In February, 1979, respondent and a companion shot and killed
one Walker during a hunting trip in Colorado. Thereafter, based on
information received from an informant as to respondent's
involvement in the interstate transportation of stolen firearms,
agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) set up
an undercover purchase of firearms from respondent, and on March
30, 1979, arrested him. After being advised of his
Miranda
rights, respondent signed a statement that he understood and waived
his rights and was willing to answer questions. The agents then
questioned him about the firearms transactions that led to his
arrest and also asked him whether he had ever shot anyone, to which
he answered that he had "shot another guy once." But when asked
whether he had shot a man named Walker, he said "no." On May 26,
1979, Colorado law enforcement officers gave respondent
Miranda warnings, and he again signed a statement that he
understood his rights and was willing to waive them. He then
confessed to the Colorado murder and signed a statement to that
effect. Upon being charged in a Colorado state court with
first-degree murder, respondent moved to suppress both the March 30
and May 26 statements on the ground that his waiver of
Miranda rights was invalid. The trial court held that the
ATF agents' failure to inform respondent before the March 30
interview that they would question him about the Colorado murder
did not affect the waiver, and that therefore the March 30
statement should not be suppressed. But, while ruling that the
March 30 statement was inadmissible on other grounds, the court
held that the May 26 statement was made freely, voluntarily, and
intelligently, and should not be suppressed, and hence admitted it
in evidence, and respondent was convicted. The Colorado Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that respondent's waiver of his
Miranda rights before the March 30 statement was invalid
because he was not informed that he would be questioned about the
Colorado murder, and that the State had failed to prove the May 26
statement was not the product of the prior illegal statement. The
Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that respondent's
confession to the murder should have been suppressed because it was
the illegal "fruit" of the March 30 statement.
Page 479 U. S. 565
Held: A suspect's awareness of all the crimes about
which he may be questioned is not relevant to determining the
validity of his decision to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege;
accordingly, the ATF agents' failure to inform respondent of the
subject matter of the interrogation could not affect his decision
to waive that privilege in a constitutionally significant manner.
Pp.
479 U. S.
571-577.
(a) A confession cannot be "fruit of the poisonous tree" if the
tree itself is not poisonous. Pp.
479 U. S.
571-572.
(b) Respondent's March 30 decision to waive his Fifth Amendment
privilege was voluntary absent evidence that his will was overborne
and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired because
of coercive police conduct. His waiver was also knowingly and
intelligently made, that is, he understood that he had the right to
remain silent and that anything he said could be used as evidence
against him. The Constitution does not require that a suspect know
and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth
Amendment privilege. Here, there was no allegation that respondent
failed to understand that privilege or that he misunderstood the
consequences of speaking freely.
479 U. S.
573-575.
(c) Mere silence by law enforcement officials as to the subject
matter of an interrogation is not "trickery" sufficient to
invalidate a suspect's waiver of
Miranda rights. Once
Miranda warnings are given, it is difficult to see how
official silence could cause a suspect to misunderstand the nature
of his constitutional privilege to refuse to answer any questions
that might incriminate him. The additional information in question
in this case could affect only the wisdom of a
Miranda
waiver, not its voluntary and knowing nature. Pp.
479 U. S.
575-577.
713 P.2d
865, reversed and remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and
SCALIA, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which BRENNAN, J., joined,
post, p.
479 U. S.
577.
Page 479 U. S. 566
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 (1966), the Court held that a suspect's waiver of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is valid
only if it is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
Id. at
384 U. S. 444.
This case presents the question whether the suspect's awareness of
all the crimes about which he may be questioned is relevant to
determining the validity of his decision to waive the Fifth
Amendment privilege.
I
In February, 1979, respondent John Leroy Spring and a companion
shot and killed Donald Walker during a hunting trip in Colorado.
Shortly thereafter, an informant told agents of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) that Spring was engaged in the
interstate transportation of stolen firearms. The informant also
told the agents that Spring had discussed his participation in the
Colorado killing. At the time the ATF agents received this
information, Walker's body had not been found and the police had
received no report of his disappearance. Based on the information
received from the informant relating to the firearms violations,
the ATF agents set up an undercover operation to purchase firearms
from Spring. On March 30, 1979, ATF agents arrested Spring in
Kansas City, Missouri, during the undercover purchase.
Page 479 U. S. 567
An ATF agent on the scene of the arrest advised Spring of his
Miranda rights. [
Footnote
1] Spring was advised of his
Miranda rights a second
time after he was transported to the ATF office in Kansas City. At
the ATF office, the agents also advised Spring that he had the
right to stop the questioning at any time or to stop the
questioning until the presence of an attorney could be secured.
Spring then signed a written form stating that he understood and
waived his rights, and that he was willing to make a statement and
answer questions.
ATF agents first questioned Spring about the firearms
transactions that led to his arrest. They then asked Spring if he
had a criminal record. He admitted that he had a juvenile record
for shooting his aunt when he was 10 years old. The agents asked if
Spring had ever shot anyone else. Spring ducked his head and
mumbled, "I shot another guy once." The agents asked Spring if he
had ever been to Colorado. Spring said no. The agents asked Spring
whether he had shot a man named Walker in Colorado and thrown his
body into a snowbank. Spring paused and then ducked his head again
and said no. The interview ended at this point.
On May 26, 1979, Colorado law enforcement officials visited
Spring while he was in jail in Kansas City pursuant to his arrest
on the firearms offenses. The officers gave Spring the
Miranda warnings, and Spring again signed a written form
indicating that he understood his rights and was willing to waive
them. The officers informed Spring that they wanted to question him
about the Colorado homicide. Spring indicated that he "wanted to
get it off his chest." In an interview that lasted approximately 1
1/2 hours, Spring confessed to the Colorado murder. During that
time, Spring
Page 479 U. S. 568
talked freely to the officers, did not indicate a desire to
terminate the questioning, and never requested counsel. The
officers prepared a written statement summarizing the interview.
Spring read, edited, and signed the statement.
Spring was charged in Colorado state court with first-degree
murder. Spring moved to suppress both statements on the ground that
his waiver of
Miranda rights was invalid. The trial court
found that the ATF agents' failure to inform Spring before the
March 30 interview that they would question him about the Colorado
murder did not affect his waiver of his
Miranda
rights:
"[T]he questions themselves suggested the topic of inquiry. The
questions dealt with 'shooting anyone' and specifically killing a
man named Walker and throwing his body in a snowbank in Colorado.
The questions were not designed to gather information relating to a
subject that was not readily evident or apparent to Spring. Spring
had been advised of his right to remain silent, his right to stop
answering questions, and to have an Attorney present during
interrogation. He did not elect to exercise his right to remain
silent or to refuse to answer questions relating to the homicide,
nor did he request Counsel during interrogation."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 4-A.
Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the March 30
statement should not be suppressed on Fifth Amendment grounds. The
trial court, however, subsequently ruled that Spring's statement
that he "shot another guy once" was irrelevant, and that the
context of the discussion did not support the inference that the
statement related to the Walker homicide. For that reason, the
March 30 statement was not admitted at Spring's trial. The court
concluded that the May 26 statement
"was made freely, voluntarily, and intelligently, after
[Spring's] being properly and fully advised of his rights, and that
the statement should not be suppressed, but should
Page 479 U. S. 569
be admitted in evidence."
Id. at 5-A. The May 26 statement was admitted into
evidence at trial, and Spring was convicted of first-degree murder.
[
Footnote 2]
Spring argued on appeal that his waiver of
Miranda
rights before the March 30 statement was invalid because he was not
informed that he would be questioned about the Colorado murder.
Although this statement was not introduced at trial, he claimed
that its validity was relevant because the May 26 statement that
was admitted against him was the illegal "fruit" of the March 30
statement,
see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.
S. 471 (1963), and therefore should have been
suppressed. The Colorado Court of Appeals agreed with Spring,
holding that the ATF agents
"had a duty to inform Spring that he was a suspect, or to
readvise him of his
Miranda rights, before questioning him
about the murder."
671 P.2d
965, 966 (1983). Because they failed to do so before the March
30 interview,
"any waiver of rights in regard to questions designed to elicit
information about Walker's death was not given knowingly or
intelligently."
Id. at 967. The court held that the March 30 statement
was inadmissible, and that the State had failed to meet its burden
of proving that the May 26 statement was not the product of the
prior illegal statement. The court reversed Spring's conviction and
remanded the case for a new trial, directing that, if the State
sought to introduce the May 26 statement into evidence, the trial
court should determine whether the "taint" of
Page 479 U. S. 570
the March 30 statement was sufficiently attenuated to allow
introduction of the May 26 statement.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, although its reasoning differed in some respects.
713 P.2d
865 (1985). The court found:
"[T]he validity of Spring's waiver of constitutional rights must
be determined upon an examination of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement to determine
if the waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. No one factor
is always determinative in that analysis. Whether, and to what
extent, a suspect has been informed or is aware of the subject
matter of the interrogation prior to its commencement is simply one
factor in the court's evaluation of the total circumstances,
although it may be a major or even a determinative factor in some
situations."
Id. at 872-873 (citations omitted). The court
concluded:
"Here, the absence of an advisement to Spring that he would be
questioned about the Colorado homicide, and the lack of any basis
to conclude that, at the time of the execution of the waiver, he
reasonably could have expected that the interrogation would extend
to that subject,
are determinative factors in undermining
the validity of the waiver."
Id. at 874 (emphasis in original).
Justice Erickson, joined by Justice Rovira, dissented as to the
resolution of this issue, stating:
"Law enforcement officers have no duty under
Miranda to
inform a person in custody of all charges being investigated prior
to questioning him. All that
Miranda requires is that the
suspect be advised that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can and will be used against him in court, that he
has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer
present during interrogation, and that, if he cannot afford a
lawyer,
Page 479 U. S. 571
one will be appointed to represent him."
Id. at 880 (citations omitted). The dissenting justices
found "ample evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that
Spring waived his
Miranda rights," and rejected
"the majority's conclusion that Spring's waiver of his
Miranda rights on March 30, 1979, was invalid simply
because he was not informed of all matters that would be reviewed
when he was questioned by the police."
Id. at 881. The court remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with its opinion.
We granted certiorari, 476 U.S. 1104 (1986), to resolve an
arguable Circuit conflict [
Footnote
3] and to review the Colorado Supreme Court's determination
that a suspect's awareness of the possible subjects of questioning
is a relevant and sometimes determinative consideration in
assessing whether a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is
valid. We now reverse.
II
There is no dispute that the police obtained the May 26
confession after complete
Miranda warnings and after
informing Spring that he would be questioned about the Colorado
homicide. The Colorado Supreme Court nevertheless held that the
confession should have been suppressed because it was the illegal
"fruit" of the March 30 statement. A confession cannot be "fruit of
the poisonous tree" if the tree itself is not
Page 479 U. S. 572
poisonous. Our inquiry, therefore, centers on the validity of
the March 30 statement. [
Footnote
4]
A
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." [
Footnote
5] This privilege "is fully applicable during a period of
custodial interrogation."
Miranda v. Arizona," 384 U.S. at
384 U. S.
460-461. [
Footnote
6] In
Miranda, the Court concluded that,
"without proper safeguards, the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely."
Id. at
384 U. S. 467.
Accordingly, the Court formulated the now-familiar "procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination."
Id. at
384 U. S. 444.
The Court's fundamental aim in designing the
Miranda
warnings was
"to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence
and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation
process."
Id. at
384 U. S.
469.
Consistent with this purpose, a suspect may waive his Fifth
Amendment privilege, "provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently."
Id. at
384 U. S. 444.
In this case, the law enforcement officials twice informed
Spring
Page 479 U. S. 573
of his Fifth Amendment privilege in precisely the manner
specified by
Miranda. As we have noted, Spring indicated
that he understood the enumerated rights and signed a written form
expressing his intention to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege.
The trial court specifically found that "there was no element of
duress or coercion used to induce Spring's statements [on March 30,
1978]." App. to Pet. for Cert. 3-A. Despite the explicit warnings
and the finding by the trial court, Spring argues that his March 30
statement was in effect compelled in violation of his Fifth
Amendment privilege because he signed the waiver form without being
aware that he would be questioned about the Colorado homicide.
Spring's argument strains the meaning of compulsion past the
breaking point.
B
A statement is not "compelled" within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment if an individual "voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently" waives his constitutional privilege.
Miranda v.
Arizona, supra, at
384 U. S. 444.
The inquiry whether a waiver is coerced "has two distinct
dimensions."
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.
S. 412,
475 U. S. 421
(1986):
"First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary
in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate
choice, rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second,
the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it. Only if the 'totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice and
the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude
that the
Miranda rights have been waived."
Ibid. (quoting
Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U. S. 707,
442 U. S. 725
(1979)).
There is no doubt that Spring's decision to waive his Fifth
Amendment privilege was voluntary. He alleges no "coercion
Page 479 U. S. 574
of a confession by physical violence or other deliberate means
calculated to break [his] will,"
Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U. S. 298,
470 U. S. 312
(1985), and the trial court found none. His allegation that the
police failed to supply him with certain information does not
relate to any of the traditional indicia of coercion:
"the duration and conditions of detention . . . , the manifest
attitude of the police toward him, his physical and mental state,
the diverse pressures which sap or sustain his powers of resistance
and self-control."
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.
S. 568,
367 U. S. 602
(1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Absent evidence that Spring's
"will [was] overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired" because of coercive police conduct,
ibid.;
see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U. S. 157,
479 U. S.
163-164 (1986), his waiver of his Fifth Amendment
privilege was voluntary under this Court's decision in
Miranda.
There also is no doubt that Spring's waiver of his Fifth
Amendment privilege was knowingly and intelligently made: that is,
that Spring understood that he had the right to remain silent and
that anything he said could be used as evidence against him. The
Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and
understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth
Amendment privilege.
Moran v. Burbine, supra, at
475 U. S. 422;
Oregon v. Elstad, supra, at
470 U. S.
316-317. The Fifth Amendment's guarantee is both simpler
and more fundamental: A defendant may not be compelled to be a
witness against himself in any respect. The
Miranda
warnings protect this privilege by ensuring that a suspect knows
that he may choose not to talk to law enforcement officers, to talk
only with counsel present, or to discontinue talking at any time.
The
Miranda warnings ensure that a waiver of these rights
is knowing and intelligent by requiring that the suspect be fully
advised of this constitutional privilege, including the critical
advice that whatever he chooses to say may be used as evidence
against him.
Page 479 U. S. 575
In this case, there is no allegation that Spring failed to
understand the basic privilege guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
Nor is there any allegation that he misunderstood the consequences
of speaking freely to the law enforcement officials. In sum, we
think that the trial court was indisputably correct in finding that
Spring's waiver was made knowingly and intelligently within the
meaning of
Miranda.
III
A
Spring relies on this Court's statement in
Miranda
that
"any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or
cajoled into a waiver will . . . show that the defendant did not
voluntarily waive his privilege."
384 U.S. at
384 U. S. 476.
He contends that the failure to inform him of the potential
subjects of interrogation constitutes the police trickery and
deception condemned in
Miranda, thus rendering his waiver
of
Miranda rights invalid. Spring, however, reads this
statement in
Miranda out of context and without due regard
to the constitutional privilege the
Miranda warnings were
designed to protect.
We note first that the Colorado courts made no finding of
official trickery. [
Footnote 7]
In fact, as noted above, the trial court expressly found that
"there was no element of duress or coercion used to induce Spring's
statements."
Supra at
479 U. S.
573.
Page 479 U. S. 576
Spring nevertheless insists that the failure of the ATF agents
to inform him that he would be questioned about the murder
constituted official "trickery" sufficient to invalidate his waiver
of his Fifth Amendment privilege, even if the official conduct did
not amount to "coercion." Even assuming that Spring's proposed
distinction has merit, we reject his conclusion. This Court has
never held that mere silence by law enforcement officials as to the
subject matter of an interrogation is "trickery" sufficient to
invalidate a suspect's waiver of
Miranda rights, and we
expressly decline so to hold today. [
Footnote 8]
Once
Miranda warnings are given, it is difficult to see
how official silence could cause a suspect to misunderstand the
nature of his constitutional right -- "his right to refuse to
answer any question which might incriminate him."
United States
v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181,
431 U. S. 188
(1977).
"Indeed, it seems self-evident that one who is told he is free
to refuse to answer questions is in a curious posture to later
complain that his answers were compelled."
Ibid. We have held that a valid waiver does not require
that an individual be informed of all information "useful" in
making his decision or all information that "might . . . affec[t]
his decision to confess."
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at
475 U. S.
422.
"[W]e have never read the Constitution to require that the
police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him
calibrate his self-interest in
Page 479 U. S. 577
deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights."
Ibid. [
Footnote 9]
Here, the additional information could affect only the wisdom of a
Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing
nature. Accordingly, the failure of the law enforcement officials
to inform Spring of the subject matter of the interrogation could
not affect Spring's decision to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege
in a constitutionally significant manner.
B
This Court's holding in
Miranda specifically required
that the police inform a criminal suspect that he has the right to
remain silent and that anything he says may be used against him.
There is no qualification of this broad and explicit warning. The
warning, as formulated in
Miranda, conveys to a suspect
the nature of his constitutional privilege and the consequences of
abandoning it. Accordingly, we hold that a suspect's awareness of
all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of
interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth
Amendment privilege.
IV
The judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Under this Court's decision in
Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U. S. 436
(1966), prior to a custodial interrogation a criminal suspect
must
"be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed."
Id. at
384 U. S.
444.
[
Footnote 2]
Spring also moved to suppress a third statement made on July 13,
1979, after he had pleaded guilty to the federal firearms offenses
and after an information charging him with murder had been issued
in Colorado. The Colorado Supreme Court unanimously concluded that
the statement should be suppressed because the questioning
officials made no effort "to reaffirm Spring's decision to waive
his constitutional rights after he declined to answer particular
questions."
713 P.2d
865, 878 (1985). We granted certiorari only on the question
whether the second statement should have been admitted into
evidence. 476 U.S. 1104 (1986). Accordingly, the admissibility of
the third statement is not before us.
[
Footnote 3]
The Colorado Supreme Court followed the lead of several Federal
Courts of Appeals in holding that a suspect's awareness of the
subject matter of the interrogation is one factor to be considered
in determining whether a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is
valid.
United States v. Burser, 728 F.2d 140, 141 (CA2
1984);
Carter v. Garrison, 656 F.2d 68, 70 (CA4 1981) (per
curiam),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 952 (1982);
United
States v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323, 328 (CA6 1981). Other Courts
of Appeals have found that a suspect's awareness of the subject
matter of interrogation is not a relevant factor in determining the
validity of a
Miranda waiver.
United States v.
Anderson, 176 U.S.App.D.C. 76, 77, n. 3, 633 F.2d 1210, 1212,
n. 3 (1976);
United States v. Campbell, 431 F.2d 97, 99,
n. 1 (CA9 1970).
[
Footnote 4]
The State argued for the first time in its petition for
rehearing to the Colorado Supreme Court that this Court's decision
in
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298
(1985), renders the May 26 statement admissible without regard to
the validity of the March 30 waiver. The Colorado Supreme Court
noted that the State would be free to make this argument to the
trial court on remand. 713 P.2d at 876. The question whether our
decision in
Oregon v. Elstad provides an independent basis
for admitting the May 26 statement therefore is not before us in
this case.
[
Footnote 5]
This privilege is applicable to the States through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1
(1964).
[
Footnote 6]
The State does not dispute that the statement at issue was
obtained during a "custodial interrogation" within the meaning of
Miranda.
[
Footnote 7]
The trial court found:
"Though it is true that [the ATF agents] did not specifically
advise Spring that a part of their interrogation would include
questions about the Colorado homicide, the questions themselves
suggested the topic of inquiry."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 4-A. According to the Colorado Supreme
Court,
"It is unclear whether Spring was told by the agents that they
wanted to question him specifically about the firearms violations
for which he was arrested or whether the agents simply began
questioning Spring without making any statement concerning the
subject matter of the interrogation. What is clear is that the
agents did not tell Spring that they were going to ask him
questions about the killing of Walker before Spring made his
original decision to waive his
Miranda rights."
713 P.2d at 871.
[
Footnote 8]
In certain circumstances, the Court has found affirmative
misrepresentations by the police sufficient to invalidate a
suspect's waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
See, e.g.,
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U. S. 528
(1963) (misrepresentation by police officers that a suspect would
be deprived of state financial aid for her dependent child if she
failed to cooperate with authorities rendered the subsequent
confession involuntary);
Spano v. New York, 360 U.
S. 315 (1959) (misrepresentation by the suspect's friend
that the friend would lose his job as a police officer if the
suspect failed to cooperate rendered his statement involuntary). In
this case, we are not confronted with an affirmative
misrepresentation by law enforcement officials as to the scope of
the interrogation, and do not reach the question whether a waiver
of
Miranda rights would be valid in such a
circumstance.
[
Footnote 9]
Such an extension of
Miranda would spawn numerous
problems of interpretation, because any number of factors could
affect a suspect's decision to waive his
Miranda rights.
The requirement would also vitiate to a great extent the
Miranda rule's important "virtue of informing police and
prosecutors with specificity" as to how a pretrial questioning of a
suspect must be conducted.
Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U. S. 707,
442 U. S. 718
(1979).
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.
The Court asserts there is "no doubt" that respondent Spring's
decision to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege
Page 479 U. S. 578
was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.
Ante at
479 U. S. 573
and
479 U. S. 574.
I agree, however, with the Colorado Supreme Court that a
significant doubt exists in the circumstances of this case, and
thus the State has failed to carry the "heavy burden" recognized in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436,
384 U. S. 475
(1966), for establishing the constitutional validity of Spring's
alleged waiver.
Consistent with our prior decisions, the Court acknowledges that
a suspect's waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, such as
Miranda's protections against self-incrimination during a
custodial interrogation, must be examined in light of the
"
"totality of the circumstances."'" Ante at
479 U. S. 573,
quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.
S. 412, 475 U. S. 421
(1986), in turn quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.
S. 707, 442 U. S. 725
(1979); see also id. at 442 U. S.
724-725; North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.
S. 369, 441 U. S.
374-375 (1979); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.
S. 458, 304 U. S. 464
(1938). Nonetheless, the Court proceeds to hold that the specific
crimes and topics of investigation known to the interrogating
officers before questioning begins are "not relevant" to, and in
this case "could not affect," the validity of the suspect's
decision to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege. Ante at
479 U. S. 577.
It seems to me self-evident that a suspect's decision to waive this
privilege will necessarily be influenced by his awareness of the
scope and seriousness of the matters under investigation.
To attempt to minimize the relevance of such information by
saying that it "could affect only the wisdom of" the suspect's
waiver, as opposed to the validity of that waiver, ventures an
inapposite distinction.
Ibid. Wisdom and validity in this
context are overlapping concepts, as circumstances relevant to
assessing the validity of a waiver may also be highly relevant to
its wisdom in any given context. Indeed, the admittedly "critical"
piece of advice the Court recognizes today -- that the suspect be
informed that whatever he says may be used as evidence against him
-- is certainly relevant to the wisdom of any suspect's decision to
submit to custodial interrogation without first consulting his
lawyer.
Ante at
Page 479 U. S. 579
479 U. S. 574.
The Court offers no principled basis for concluding that this is a
relevant factor for determining the validity of a waiver but that,
under what it calls a
totality of the circumstances
analysis, a suspect's knowledge of the specific crimes and other
topics previously identified for questioning can never be.
The Court quotes
Moran v. Burbine, supra, at
475 U. S. 422,
as holding that "a valid waiver does not require that an individual
be informed of
all information
useful' in making his
decision or all information that `might . . . affec[t] his
decision to confess.'" Ante at 479 U. S. 576
(emphasis added). Noticeably similar is the Court's holding today:
"[A] suspect's awareness of all the possible subjects of
questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to
determining" the validity of his waiver. Ante at
479 U. S. 577
(emphasis added). This careful phraseology avoids the important
question whether the lack of any indication of the
identified subjects for questioning is relevant to
determining the validity of the suspect's waiver.
I would include among the relevant factors for consideration
whether, before waiving his Fifth Amendment rights, the suspect was
aware, either through the circumstances surrounding his arrest or
through a specific advisement from the arresting or interrogating
officers, of the crime or crimes he was suspected of committing and
about which they intended to ask questions. To hold that such
knowledge is relevant would not undermine the "
virtue of
informing police and prosecutors with specificity' as to how a
pretrial questioning of a suspect must be conducted,"
ante, at 479 U. S. 577,
n. 9 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., supra, at 442 U. S.
718), nor would it interfere with the use of legitimate
interrogation techniques. Indeed, requiring the officers to
articulate, at a minimum, the crime or crimes for which the suspect
has been arrested could contribute significantly toward ensuring
that the arrest was, in fact, lawful, and the suspect's statement
not compelled because of an error at this stage alone, a problem we
addressed in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.
S. 590, 422 U. S. 601
(1975), under the
Page 479 U. S. 580
Fourth Amendment on the assumption that the defendant's waiver
of his Fifth Amendment rights in that case had been voluntary.
See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.
S. 200,
442 U. S. 217
(1979) (voluntary waiver of
Miranda warnings is a
threshold requirement for Fourth Amendment analysis).
The interrogation tactics utilized in this case demonstrate the
relevance of the information Spring did not receive. The agents
evidently hoped to obtain from Spring a valid confession to the
federal firearms charge for which he was arrested, and then parlay
this admission into an additional confession of first-degree
murder. Spring could not have expected questions about the latter,
separate offense when he agreed to waive his rights, as it occurred
in a different State and was a violation of state law outside the
normal investigative focus of federal Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms agents.
"Interrogators describe the point of the first admission as the
'breakthrough' and the 'beachhead,' R. Royal & S. Schutt, The
Gentle Art of Interviewing and Interrogation: A Professional Manual
and Guide 143 (1976), which, once obtained, will give them enormous
'tactical advantages,' F. Inbau & J. Reid, Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions 82 (2d ed. 1967)."
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298,
470 U. S. 328
(1985) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The coercive aspects of the
psychological ploy intended in this case, when combined with an
element of surprise which may far too easily rise to a level of
deception, [
Footnote 2/1] cannot be
justified in light of
Miranda's strict
Page 479 U. S. 581
requirements that the suspect's waiver and confession be
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 384 U.S. at
384 U. S.
445-458,
384 U. S.
475-476. If a suspect has signed a waiver form with the
intention of making a statement regarding a specifically alleged
crime, the Court today would hold this waiver valid with respect to
questioning about any other crime, regardless of its relation to
the charges the suspect believes he will be asked to address. Yet
once this waiver is given and the intended statement made, the
protections afforded by
Miranda against the "inherently
compelling pressures" of the custodial interrogation,
id.
at
384 U. S. 467,
have effectively dissipated. Additional questioning about entirely
separate and more serious suspicions of criminal activity can take
unfair advantage of the suspect's psychological state, as the
unexpected questions cause the compulsive pressures suddenly to
reappear. Given this technique of interrogation, a suspect's
understanding of the topics planned for questioning is, therefore,
at the very least "relevant" to assessing whether his decision to
talk to the officers was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
made.
Not only is the suspect's awareness of the suspected criminal
conduct relevant, its absence may be determinative in a given case.
The State's burden of proving that a suspect's waiver was
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent is a "heavy" one.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at
384 U. S. 475.
We are to "
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver'
of fundamental constitutional rights" and we shall "`not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.'"
Johnson,
Page 479 U. S. 582
304 U.S. at
304 U. S. 464
(citations omitted); see
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.
S. 387,
430 U. S. 404
(1977). It is reasonable to conclude that, had Spring known of the
federal agents' intent to ask questions about a murder unrelated to
the offense for which he was arrested, he would not have consented
to interrogation without first consulting his attorney. In this
case, I would therefore accept the determination of the Colorado
Supreme Court that Spring did not voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waive his Fifth Amendment rights.
713 P.2d
865, 873-874 (1985). [
Footnote
2/2]
I dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The Court rejects, for now, the notion that "mere silence" by
law enforcement officials may deprive the suspect of information so
relevant to his decision to waive his
Miranda rights as to
constitute deception, though it does acknowledge that circumstances
can arise in which an affirmative misrepresentation by the officers
will invalidate the suspect's waiver.
Ante at
479 U. S. 576,
and n. 8. In
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.
S. 412,
475 U. S. 453,
(1986), I joined JUSTICE STEVENS' dissenting opinion, which stated
that
"there can be no constitutional distinction . . . between a
deceptive misstatement and the concealment by the police of the
critical fact that an attorney retained by the accused or his
family has offered assistance. . . ."
I would hold the officers' failure in the present case to inform
Spring of their intent to question him about the Colorado murder
equally critical.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 (1966), places an especially heavy burden on the
State to show that a suspect waived his privilege against
self-incrimination:
"
[A]ny evidence that the accused was threatened,
tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show
that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege."
Id. at
384 U. S. 476
(emphasis added). I would hold that the interrogating officers'
preconceived plan in this case to obtain a waiver from Spring with
reference to a particular federal offense and then ask about a
separate, unrelated state offense precludes the State from carrying
that heavy burden.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Nothing in the Court's decision today precludes the courts of
Colorado from interpreting that State's Constitution as
independently recognizing a suspect's knowledge of the intended
scope of interrogation as a relevant factor for determining whether
he validly waived his right against self-incrimination under state
law.
See Colo. Const., Art. II, ยง 18.