Respondent, a native and citizen of Dominica, West Indies,
remained in the United States illegally after her authorization to
stay expired in 1975. Two of her minor nieces, United States
citizens, came from Dominica to live with her in 1983 to attend
school. In deportation proceedings instituted against her in 1983,
respondent conceded deportability, but applied for suspension of
deportation pursuant to § 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, which authorizes the Attorney General, in his
discretion, to suspend deportation and to adjust the illegal
alien's status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, if,
inter alia, deportation would result in
extreme hardship to the alien or to "his spouse, parent, or child,
who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence." An Immigration Judge and the Board of
Immigration Appeals found that respondent could not demonstrate
extreme hardship to herself or to the specified persons. The Board
also determined, as a factual matter, that respondent's separation
from her nieces would not constitute extreme hardship to herself,
and, as a legal matter, that a niece is not a "child" within §
244(a)(1)'s meaning. On review, the Court of Appeals held that the
Board erred in not giving sufficient consideration to whether
respondent's relationship with her nieces was the functional
equivalent of a parent-child relationship. Remanding the case, the
court instructed the Board to determine whether there was such a
relationship, and, if so, whether respondent's nieces would
experience extreme hardship as a result of her deportation.
Held: The Board is not required under § 244(a)(1) to
consider the hardship to a third party other than a spouse, parent,
or child, as defined by the Act. The definition of the term "child"
in § 101(b)(1) of the Act is particularly exhaustive. Even if
respondent's relationship with her nieces closely resembles a
parent-child relationship, Congress, through the statute's plain
language, precluded the functional approach to defining the term
"child."
Certiorari granted; 782 F.2d 1028, reversed.
Page 479 U. S. 86
PER CURIAM.
Virginia Hector, a native and citizen of Dominica, West Indies,
entered the United States in April, 1975, as a nonimmigrant visitor
for pleasure. She has remained in this country illegally since
April 30, 1975, when her authorization to stay expired. The
youngest of her four children, a 10-year-old boy, resides with her
here; the other three children live with their grandparents in
Dominica. In 1983, two of Hector's nieces, United States citizens
aged 10 and 11, came to live with her in order to attend school in
what their parents perceived to be a superior educational system.
The nieces' parents continue to reside in Dominica.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) instituted
deportation proceedings against Hector in July, 1983. She conceded
deportability, but applied for suspension of deportation pursuant
to §244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 66
Stat. 214,
as amended, 8 U.S.C. §1254(a)(1). That section
authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to suspend
deportation of an illegal alien, and to adjust the alien's status
to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if
the deportable alien
"has been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than seven years immediately
preceding the date of . . . application, and proves that during all
of such period he was and is a person of good moral character; and
is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney
General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse,
parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence."
An Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Board) found that Hector satisfied the first two statutory
elements -- continuous physical residence and good moral character
-- but that she could not demonstrate extreme hardship
Page 479 U. S. 87
to herself, or to her "spouse, parent, or child." With respect
to her nieces, the Board determined that, as a factual matter,
Hector's separation from them would not constitute extreme hardship
to herself; [
Footnote 1] as a
legal matter, the Board concluded that a niece is not a "child"
within the meaning of § 244(a)(1).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted Hector's
petition for review and remanded the case to the Board. 782 F.2d
1028 (1986). The court held that the Board had erred in not giving
sufficient consideration to whether Hector's relationship with her
nieces was the functional equivalent of a parent-child
relationship. The court thus instructed the Board to ascertain
whether there was a parental-type relationship, and, if so, to
determine whether Hector's nieces would experience extreme hardship
as a result of her deportation. [
Footnote 2]
In so holding, the court relied on its earlier decision in
Tovar v. INS, 612 F.2d 794 (1980), which held that the
term "child" as used in §244(a)(1) includes individuals who do not
fit within the statutory definition of "child" set out in §
101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1), if their relationship with
Page 479 U. S. 88
the deportable alien closely resembles that of a parent and
child. [
Footnote 3]
Because we find the plain language of the statute so compelling,
we reverse, and hold that the Board is not required under
§244(a)(1) to consider the hardship to a third party other than a
spouse, parent, or child, as defined by the Act. Congress has
specifically identified the relatives whose hardship is to be
considered, and then set forth unusually detailed and unyielding
provisions defining each class of included relatives. [
Footnote 4] The statutory definition of
the term "child" is particularly exhaustive. [
Footnote 5] Hector has never claimed, and the
Page 479 U. S. 89
Court of Appeals did not hold, that the two nieces qualify under
that statutory definition.
As we have explained with reference to the technical definition
of "child" contained within this statute:
"With respect to each of these legislative policy distinctions,
it could be argued that the line should have been drawn at a
different point and that the statutory definitions deny
preferential status to [some] who share strong family ties. . . .
But it is clear from our cases . . . that these are policy
questions entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our
Government, and we have no judicial authority to substitute our
political judgment for that of the Congress."
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787,
430 U. S. 798
(1977).
Page 479 U. S. 90
Thus, even if Hector's relationship with her nieces closely
resembles a parent-child relationship, we are constrained to hold
that Congress, through the plain language of the statute, [
Footnote 6] precluded this functional
approach to defining the term "child."
Cf. INS v.
Phinpathya, 464 U. S. 183,
464 U. S. 194
(1984) (refusing to ignore "the clear congressional mandate and the
plain meaning of the statute" where it was clear that "Congress
considered the harsh consequences of its actions"). Congress has
shown its willingness to redefine the term "child" on a number of
occasions, [
Footnote 7] but it
has not included
Page 479 U. S. 91
nieces in that definition or authorized us to adopt a functional
definition. [
Footnote 8]
Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BRENNAN would grant the petition and set the case for
oral argument.
JUSTICE MARSHALL dissents from this summary disposition, which
has been ordered without affording the parties prior notice or an
opportunity to file briefs on the merits.
See, e.g., Acosta v.
Louisiana Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 478 U.
S. 251 (1986) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 1]
The Board found that
"[t]he emotional hardship to the respondent due to difficulties
encountered by her nieces as a result of her deportation also does
not constitute extreme hardship even when combined with the other
factors in her case."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a.
Cf. Contreras-Buenfil v.
INS, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (CA9 1983);
Antoine-Dorcelli v.
INS, 703 F.2d 19, 22 (CA1 1983).
[
Footnote 2]
Both the Immigration Judge and the Board had also held, in the
alternative, that Hector's relationship with her nieces was not
akin to a mother and daughter relationship, and that, in any event,
the nieces would not experience extreme hardship as a result of
Hector's deportation. The Court of Appeals held, however, that the
Board had foreclosed presentation of evidence on these issues, and
had not meaningfully addressed each relevant factor. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 4a. Judge Garth dissented, concluding that the Board has
adequately considered Hector's relationship with her nieces and the
hardship issue.
Id. at 5a, n. 1.
[
Footnote 3]
The Courts of Appeals have reached varying conclusions on
whether hardship to an alien's relative or loved one who does not
qualify under the statute's technical definitions as a spouse,
parent, or child must be independently considered in assessing
extreme hardship under § 244(a)(1). As indicated, the Third Circuit
has held that the Board must look at the hardship that some third
parties would experience, even if they do not qualify under the
definitional section of the Act.
See Tovar v. INS, 612
F.2d 794, 797-798 (1980). A number of other Circuits have rejected
this flexible approach.
See, e. g., Zamora-Garcia v. United
States Dept. of Justice INS, 737 F.2d 488 (CA5 1984);
Contreras-Buenfil, supra, at 403.
[
Footnote 4]
The term "parent" is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2); the term
"spouse" is defined in § 1101(a)(35).
[
Footnote 5]
The definitional section provides:
"(b) As used in in subchapters I and II of this chapter -- "
"(1) The term 'child' means an unmarried person under twenty-one
years of age who is -- "
"(A) a legitimate child;"
"(B) a stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided
the child had not reached the age of eighteen years at the time the
marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred;"
"(C) a child legitimated under the law of the child's residence
or domicile, or under the law of the father's residence or
domicile, whether in or outside the United States, if such
legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age of
eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the
legitimating parent or parents at the time of such
legitimation;"
"(D) an illegitimate child by, through whom, or on whose behalf
a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the
relationship of the child to its natural mother;"
"(E) a child adopted while under the age of sixteen years if the
child has thereafter been in the legal custody of, and has resided
with, the adopting parent or parents for at least two years:
Provided, That no natural parent of any such adopted child
shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any
right, privilege, or status under this chapter; or"
"(F) a child, under the age of sixteen at the time a petition is
filed in his behalf to accord a classification as an immediate
relative under section 1151(b) of this title, who is an orphan
because of the death or disappearance of, abandonment or desertion
by, or separation or loss from, both parents, or for whom the the
sole or surviving parent is incapable of providing the proper care
and has in writing irrevocably released the child for emigration
and adoption; who has been adopted abroad by a United States
citizen and spouse jointly, or by an unmarried United States
citizen at least twenty-five years of age, who personally saw and
observed the child prior to or during the adoption proceedings; or
who is coming to the United States for adoption by a United States
citizen and spouse jointly, or by an unmarried United States
citizen at least twenty-five years of age, who have or has complied
with the preadoption requirements, if any, of the child's proposed
residence:
Provided, That the Attorney General is
satisfied that proper care will be furnished the child if admitted
to the United States:
Provided further, That no natural
parent or prior adoptive parent of any such adopted child shall
thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right,
privilege, or status under this chapter."
§ 1101(b)(1). The suspension of deportation provision, §1254(a),
is part of subchapter II; this definition of "child" therefore
applies.
[
Footnote 6]
The limiting nature of the plain language is corroborated by the
legislative history of both the suspension of deportation provision
and the definitional section of the Act.
With respect to suspension of deportation, the Senate rejected a
draft of the bill that focused on the hardship to the "immediate
family."
See S. 716, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). In a
prepared analysis of S. 716, the INS expressed concern about this
undefined term that the INS considered "obscure, uncertain, and
difficult, if not impossible, to administer" since the language
could "conceivably be claimed to include
any relative of
the alien, by blood or marriage, who might be living with him in
his household." 4 INS, Analysis of S. 716, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.,
244-2 and 244-3 (1951) (emphasis in original). Instead, the INS
asked Congress to list the "particular relatives who are intended
to be described."
Id. at 244-3. The bill that was
eventually passed contained the "parent, spouse, or child" language
that is now in effect.
The history of the definitional section similarly demonstrates
that Congress has been actively engaged in delineating just how
broad it wishes the definition of "child" to be. As originally
enacted, the statute defined a "child" as an unmarried legitimate
or legitimated child or stepchild under 21 years of age.
See
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. at
430 U. S. 797.
Congress has since repeatedly fine-tuned the definition of "child."
There have been no less than four separate amendments, each adding
to or refining the definition.
See Act of Sept. 11, 1957,
Pub L. 85-316, § 2, 71 Stat. 639; Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L.
87-301, §§1-4, 75 Stat. 650-651; Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L.
89-236, § 8(c), 79 Stat. 917; Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. 97-116,
95 Stat. 1611. In light of this history of close congressional
attention to this specific issue, we are especially bound to pay
heed to the plain mandate of the words Congress has chosen.
[
Footnote 7]
See n 6,
supra. Similarly, Congress has shown that it is willing to
correct inequities that might result in our applying the plain
language of the suspension of deportation provision. In the
recently enacted Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub.
L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, Congress explicitly amended the Act to
"overrule
INS v. Phinpathya, [
464
U.S. 183] (1984), which held that any absence, however brief,
breaks the continuity of physical presence." H. R. Rep. No. 99-682,
pt. 1, p. 124 (1986).
[
Footnote 8]
Our decision, of course, does not affect the possibility that
Hector may be entitled to relief under the amnesty provisions of
the newly enacted Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
supra.