Appellant's father died intestate at a time when § 42 of the
Texas Probate Code prohibited an illegitimate child from inheriting
from its father unless its parents had subsequently married.
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762,
decided four months after the father's death, held that a total
statutory disinheritance, from the paternal estate, of children
born out of wedlock and not legitimated by the subsequent marriage
of their parents, is unconstitutional. Thereafter, appellant filed
a claim to a share in her father's estate, but it was denied by a
Texas trial court. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that
Trimble does not apply retroactively.
Held: The interest, protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, in avoiding unjustified discrimination against children
born out of wedlock, requires that appellant's claim to a share in
her father's estate be protected by the full applicability of
Trimble. There is no justification for the State's rejection of the
claim. At the time appellant filed her claim,
Trimble had
been decided, and her father's estate remained open. Neither the
date of the father's death nor the date appellant's claim was filed
should have prevented the applicability of
Trimble. Those
dates, either separately or in combination, had no impact on the
State's interest in orderly administration of the estate. Pp.
476 U. S.
854-857.
682 S.W.2d 697, reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Prince Ricker, appellant's father, died intestate on December
22, 1976. At that time, § 38 of the Texas Probate Code
Page 476 U. S. 853
provided that a decedent's estate should descend to "his
children and their descendants," [
Footnote 1] but § 42 prohibited an illegitimate child from
inheriting from her father unless her parents had subsequently
married. [
Footnote 2] In
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762
(1977) -- decided four months after Ricker's death -- we held that
a total statutory disinheritance, from the paternal estate, of
children born out of wedlock and not legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of their parents is unconstitutional. In this case, the
Texas Court of Appeals held that § 42 of the Texas Probate Code
nevertheless prevented appellant from sharing in her father's
estate because
Trimble does not apply retroactively.
[
Footnote 3] The Texas Supreme
Court refused appellant's application of error, noting "no
reversible error." We noted probable jurisdiction, 474 U.S. 1018
(1985), and now reverse.
I
Only a few facts need be stated. In November, 1957, Prince
Ricker and appellant's mother participated in a ceremonial
marriage, but it was invalid because Ricker's divorce from his
first wife was not final. Appellant was born a year later. Ricker
was lawfully married three times, once before and twice after his
liaison with appellant's mother. He was
Page 476 U. S. 854
survived by five legitimate children (two from his first and
three from his third marriage) and by appellant.
Shortly after Ricker's death in 1976, his oldest daughter was
appointed administratrix of his estate. The estate was still open
in February, 1978, when appellant formally notified the
administratrix and the Probate Court of her claim to a one-sixth
share of the estate. In due course, she filed a formal complaint; a
jury found that Ricker was her father, but the trial court
concluded that he was never validly married to her mother, and
denied her claim.
In the Court of Appeals, appellant contended that she was
entitled to inherit even if she was illegitimate, because § 42 was
unconstitutional, and also that she was entitled to be legitimated
on various theories. The appellate court rejected all her
arguments. [
Footnote 4]
II
Although the question presented in this case is framed in terms
of "retroactivity," its answer is governed by a rather clear
distinction that has emerged from our cases considering the
constitutionality of statutory provisions that impose special
burdens on illegitimate children. In these cases, we have
unambiguously concluded that a State may not justify discriminatory
treatment of illegitimates in order to express its disapproval of
their parents' misconduct. [
Footnote 5] We have,
Page 476 U. S. 855
however, also recognized that there is a permissible basis for
some "distinctions made in part on the basis of legitimacy";
[
Footnote 6] specifically, we
have upheld statutory provisions that have an evident and
substantial relation to the State's interest in providing for the
orderly and just distribution of a decedent's property at death.
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U. S. 259
(1978). [
Footnote 7]
The state interest in the orderly disposition of decedents'
estates may justify the imposition of special requirements upon an
illegitimate child who asserts a right to inherit from her father,
and, of course, it justifies the enforcement of generally
applicable limitations on the time and the manner in which claims
may be asserted. After an estate has been finally distributed, the
interest in finality may provide an additional, valid justification
for barring the belated assertion of claims, even though they may
be meritorious and even though mistakes of law or fact may have
occurred during the
Page 476 U. S. 856
probate process. We find no such justification for the State's
rejection of appellant's claim in this case.
The Texas courts have relied on
Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U. S. 762
(1977), as a basis for holding § 42 invalid in cases that were
pending on April 26, 1977 -- the date
Trimble was decided.
See Winn v. Lackey, 618 S.W.2d 910 (Tex.Civ.App.1981);
Lovejoy v. Lillie, 569 S.W.2d 501 (Texas Civ.App.1978).
Although the administration of Prince Ricker's estate was in
progress on that date, the court refused to apply
Trimble
because appellant's claim was not asserted until later. Thus, the
test applied by the Texas court resulted in the denial of
appellant's claim because of the conjunction of two facts: (1) her
father died before April 26, 1977, and (2) her claim was filed
after April 26, 1977.
There is nothing in the record to explain why these two facts,
either separately or in combination, should have prevented the
applicability of
Trimble, and the allowance of appellant's
claim, at the time when the trial court was required to make a
decision. At that time, the governing law had been established:
Trimble had been decided, and it was clear that § 42 was
invalid. The state interest in the orderly administration of Prince
Ricker's estate would have been served equally well regardless of
how the merits of the claim were resolved. In this case, then,
neither the date of his death nor the date the claim was filed had
any impact on the relevant state interest in orderly
administration; their conjunction similarly had no impact on that
state interest.
The interest in equal treatment protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution -- more specifically, the interest in
avoiding unjustified discrimination against children born out of
wedlock,
see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.
S. 495,
427 U. S. 505
(1976) -- should therefore have been given controlling effect. That
interest requires that appellant's claim to a share in her father's
estate be protected by the full applicability of
Trimble
to her claim. [
Footnote 8]
Page 476 U. S. 857
The judgment of the Texas Court of Appeals is therefore
reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Is is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
See Tex. Prob.Code Ann. § 38(a) (Vernon 1980) ("Where
any person having title to any estate, . . . shall die intestate,
leaving no husband or wife, it shall descend and pass in parcenary
to his kindred, male and female, in the following course: 1. To his
children and their descendants . . .").
[
Footnote 2]
See Tex.Prob.Code Ann. § 42 (Vernon 1956) ("For the
purpose of inheritance to, through, and from an illegitimate child,
such child shall be treated the same as if he were the legitimate
child of his mother, so that he and his issue shall inherit
from his mother and from his maternal kindred, both
descendants, ascendants, and collaterals in all degrees, and they
may inherit from him") (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 3]
"Under the rule of
Winn v. Lackey, [618 S.W.2d 910
(Tex.Civ.App.1981)] and the out-of-state cases cited therein, the
equal protection argument fails as
Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U. S.
762 . . . (1977), has not been applied retroactively
where the father died before the case came down and suit was filed
afterwards."
682 S.W.2d 697, 700 (Tex.App.1984).
[
Footnote 4]
In her jurisdictional statement, appellant raised several
questions that relate to the legitimation issue. Because we hold
that she is entitled to relief on her principal claim, and because
the legitimation questions appear not to have been properly
presented as federal questions,
see appellant's brief
before the Texas Court of Appeals (presenting only the
Trimble question as a federal constitutional issue), we do
not reach the legitimation issue.
[
Footnote 5]
"It is true, of course, that the legal status of illegitimacy,
however defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic
determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate
individual, and it bears no relation to the individual's ability to
participate in and contribute to society. The Court recognized in
Weber [v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S.
164 (1972)] that visiting condemnation upon the child in
order to express society's disapproval of the parents'
liaisons"
"is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible
for his birth, and penalizing the illegitimate child is an
ineffectual -- as well as an unjust -- way of deterring the
parent."
"406 U.S. at
406 U. S. 175. (Footnote
omitted.)"
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495,
427 U. S. 505
(1976).
[
Footnote 6]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 7]
"The presence in this case of the State's interest in the
orderly disposition of a decedent's property at death distinguishes
it from others in which that justification for an
illegitimacy-based classification was absent.
E.g., Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974);
Gomez
v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535 (1973);
Weber
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S.
164,
406 U. S. 170 (1972);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 (1968)."
439 U.S. at
439 U. S. 268,
n. 6 (opinion of POWELL, J.). Although the dissenters did not
believe the state interest was sufficient to support the particular
statute before the Court in that case, they agreed with the basic
proposition that this state interest may justify some differential
treatment -- "New York might require illegitimates to prove
paternity by an elevated standard of proof,"
id. at
439 U. S. 279
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 8]
In addition to concluding that
Trimble did not apply,
the Texas Court of Appeals stated that
"[e]ven if the plaintiff could claim under section 42(b) as
amended, her exclusion from the inheritance under that statute does
not deny her constitutional equal protection, since a rational
state basis supports that legislation."
682 S.W.2d at 700. We read that statement, not as an alternative
ground for the court's judgment, but as the rejection of an
alternative ground for appellant's recovery. To read it as assuming
that the amended statute defeated appellant's claim, even if
Trimble applied, would, in the context of this case and
the amended statute's requirements, raise serious due process
questions.