In 1950, Congress amended the Social Security Act to authorize
voluntary participation by States in the Social Security System
with respect to old age, disability, and death benefits. Under 42
U.S.C. § 418(a) (1982 ed. and Supp. II), States may obtain coverage
for employees of the State and its political subdivisions by
executing an agreement (§ 418 Agreement) with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (Secretary) that is required to be "not
inconsistent with the provisions of" § 418. As originally enacted,
§ 418(g) permitted States to terminate their § 418 Agreements upon
giving at least two years' advance notice in writing to the
Secretary. However, because the increasing rate of state
withdrawals was threatening the integrity of the System, Congress
amended § 418(g) in 1983 to provide that no § 418 Agreement "may be
terminated, either in its entirety or with respect to any coverage
group, on or after April 20, 1983." The amendment expressly
prevents States from withdrawing employees from the System even if
a termination notice had been filed prior to the amendment's
enactment. In 1951, California and the Secretary entered into a §
418 Agreement that covered employees of the State and its political
subdivisions. The Agreement recited that its provisions were "in
conformity with" § 418, and included a termination clause mirroring
the provisions of § 418(g) then in effect. When the 1983 amendment
of § 418(g) prevented termination notices that California
previously had filed from taking effect, proceedings were
instituted in the Federal District Court attacking the validity of
amended § 418(g). The court held that § 418(g) was
unconstitutional, reasoning that the § 418 Agreement created a
"contractual right" in favor of the State and its subdivisions to
withdraw from the Social Security System, and that such right
constituted "private property" within the meaning of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although the court
concluded that amended § 418(g) effected a taking of that property
without providing the requisite just compensation, it held that a
damages award would be contrary to Congress' will, and accordingly
simply declared § 418(g) unconstitutional.
Page 477 U. S. 42
Held: Amended § 418(g) does not effect a taking of
property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Pp.
477 U. S.
51-56.
(a) In enacting the Social Security Act in 1935, Congress
anticipated the need to respond to changing conditions, and
therefore included § 1304, which expressly reserves to it "[t]he
right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision" of the Act. The Act
itself, including the original version of § 418(g), created no
contractual rights, and therefore Congress had the power to amend
that section. In view of the Act's purpose and structure, and of
Congress' express reservation of authority to alter its provisions,
courts should be extremely reluctant to construe § 418 Agreements
in a manner that forecloses Congress' exercise of that authority.
Pp.
477 U. S.
61-53.
(b) The conclusion that Congress reserved the authority to amend
not only § 418 but also § 418 Agreements entered into "in
conformity with" § 418 is supported by precedent.
Cf.
Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700;
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
R. Co., 470 U. S. 451. The
language of § 1304's reservation expressly notified California that
Congress retained the power to amend the law under which the
Agreement was executed and, by amending that law, to alter the
Agreement itself. Pp.
477 U. S.
53-54.
(c) The "contractual right" at issue in this case bears little,
if any, resemblance to rights held to constitute "property" within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. The termination provision in
the § 418 Agreement exactly tracked the language of the statute,
conferring no right on California beyond that contained in § 418
itself. The termination provision in California's § 418 Agreement
did not rise to the level of "property," and thus amended § 418 did
not effect a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Pp.
477 U. S.
54-56.
613 F. Supp. 558, reversed and remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 477 U. S. 43
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
On this appeal, we review a decision of the District Court for
the Eastern District of California that § 103 of the Social
Security Amendments Act of 1983, 97 Stat. 71, 42 U.S.C. § 418(g)
(1982 ed., Supp. II), effected a taking of property within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment by preventing States from
withdrawing state and local government employees from the Social
Security System.
I
A
The Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 301
et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. II), established
an insurance program for "persons working in industry and commerce
as a long-run safeguard against the occurrence of old-age
dependency." H.R.Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1949).
From that relatively humble beginning, the coverage of the Act has
been expanded to provide benefits not only to the "insured worker
in his old age,"
ibid., but also to "individuals and
families when workers retire, become disabled, or die." S.Rep. No.
98-13, vol. 2, p. 78 (1983). [
Footnote 1] The "basic idea" of Social Security
"is that, while they are working, employees and their employers
pay earmarked social security contributions (FICA taxes). . . .
Then, when earnings stop, or are reduced because of retirement in
old-age,
Page 477 U. S. 44
death, or disability, cash benefits are paid to partially
replace the earnings that were lost."
Ibid. The System operates on a "pay as you go" basis,
with current contributions "largely paid out in current benefits,"
ibid. In the words of Congress, the System now functions
"as the Nation's basic social insurance program." H.R.Rep. No.
98-25, p.19 (1983). To ensure that this important program could
evolve as economic and social conditions changed, Congress
expressly reserved to itself "[t]he right to alter, amend, or
repeal any provision of" the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1304. [
Footnote 2]
As of 1983, more than 90% of the Nation's paid employees, a
total of more than 115 million people, participated in the Social
Security System. H.R.Rep. No. 98-25, at 13. [
Footnote 3] Participation in the System is, and
has been since its inception, "basically mandatory."
Id.
at 19. Therefore, most workers covered by the System and their
employers have no choice whether or not to participate. In 1935,
when the Act was adopted, Congress faced questions as to whether it
could compel the States and their political subdivisions to include
their employees in the System. [
Footnote 4] Therefore, the Act at that time excluded such
employees from its coverage.
See 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(7).
Responding to subsequent pressure
Page 477 U. S. 45
from States that sought Social Security coverage for their
employees, in 1950 Congress enacted § 418, the provision at the
heart of the controversy in this case.
Section 418 authorizes voluntary participation by States in the
Social Security System. [
Footnote
5] Under § 418(a), States may obtain coverage for their
employees and employees of their political subdivisions, enrolling
all or only specified "coverage groups" of workers. 42 U.S.C. §
418(a)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. II);
see § 418(b)(5) (defining
coverage group) [
Footnote 6]
States enter the System by executing "an agreement" (§ 418
Agreement) with the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(Secretary). [
Footnote 7] While
§ 418 gives States some authority over the content of the
Agreements,
i.e., States may identify the covered
employees, the provisions of a § 418 Agreement are required to be
"not inconsistent with the provisions of" § 418. § 418(a)(1). From
its enactment in 1950 through 1983, § 418 permitted States to
terminate their § 418 Agreements "[u]pon giving at least two years'
advance notice in writing to the [Secretary]." § 418(g)(1). Once a
State exercised its option to withdraw, it could not thereafter
reenter the System. § 418(g)(3)
Following adoption of § 418, all 50 States entered into § 418
Agreements with respect to their own employees, local
government
Page 477 U. S. 46
employees, or both. [
Footnote
8] "By the early 1960's most States had made coverage
agreements," H.R.Rep. No. 9825, at 18, and the percentage of state
and local employees enrolled in the System increased from 11% in
1951 to 70% in 1970, H.R.Comm.Print 97-34, at 25. Since 1970,
"[c]overage of State and local employees has remained fairly
constant at 70-72 percent." H.R.Rep. No. 98-25, at 18. As of 1983,
"some 9.4 million out of the approximately 13.2 million State and
local employees" participated in the Social Security System.
Id. at 17.
For the first 20 years of their participation, "very few" States
exercised their option under § 418(g) to withdraw from the System.
Id. at 18. Until the mid-1970's, the number of state and
local employees "leaving the system was always greatly exceeded by
the number of newly-covered employees -- in most years, by 50,000
or more."
Ibid. [
Footnote
9] Starting in 1976, however, this trend reversed, and the
"numbers of positions being terminated from coverage" began to
exceed "the numbers of newly-covered positions."
Ibid.
From 1977 through 1981, "termination activity was greater than in
the previous ten years," with coverage "terminated for 96,000 State
and local government employees."
Ibid. As of 1982,
coverage was "terminated for 595 State entities employing 190,000
workers."
Ibid. Finally, "for the two-year period of
1983-84, terminations [were] pending for 634 State and local
entities employing 227,000 workers."
Ibid.
After studying the trend towards termination of § 418 Agreements
and the reasons for it, [
Footnote 10] Congress determined
Page 477 U. S. 47
that the increasing rate of withdrawals was threatening the
integrity of the System in a number of important respects. As an
initial matter, Congress observed that the current rate of
withdrawals would cost the System between $500 million and $1
billion annually. H.R.Comm.Print 97-34, at 13-14. Congress further
concluded that States' ability to withdraw was
"inequitable both for the employees who lose coverage and for
the vast majority of the nation's workforce who continue to pay
into the system."
H.R.Rep. No. 98-25, at 18-19. While States terminating § 418
Agreements often did so in the course of designing benefit packages
that would attract long-term workers, Congress believed that sound
social policy also required protection of employees who move from
job to job.
Id. at 19. Moreover,
"the shifting of the tax burden of social security from those
workers who withdraw, but who remain entitled to future benefits
based on their past earnings,"
created resentment on the part of workers whose participation in
the System was mandatory. [
Footnote 11]
Ibid.
Page 477 U. S. 48
Accordingly, Congress decided to amend § 418(g) by repealing the
termination provision. As amended, § 418(g) provides that no § 418
Agreement "may be terminated, either in its entirety or with
respect to any coverage group, on or after April 20, 1983." The
amendment expressly prevents States from withdrawing employees from
the System even if a termination notice had been filed prior to
enactment of the amendment. [
Footnote 12]
B
On March 9, 1951, California and the Secretary entered into a §
418 Agreement, effective as of January 1, 1951, under which the
parties agreed to extend Social Security coverage to employees of
the State and its political subdivisions. The Agreement recited
that its provisions were "in conformity with" § 418, and authorized
the State to modify the Agreement to include additional groups of
employees, "such modification to be consistent with the provisions
of" § 418. The Agreement also included a clause that permitted the
State to terminate the Agreement either in its entirety or with
respect to particular coverage groups. The terms of the clause
Page 477 U. S. 49
exactly mirrored the statutory termination provision embodied in
§ 418(g). [
Footnote 13]
When Congress amended § 418(g) in 1983, California had filed
termination notices on behalf of 71 of its political subdivisions,
employing approximately 34,000 persons. [
Footnote 14] When the amendment prevented the
termination notices from taking effect, appellees commenced the
lawsuits underlying this appeal, naming as defendants the United
States and the Secretary and Undersecretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services. The first lawsuit was brought by several
public agencies of California, their employees and taxpayers, and
by an organization calling itself Public Agencies Opposed to Social
Security Entrapment. These parties alleged, among other claims,
that amended § 418(g) had deprived them of their "contract rights"
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
[
Footnote 15] In the second
lawsuit, the State of California sought to enjoin enforcement of §
418(g) as well as a declaration that the section was
unconstitutional.
Page 477 U. S. 50
The State claimed that the federal defendants had acted in
excess of their constitutional authority and had violated the Tenth
Amendment by breaching their contract with the State and by
impairing the State's "ability . . . to structure its relationships
with its employees." [
Footnote
16] App. 26-27.
Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court
held that § 418(g) was unconstitutional.
Public Agencies
Opposed to Social Security Entrapment v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp.
558 (ED Cal.1985). [
Footnote
17] The court decided that the § 418 Agreement created a
"contractual right" to withdraw from the Social Security System
that ran in favor of both the State and its public agencies. This
contractual right existed independently of the statutory
termination provision,
Page 477 U. S. 51
and Congress derived no authority from § 1304 [
Footnote 18] to amend the § 418 Agreement,
as opposed to § 418.
The contractual right to withdraw, reasoned the District Court,
constituted "private property" within the meaning of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Amended § 418(g)
effected a taking of that property without providing the requisite
just compensation. In the court's view, the
"only rational compensation would be reimbursement by the United
States to the State or public agencies, of the amount of money they
currently pay to the United States for their participation"
in the Social Security Program. 613 F. Supp. at 575. Since
amended § 418(g) was enacted to solve the Social Security
"financial crisis," however, the District Court concluded that an
order awarding this measure of damages would be "simply and clearly
contrary to the will of Congress."
Ibid. Accordingly, the
District Court simply declared § 418(g) unconstitutional.
Ibid. We noted probable jurisdiction, 474 U.S. 1004
(1985), and now reverse.
II
A
Congress' decision that American workers need a federal program
of social insurance protecting them in old age and disability "has
of necessity called forth a highly complicated and interrelated
statutory structure."
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.
S. 603,
363 U. S. 610
(1960). Since the Act was designed to protect future, as well as
present, generations of workers, it was inevitable that amendment
of its provisions would be necessary in response to evolving social
and economic conditions unforeseeable in 1935.
Ibid.
Congress anticipated that it would be necessary to respond to
"ever-changing conditions" with "flexibility and boldness,"
ibid., and therefore included in the Act
"a clause expressly reserving to it '[t]he
Page 477 U. S. 52
right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision' of the Act. §
1104, 49 Stat. 648, 42 U.S.C. § 1304. That provision makes express
what is implicit in the institutional needs of the program."
Id. at
363 U. S. 611.
As appellees must concede, the Act itself, including the original
version of § 418(g), created no contractual rights.
Cf.
Flemming v. Nestor, supra, at
363 U. S.
608-611;
see also National Railroad Passenger
Corporation v. Atchison, T & S. F. R. Co., 470 U.
S. 451,
470 U. S.
465-470 (1985). Therefore, there is no doubt that
Congress had the power to amend the section.
In view of the purpose and structure of the Act, and of
Congress' express reservation of authority to alter its provisions,
courts should be extremely reluctant to construe § 418 Agreements
in a manner that forecloses Congress' exercise of that authority.
While the Federal Government, as sovereign, has the power to enter
contracts that confer vested rights, and the concomitant duty to
honor those rights,
see Perry v. United States,
294 U. S. 330,
294 U. S.
350-354 (1935);
Lynch v. United States,
292 U. S. 571
(1934), we have declined in the context of commercial contracts to
find that a
"sovereign forever waives the right to exercise one of its
sovereign powers unless it expressly reserves the right to exercise
that power in"
the contract.
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U. S. 130,
455 U. S. 148
(1982). Rather, we have emphasized that,
"[w]ithout regard to its source, sovereign power, even when
unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs all contracts
subject to the sovereign's jurisdiction, and will remain intact
unless surrendered in unmistakable terms."
Ibid. Therefore, contractual arrangements, including
those to which a sovereign itself is party, "remain subject to
subsequent legislation" by the sovereign.
Id. at
455 U. S.
147.
These principles form the backdrop against which we must
consider the District Court's decision effectively to forbid
Congress to amend a provision of the Social Security Act. That
decision heeded none of this Court's often-repeated admonitions
that contracts should be construed, if possible,
Page 477 U. S. 53
to avoid foreclosing exercise of sovereign authority. Those
admonitions take on added force when the arrangement pursuant to
which the Government is claimed to have surrendered a sovereign
power is one that serves to implement a comprehensive social
welfare program affecting millions of individuals throughout our
Nation.
B
Venerable precedent supports our conclusion that Congress
reserved the authority to amend not only § 418 but also Agreements
entered into "in conformity with" that section. Just last Term, we
considered a statute in which Congress had "
expressly reserved'
its right to `repeal, alter, or amend' the Act at any time,"
National Railroad Passenger Corporation, supra, at
470 U. S. 456,
and we noted that the "effect of these few simple words" has been
settled since the Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U. S.
700 (1879). 470 U.S. at 470 U. S.
467-468, n. 22. The Sinking-Fund Cases involved
federal statutes that governed railroads' obligations to the United
States on subsidy bonds. The statutes in question expressly
reserved Congress' authority to repeal, alter, or amend them, and
Congress exercised that power by requiring the railroads to set
aside part of their current income as a sinking fund to meet their
debts to the Government as those debts came due. The railroads
claimed that this amendment deprived them of property without due
process and improperly interfered with their vested rights. 99 U.S.
at 99 U. S. 719.
In rejecting those arguments, the Court explained that, through the
language of reservation,
"Congress not only retains, but has given special notice of its
intention to retain, full and complete power to make such
alterations and amendments as come within the just scope of
legislative power."
Id. at
99 U. S. 720.
The effect of the Court's construction of the reservation was to
authorize Congress not only to amend the statute granting the
railroads' corporate charter but also to change the stipulations of
a contract made under that charter subsequently to and
Page 477 U. S. 54
independently of the original statute. Whatever the limits of
the reserved power, it was "safe to say" that Congress had the
authority to provide by amendment whatever rules it might "have
prescribed in the original charter" and terms governing the
"performance of contracts already entered into."
Id. at
99 U. S.
721.
This reasoning disposes of appellees' contention that Congress
lacked authority to amend California's § 418 Agreement. The State
accepted the Agreement under an Act that contained the language of
reservation. That language expressly notified the State that
Congress retained the power to amend the law under which the
Agreement was executed and, by amending that law, to alter the
Agreement itself. [
Footnote
19] We have no doubt that, in 1950, Congress could have
provided that States electing to enter the Social Security System
would not have authority to terminate their participation.
Therefore, amended § 418(g) falls well within the limits of
Congress' reserved power to alter the law governing performance of
§ 418 Agreements.
C
The § 418 Agreement provided that its terms were "in conformity
with" § 418. Therefore, the Agreement expressly incorporated § 418,
which of course was fully subject to Congress' reserved power of
amendment. Appellees nonetheless insist that the termination
provision embodied in the
Page 477 U. S. 55
Agreement constituted a valuable property right that was "taken"
when Congress enacted amended § 418(g). In the Sinking-Fund Cases,
the Court did observe that Congress' exercise of the reserved power
"has a limit," in that Congress could not rely on that power to
"take away property already acquired under the operation of the
charter, or to deprive the corporation of the fruits actually
reduced to possession of contracts lawfully made."
99 U.S. at
99 U. S. 720.
Similarly, other decisions have held that Congress does not have
the power to repudiate its own debts, which constitute "property"
to the lender, simply in order to save money.
Perry v. United
States, 294 U.S. at
294 U. S.
350-351;
see Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S.
at
292 U. S.
576-577.
But the "contractual right" at issue in this case bears little,
if any, resemblance to rights held to constitute "property" within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. The termination provision in
the Agreement exactly tracked the language of the statute,
conferring no right on the State beyond that contained in § 418
itself. The provision constituted neither a debt of the United
States,
see Perry v. United States, supra, nor an
obligation of the United States to provide benefits under a
contract for which the obligee paid a monetary premium,
see
Lynch v. United States, supra. The termination clause was not
unique to this Agreement; nor was it a term over which the State
had any bargaining power or for which the State provided
independent consideration. Rather, the provision simply was part of
a regulatory program over which Congress retained authority to
amend in the exercise of its power to provide for the general
welfare. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the
termination provision in California's § 418 Agreement did not rise
to the level of "property." The provision simply cannot be viewed
as conferring any sort of "vested right" in the face of precedent
concerning the effect of Congress' reserved power on agreements
entered into under a statute containing the language of
reservation. Since appellees had no property right in
Page 477 U. S. 56
the termination clause, amended § 418 did not effect a taking
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
III
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
According to the Senate Special Committee on Aging, the Social
Security System is "much more" than a
"retirement program for older workers. . . . Social security is
also family security, protecting workers and their families from
loss of earnings because of death, retirement, or disability."
Senate Special Committee on Aging, Termination of Social
Security Coverage: The Impact on State and Local Government
Employees, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (Comm.Print 1976) (hereinafter
Senate Report on Aging).
[
Footnote 2]
Congress included this provision in the original Act, and has
retained it ever since.
See Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U. S. 603,
363 U. S.
610-611 (1960).
[
Footnote 3]
"The ten percent of workers not . . . covered by social security
[in 1983] include[d] most Federal civilian workers (2.4 out of 2.7
million), about 30 percent of State and local employees
(approximately 3 million), and 10-15 percent of employees of
nonprofit organizations (up to 1 million)."
H.R.Rep. No. 98-25, at 13.
[
Footnote 4]
As Congress explained when it was studying the reasons
underlying States' decisions to withdraw employees from the
System,
"[t]he Social Security Act of 1935 excluded from coverage all
employment for States and localities, primarily because of the
question of the constitutionality of any general levy of the
employer tax on States and localities."
Subcommittee on Social Security of House Committee on Ways and
Means, Termination of Social Security Coverage for Employees of
State and Local Governments and Nonprofit Groups, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., Ser. No. WMCP: 9734, p. 20 (Comm.Print 1982) (hereinafter
H.R.Comm.Print 97-34).
[
Footnote 5]
At the time Congress enacted the amendment challenged in this
case, it explained that provision for voluntary participation by
employees of state and local governments was
"the result of congressional desire to extend coverage as
quickly and with as little difficulty as possible to those
employees who needed it most."
H.R.Rep. No. 98-25, at 19.
[
Footnote 6]
Under the Act, therefore, States decide which groups of
employees will receive Social Security coverage. Section 418(d)(3)
creates an exception to this rule. Where state employees already
are members of a retirement program, that section requires that a
majority of such employees agree to participate in the Social
Security System. 42 U.S.C. § 418(d)(3) (1982 ed. and Supp. II).
[
Footnote 7]
For purposes of conciseness, we use the term "Secretary" to
refer to the federal official responsible for administration of the
System both under the current and prior versions of the Social
Security Act.
[
Footnote 8]
As of 1983, the employees of Alaska,
"the only State to withdraw from the system, and of Maine,
Massachusetts, Nevada, and Ohio, which never chose to participate
in the system,"
were not covered by Social Security. H.R.Rep. No. 98-25, at 17.
Each of those States, however, was party to a § 418 Agreement that
provided coverage to local government employees.
[
Footnote 9]
During these years, "many terminations were caused by
consolidation of local jurisdictions, rather than by withdrawal
from the social security system."
Id. at 18.
[
Footnote 10]
The Senate Special Committee on Aging found that States offered
the following reasons for terminating their § 418 Agreements:
employees wanted more take-home pay through a reduction in payroll
deductions; state and local governments sought to cut costs by
dropping Social Security coverage; news reports concerning "the
projected exhaustion of social security trust funds in the 1980's"
led employees to believe that benefits would cease; state and local
governments believed that Social Security taxes would continue to
rise, and thus viewed termination as a means "to achieve more
static and budgetable expenditures"; some employees favored
termination because they perceived that they would receive Social
Security benefits even if they were no longer required to pay into
the System; and alternative retirement plans were believed to pay
higher levels of benefits. Senate Report on Aging 6-8;
see
also H.R.Comm.Print 97-34, at 6-7. The Committee also found
that "many" decisions to withdraw from the System were made in the
absence of "[i]nformation necessary for informed judgments." Senate
Report on Aging 8.
[
Footnote 11]
Congress regarded voluntary participation by some employees,
such as those of state and local governments, as an anomaly in an
otherwise mandatory program.
"The fundamental principle underlying compulsory coverage for
most workers is that responsibility for paying for insurance
against such risks should be borne by the society as a whole to the
extent possible."
H.R.Comm.Print 97-34, at 4. Mandatory participation is necessary
to sustain the "
pay-as-you-go' financing structure,"
particularly since workers retain coverage "regardless of how many
times they change their jobs in a lifetime." Ibid.
Mandatory participation ensures workers that they will obtain a
minimum level of benefits in the event of a catastrophe that the
worker did not foresee or plan for. Ibid. In the context
of a mandatory system, voluntary participation for some employees
was, in Congress' view, "inconsistent with the principle of equal
treatment of all citizens." Id. at 5.
[
Footnote 12]
The amendment, set out in Pub.L. 98-21, § 103, 97 Stat. 71-72
provides:
"(a) [42 U.S.C. § 418(g)] is amended to read as follows:"
" Duration of Agreement"
"(g) No agreement under this section may be terminated, either
in its entirety or with respect to any coverage group, on or after
the date of the enactment of the Social Security Amendments of
1983."
"(b) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to any
agreement in effect under [§ 418] on the date of the enactment of
this Act, without regard to whether a notice of termination is in
effect on such date, and to any agreement or modification thereof
which may become effective under such [§ 418] after that date."
[
Footnote 13]
The termination provision in California's § 418 Agreement
stated:
"The State, upon giving at least two years' advance notice in
writing to the [Secretary], may terminate this agreement, either in
its entirety or with respect to any coverage group, effective at
the end of a calendar quarter specified in the notice, provided,
however, that the agreement may be terminated in its entirety only
if it has been in effect not less than five years prior to receipt
of such notice, and provided further that the agreement may be
terminated with respect to any coverage group only if it has been
in effect with respect to such coverage group for not less than
five years prior to receipt of such notice."
Reprinted, App. 31.
[
Footnote 14]
If these employees were withdrawn from the System,
"approximately $33.7 millio[n] would be lost to the social security
trust funds in 1984."
Id. at 61.
[
Footnote 15]
Plaintiffs in this lawsuit also alleged that the enactment
denied them their contract rights without due process, that it
constituted an attempt to regulate "
essential state and local
government functions,' in violation of the Tenth Amendment," and
that they were entitled to specific performance for the
Government's breach of contract. Public Agencies Opposed to
Social Security Entrapment v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 558, 565
(ED Cal.1985).
[
Footnote 16]
Though the State did not press any claim that amended § 418(g)
effected a taking of its property without the compensation required
by the Fifth Amendment, the District Court rested its decision on
that ground, finding it unnecessary to reach any of the arguments
raised by the State. Therefore, none of those arguments are before
us.
[
Footnote 17]
Before reaching the merits, the District Court determined that
the plaintiffs in both suits, appellees here, had standing to
challenge the validity of the enactment. With respect to the first
lawsuit, brought by the public agencies and certain individuals,
the court concluded that the agencies alleged an injury sufficient
to confer standing because they claimed that amended § 418(g)
deprived them of their contractual rights as third-party
beneficiaries of the State's § 418 Agreement.
Id. at
567-570. The individual plaintiffs had standing because they
claimed that the federal defendants had denied them equal
protection.
Id. at 571. With respect to the second suit,
the court found that the State had standing because it alleged
"a judicially cognizable interest in the preservation of its own
sovereignty, and a diminishment of that sovereignty by the alleged
interference in its employment relations with its public
employees."
Id. at 567. While appellants suggest in this Court that
none of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit brought by the public
agencies were properly before the District Court, they concede, and
we agree, that there is no question concerning the State's standing
to bring the action. Therefore, the District Court plainly had
authority to resolve this controversy, as do we.
[
Footnote 18]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1304 provides: "The right to alter, amend, or
repeal any provision of this chapter is hereby reserved to the
Congress."
[
Footnote 19]
The language of § 418 and of California's § 418 Agreement
provides further support for this conclusion. Section 418(a)(1)
requires that the provisions of § 418 Agreements be "not
inconsistent with the provisions of this section," 42 U.S.C. §
418(a)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. II), and the Agreement provided that it
was "in conformity with" § 418. The State was thus on notice that
the terms of its Agreement must mirror the provisions of the
section, which could be amended under the reserved power. If
Congress amended § 418 in such a manner as to render a provision of
an Agreement "inconsistent" or no longer "in conformity" with the
section, then the logical conclusion is that the inconsistent
provision no longer was to be given legal effect.