The Speedy Trial Act (Act) commands that a defendant be tried
within 70 days of the latest of either the filing of an indictment
or information, or the first appearance before a judge or
magistrate. However, a provision of the Act, 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(1)(F) (hereafter subsection (F)), excludes from this
time
"[a]ny period of delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the defendant, including . . . delay resulting from any
pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the
conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such
motion."
With regard to petitioners, who were ultimately convicted in
Federal District Court of charges relating to the manufacture,
possession, and distribution of controlled substances, the Act's
70-day period commenced on September 3, 1980, but the trial did not
begin until November 1, 1982, because of various delays, including
those resulting from overlapping filings by petitioners and the
Government with respect to a motion to suppress certain evidence, a
hearing and posthearing submissions by the parties on that motion,
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the court's denial of
the motion to suppress, and petitioners' motion to dismiss the
indictment because of violation of the Act. The Court of Appeals
affirmed petitioners' convictions, rejecting their contention that,
under subsection (F), only delays that were "reasonably necessary"
could be excluded from the Act's 70-day period.
Held:
1. Congress intended subsection (F) to exclude from the Act's
70-day limitation all time between the filing of a pretrial motion
and the conclusion of the hearing on that motion, whether or not a
delay in holding that hearing is "reasonably necessary." The plain
terms of the statute exclude all time between the filing of and the
hearing on a motion, whether that hearing was prompt or not.
Moreover, Congress' express use of the phrase "reasonable period of
delay" in another provision of the statute indicates that the
exclusion of the period defined in subsection (F) was intended to
be automatic. The legislative history also supports this reading of
subsection (F). Nor does the phrase "or other prompt disposition"
in subsection (F) imply that only reasonably necessary delays may
be excluded between the time of filing and the conclusion of
Page 476 U. S. 322
the hearing. That language was intended to apply to situations
where motions are decided on the papers filed without a hearing.
Pp.
476 U. S.
326-330.
2. Subsection (F) also excludes time after a hearing on a motion
where the District Court awaits additional filings from the parties
that are needed for proper disposition of the motion. Although the
language of the statute is not clear on this point, its structure
requires that such time be excluded. Pp.
476 U. S.
330-331.
3. Under the facts in this case, there were only 69
nonexcludable days of delay before petitioners' trial, and
therefore the Act was not violated. Pp.
476 U. S.
331-333.
746 F.2d 619, affirmed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and
BLACKMUN, JJ., joined,
post, p.
476 U. S.
333.
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161
et seq. (1982
ed. and Supp. II), as amended in 1979 and in 1984, commands that a
defendant be tried within 70 days of the latest of either the
filing of an indictment or information, or the first appearance
before a judge or magistrate. Section 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes from
this time
"delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of
the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other
prompt disposition of, such motion."
This case requires us to decide the narrow questions whether
that exclusion is limited to reasonably necessary delays, and
whether it applies to delays occasioned by the filing of
posthearing briefs on motions.
I
A jury convicted petitioners of charges arising out of
manufacture, possession, and distribution of controlled substances
.
Page 476 U. S. 323
[
Footnote 1] The evidence at
trial showed that, in February and April, 1980, petitioner
Henderson, under the alias "Richard Martin," placed orders with a
scientific supply company in Ohio for chemicals that could be used
in the manufacture of illegal drugs. The orders attracted the
attention of the Drug Enforcement Agency. Agents obtained a warrant
from a United States Magistrate, authorizing installation of an
electronic transmitter in one of the chemical containers. Henderson
drove from California to Ohio, picked up the second order of
chemicals on June 24, and headed west. Agents lost the tracking
signal despite their following by both car and plane, only to
receive it later in July from petitioner Freedman's house near
Watsonville, California. A search pursuant to warrant on July 17
revealed an illicit drug factory. The last of the codefendants,
Peter Bell, was arraigned on September 3, 1980. [
Footnote 2]
The Speedy Trial Act requires that trial begin within 70 days of
the latest indictment, information, or appearance -- in this case,
September 3. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). A timely trial would have
commenced on November 12, 1980, barring periods of excludable
delay. Overlapping filings by petitioners and the Government,
however, kept a suppression motion pending from its filing on
November 3, 1980, through a hearing
Page 476 U. S. 324
on that motion on March 25, 1981. [
Footnote 3] The court deferred decision on the motion
pending receipt of posthearing submissions from the parties, the
last of which was filed on December 15, 1981.
See App.
29-31. The District Court finally denied the motion to suppress on
January 19, 1982.
From January 25 to May 10, 1982, both parties filed additional
motions before the District Court -- on January 25, the Government
moved to set the case for trial, and on March 23, petitioners moved
to reconsider the motion to suppress. On February 3, the court held
a hearing on the Government's motion and granted a continuance
through April 21 to allow defense counsel to file a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the suppression motion.
[
Footnote 4] After a hearing on
May 10, the court denied petitioners' motion to reconsider the
motion to suppress, and set a trial date of September 13, 1982. The
court also entered an order excluding, for purposes of the Act, the
time from May 10 to September 13 based on a provision of the Act
that allows such exclusion by the Court to satisfy the "ends of
justice."
Id. at 32-33;
see 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(8)(A). [
Footnote 5]
Page 476 U. S. 325
On July 23, 1982, Thornton filed a motion to dismiss the
superseding indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. The
other two petitioners subsequently joined this motion. The District
Judge held a hearing almost two months later, on September 8, and
denied the motion from the bench on that date. He filed a
memorandum and order outlining his reasons exactly 30 days later.
At that time, the judge also entered an order excluding the time
from October 8 to November 1, again based on the "interests of
justice." 3 Record, Doc. Nos. 98-99. Trial commenced on November 1,
1982.
Petitioners appealed their convictions, arguing,
inter
alia, that the District Court could exclude from their Speedy
Trial Act computation only delays that were "reasonably necessary."
746 F.2d 619, 622 (CA9 1984). The Court of Appeals held that the
statute "excludes delays resulting from pretrial motions without
qualification."
Ibid. The court noted that Congress had
explicitly provided that the excludability of certain other delays
depended on their reasonableness, but had not done so for delays
from pretrial motions.
Ibid. Judge Ferguson dissented,
relying on the Act's legislative history and the interpretations of
other Circuits.
Id. at 625-626. We granted certiorari to
resolve a conflict among the Circuits. [
Footnote 6] 474 U.S. 900 (1985). We now affirm.
Page 476 U. S. 326
II
The Speedy Trial Act requires that a criminal trial must
commence within 70 days of the latest of a defendant's indictment,
information, or appearance, barring periods of excludable delay.
United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.
S. 231 (1985);
see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
Section 3161(h) (1)(F) (subsection (F)) excludes from these 70 days
certain delays occasioned by the filing of pretrial motions:
"(h) The following periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which an information or an indictment
must be filed, or in computing the time within which the trial of
any such offense must commence:"
"(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the defendant, including but not limited to -- "
"
* * * *"
"(F)
delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the
filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or
other prompt disposition of, such motion."
(Emphasis added.)
A
On its face, subsection (F) excludes "[a]ny period of delay"
caused by "any pretrial motion," "from the filing of the motion
through the conclusion of the hearing." The plain terms of the
statute appear to exclude all time between the filing of and the
hearing on a motion, whether that hearing was prompt or not.
Moreover, subsection (F) does not require
Page 476 U. S. 327
that a period of delay be "reasonable" to be excluded, although
Congress clearly knew how to limit an exclusion: in § 3161(h)(7),
Congress provided for exclusion of a
"reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for
trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run
and no motion for severance has been granted."
Apart from this single instance, every other provision in §
3161(h) provides for exclusion of "any period of delay." [
Footnote 7] The provision excludes, for
example, all of the time consumed by an interlocutory appeal, §
3161(h)(1)(E), by a competency examination, § 3161(h)(1)(A), and by
the defendant's unavailability, § 3161(h)(3)(A). As the Court of
Appeals concluded:
"The difference between (7) and (1) through (6) is a strong
indication that exclusion of the periods defined in (1)-(6) was
intended to be automatic."
746 F.2d at 622.
The legislative history of the 1979 Amendments to the Act
supports this reading of subsection (F). [
Footnote 8] That history shows that Congress was aware
of the breadth of the exclusion it was enacting in subsection (F).
The Senate Judiciary Committee
Page 476 U. S. 328
acknowledged that, "if basic standards for prompt consideration
of pretrial motions are not developed," the liberalized 1979
Amendments to subsection (F) "could become a loophole which could
undermine the whole Act." S.Rep. No. 96-212, p. 34 (1979). In its
subsequent consideration of subsection (F), the House of
Representatives did not qualify the exclusion in any way or limit
such potential abuse by statute. Instead, the House adopted the
Senate's version
"with the intention that potentially excessive and abusive use
of this exclusion be precluded by district or circuit guidelines,
rules, or procedures relating to motions practice."
H.R.Rep. No. 96-390, p. 10 (1979). Congress clearly envisioned
that any limitations should be imposed by circuit or district court
rules, rather than by the statute itself. [
Footnote 9] Such rules, developed pursuant to §
3166(f), should provide the assurance of a speedy disposition of
pretrial motions.
Petitioners largely concede these arguments, and advance two
other contentions for limiting subsection (F)'s exclusion to time
that is "reasonably necessary" for the disposition of pretrial
motions. First, they contend that the phrase "other prompt
disposition" within subsection (F) implies that a district court
may not unreasonably delay a criminal trial by deferring a hearing
on a pretrial motion. Two of the Courts of Appeals that have
limited the exclusion in subsection (F) to delays that are
"reasonably necessary" have relied on this argument.
United
States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 543 (CA7 1983);
United
States v. Cobb, 697 F.2d 38, 41-42 (CA2 1982). But a reading
of subsection (F) in connection with § 3161(h)(1)(J) (subsection
(J)), which allows exclusion of up to 30
Page 476 U. S. 329
days while the district court has a motion "under advisement,"
i.e., 30 days from the time the court receives all the
papers it reasonably expects, undermines this conclusion. The
phrase "prompt disposition" was intended to prevent a district
court from using subsection (F) to exclude time after a motion is
taken under advisement when that time fails to qualify for
exclusion under subsection (J).
Subsection (F), written in the disjunctive, excludes time in two
situations. The first arises when a pretrial motion requires a
hearing: subsection (F), on its face, excludes the entire period
between the filing of the motion and the conclusion of the hearing.
The second situation concerns motions that require no hearing and
that result in a "prompt disposition." There, the promptness
requirement was "intended to provide a point at which time will
cease to be excluded, where motions are decided on the papers filed
without hearing." S.Rep. No. 96-212, at 34. The "point at which
time will cease to be excluded" is identified by subsection (J),
which permits an exclusion of 30 days from the time a motion is
actually "under advisement" by the court. Without the promptness
requirement in subsection (F), a court could exclude time beyond
subsection (J)'s 30-day "under advisement" provision simply by
designating the additional period as time "from the filing of the
motion" through its "disposition" under subsection (F). As the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary explained:
"In using the words 'prompt disposition,' the committee intends
to make it clear that, in excluding time between filing and
disposition on the papers, the Committee does not intend to permit
circumvention of the 30-days 'under advisement' provision contained
in Subsection (h)(1)(J). Indeed, if motions are so simple or
routine that they do not require a hearing, necessary advisement
time should be considerably less than 30 days."
Ibid. We therefore conclude that, for pretrial motions
that require a hearing, the phrase "or other prompt disposition" in
subsection
Page 476 U. S. 330
(F) does not imply that only "reasonably necessary" delays may
be excluded between the time of filing of a motion and the
conclusion of the hearing thereon.
Petitioners' second argument rests on the sentence that
immediately follows the extract quoted above:
"Nor does the Committee intend that additional time be made
eligible for exclusion by postponing the
hearing date or
other disposition of the motions beyond what is
reasonably
necessary."
Ibid. (emphasis added). Four Courts of Appeals have
relied on this legislative history to support their "reasonably
necessary" qualification in subsection (F).
United States v.
Ray, 768 F.2d 991, 998 (CA8 1985);
United States v.
Mitchell, 723 F.2d 1040, 1047 (CA1 1983);
United States v.
Novak, 715 F.2d 810, 819 (CA3 1983),
cert. denied sub nom.
Ware v. United States, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984);
United States
v. Cobb, 697 F.2d 38, 44 (CA2 1982).
Any qualification of subsection (F)'s exclusion based on this
sentence, which appears in the paragraph discussing motions decided
without a hearing, would be at odds with the plain language of the
statute. It also would be contrary to other passages contained in
both the House and Senate Reports that specifically concern the
"hearings" provision of subsection (F).
See supra at
476 U. S.
327-328. We therefore decline to read into subsection
(F) a "reasonably necessary" qualification based on this single
sentence from the Senate Report. We instead hold that Congress
intended subsection (F) to exclude from the Speedy Trial Act's
70-day limitation all time between the filing of a motion and the
conclusion of the hearing on that motion, whether or not a delay in
holding that hearing is "reasonably necessary."
B
The remaining issue is whether subsection (F) excludes time
after a hearing on a motion but before the district court receives
all the submissions by counsel it needs to decide that motion.
Cf. § 3161(h)(1) (excluding "[a]ny period of delay
resulting
Page 476 U. S. 331
from other proceedings concerning the defendant"). Although the
language of subsection (F) is not clear on this point, we are
convinced that its structure, as well as reason, requires that such
time be excluded.
The provisions of the Act are designed to exclude all time that
is consumed in placing the trial court in a position to dispose of
a motion.
See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 96-212, at 9-10. District
courts often find it impossible to resolve motions on which
hearings have been held until the parties have submitted
posthearing briefs or additional factual materials, especially
where the motion presents complicated issues. It would not have
been sensible for Congress to exclude automatically all the time
prior to the hearing on a motion and 30 days after the motion is
taken under advisement, but not the time during which the court
remains unable to rule because it is awaiting the submission by
counsel of additional materials. Moreover, for motions decided
solely on the papers, Congress has allowed exclusion of time during
which the parties are filing their briefs. 18 U.S.C. §§
3161(h)(1)(F), (J);
see supra, at
476 U. S.
328-329. It is consistent with this exclusion to exclude
time when the court awaits the briefs and materials needed to
resolve a motion on which a hearing has been held -- motions that
the Senate Judiciary Committee recognized as typically more
difficult than motions decided on the papers.
See S.Rep.
No. 96-212, at 34. We therefore hold that subsection (F) excludes
time after a hearing has been held where a district court awaits
additional filings from the parties that are needed for proper
disposition of the motion.
III
We now calculate the number of nonexcludable days before
petitioners' trial. The Act began to run on September 3, 1980, the
date of arraignment of codefendant Bell. On October 22, 1980, the
District Court entered -- with the consent of the parties -- a
continuance through November 12. The District Court excluded that
continuance from the Speedy Trial
Page 476 U. S. 332
Act's 70-day limit under § 3161(h)(8)(A) in "the interest of
justice." App. 26-27;
see 746 F.2d at 623-624. That
exclusion is not challenged in this Court.
The motion to suppress was filed during this continuance, on
November 3, 1980. App. 27. The hearing on this and subsequent
motions was held on March 25, 1981.
Id. at 28. This time
is automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1)(F). The court
declined to reach a final decision on the suppression motion at
that hearing because it needed further information.
Id. at
28-29. The court did not receive all filings in connection with the
motion until December 15, 1981, when the Government submitted its
response to petitioners' memorandum and request for an evidentiary
hearing.
Id. at 31. That time is also excludable, plus 30
days for the District Court to take the matter under advisement. We
therefore exclude the period from March 25, 1981, through January
14, 1982.
On January 25, 1982, the Government filed a motion to set the
case for trial, noticed for February 3. We need not decide whether
this time is excludable under subsection (F), as it does not affect
the disposition of this case. On February 3, the court continued
the case until April 21 to afford defense counsel the opportunity
to file a motion to reconsider the suppression ruling.
Ibid. The District Court subsequently found that this time
was excludable under § 3161(h)(8)(A) as a continuance necessary for
the "interests of justice."
Id. at 34. [
Footnote 10] On March 23, petitioners filed
their motion for reconsideration. Under subsection (F), an
exclusion for this pending motion ran from March 23 until the
disposition by hearing on May 10.
See App. 33. At that
time, the court stated that it would exclude under § 3161(h)(8)(A)
the time from May 10 to September 13, the new trial date, because
of the difficulty of coordinating the schedules of five defense
attorneys. The court entered a similar order on September 13
Page 476 U. S. 333
that extended through the ultimate trial date of November 1,
1982. Neither of those orders is properly before us. As the case
stands here, it presents 69 nonexcludable days of delay, and
therefore the Speedy Trial Act was not violated. [
Footnote 11]
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The jury convicted all three petitioners of conspiracy to
manufacture and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine
and phenyl-2-propanone,
see 21 U.S.C. § 846; petitioners
Thornton and Freedman of manufacture and possession with intent to
distribute of methamphetamine,
see § 842(a)(1); and
petitioner Henderson of traveling interstate with intent to promote
the manufacture and possession of methamphetamine,
see 18
U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).
[
Footnote 2]
Codefendant Bell was severed from petitioners' trial on November
1, 1982. All defendants who are joined for trial generally fall
within the speedy trial computation of the latest codefendant.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7). Once Bell was joined with
petitioners in the September 3 superseding indictment, their 70-day
period was measured with respect to his.
[
Footnote 3]
On November 3, 1980, petitioners filed a motion to suppress
evidence. 2 Record, Doc. Nos. 24-26. On November 24, petitioners
filed a supplemental memorandum concerning alleged
misrepresentations in the affidavit supporting the search warrant.
On its own motion, the District Court rescheduled the hearing from
November 26, 1980, to January 14, 1981, and again to January 28,
1981. A third continuance, at petitioner Freedman's request, moved
the hearing date to February 18, 1981. Meanwhile, on January 13,
petitioners filed a motion to reveal the identity of a confidential
informant. At the February 18 hearing, petitioners requested and
received a continuance to March 2 to reply to the Government's
responses, filed only the day before. The hearing was held instead
on March 25, after a 21-day continuance from the court on March
4.
[
Footnote 4]
Petitioners filed the motion on March 23; the Government filed
its response on April 14, 1982. 3 Record, Doc. Nos. 74-75.
[
Footnote 5]
Section 3161(h)(8)(A) provides for the exclusion of
"[a]ny period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by
any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or
his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the Government,
if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings
that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the
best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No
such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
court in accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable under
this subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the
case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the
ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh
the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy
trial."
[
Footnote 6]
Several Courts of Appeals have read into 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(1)(F) a requirement that only delays that are "reasonably
necessary" may be excluded from the computation of the 70-day
period.
United States v. Ray, 768 F.2d 991, 998-999 (CA8
1985);
United States v. Mitchell, 723 F.2d 1040, 1047 (CA1
1983);
United .states v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 543 (CA7
1983);
United States v. Novak, 715 F.2d 810, 819-820 (CA3
1983),
cert. denied sub nom. Ware v. United States, 465
U.S. 1030 (1984);
United States v. Cobb, 697 F.2d 38, 44
(CA2 1982). Other Circuits have held that § 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes
without qualification the entire period between the filing of the
motion and the conclusion of the hearing. 746 F.2d 619 (CA9 1984)
(case below);
United States v. Stafford, 697 F.2d 1368,
1373 (CA11 1983).
Cf. United States v. Horton, 705 F.2d
1414, 1416 (CA5),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 997 (1983).
[
Footnote 7]
Section 3161(h)(1)(H), which provides for the exclusion of delay
from transporting a defendant "from another district, or to and
from places of examination or hospitalization," presumes that any
such delay over 10 days is unreasonable.
[
Footnote 8]
The discussion in S.Rep. No. 96-212, p. 34 (1979),
see
post at
476 U. S.
336-337, concerns time spent
preparing pretrial
motions. The pertinent language from the Report reads:
"Although some witnesses contended that all time consumed by
motions practice, from preparation through their disposition,
should be excluded, the Committee finds that approach unreasonable.
This is primarily because, in routine cases, preparation time
should not be excluded where the questions of law are not novel and
the issues of fact simple. However, the Committee would permit,
through its amendments to subsection (h)(8)(B), reasonable
preparation time for pretrial motions in cases presenting novel
questions of law or complex facts."
S.Rep. No. 96-212 at 33-34. Our holding concerns time
after
the submission of pretrial motions. We note in such situations
that the trial court is in a position to determine what, if any,
additional submissions that it needs from the parties, and when
those submissions are due.
[
Footnote 9]
The dissent relies on district court rules as a basis for
invoking petitioners' standard.
Post at
476 U. S.
337-338, n. 2. The interpretation of the local rule,
however, is a matter on which we should defer to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It found no violation of the
rule.
It would be useful in the future for circuit and district court
rules to include specific timetables, thereby giving substance to
the obligations of prosecutors and defense counsel under the Speedy
Trial Act.
[
Footnote 10]
The unexplained failure of the District Court to find the delay
from any continuance to be excludable until October, 1982, has not
been argued by either party before this Court, and therefore is not
before us.
[
Footnote 11]
The count is 49 days from September 3, 1980, to November 22,
1980, and 20 days from January 14, 1982, to February 3, 1982.
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and
JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.
The purpose of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, as amended in 1979
and in 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3161
et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp.
II), is to quantify and make effective the Sixth Amendment right to
a a speedy trial. S.Rep. No. 96-212, p. 6 (1979); S.Rep. No.
93-1021, p. 1 (1974). To this end, the Act entitles a criminal
defendant to dismissal of the charges pending against him if he is
not brought to trial within 70 days of his initial appearance or
indictment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(c), 3162. In computing the running of
this 70-day period, the Act permits certain periods of time to be
excluded. These exclusions are designed to take account of specific
and recurring periods of delay which often occur in criminal cases;
they are not to be used either to undermine the time limits
established by the Act or to subvert the very purpose the Act was
designed to fulfill. Nonetheless, this is precisely the result
achieved by the majority's reasoning, as it allows trial judges
indefinitely to delay disposing of pretrial motions. For this
reason, I dissent.
As interpreted by the majority, § 3161(h)(1)(F) (subsection (F))
excludes the entire period between the filing of the pretrial
motion and the date on which the motion is finally taken under
advisement. For motions requiring a hearing, all time
Page 476 U. S. 334
is excluded from the date the motion is filed through the
conclusion of the hearing.
Ante at
476 U. S.
329-330. There is no requirement that the hearing be
held promptly, and the reason for the delay is irrelevant.
Regardless of whether a hearing is postponed due to a stipulated
continuance, the sudden illness of counsel, or the trial judge's
decision to play golf, until the hearing is concluded, the 70-day
clock remains at a standstill. Moreover, if at the conclusion of
the hearing the trial judge determines that more information would
be helpful to his resolution of the motion, or if the prosecutor
simply announces his intention to file supplemental papers, the
period of excludable delay continues indefinitely until the court
receives all of the papers it reasonably expects. Only at that
point is the motion considered to be "actually under advisement,"
and even then, § 3161(h)(1)(J) (subsection (J)) provides for an
additional 30 days before the clock begins running again.
For pretrial motions that do not require a hearing, the majority
reads subsection (F) to exclude the entire period of time from the
filing of the motion through its "prompt disposition."
Ante at
476 U. S. 329.
As construed by the Court, however, the word "prompt" does not
refer to the speed at which the trial court is required to handle
the motion; instead, it merely serves to designate the "point at
which time will cease to be excluded."
Ibid. That is to
say, Congress inserted the word "prompt" simply to distinguish the
time at which the motion is taken under advisement from the "final"
disposition, or resolution, of the pretrial motion by the court,
and thus prevent trial courts from avoiding the 30-day limitation
imposed by subsection (J) by claiming that the unlimited delay
sanctioned by subsection (F) applies until the court finally
disposes of (
i.e., decides) the pretrial motion.
Ante at
476 U. S.
329.
As I see it, the majority has misread both subsection (F) and
the Act as a whole. I read subsection (F) to require
all
pretrial motions, regardless of whether they require a hearing, to
be disposed of promptly. There is no reason to believe
Page 476 U. S. 335
that Congress did not intend the word "prompt" to mean exactly
what it normally means, "performed readily or immediately;" "given
without delay or hesitation." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, Unabridged, p. 1816 (1976). Reading the word "prompt"
in subsection (F) as a synonym for "quick," rather than as an
antonym for the word "final," is a far more logical reading of the
statute, and is more in keeping with the overall purpose of the
Speedy Trial Act. I also find no merit to the contention that the
phrase "other prompt disposition" only applies to pretrial motions
to be decided without a hearing. After all, there cannot be an
"
other prompt disposition" of a motion unless there was a
prompt disposition in the first place, and the plain language of
subsection (F) shows that Congress intended hearings on pretrial
motions to be conducted just as promptly as any other disposition
of such motions.
This reading of subsection (F) is consistent with the structure
of the Speedy Trial Act taken as a whole. Subsection (F) allows for
the exclusion of the period of delay occurring between the making
of the pretrial motion and its submission to the trial court for
decision. It is this portion of the pretrial proceedings that the
Act commands must be "prompt," and the reason for such a
requirement is clear: it forces the parties to submit all necessary
papers, and the court to hold any necessary hearings and decide
what information it needs, in a timely and orderly manner. As shown
above, the use of the word "prompt" in this context does more than
simply distinguish this point in time from the time when the motion
is finally decided (
i.e., the "final" disposition of the
motion); instead, it describes the pace at which both the parties
and the court are to act in ensuring that the trial judge can rule
on the pretrial motion as quickly as possible. The promptness
requirement, in other words, expressly is designed to prevent
endless and needless delays in the assembly of the relevant
material necessary for the trial court to make a reasoned decision
on the submitted pretrial motion.
Page 476 U. S. 336
Subsection (F) thus requires prompt submission of material to
the court and efficient scheduling of pretrial hearings, and once
the court receives all of the papers and arguments it reasonably
expects, the motion is considered to be "actually under advisement
by the court." Consistent with the purpose of the Act and the
promptness requirement imposed by subsection (F), subsection (J)
then gives the trial court no more than 30 days in which to
consider the parties' contentions and finally to decide the motion.
The period during which the court has the motion "under advisement"
is governed by subsection (J), and, contrary to the majority's
holding,
ante at
476 U. S.
328-329, its 30-day limitation period has no bearing on
the speed with which the motion is submitted to the court for
decision.
Construing subsection (F) as mandating the prompt scheduling of
hearings and submission of material in order for the trial court to
take the matter under advisement is supported not only by the
language of the statute and the structure of the Act, but also by
the legislative history. In explaining the 1979 Amendments to the
Act which established subsection (F) in its present form, the
Senate Judiciary Committee noted that this portion of the Act "must
be read together with the proposed change in clause (ii) of
subsection (h)(8)(B) involving
preparation' for `pretrial
proceedings.'" S.Rep. No. 96-212, p. 33 (1979). [Footnote 2/1] The Committee expressly
rejected
Page 476 U. S.
337
as "unreasonable" the suggestion that "all time consumed by
motions practice, from preparation through their disposition,
should be excluded," finding instead that, "in routine cases,
preparation time should not be excluded where the questions of law
are not novel and the issues of fact simple." Id. at
33-34. Even in cases involving "novel questions of law or complex
facts," the Committee concluded that only "reasonable preparation
time for pretrial motions" would be necessary. Id. at 34.
Despite the narrow reading of the legislative history by the
majority, therefore, the Senate Committee clearly meant exactly
what it said when it declared that it did not intend that
"additional time be made eligible for exclusion by postponing
the hearing date or other disposition of the motions beyond what is
reasonably necessary."
Ibid. [
Footnote
2/2]
Page 476 U. S. 338
Adhering to both the plain language of the statute and its
legislative history, the majority of courts considering this
question have held that subsection (F) permits the exclusion of
only a reasonable amount of time for the trial court to take a
pretrial motion under advisement, and that any other result would
defeat the purposes of the Act.
See United States v. Ray,
768 F.2d 991, 997-999 (CA8 1986);
United States v.
Mitchell, 723 F.2d 1040, 1046-1047 (CA1 1983);
United
States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 543-544 (CA7 1983);
United
States v. Novak, 715 F.2d 810, 819-820 (CA3 1983),
cert.
denied sub nom. Ware v. United States, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984);
United States v. Cobb, 697 F.2d 38, 43-45 (CA2 1982);
United States v. Smith, 563 F.
Supp. 217, 219-220 (Md.1983),
aff'd, 750 F.2d 1233
(CA4 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1057 (1986);
United
States v. Hawker, 552 F.
Supp. 117, 124-125 (Mass.1982). Similarly, the Judicial
Conference of the United States recognizes that, "[i]n some
circumstances, the duration of this exclusion may be subject to a
reasonableness requirement." Committee on the Administration of the
Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Guidelines to the Administration of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974,
as Amended (Dec.1979 rev., with amendments through Oct.1984), 106
F.R.D. 271, 289
Page 476 U. S. 339
(1984). Finally, commentators have also noted the necessity for
this construction, finding that, without it, there would be no need
for trial courts to process motions in a timely fashion, thus
undermining the purposes of the Act.
See Misner, The 1979
Amendments to the Speedy Trial Act: Death of the Planning Process,
32 Hastings L.J. 635, 664-665 (1981); Note, Speedy Trial: A
Constitutional Right in Search of Definition, 61 Geo. L.J. 657,
679, and n. 136 (1973), reprinted in Hearings on S. 754 before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 61, 83, and n. 136 (1973).
I agree with this wealth of statutory, judicial, and scholarly
authority, and would hold that the Speedy Trial Act requires a
trial court to take all pretrial motions under advisement in a
prompt manner, and, as a result, that only that period of delay
found to be reasonably necessary to such a prompt handling of the
motion is properly excludable under subsection (F). By holding that
the entire period of delay from the filing of a pretrial motion
until that motion is taken under advisement is excludable from the
70-day speedy trial computation, the majority allows this exception
to swallow the rule, and, in so doing, undermines the entire Act.
As Judge Ferguson concluded in his dissent below,
"[w]hile I sympathize with the majority's search for a
per
se rule, . . . I cannot agree that the desire for an 'easy'
rule can justify the abrogation of the major purpose of the Speedy
Trial Act -- to insure the defendant a speedy trial."
746 F.2d 619, 627 (1984). I would reverse the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit, and remand for a determination of whether the delay
in this case was reasonable.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B) governs the factors a judge is
to consider in determining whether to grant an "ends of justice"
continuance authorized by § 3161(h)(8)(A). Subsection (h)(8)(B)(ii)
provides:
"Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number
of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of
novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect
adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial
itself within the time limits established by this section."
The majority characterizes this subsection as dealing only with
"time spent
preparing pretrial motions."
Ante at
476 U. S. 327,
n. 8 (emphasis in original). This description ignores the plain
language of the subsection, which states that it applies to
"preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself."
Furthermore, the majority's statement that its "holding concerns
time
after the submission of pretrial motions" shows how
far removed from the purposes of the Speedy Trial Act its opinion
lies. By treating the interval between the time when pretrial
motions are submitted to the court and the time when the court
takes the motion "under advisement" as a time not governed either
by the promptness requirement of subsection (F) or the 30-day
limitation imposed by subsection (J), the Court carves out a period
in which the 70-day limit imposed by the Act does not apply. This
construction permits potentially excessive and abusive use of the
Act's exclusions, and results in the denial of a speedy trial to a
criminal defendant -- the precise result which the Act was designed
to avoid.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The majority is correct that Congress placed a great deal of
reliance on the development of local guidelines relating to motions
practice to establish the specific periods of allowable delay under
subsection (F).
Ante at
476 U. S. 328.
I disagree, however, that Congress left this potentially unlimited
period of time to be governed solely by such rules. Although
Congress might have intended for the district courts and circuits
to quantify the precise limits acceptable under this portion of the
Act, Congress made sure that, even without the development of such
standards, no more time than what is "reasonably necessary" for the
prompt submission of the motion to the trial court for decision
would be excluded from the running of the 70-day clock established
by the Act.
Moreover, even if the majority is correct that "Congress clearly
envisioned that any limitations should be imposed by circuit or
district court rules rather than by the statute itself,"
ante at
476 U. S. 328,
the majority fails to consider the applicable local rules relevant
to this case. These provide that
"[a]ll pre-trial hearings shall be conducted as soon after the
arraignment as possible, consistent with the priorities of other
matters on the court's criminal docket."
U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, Plan for
Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, Sec. II(4)(F)(4) (revised,
Apr. 7, 1980), California Rules of Court 822-824 (West 1986).
Although this rule does not offer any specific guidance, it is
sufficient to invoke the "reasonably necessary" standard intended
by Congress.
Finally, the majority states that it is deferring to the Ninth
Circuit's determination that the local rules were not violated in
this case.
Ante at
476 U. S. 328,
n. 9. This finding is not supported by the record, for, although
the lower court cited to the local rules, 746 F.2d 619, 623 (1984),
there is no indication that the panel ever applied the rules to the
facts of this case, let alone that it found that the rules had not
been violated.