anything by the said defendant in that plea
alleged, ought not to be barred from having or maintaining his
aforesaid action thereof against him, the said defendant, because
he says that he, the said plaintiff, hath not brought his action to
charge the said defendant for the debt of John B. Jones, and for no
other purpose whatever, but that the said action is brought to
charge the said defendant upon his said several original promises
and undertakings, founded upon the said several new and sufficient
considerations in the said count of said declaration stated and set
forth; and this he prays may be inquired of by the country."
"HARRIS & HARRISON,
Plaintiff's Attorneys"
Defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's replication, filed at
December term, 1842, in the words and figures following,
to-wit:
"And the said defendant saith, that the said replication of the
said plaintiff to the said second plea of the said defendant is not
sufficient in law for the said plaintiff to have or maintain his
action aforesaid; and this he is ready to verify; wherefore he
prays judgment &c."
"GHOLSON & SMITH,
for Defendant"
In this condition of the pleadings, it appeared by the record
that the parties went to trial, when the jury found a verdict for
the plaintiff, assessing his damages at $3,451.88.
The trial took place on the 12th of December, 1842.
An execution was issued upon the judgment, then an alias, a
pluries, and an alias pluries.
On 5 June, 1845, a writ of error was sued out which brought the
case up to this Court.
Page 48 U. S. 714
MR. JUSTICE WOODBURY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The original action in this case was assumpsit. Though the
declaration contained several counts, some on a special promise and
some for money paid and received, it was endorsed on the original
summons, that the action was "brought to recover the sum of $4,000
and interest at 10 percent, paid for defendant, from 27 January,
1840, to Mississippi Union Bank," &c.
There was a demurrer and other pleadings as to this declaration,
which it is not necessary to repeat, as leave was given to amend
throughout; and on 6 December, 1842, a new declaration was filed,
consisting of three special counts and the usual money counts, all
of which must of course be for the original cause of action.
On 9 December, 1842, the defendant pleaded the
Page 48 U. S. 715
general issue of
nonassumpsit to the whole declaration,
and, for further plea to the three special counts, averred that the
suit was brought to charge him for the debt of John B. Jones, and
for no other purpose, and that, there being no evidence of his
promise in writing, the suit was barred by the statute of frauds
and perjuries. To this the plaintiff replied, that the suit was not
so brought, but on original promises made by the defendant. The
latter filed a general demurrer to this replication.
On 12 December the general issue joined as to the whole
declaration appears to have been tried, and a verdict returned for
$3,451.88, for which sum, at the same term, judgment was rendered
and execution issued.
Nothing further took place till June 5, 1845, when this writ of
error was brought to reverse the judgment, assigning as the ground
for it, that the demurrer to the replication should first have been
disposed of, and that the statute of frauds pleaded in the
preceding plea was a full defense to the matters alleged by the
original plaintiff.
This case presents some questions of practice and of pleading
which possess no little difficulty. They must be settled chiefly by
the reasons which may be applicable to them, and when precedents in
this Court are not found for a guide in aid of those reasons, they
may be strengthened by analogies established in the state courts or
in England, where the systems of pleading and practice are somewhat
similar. It seems proper, and is conceded, that in a cause where
several pleas are filed, as here, and some terminate in a demurrer
and others in an issue to the jury, they should all, as a general
rule, unless waived or withdrawn, be in some way disposed of by the
court. The leading inquiry, then, is, if enough appears in all the
proceedings here to render it probable that the issue, in law no
less than in fact, was in some way disposed of, though this is not,
eo nomine, mentioned in the record. Assuredly, it is usual
in this country, as a matter of practice, when there is an issue of
fact and another of law in the same action, to have the question of
law heard and decided first.
Green v. Dulany, 2 Munf. 518;
Muldrow v. McLelland, 1 Litt. 4; Co.Litt. 72
a;
Com.Dig., Pleader, Demurrer, 22. The 28th rule for the circuit
courts accords with this, by directing that, in such cases, "the
demurrer shall, unless the court shall otherwise, for good cause,
direct, be first argued and determined," because a decision on
that, if one way, that is, if in favor of the demurrer, will
frequently dispose of the whole cause, and supersede the expense
and necessity of a jury trial of the other issue, as well as give
an opportunity to move for an amendment. 5 Bac.Abr., Pleas and
Pleading No. 1; Tidd's Pract. 476;
Dubery v. Paige, 2 D.
& E. 394. Yet this course
Page 48 U. S. 716
being a matter of sound discretion in the court rather than of
fixed or inflexible right, it cannot always be absolutely presumed
to have been pursued.
See 28th Rule,
ante, and
cases before cited; 2 D. & E. 394; 1 Saunders 80, note 1. But
as it is usual, and the defendant in this case did not file any
exception, as if there had been a refusal by the court to decide
first on the demurrer, the presumption does not seem so strong that
there had been a refusal or neglect to do it, as that the demurrer
had been waived by the defendant, or, if not waived, had been
decided, and the particular minute of this on the record omitted by
a mistake of the clerk.
Several other circumstances exist which, in connection with
these, contribute to strengthen this last presumption, and to
justify us on legal grounds in inferring that one of the above
events, either a waiver or decision of the demurrer, actually took
place here. First, as to those in favor of the position that the
demurrer was waived. Only one cause of action existed here, though
set out in several counts. This is stated not only, as before
mentioned, in the summons by the original plaintiff, but by the
defendant in his special plea, and in the argument of his counsel.
The general issue, which was joined and tried, went to the whole
declaration; and under that, at the trial, any parol evidence
offered in its support could have been objected to as within the
statute of frauds, which seems to have been the whole defense, as
well as under the special plea setting up this statute against the
special counts. This is clear from the books of practice. 1
Chit.Pl. 515; 2 Leigh's N.P. 1066; 1 Tidd's Pract. 646. Though, to
be sure, it could be pleaded specially, also, and this may now be
necessary under the new rules of court in England. 1 Bingh. 781; 2
Crompt., Mees. & Rosc. 627. Hence, from abundant caution lest
this objection might not be admissible under the general issue, the
special plea here was probably at first filed. But before the trial
came on, which was three days after, it is likely that the
defendant had become convinced that it was admissible, under the
general issue, and therefore went to trial without having the
demurrer first argued and decided, or even joined, but waived it.
If, on the contrary, he concluded to try the issue to the jury
first, and then, if not allowed there to make his objection as to
the statute, to argue the demurrer afterwards, the inference would
be equally strong, that he was allowed to urge the objection at the
trial, and had a decision on it there, and therefore waived his
special plea and demurrer, and a separate and unnecessary decision
on them, afterwards. Such was the presumption in the case of
Bond v. Hills, 3 Stewart 283, more fully explained
hereafter. It was held likewise in
Morrison v. Morrison, 3
Stewart
Page 48 U. S. 717
444, that if a demurrer and an issue of fact were to the same
matter, and the latter was tried first, it must be presumed that
the other had been waived.
In
Dufan v. Couprey's
Heirs, 6 Pet. 170, a writ of error was brought, for
the same general cause as here, that one of the pleas intended for
the court did not appear by the record to have been decided. But
the court sustained the judgment below; the other plea, on
examination, as will soon be shown to be the case here, being found
immaterial after the finding of the jury. Where one material issue
is decided going to the whole declaration, it is of no consequence
how an immaterial issue going only to a part of it is found, if no
injury be done by it to either party. 6 Mo. 544. And by parity of
reasoning, it would be of no consequence whether it was decided at
all or not, if enough else is decided to dispose properly of the
whole case.
What fortifies these views is the fact, that the defendant never
procured a joinder to his demurrer by the plaintiff. As he
interposed this defense in a special plea, and filed the demurrer
to the replication, it would be material for him, if wanting a
decision on them, to get the pleadings finished. He should have
moved for a joinder, or got a rule for one, 1 Chit.Pl. 628, and
should likewise have moved for a decision on them, if desired,
before a final judgment was rendered on the verdict. It is true
that some books appear to consider it the duty of the plaintiff to
join in a demurrer soon after it has been tendered by the
defendant. But this, it is believed, generally depends on a
positive rule of court, which may exist, to require it. 33d Rule of
Practice for courts of equity, 1 How. 43;
Williams' Case,
Skinner 217. And without such rule, as in this case, he may need
and take time to decide on making a motion to amend, before
joining; and the harshest penalty proper for delay in the joinder
would seem to be, that the demurrer may be considered, when
requested by the party making it, though no formal joinder has
taken place. 3 Levinz 222; Skinner 217. The omission of the
defendant, then, to obtain a joinder, to which he was by law
entitled, 1 Chit. 647; Barnes, 163, the omission to add one
himself, which is sometimes permissible, 5 Taunt. 164, and 1 Pike
180, and the omission to request a decision without any joinder, as
he may after much delay, Skinner 217, all appear on the record, and
look not only like a waiver of a decision on the demurrer by the
defendant, but a neglect of his own duties on the subject. A waiver
of a demurrer often takes place, and is, by law, permissible. 1
Tidd's Pr. 710; 1 East 135; 2 Bibb, 12; 1 Burrow 321; 2 Strange
1181.
Quilibet renuntiare potest jure
Page 48 U. S. 718
pro se introducto. The want of a decision would, in
this aspect of the subject, seem to be by his own consent; and
consensus tollit errorem. The course of the defendant
appears to have been, practically and substantially, if not
formally, an abandonment of a wish for any separate decision on the
demurrer.
See cases of this kind.
Wright v.
Hollingsworth, 1 Pet. 165; Bac.Abr., Error, K. 5;
Vaiden v. Bell, 3 Randolph 448;
Patrick v.
Conrad, 3 Marsh. 613; 2 Marsh. 227;
Casky v. January,
Hardin 539. As a plea of the general issue, while a demurrer is
pending undisposed of, is considered a waiver of it.
Cobb v.
Ingalls, Breese 180.
In another view of the subject, looking to the defendant's own
neglect as the cause, a party cannot be allowed to take advantage
of his own wrong or inattention. Thus it has been decided, that a
writ of error will not lie for one's own neglect or irregularity. 1
McCord 205; 1 Pike 90;
Kincaid v. Higgins, 1 Bibb, 396; 2
Blackf. 71; 3 McCord 302, 477;
Kyle v. Hayle, 6 Mo. 544.
It strengthens these conclusions that the original defendant seems
to have long acquiesced in what he now excepts to -- that he does
not appear to have asked for a decision on the demurrer, to have
made any complaint at the time of the demurrer not being decided,
to have filed any motion about it, offered any bill of exceptions,
or even brought any writ of error, till after the lapse of nearly
three years. So much as to the waiver of the demurrer. But if the
demurrer was not, in truth, waived or withdrawn by the defendant,
or cannot be now so considered, from all which appears on the
record, the presumption from all is evident, that the demurrer and
special plea were actually decided on by the court, and the
omission to enter it on the record may be cured by the statute of
jeofails. Such a decision would have been its ordinary and proper
course of proceeding.
This Court has held, in a state of things much like this, as
will soon be more fully explained, that it was bound to presume
that "justice was administered in the ordinary form."
45 U. S. 4 How.
167. And hence, in 3 Stewart 447, 448, where a decree was averred
in the record, but not its form, it was presumed to have been in
the ordinary form. The court could not properly have decided and
given judgment for the plaintiff in this case, as it did, and, as
must be presumed, properly, in the first instance, if the demurrer
had not been waived or settled in favor of the plaintiff. Nor was
the defendant likely to have acquiesced in the judgment without
putting an exception on the record, unless one of these
circumstances had occurred. This question has arisen in several of
the states, and been decided in conformity with these views. In the
case of
Cochran's
Page 48 U. S. 719
Executors v. Davis, 5 Litt. 129, the court very
properly adopt a like principle, saying --
"To this plea there was a demurrer, and although there is no
order of record expressly disposing of the demurrer, yet, as the
court gave judgment for the plaintiff on the whole record, it must
be taken that the demurrer was sustained and the plea
overruled."
So in substance it was held in
McCollom v. Hogan, 1
Ala. 515; and in
Bond v. Hills, 3 Stewart, 283, where, as
in this case, there was a plea, amounting to the general issue, or
containing what was admissible under it, and it did not appear
distinctly to have been disposed of, but the general issue was
tried, it was held to be presumed that the defendant had the full
benefit of the objection on the trial, and error will not lie. It
is true that where one issue in a cause is found one way and
another on a matter entirely distinct is not disposed of, it may
not be proper always to consider it as decided.
Pratt v.
Payne, 5 Mo. 51. But here the questions involved in both
issues were the same; both related to the same cause of action, and
both to the same defense. The cases on this subject are so much
more numerous in the states than in England or in this Court, that
we oftener find it necessary to resort to them for analogies in
support of our reasoning as to what should, under all the facts, be
presumed. But in this Court, at this very term, we have a strong
illustration of the correctness or truth of such a presumption, in
the case of
Harris v. Wall; where, on similar findings by
a jury on some pleas and a demurrer to others, and a judgment for
the defendant without any entry made specifically that the demurrer
was disposed of, it happens, in point of fact, that it was decided,
and the judge on that circuit, now present, has with him his
written opinion, which he delivered when deciding it. So in
Stockton v.
Bishop, 4 How. 167, in a writ of error, where a
verdict appeared and a judgment, but not for any particular sum,
with several other important omissions, this Court, by Catron,
Justice, remarked --
"Still we are bound to presume, in favor of proceedings in a
court having jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter, that
justice was administered in the ordinary form when so much appears
as is found in this imperfect record."
Again, on a writ of error, many things will always be presumed
or intended, in law as well as fact, to have happened, which are
not
ipsissimis verbis or substantively so set out on the
record, but are plainly to be inferred to have happened from what
is set out. Cro.Eliz. 467; 4 How. 166. Thus, in this case, numerous
circumstances stated on the record, and already referred to,
indicate that the demurrer and special plea, if not withdrawn or
waived, were actually disposed of. Among
Page 48 U. S. 720
them, raising a strong presumption that way, is the fact, that
three days elapsed after the pleas and demurrer were filed, before
the trial of the other issue; that within this period the court had
time to hear the question of law argued; that it is the usual
practice to hear such a question before going to a trial of the
facts; and hence, unless the demurrer was waived, that the court,
before the trial, did probably hear and decide the demurrer against
the defendant. Again, the court would have been still less likely
to have proceeded to final judgment without first disposing of the
question of law, unless waived or settled either before, at, or
after the trial. Such, too, being the duty of the court, they are
to be presumed, till the contrary appears, to have done their duty.
Wilkes v. Dinsman, ante, 48
U. S. 89. Nor is such a presumption here, as some have
suggested, against the record; because the record says nothing on
the subject. But it is consistent with everything that is there
said, and with what is fairly to be inferred from the whole record,
carrying with us the probable idea, in that event, of some omission
or misprision by the clerk in noting all which happened.
The omission of the clerk to enter on the record the judgment
upon the demurrer, or to state its waiver, if it was abandoned,
would be merely a clerical mistake, and it is well settled at
common law, that a misprision by a clerk, if the case be clearly
that alone, though it consist of the omission of an important word
or expression, is not a good ground to reverse a judgment, where
substance enough appears to show that all which was proper and
required was properly done.
Willoughby v. Gray, Cro.Eliz.
467;
Weston's Case, 11 Mass. 417. The statutes of jeofails
usually go still further in remedying defects after verdicts and
judgments. Considering this, under those statutes, as a case of
defect or want of form in the entry by the clerk, and not of error
in the real doings of the court, the statute of jeofails of the
United States, curing all defects or want of form in judgments, is
explicit against our reversing this for such a cause. Sec. 32 of
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 91. If the state laws are to govern,
the words of the statute of jeofails are equally explicit and more
minute in Mississippi, in curing such defects, resembling more the
English statutes. Hutchinson's Code for Mississippi 841. It is not
a little singular, that the unwillingness in England to have
judgments disturbed by writs of error for defects in them or in the
prior pleadings, where a verdict of a jury has been rendered for a
plaintiff, is such, that something like five or six acts of
Parliament were passed before our ancestors emigrated hither, and
several more since, to prevent writs of error from being maintained
for defects in form, as well as to empower amendments
Page 48 U. S. 721
in such cases.
See those in 1 Bac.Abr., Amendment and
Jeofails;
O'Driscoll v. McBurney, 2 Nott & McCord 58.
Some of the defects cured seem to be very near as strong as the
present case. 11 Coke 6
b; Act of 32 Hen. VIII. c. 30. The
difficulty is in deciding "what is substance and what is form," and
that is governed by no fixed test, but it is laid down that it
"must be determined in every action according to its nature." 1
Bac.Abr., Amendment and Jeofails, E. 1; 1 Saund. 81, note 1.
At common law, defects in collateral pleadings, or other matters
not preceding the verdict, and not to be proved in order to get a
verdict, were not cured by it. Yet those were cured which related
to matters necessary to be shown to get a verdict, and hence, after
it, are presumed to have been shown.
Renner v.
Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 581; Com.Dig., Pleader,
Count, c. 87;
Carson v. Hood, 4 Dall. 108 [omitted]; 1
Sumn. 314; 1 Gall. 261; 1 Wils. 222; Burr. 17, 25;
Cotterel v.
Cummins, 6 Serg. & R. 348; 1 Sumner 319; 16 Conn. 586; 11
Wendell 375; 7 Greenleaf 63. But these defects in collateral
matters, as here, when they relate to form, are as fully cured by
the statutes of jeofails as those connected with the verdict are by
intendment at common law.
Stennel v. Hogg, 1 Saunders 228,
note 1;
Dale v. Dean, 16 Conn. 579. Any omission like this
would certainly be amendable below, and some cases have gone so far
as to hold, in error, that any defect amendable below will be
considered as actually amended.
Cummings v. Lebo, 2 Rawle
23.
In conclusion on this point, this Court, by CATRON, JUSTICE, in
the writ of error before named of
Stockton
v. Bishop, 45 How. 155, 164 [argument of counsel --
omitted], stated that
"it must be admitted that Congress acted wisely in declaring
that no litigant party shall lose his right in law for want of
form, and in going one step further, as Congress unquestionably has
done, by declaring that to save the parties' rights, the substance
should be infringed on to some extent when contrasted with modes of
proceeding in the English courts and with their ideas of what is
substance."
After this, it would seem hypercritical, and contrary to the
whole spirit of the statutes of jeofails both of the United States
and of Mississippi, to allow an exception so contrary to legal
presumption as this to be sustained. Nor does it promote the ends
of justice to let parties lie by and not take exceptions, and
afterwards reverse judgments for omissions, which, if noticed at
the time, would have been corrected.
McCready v. James, 6
Wharton 547. And this Court, where the issues were three, and the
verdict and judgment not separate on each, but general on all, and
the objection was taken on the writ of error, in
Page 48 U. S. 722
Roach v.
Hulings, 16 Pet. 321, said, by DANIEL, JUSTICE:
"Objections of this character, that are neither taken at the
usual stage of the proceedings nor prominently presented on the
face of the record but which may be sprung upon a party after an
apparent waiver of them by an adversary, and still more
after a trial upon the merits, can have no claim to the
favor of the Court, but should be entertained only in obedience to
the strictest requirements of law,"
and they were in that case accordingly overruled or considered
as cured.
Another ground for affirming the judgment, which the plaintiff
in error cannot easily overcome, is that if the three counts to
which the special plea is filed cannot be sustained, the defendant
in error has obtained a verdict on all the counts; thus showing, at
least, that there was no valid defense to the others. And if those
three were conceded to be bad, the others are good, and
notwithstanding a verdict and judgment on all, the latter must not
in such case be reversed on error. By an express statute in
Mississippi passed June 28, 1842, one good count, though others are
bad, will sustain a judgment. Hutch. Code for Miss., ch. 5, art. 1.
This is not a peculiarity confined to Mississippi, but a like rule
prevails in several other states. 2 Bibb, 62; 2 Litt. 100; 2 Bay,
204; 2 Hill 648; 1 Blackf. 12; 1 Stewart, 384; 2 Conn. 324. And
though in some it is otherwise, 1 Caines 347; 11 Johns. 98; 9 Mass.
198, and is otherwise in England,
Grant v. Astle, Doug.
703, yet it has been regretted by some of her eminent jurists as
"inconvenient and ill-judged."
If this provision, then, in Mississippi, should be regarded as a
rule of practice, it existed there when the last process act, of
May, 1828, passed, and hence, by acts of Congress and the rules of
our circuit courts, binds them; but if it be a right conferred by
her statute, it equally must govern us, by the Judiciary law of
1789, in all cases tried like this in that state.
41
U. S. 16 Pet. 89,
41 U. S. 303.
But, beside these reasonings and views, to some of which a
portion of the court except, there exists another ground for
affirming the judgment below, which appears to us fully established
both on principle and adjudged cases. The first fault in the
pleadings connected with the demurrer seems to have been committed
by the defendant himself, and no reason appears on the whole record
why the original judgment should not have been rendered against him
on that ground. His only defense set up was the statute of frauds
and perjuries. This statute was pleaded specially; but, on the
facts and the law, it does not seem to have been applicable to the
case. The case was a transaction of money paid by the plaintiff on
account of the defendant,
Page 48 U. S. 723
and must have been considered by the court and jury as done
under an original undertaking to repay it in a particular way,
which the defendant had not fulfilled, and which was not within the
provisions of the statute. The defendant was misled, by the mode of
payment being special and to a third person, into an impression
that the original promise was to a third person. The suit is not
brought by the third person, to whom the original plaintiff owed a
debt, nor was the promise made to a third person; but it is brought
by the person who advanced money on account of the defendant, on a
consideration moving from him alone, and on the promise made to him
alone for its payment in a particular manner.
See, on
this,
Read v. Nash, 1 Wilson 305; 2 Leigh's N.P. 1031;
King v. Despard, 5 Wendell 277;
Towne v. Grover,
9 Pick. 306;
Hodgson v. Anderson, 3 Barn. & Cres.
842.
This was virtually, therefore, an undertaking by the defendant
to pay his own debt, but simply specifying a particular manner of
doing it, and unless it was found at the trial that the statute of
frauds did not apply, it is to be presumed that a recovery would
not have been had before the jury where it was competent to make
this an objection.
The matter of the plea, then, having been clearly bad, it
appears to be well settled that when a demurrer is filed to a
replication, if the plea is bad, judgment ought to be given for the
plaintiff.
Anon., 2 Wilson, 150;
Semble, Moor
692; Com.Dig., Pleader, Proceedings in Error, 3 B. 16; 1 Levinz
181. The whole record connected with the demurrer is open on the
writ of error, and judgment goes against the earliest fault. Breese
207;
Morgan v. Morgan, 4 Gill & Johns. 395.
In regard to the suggestion that the demurrer might have applied
to some other objection than the statute of frauds, either in the
plea or, going back to the declaration, some defect there (as the
first defect bad on general demurrer is the fatal one, 1 Chit.Pl.
647), it is enough to say that no other appears, then or now, to
have been pointed out, and none is intimated in the argument for
the plaintiff in error.
If is very doubtful also if, in this particular case, a defect
in the declaration would be considered at all on this demurrer, as
the general issue is pleaded to all of the declaration covering
these three special counts. And an issue in fact and a demurrer
cannot both be allowed to reach the same count. Bac.Abr., Pleas and
Pleading n. 1; 2 Blackf. 34; 5 Wendell 104. If there be an
exception to this rule, it must be by some local law or practice
nor existing here. 1 Litt. 4; 4 Munford 104.
From the whole record, therefore, it appears that the judgment
below in favor of the plaintiff was probably correct, even
Page 48 U. S. 724
if the demurrer had not been waived, and in this event it is
clear that the judgment should not, on this writ of error, be
reversed. Hobart 56; Com.Dig., Pleader, Demurrer, Q. 2;
Saunders v. Johnson, 1 Bibb, 322; 6 Monroe 295, 606;
Phelps v. Taylor, 4 Monroe 170;
semble, 3 Bibb,
225;
McWaters v. Draper, 5 Monroe 496; Hardin 164. In
Foster v. Jackson, Hobart, 56, the opinion says, "It is
the office of the court to judge the law upon the whole record."
The other cases cited show, that in writs of error, as well as
demurrers, the same rule prevails.
The propriety of our conclusions in this case becomes more
manifest when we consider that a reversal of the judgment would be
of no use to the original defendant, because, if reversed, the
order here could not be to render judgment for the defendant, but
to have a record made of the waiver or decision of the demurrer, if
either occurred, and if not, then a joinder in demurrer and an
opinion below on the question presented by it, and which opinion,
as already shown, must probably be for the plaintiff, and then the
same judgment be entered again on the verdict which exists now.
McGriffin v. Helson, 5 Litt. 48; 2 Strange 972;
Jackson v. Runlet, 1 Woodb. & Min. 381.
Finally, so far as any presumptions or doubts on any of these
considerations should operate against either party in forming our
conclusions, we are unable to see anything in the acquiescent
conduct of the original defendant before the judgment, or in the
merits of his original defense, or in his writ of error, brought
after such an uninterrupted silence and assent for years, which
entitle him to any peculiar favor.
The plaintiff in error, likewise, must always make out his case
clearly and satisfactorily, as every reasonable intendment should
be in favor of a judgment already rendered.
Fentriss
v. Smith, 10 Pet. 161;
Lander v. Reynolds,
3 Litt. 16; La. Code of Pract. 909, note, and cases there cited; 3
Martin (N.S.), 29; 15 Louis. 480 &c. This not having been done
in the present case, we think that the judgment below must be
Affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY.
I think the judgment of the district court may be supported on
the ground that the decision on the demurrer had become immaterial
after the verdict on the general issue. The special plea out of
which the demurrer arose applied only to three counts. There was a
fourth count, to which no defense was made except by the plea of
the general issue, and according to the law and practice of
Mississippi, one good count is sufficient to support the judgment
when there are several counts in a declaration and the others bad.
And after the verdict on the
Page 48 U. S. 725
general issue, the decision of the demurrer was immaterial and
the judgment must still have been for the plaintiff even if the
demurrer was decided for defendant. The omission to dispose of an
immaterial issue is not a ground for reversing a judgment, as the
decision of such issue could not influence the judgment of the
district court. But I do not concur in the other portions of the
opinion, and think that many of the positions taken in it cannot be
supported.
MR. JUSTICE CATRON concurs with the Chief Justice.
MR. JUSTICE DANIEL.
Regarding the opinion just delivered as in direct opposition to
the very canons of pleading at law, I feel constrained to declare
my dissent from it. I cannot subscribe to, and can hardly
comprehend, a doctrine of presumptions which, in proceedings at law
and on questions of pleading, infers that the parties or the court
have acted in direct contravention of the facts apparent upon, and
standing prominently out upon, the record, operating by such
presumption a false feature of the record itself. In this case the
defendant has tendered an issue in law to the replication to the
third plea; the record discloses the fact, that this issue has
never been tried; it is therefore undeniable that there is a chasm
in the proceedings, and that the court has not passed upon the
whole case. If presumption can be admitted to warrant the
conclusion that this demurrer was withdrawn, where shall such
presumption end? Would it not be equally regular to presume that
any other plea or issue on the record has been withdrawn? Then, if
any other source than the record itself can be resorted to in order
to ascertain what was in truth involved in the trial, conjecture or
evidence
aliunde must be introduced to determine, and that
which, by legal intendment, is the only evidence or proof of the
proceedings, the record becomes the weakest of all proof, or rather
becomes no proof at all. I think the judgment should be reversed,
and the cause remanded for a trial on all the issues of law and of
fact.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the District Court of the United States for the Northern
District of Mississippi, and was argued by counsel. On
consideration whereof it is now here ordered and adjudged by this
Court that the judgment of the said district court in this cause be
and the same is hereby affirmed with costs and damages at the rate
of six percent per annum.