After the District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss
petitioner's civil rights suit against respondents, and after
petitioner abandoned his appeal, the District Court granted
respondents' motion for an award of attorney's fees on the ground
that petitioner had filed his action in bad faith. Petitioner then
filed a motion, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), to
alter or amend the judgment. After a hearing, the court denied the
motion from the bench, and petitioner filed a notice of appeal that
same afternoon. However, the District Court's order denying the
Rule 59(e) motion was not entered on the docket until two days
later, and petitioner did not file a new notice of appeal following
the docket entry. Dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the notice of appeal was premature under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4), which provides that, with regard to
certain motions in the district court, including motions under Rule
59 to alter or amend the judgment, the time for appeal shall run
from "the entry of the order . . . granting or denying" any such
motion; that a notice of appeal filed before "the disposition" of
any such motion shall have no effect; and that "[a] new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the
entry of the order disposing of the motion." The court concluded
that petitioner's notice of appeal must be treated as a nullity,
and thus the court had no jurisdiction over the appeal.
Held. The Court of Appeals' interpretation of Rule
4(a)(4) was correct.
Such interpretation comports with the Rule's plain wording.
Moreover, the plain import of Rule 4(a)(2) -- which provides
that,
"
[e]xcept as provided in (a)(4) of this Rule 4, a
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision or
order but before the entry of the judgment or order shall be
treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof"
(emphasis added) -- is that, with respect to the particular
motions to which it applies, Rule 4(a)(4) constitutes an exception
to the general rule that a notice of appeal filed after
announcement of an order, but before its entry in the docket, will
be deemed timely filed. Thus, a notice of appeal is ineffective
unless filed after entry of judgment on a Rule 59(e) motion or any
of the other motions to which Rule 4(a)(4) applies.
Certiorari granted; 776 F.2d 1046, affirmed.
Page 478 U. S. 252
PER CURIAM.
In 1981, petitioner filed a civil rights action against
respondents. Respondents moved to dismiss, and the District Court
dismissed the action in its entirety. Petitioner filed, and then
abandoned, an appeal. Respondents then moved in the District Court
for an award of attorney's fees on the ground that petitioner had
filed his action in bad faith. The court granted the motion and
awarded respondents fees amounting to some $19,000. Petitioner
filed a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment, as authorized
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The District Court held a
hearing on the motion, and denied it from the bench. Petitioner
filed a notice of appeal that same afternoon. Not until two days
later, however, was the order denying the motion to alter or amend
the judgment entered on the docket. Petitioner did not file a new
notice of appeal following the docket entry.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
dismissed petitioner's appeal, ruling that the notice of appeal was
prematurely filed. 776 F.2d 1046 (1985). The Court of Appeals
relied on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4), which, in
pertinent part, provides:
"If a timely motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is filed in the district court by any party . . . under Rule 59 to
alter or amend the judgment . . . the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order . . . granting or
denying any . . . such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new
notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured
from the entry of the order disposing of the motion as provided
above."
The court concluded that, because petitioner filed his notice of
appeal before the order disposing of the Rule 59 motion, Rule
Page 478 U. S. 253
4(a)(4) required it to treat the notice as a "nullity," and thus
deprived the court of jurisdiction over the appeal.
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Rule 4(a)(4) is directly
contrary to that adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in
Calhoun v. United States, 647 F.2d 6 (1981).
There, the court held that the Rule's command that "[a] notice of
appeal filed before the disposition of [a Rule 59 motion] shall
have no effect," did not render a notice of appeal filed after the
announcement of the decision on the motion, but before the entry of
the order, a nullity. Rather, the court concluded that the term
"disposition," as used in the rule, was synonymous with
"announcement"; accordingly, a notice of appeal could be given
effect as long as it was filed after the trial court's announcement
of its ruling. The Ninth Circuit concluded that this interpretation
of the Rule was justified by
"the policy of 'exercising all proper means to prevent the loss
of valuable rights when the validity of an appeal is challenged not
because something was done too late, but rather because it was done
too soon.'"
Id. at 10 (quoting
Williams v. Town of
Okoboji, 599 F.2d 238, 239-240 (CA8 1979)). The court reasoned
that, if a notice filed before entry of the order were deemed
defective, "valuable rights [might] be lost because an important,
but ministerial, act was not performed when expected." 647 F.2d at
11.
Because such a direct conflict over the interpretation of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure calls for resolution in this Court, we
grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.
* Finding that the
issue is not one that requires plenary consideration, we now affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Unlike the decision of the Ninth Circuit in
Calhoun,
the decision below comports with the plain wording of the Rules.
Rule 4(a)(4) specifically states that a notice of appeal, to be
effective, must be "filed within the prescribed time measured from
the entry of the order disposing of the motion as provided
Page 478 U. S. 254
above." Further, Rule 4(a)(2) provides that,
"
[e]xcept as provided in (a)(4) of this Rule 4, a
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision or
order but before the entry of the judgment or order shall be
treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof."
(Emphasis added.) The plain import of this language is that,
with respect to the particular motions to which it applies, Rule
4(a)(4) constitutes an exception to the general rule that a notice
of appeal filed after announcement of an order, but before its
entry in the docket, will be deemed timely filed. The Ninth
Circuit's Calhoun rule essentially reads the first clause of
subdivision (a)(2) out of Rule 4 by holding that Rule 4(a)(4) does
not constitute such an exception. But if subdivision (a)(2) is
taken seriously, it is untenable to read subdivision (a)(4) except
as the Fifth Circuit has read it in this case: that is, as
establishing the rule that a notice of appeal is ineffective unless
filed after entry of judgment on a Rule 59 motion or any of the
other motions to which the subdivision applies.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Affirmed.
JUSTICE BRENNAN would grant the petition for certiorari and set
the case for oral argument
JUSTICE MARSHALL dissents from this summary disposition, which
has been ordered without affording the parties prior notice or an
opportunity to file briefs on the merits.
See, e.g., Allen v.
Hardy, post p.
478 U. S. 255;
City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.
S. 796 (1986);
Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.
S. 111,
462 U. S.
120-121 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
* Accordingly, respondents' motion for an award of damages on
the ground that the petition is frivolous is denied.
