Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Virginia on charges of
capital murder for fatally shooting the white proprietor of a
jewelry store in the course of a robbery. During
voir
dire, the state trial judge refused petitioner's request to
question the prospective jurors on racial prejudice. The jury
convicted petitioner, and, after a separate sentencing hearing,
recommended that he be sentenced to death, a recommendation the
trial judge accepted. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the death
sentence, rejecting petitioner's argument that the trial judge
deprived him of a fair trial by refusing to question the
prospective jurors on racial prejudice. Petitioner then sought
habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court, which rejected the
same argument and denied relief, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is
remanded.
753 F.2d 342, reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I and III, concluding that a defendant accused of an
interracial capital crime is entitled to have prospective jurors
informed of the victim's race and questioned on the issue of racial
bias. This rule is minimally intrusive. As in other cases involving
"special circumstances," the trial judge retains discretion as to
the form and number of questions, including whether to question the
venire individually or collectively. Also, a defendant cannot
complain of a failure to question the venire on racial prejudice
unless he has specifically requested such an inquiry. Pp.
476 U. S. 29-33,
476 U. S.
36-37.
JUSTICE WHITE, joined by JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE STEVENS, and
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concluded in Parts II and IV that:
(1) The risk that racial prejudice may have infected
petitioner's capital sentencing is unacceptable in light of the
ease with which that risk, being especially serious in view of the
finality of the death sentence, could have been minimized.
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S. 589,
distinguished. Pp.
476 U. S.
33-36.
(2) While it is not necessary that petitioner be retried on the
issue of guilt, there was an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice
infecting the
capital sentencing proceeding, and the
inadequacy of the
voir dire requires
Page 476 U. S. 29
that his death sentence be vacated. This unacceptable risk arose
from the conjunction of three factors: the fact that the crime
charged involved interracial violence, the broad discretion given
the jury under Virginia law at the sentencing hearing, and the
special seriousness of the risk of improper sentencing in a capital
case. Pp.
476 U. S.
37-38.
WHITE, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and III, in which
BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and an
opinion with respect to Parts II and IV, in which BLACKMUN,
STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BURGER, C.J., concurred in the
judgment. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part,
post, p.
476 U. S. 38.
MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN, J., joined,
post, p.
476 U. S. 45.
POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J.,
joined,
post, p.
476 U. S.
45.
JUSTICE WHITE announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and III, and an
opinion with respect to Parts II and IV, in which JUSTICE BLACKMUN,
JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join.
Petitioner is a black man sentenced to death for the murder of a
white storekeeper. The question presented is whether the trial
judge committed reversible error at
voir dire by refusing
petitioner's request to question prospective jurors on racial
prejudice.
I
On July 12, 1978, petitioner entered a jewelry store in
Franklin, Virginia, armed with a sawed-off shotgun. He demanded
that the proprietor, W. Jack Smith, Jr., put jewelry and money from
the cash register into some jewelry bags. Smith complied with
petitioner's demand, but triggered a
Page 476 U. S. 30
silent alarm, alerting the Police Department. When Alan Bain, a
police officer, arrived to inquire about the alarm, petitioner
surprised him and forced him to surrender his revolver.
Having learned that Smith had triggered a silent alarm,
petitioner became agitated. He fired toward the rear wall of the
store and stated that, if he saw or heard any more police officers,
he was going to start killing those in the store. [
Footnote 1] When a police siren sounded,
petitioner walked to where Smith was stationed behind a counter
and, without warning, shot him in the head with Bain's pistol,
wounding Smith and causing him to slump incapacitated to the
floor.
Officer Bain attempted to calm petitioner, promising to take him
anywhere he wanted to go and asking him not to shoot again.
Petitioner angrily replied that he was going to kill Smith for
"snitching," and fired two pistol shots into Smith's chest, fatally
wounding him. As petitioner turned away from shooting Smith, Bain
was able to disarm him and place him under arrest.
A Southampton County, Virginia, grand jury indicted petitioner
on charges of capital murder, use of a firearm in the commission of
a murder, and possession of a sawed-off shotgun in the commission
of a robbery. Petitioner requested and was granted a change of
venue to Northampton County, Virginia, a rural county some 80 miles
from the location of the murder.
Prior to the commencement of
voir dire, petitioner's
counsel submitted to the trial judge a list of proposed questions,
including the following:
"The defendant, Willie Lloyd Turner, is a member of the Negro
race. The victim, W. Jack Smith, Jr., was a white Caucasian. Will
these facts prejudice you against Willie Lloyd Turner or affect
your ability to render a fair
Page 476 U. S. 31
and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence?"
Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 522, n. 8,
273 S.E.2d
36, 42, n. 8 (1980).
The judge declined to ask this question, stating that it "has
been ruled on by the Supreme Court." [
Footnote 2] App. 15. The judge did ask the venire, who
were questioned in groups of five in petitioner's presence, whether
any person was aware of any reason why he could not render a fair
and impartial verdict, to which all answered "no."
Id. at
17, 78. At the time the question was asked, the prospective jurors
had no way of knowing that the murder victim was white.
The jury that was empaneled, which consisted of eight whites and
four blacks, convicted petitioner on all of the charges against
him.
Id. at 97 and Addendum. After a separate sentencing
hearing on the capital charge, the jury recommended that petitioner
be sentenced to death, a recommendation the trial judge accepted.
Id. at 18, 19.
Petitioner appealed his death sentence to the Virginia Supreme
Court. Among other points, he argued that the trial judge deprived
him of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury by
refusing to question prospective jurors on racial prejudice. The
Virginia Supreme Court rejected this argument. Relying on our
decision in
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.
S. 589 (1976), the court stated that a trial judge's
refusal to ask prospective jurors about their racial attitudes,
while perhaps not the wisest decision as a matter of policy, is not
constitutionally objectionable in the absence of factors akin to
those in
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.
S. 524 (1973). [
Footnote
3]
Turner v. Commonwealth, supra, at 523, 273 S.E.
Page 476 U. S. 32
2d at 42. The court held that "[t]he mere fact that a defendant
is black and that a victim is white does not constitutionally
mandate . . . an inquiry [into racial prejudice]."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 4]
Having failed in his direct appeal, petitioner sought habeas
corpus relief in the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia. App. 97. Again he argued without success that
the trial judge's refusal to ask prospective jurors about their
racial attitudes deprived him of his right to a fair trial.
Id. at 102-104. The District Court noted that, in
Ristaino, supra, which involved a crime of interracial
violence, [
Footnote 5] we held
that inquiry into racial prejudice at
voir dire was not
constitutionally required because the facts of the case "
did
not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might
infect [the defendant's] trial.'" App. 103 (quoting 424 U.S. at
424 U. S.
598). The court found the present case like
Ristaino and unlike Ham in that "racial issues
[are] not `inextricably bound up with the facts at trial.'" App.
103.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's denial of habeas corpus relief
for
Page 476 U. S. 33
petitioner.
Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342 (1985). Like
the Virginia Supreme Court and the District Court, the Fourth
Circuit found no "special circumstances" in this case analogous to
those in
Ham. The court rejected the idea that "the nature
of the crime or punishment itself is . . . a special circumstance."
753 F.2d at 345. Relying on
Ristaino, the court likewise
found no special circumstance in the fact that petitioner is black
and his victim white. [
Footnote
6]
We granted certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit's decision
that petitioner was not constitutionally entitled to have potential
jurors questioned concerning racial prejudice. 471 U.S. 1098
(1985). We reverse.
II
The Fourth Circuit's opinion correctly states the analytical
framework for evaluating petitioner's argument:
"The broad inquiry in each case must be . . . whether, under all
of the circumstances presented, there was a constitutionally
significant likelihood that, absent questioning about racial
prejudice, the jurors would not be indifferent as [they stand]
unsworne."
753 F.2d at 345-346 (internal quotation omitted). The Fourth
Circuit was correct, too, in holding that, under
Ristaino,
the mere fact that petitioner is black and his victim white does
not constitute a "special circumstance" of constitutional
proportions. What sets this case apart from
Ristaino,
however, is that, in addition to petitioner's being accused of a
crime against a white victim, the crime charged was a capital
offense.
In a capital sentencing proceeding before a jury, the jury is
called upon to make a "highly subjective, 'unique,
individualized
Page 476 U. S. 34
judgment regarding the punishment that a particular person
deserves.'"
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.
S. 320,
472 U. S. 340,
n. 7 (1985) (quoting
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.
S. 862,
462 U. S. 900
(1983) (REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment)). The Virginia
statute under which petitioner was sentenced is instructive of the
kinds of judgments a capital sentencing jury must make. First, in
order to consider the death penalty, a Virginia jury must find
either that the defendant is likely to commit future violent crimes
or that his crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an
aggravated battery to the victim." Va.Code § 19.2-264.2 (1983).
Second, the jury must consider any mitigating evidence offered by
the defendant. Mitigating evidence may include, but is not limited
to, facts tending to show that the defendant acted under the
influence of extreme emotional or mental disturbance, or that at
the time of the crime the defendant's capacity "to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was significantly impaired." § 19.2-262.4(B).
Finally, even if the jury has found an aggravating factor, and
irrespective of whether mitigating evidence has been offered, the
jury has discretion not to recommend the death sentence, in which
case it may not be imposed. § 19.2-264.2.
Virginia's death penalty statute gives the jury greater
discretion than other systems which we have upheld against
constitutional challenge.
See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas,
428 U. S. 262
(1976). However, our cases establish that every capital sentencer
must be free to weigh relevant mitigating evidence before deciding
whether to impose the death penalty,
see, e.g., Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104
(1982);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586,
438 U. S.
597-609 (1978) (plurality opinion), and that, in the
end, it is the jury that must make the difficult, individualized
judgment as to whether the defendant deserves the sentence of
death.
Page 476 U. S. 35
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a
capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for
racial prejudice to operate, but remain undetected. On the facts of
this case, a juror who believes that blacks are violence prone or
morally inferior might well be influenced by that belief in
deciding whether petitioner's crime involved the aggravating
factors specified under Virginia law. Such a juror might also be
less favorably inclined toward petitioner's evidence of mental
disturbance as a mitigating circumstance. More subtle, less
consciously held racial attitudes could also influence a juror's
decision in this case. Fear of blacks, which could easily be
stirred up by the violent facts of petitioner's crime, might
incline a juror to favor the death penalty. [
Footnote 7]
The risk of racial prejudice infecting a capital sentencing
proceeding is especially serious in light of the complete finality
of the death sentence.
"The Court, as well as the separate opinions of a majority of
the individual Justices, has recognized that the qualitative
difference of death from all other punishments requires a
correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital
sentencing determination."
California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992,
463 U. S.
998-999 (1983). We have struck down capital sentences
when we found that the circumstances
Page 476 U. S. 36
under which they were imposed
"created an unacceptable risk that 'the death penalty [may have
been] meted out arbitrarily or capriciously' or through 'whim . . .
or mistake.'"
Caldwell, supra, at
472 U. S. 343
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(citation omitted). In the present case, we find the risk that
racial prejudice may have infected petitioner's capital sentencing
unacceptable in light of the ease with which that risk could have
been minimized. [
Footnote 8] By
refusing to question prospective jurors on racial prejudice, the
trial judge failed to adequately protect petitioner's
constitutional right to an impartial jury. [
Footnote 9]
III
We hold that a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime
is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the
Page 476 U. S. 37
race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias.
[
Footnote 10] The rule we
propose is minimally intrusive; as in other cases involving
"special circumstances," the trial judge retains discretion as to
the form and number of questions on the subject, including the
decision whether to question the venire individually or
collectively.
See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 527.
Also, a defendant cannot complain of a judge's failure to question
the venire on racial prejudice unless the defendant has
specifically requested such an inquiry.
IV
The inadequacy of
voir dire in this case requires that
petitioner's death sentence be vacated. It is not necessary,
however, that he be retried on the issue of guilt. Our judgment in
this case is that there was an unacceptable risk of racial
prejudice infecting the
capital sentencing proceeding.
This judgment is based on a conjunction of three factors: the fact
that the crime charged involved interracial violence, the broad
discretion given the jury at the death penalty hearing, and the
special seriousness of the risk of improper sentencing in a capital
case. [
Footnote 11] At the
guilt phase of petitioner's trial, the jury had no greater
discretion than it would have had if the crime charged had been
noncapital murder. Thus, with respect to the guilt phase of
petitioner's trial, we find this case
Page 476 U. S. 38
to be indistinguishable from
Ristaino, to which we
continue to adhere. [
Footnote
12]
See n 5,
supra.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE concurs in the judgment.
[
Footnote 1]
In addition to Smith and Bain, a store employee and two
customers were present at this time.
[
Footnote 2]
Whether the trial judge was referring to this Court's decision
in
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S. 589
(1976), or to a decision of the Virginia Supreme Court, is
unclear.
[
Footnote 3]
In
Ham, a young black man known in his small South
Carolina hometown as a civil rights activist was arrested and
charged with possession of marijuana. We held that the trial judge
committed reversible error in refusing to honor Ham's request to
question prospective jurors on racial prejudice. In
Ristaino,
supra, we specified the factors which mandated an inquiry into
racial prejudice in
Ham:
"Ham's defense was that he had been framed because of his civil
rights activities. His prominence in the community as a civil
rights activist, if not already known to veniremen, inevitably
would have been revealed to the members of the jury in the course
of his presentation of that defense. Racial issues therefore were
inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial. Further, Ham's
reputation as a civil rights activist and the defense he interposed
were likely to intensify any prejudice that individual members of
the jury might harbor."
424 U.S. at
424 U. S.
596-597.
[
Footnote 4]
The court also rejected petitioner's reliance on a statistical
study showing that black defendants who kill white victims are
sentenced to death with disproportionate frequency. The court
stated that the study, which is based on statistics compiled in
other States, has little utility in establishing the potential for
racial prejudice in Virginia. 221 Va. at 523, n. 9, 273 S.E.2d at
42, n. 9.
[
Footnote 5]
In
Ristaino, the defendant was one of three black men
charged with assaulting a white security guard with intent to
murder him. The assault occurred in the course of a robbery. 424
U.S. at
424 U. S.
590.
[
Footnote 6]
To the suggestion that it is a special circumstance that black
murderers whose victims are white are executed with
disproportionate frequency, the court responded by quoting our
opinion in
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.
S. 182 (1981), for the proposition that "'[t]here is no
constitutional presumption of juror bias for or against members of
any particular racial or ethnic groups.'" 753 F.2d at 345 (quoting
451 U.S. at
451 U. S.
190).
[
Footnote 7]
In referring to the facts of petitioner's crime, we do not
retreat from our holding in
Ristaino. The fact of
interracial violence alone is not a "special circumstance"
entitling the defendant to have prospective jurors questioned about
racial prejudice. It should be clear, though, that our holding in
Ristaino was not based on a blind belief that the facts
presented in that case could not evoke racial prejudice. As we
stated in
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. at
451 U. S.
192:
"It remains an unfortunate fact in our society that violent
crimes perpetrated against members of other racial or ethnic groups
often raise [a reasonable possibility that racial prejudice would
influence the jury]."
Ristaino does not condone this possibility, but simply
leaves it to the trial judge's discretion to decide what measures
to take in screening out racial prejudice, absent a showing of
"significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect [the]
trial." 424 U.S. at
424 U. S.
598.
[
Footnote 8]
JUSTICE POWELL's dissent takes issue with what he terms the
"singularly unwise and unjustified presumption that capital jurors
harbor latent racial bias."
Post at
476 U. S. 53.
This remark fails to distinguish between our recognition that
jurors in a capital case
may harbor racial bias, and the
presumption, which we do not make, that any particular capital
jurors are in fact racially prejudiced. JUSTICE POWELL implicitly
recognizes such a distinction, but only when it suits his purposes;
thus, he does not say that, in a case like
Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U. S. 524
(1973), the jurors are presumed to be prejudiced, but rather that
there is "an unacceptable risk that racial prejudice will
distort the trial.'" Post at 476 U. S.
50.
Once rhetoric is put aside, it is plain that there is some risk
of racial prejudice influencing a jury whenever there is a crime
involving interracial violence,
see n 7, supra; the only question is at what point
that risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable. Notwithstanding
JUSTICE POWELL's attempt to minimize the significance of the
discretion entrusted to the jury at a capital sentencing hearing,
post at
476 U. S. 50-52,
we are convinced that such discretion gives greater opportunity for
racial prejudice to operate than is present when the jury is
restricted to factfinding. This, together with the special
seriousness with which we view the risk of racial prejudice
influencing a capital sentencing decision, is what distinguishes
this case from
Ristaino.
[
Footnote 9]
The right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by both the Sixth
Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, and by principles of due process.
Ristaino, 424
U.S. at
424 U. S. 595,
n. 6.
[
Footnote 10]
JUSTICE POWELL contends that inquiry into racial prejudice
"in the absence of circumstances that make clear a need for it
could well have the negative effect of suggesting to the jurors
that race somehow is relevant to the case."
Post at
476 U. S. 48-49,
n. 5. Whether such a concern is purely chimerical or not is a
decision we leave up to a capital defendant's counsel. Should
defendant's counsel decline to request
voir dire on the
subject of racial prejudice, we in no way require or suggest that
the judge broach the topic
sua sponte.
[
Footnote 11]
We find it unnecessary to evaluate the statistical studies which
petitioner has introduced in support of the proposition that black
defendants who kill whites are executed with disproportionate
frequency.
[
Footnote 12]
JUSTICE BRENNAN incorrectly reads into our opinion a suggestion
that "the constitutional entitlement to an impartial jury attaches
only at the sentencing phase."
Post at
476 U. S. 43.
The real question is not whether there is a constitutional right to
an impartial jury throughout a criminal trial,
see
n 9,
supra, but what
prophylactic rules the Constitution imposes on the States in
furtherance of that right. What we held in
Ristaino, and
reaffirm today, is that, absent "special circumstances" that create
a particularly compelling need to inquire into racial prejudice,
the Constitution leaves the conduct of
voir dire to the
sound discretion of state trial judges.
The implication of JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion is that every crime
of interracial violence is a "special circumstance." Over JUSTICE
BRENNAN's dissent, however,
Ristaino squarely rejected
this approach. Moreover, we are unpersuaded by JUSTICE BRENNAN's
view that "the opportunity for racial bias to taint the jury
process is . . . equally a factor at the guilt [and sentencing]
phase[s] of a bifurcated capital trial."
Post at
476 U. S. 41. As
we see it, the risk of racial bias at sentencing hearings is of an
entirely different order, because the decisions that sentencing
jurors must make involve far more subjective judgments than when
they are deciding guilt or innocence.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The Court's judgment vacates petitioner's sentence of death
while refusing to disturb his conviction. Adhering to my view that
the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153,
428 U. S. 227
(1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I agree that the death sentence
in this case must be vacated. But even if I did not hold that view,
I would still find that the sentence was unconstitutionally imposed
in this case. In my view, the constitutional right of a defendant
to have a trial judge ask the members
Page 476 U. S. 39
of the venire questions concerning possible racial bias is
triggered whenever a violent interracial crime has been committed.
See Ross v. Massachusetts, 414 U.
S. 1080 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). The reality of race relations in this country is such
that we simply may not presume impartiality, and the risk of bias
runs especially high when members of a community serving on a jury
are to be confronted with disturbing evidence of criminal conduct
that is often terrifying and abhorrent. In analyzing the question
of when the Constitution requires trial judges to accommodate
defendants' requests for inquiries into racial prejudice, I, like
the Court, am influenced by what the Court correctly describes as
the "ease" with which the risk may be minimized.
Ante at
476 U. S.
36.
In any event, I cannot fully join either the Court's judgment or
opinion. For in my view, the decision in this case, although
clearly half right, is even more clearly half wrong. After
recognizing that the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury
entitles a defendant in a capital case involving interracial
violence to have prospective jurors questioned on the issue of
racial bias -- a holding which requires that this case be reversed
and remanded for new sentencing -- the Court disavows the logic of
its own reasoning in denying petitioner Turner a new trial on the
issue of his guilt. It accomplishes this by postulating a jury role
at the sentencing phase of a capital trial fundamentally different
from the jury function at the guilt phase, and by concluding that
the former gives rise to a significantly greater risk of a verdict
tainted by racism. Because I believe that the Court's analysis
improperly intertwines the significance of the
risk of
bias with the
consequences of bias, and because in my view
the distinction between the jury's role at a guilt trial and its
role at a sentencing hearing is a distinction without substance
insofar as juror bias is concerned, I join only that portion of the
Court's judgment granting petitioner a new sentencing
proceeding,
Page 476 U. S. 40
but dissent from that portion of the judgment refusing to vacate
the conviction.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants an impartial
jury. This is not mere exhortation, for it has been noted that
"the right to an impartial jury carries with it the concomitant
right to take reasonable steps designed to insure that the jury is
impartial."
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.
S. 524,
409 U. S. 532
(1973) (MARSHALL, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Among the most important of the means designed to insure an
impartial jury is the right to strike those jurors who manifest an
inability to try the case solely on the basis of the evidence. This
right to exclude incompetent jurors cannot be exercised
meaningfully or effectively unless counsel has sufficient
information with which to evaluate members of the venire. As
JUSTICE WHITE noted for the Court in
Rosales-Lopez v. United
States, 451 U. S. 182,
451 U. S. 188
(1981),
"lack of adequate
voir dire impairs the defendant's
right to exercise peremptory challenges where provided by statute
or rule, as it is in the federal courts."
(Footnote omitted.)
Recognizing this fact, we held long ago that "essential demands
of fairness" may require a judge to ask jurors whether they
entertain any racial prejudice.
Aldridge v. United States,
283 U. S. 308
(1931);
see also Ham v. South Carolina. More recently, we
attempted to refine the analysis, and declared that, when there is
a showing of a "likelihood" that racial or ethnic prejudice may
affect the jurors, the Constitution requires a trial judge to honor
a defendant's request to examine the jurors' ability to deal
impartially with the evidence adduced at trial.
Rosales-Lopez,
supra, at
451 U. S. 190.
Exercising our supervisory powers over the federal courts, we held
in
Rosales-Lopez that, when a violent crime has been
committed, and the victim and the accused are of different races, a
per se inference of a "reasonable possibility" of
prejudice is shown. In the present case, we deal with a criminal
case from a state court involving an act of interracial
violence,
Page 476 U. S. 41
and are faced with the question of what factors and
circumstances will elevate this presumptive "reasonable
possibility" of prejudice into a constitutionally significant
"likelihood" of prejudice.
The Court identifies three factors, the "conjunction" of which
in its view entitled petitioner Turner as a matter of
constitutional right to have the jury questioned on racial bias.
These are (1) the fact that the crime committed involved
interracial violence; (2) the broad discretion given the jury at
the death penalty hearing; and (3) the "special seriousness of the
risk of improper sentencing in a capital case."
Ante at
476 U. S. 37. I
agree with the Court that, when these three factors are present, as
they were at petitioner's sentencing hearing, the trial court
commits constitutional error in refusing a defense request to ask
the jurors if the race of either the victim or the accused will
bear on their ability to render a decision based solely on the
evidence. What I cannot accept is that the judge is released from
this obligation to insure an impartial jury -- or, to put it
another way, that the defendant is stripped of this constitutional
safeguard -- when a capital jury is hearing evidence concerning a
crime involving interracial violence but passing "only" on the
issue of guilt/innocence, rather than on the appropriate
sentence.
The Court's argument is simply untenable on its face. As best I
can understand it, the thesis is that, since there is greater
discretion entrusted to a capital jury in the sentencing phase than
in the guilt phase, "there is [in the sentencing hearing] a unique
opportunity for racial prejudice to operate, but remain
undetected."
Ante at
476 U. S. 35.
However, the Court's own discussion of the issues demonstrates that
the opportunity for racial bias to taint the jury process is not
"uniquely" present at a sentencing hearing, but is equally a factor
at the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial.
According to the Court, a prejudiced juror sitting at a
sentencing hearing might be influenced by his racial bias in
deciding whether the crime committed involved aggravating
Page 476 U. S. 42
factors specified under state law; the Court notes that racial
prejudice might similarly cause that juror to be less favorably
inclined toward an accused's evidence of mitigating circumstances.
Moreover, the Court informs us:
"More subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes could also
influence a juror's decision. . . . Fear of blacks, which could
easily be stirred up by the violent facts of [a] crime, might
incline a juror to favor the death penalty."
Ibid.
The flaw in this "analysis" is that there is simply no
connection between the proposition advanced, the support proffered
for that thesis, and the conclusion drawn. In other words, it is
certainly true, as the Court maintains, that racial bias inclines
one to disbelieve and disfavor the object of the prejudice, and it
is similarly incontestable that subconscious, as well as express,
racial fears and hatreds operate to deny fairness to the person
despised; that is why we seek to insure that the right to an
impartial jury is a meaningful right by providing the defense with
the opportunity to ask prospective jurors questions designed to
expose even hidden prejudices. But the Court never explains why
these biases should be of less concern at the guilt phase than at
the sentencing phase. The majority asserts that
"a juror who believes that blacks are violence prone or morally
inferior might well be influenced by that belief in deciding
whether petitioner's crime involved the aggravating factors
specified under Virginia law."
Ibid. But might not that same juror be influenced by
those same prejudices in deciding whether, for example, to credit
or discredit white witnesses as opposed to black witnesses at the
guilt phase? Might not those same racial fears that would incline a
juror to favor death not also incline a juror to favor
conviction?
A trial to determine guilt or innocence is, at bottom, nothing
more than the sum total of a countless number of small
discretionary decisions made by each individual who sits in the
jury box. The difference between conviction and acquittal
Page 476 U. S. 43
turns on whether key testimony is believed or rejected; on
whether an alibi sounds plausible or dubious; on whether a
character witness appears trustworthy or unsavory; and on whether
the jury concludes that the defendant had a motive, the
inclination, or the means available to commit the crime charged. A
racially biased juror sits with blurred vision and impaired
sensibilities, and is incapable of fairly making the myriad
decisions that each juror is called upon to make in the course of a
trial. To put it simply, he cannot judge, because he has prejudged.
This is equally true at the trial on guilt as at the hearing on
sentencing.
To sentence an individual to death on the basis of a proceeding
tainted by racial bias would violate the most basic values of our
criminal justice system. This the Court understands. But what it
seems not to comprehend is that to permit an individual to be
convicted by a prejudiced jury violates those same values
in precisely the same way. The incongruity of the Court's split
judgment is made apparent after it is appreciated that the
opportunity for bias to poison decisionmaking operates at a guilt
trial in the same way as it does at a sentencing hearing, and after
one returns to the context of the case before us. Implicit in the
Court's judgment is the acknowledgment that there was a likelihood
that the jury that pronounced the death sentence acted, in part, on
the basis of racial prejudice. But the exact same jury convicted
Turner. Does the Court really mean to suggest that the
constitutional entitlement to an impartial jury attaches only at
the sentencing phase? Does the Court really believe that racial
biases are turned on and off in the course of one criminal
prosecution?
My sense is that the Court has confused the
consequences of an unfair trial with the
risk
that a jury is acting on the basis of prejudice. In other words, I
suspect that what is really animating the Court's judgment is the
sense of outrage it rightly experiences at the prospect of a man's
being sentenced to death on the basis of the color of his skin.
Perhaps
Page 476 U. S. 44
the Court is slightly less troubled by the prospect of a
racially motivated conviction unaccompanied by the death penalty,
and I suppose that, if, for some unimaginable reason, I had to
choose between the two cases, and could only rectify one, I would
remedy the case where death had been imposed. But there is no need
to choose between the two cases. To state what seems to me obvious,
the constitutional right implicated is the right to be judged by an
impartial jury, regardless of the sentence, and the constitutional
focus thus belongs on whether there is a likelihood of bias, and
not on what flows from that bias. In
Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U. S. 524
(1973), we reversed the conviction of a young black man who was
charged with and convicted of possession of marijuana; because the
man was known in the community as a civil rights activist, and
because we were persuaded that racial issues were inextricably
bound up with the conduct of the trial, we concluded that it was
likely that any prejudice that individual members of the jury might
harbor would be intensified, and held that, under those
circumstances, the trial judge was required to oblige the defense
request to inquire into the jury's possible racial bias. We did not
reject the petitioner's claim in that case because he was sentenced
only to 18 months' imprisonment. Surely one has a right to an
impartial jury whether one is subject to punishment for a day or a
lifetime.
The Court may believe that it is being Solomonic in "splitting
the difference" in this case and granting petitioner a new
sentencing hearing while denying him the other "half" of the relief
demanded. Starkly put, petitioner "wins" in that he gets to be
resentenced, while the State "wins" in that it does not lose its
conviction. But King Solomon did not, in fact, split the baby in
two, and, had he done so, I suspect that he would be remembered
less for his wisdom than for his hardheartedness. Justice is not
served by compromising principles in this way. I would reverse the
conviction as well as the sentence in this case to insure
compliance with the constitutional guarantee of an impartial
jury.
Page 476 U. S. 45
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
For the reasons stated in my opinion in
Ross v.
Massachusetts, 414 U. S. 1080
(1973) (dissenting from denial of certiorari), I believe that a
criminal defendant is entitled to inquire on
voir dire
about the potential racial bias of jurors whenever the case
involves a violent interracial crime. As the Court concedes, "it is
plain that there is some risk of racial prejudice influencing a
jury whenever there is a crime involving interracial violence."
Ante at
476 U. S. 36, n.
8. To my mind that risk plainly outweighs the slight cost of
allowing the defendant to choose whether to make an inquiry
concerning such possible prejudice. This Court did not identify in
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S. 589
(1976), nor does it identify today, any additional burdens that
would accompany such a rule. I therefore cannot agree with the
Court's continuing rejection of the simple prophylactic rule
proposed in
Ristaino.
Even if I agreed with the Court that a
per se rule
permitting inquiry into racial bias is appropriate only in capital
cases, I could not accept the Court's failure to remedy the denial
of such inquiry in this capital case by reversing petitioner's
conviction. Henceforth any capital defendant accused of an
interracial crime may inquire into racial prejudice on
voir
dire. When, as here, the same jury sits at the guilt phase and
the penalty phase, these defendants will be assured an impartial
jury at both phases. Yet petitioner is forced to accept a
conviction by what may have been a biased jury. This is an
incongruous and fundamentally unfair result. I therefore concur
only in the Court's judgment vacating petitioner's sentence, and
dissent from the Court's refusal to reverse the conviction as
well.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins,
dissenting.
The Court today adopts a
per se rule applicable in
capital cases, under which
"a capital defendant accused of an interracial
Page 476 U. S. 46
crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the
race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias."
Ante at
476 U. S. 36-37.
This rule is certain to add to the already heavy burden of habeas
petitions filed by prisoners under sentence of death [
Footnote 2/1] without affording any real
protection beyond that provided by our decisions in
Ham v.
South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524
(1973), and
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.
S. 589 (1976).
In effect, the Court recognizes a presumption that jurors who
have sworn to decide the case impartially nevertheless are racially
biased. Such a presumption is flatly contrary to our decisions in
Ristaino v. Ross, supra, and
Rosales-Lopez v. United
States, 451 U. S. 182,
451 U. S. 190
(1981). [
Footnote 2/2] The facts
of
Page 476 U. S. 47
this case demonstrate why it is unnecessary and unwise for this
Court to rule, as a matter of constitutional law, that a trial
judge
always must inquire into racial bias in a capital
case involving an interracial murder, rather than leaving that
decision to be made on a case-by-case basis. [
Footnote 2/3] Before today, the facts that a defendant
is black and his victim was white were insufficient to raise "a
constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning
about racial prejudice," an impartial jury would not be seated.
Ristaino v. Ross, supra, at
424 U. S.
596.
I
Nothing in this record suggests that racial bias played any role
in the jurors' deliberations. The relevant circumstances merit
emphasis, because they demonstrate that the fact of an interracial
murder, by itself, does not create a substantial likelihood that
racial issues can be expected to distort capital sentencing trials.
Without further evidence that race can be expected to be a factor
in such trials, there is no justification for departing from the
rule of
Ham and
Ristaino.
Petitioner committed murder in the course of an armed robbery of
a jewelry store in Franklin, Virginia. The murder was brutal.
Petitioner shot the store's proprietor three
Page 476 U. S. 48
times. The first shot did not kill, but caused the victim to
fall helplessly to the floor, bleeding from a scalp wound. A police
officer, who had arrived in answer to a silent alarm, pleaded with
petitioner not to shoot again. But petitioner fired two more shots
into his victim's chest, causing his death. The officer then
managed to subdue and arrest petitioner. At trial, the evidence of
petitioner's guilt was conclusive. [
Footnote 2/4] Because the local media gave the murder
extensive publicity, petitioner requested and was granted a change
of venue from Southampton County to Northampton County, across the
Chesapeake Bay, some 80 miles away from the location of the murder.
No member of the jury empaneled had read or heard about the
murder.
Virginia law vests the trial judge with the responsibility to
conduct
voir dire examination of prospective jurors.
Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 519-522,
273 S.E.2d
36, 40-42 (1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011 (1981).
Ordinarily, the judge, rather than counsel, questions members of
the venire to provide a basis for the exercise of challenges. In
this case, in accordance with state practice, the judge permitted
the parties to propose questions to be asked during
voir
dire. Counsel for petitioner submitted 15 questions. As the
10th question on his list, counsel requested the following:
"The defendant, Willie Lloyd Turner, is a member of the Negro
race. The victim, W. Jack Smith, Jr., was a white Caucasian. Will
those facts prejudice you against Willie Lloyd Turner or affect
your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on
the evidence?"
Id. at 522, n. 8, 273 S.E.2d at 42, n. 8. [
Footnote 2/5]
Page 476 U. S. 49
As support for this proposed question, petitioner's counsel
referred only to certain studies that were subsequently placed in
the record. The studies purported to show that a black defendant
who murders a white person is more likely to receive the death
penalty than other capital defendants, but the studies included no
statistics concerning administration of the death penalty in
Virginia.
See Turner v. Commonwealth, supra, at 523, n. 9,
273 S.E.2d at 42, n. 9. Counsel then discussed their proposed
questions with the judge. The prosecutor pointed out that the case
presented no racial issues beyond the fact that petitioner and his
victim were of different races.
The trial judge declined to ask the proposed question, but he
did ask general questions designed to uncover bias. For example,
the prospective jurors were asked,
"Do any of you know any reason whatsoever why you cannot render
a fair and impartial verdict in this case, either for the defendant
or for the Commonwealth of Virginia?"
Each juror responded negatively. [
Footnote 2/6] The jury of 12 persons ultimately
empaneled included 4 black citizens, and a black juror was selected
to act as foreman.
There is nothing in the record of this trial that reflects
racial overtones of any kind. From
voir dire through the
close of trial, no circumstance suggests that the trial judge's
refusal to inquire particularly into racial bias posed "an
impermissible threat to the fair trial guaranteed by due process."
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 595.
The Court does not purport to identify any such circumstance, or to
explain why the facts that a capital defendant is of one race and
his victim of
Page 476 U. S. 50
another now create a significant likelihood that racial issues
will distort the jurors' consideration of the issues in the trial.
Id. at
424 U. S. 597.
This case illustrates that it is unnecessary for the Court to adopt
a
per se rule that constitutionalizes the unjustifiable
presumption that jurors are racially biased.
II
Until today, a trial judge committed an unconstitutional abuse
of discretion by refusing to inquire into racial prejudice only
when the defendant showed that racial issues "were inextricably
bound up with the conduct of the trial." [
Footnote 2/7]
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 597.
When a defendant makes such a showing, there is an unacceptable
risk that racial prejudice will "distort the trial."
Ibid.
Under such circumstances, therefore, due process requires "a
voir dire that include[s] questioning specifically
directed to racial prejudice."
Ibid.; Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 526-527. In
Ristaino, however, the
Court expressly declined to adopt a
per se rule requiring
voir dire inquiry into racial bias in every trial for an
interracial crime. Neither the Constitution nor sound policy
considerations supported such a
per se approach. [
Footnote 2/8] But today the Court decides
that the Constitution does require a
per se rule in
capital cases because the
Page 476 U. S. 51
capital jury exercises discretion at the sentencing phase. The
Court's reasoning ignores the many procedural and substantive
safeguards, similar to those governing the jury's decision on guilt
or innocence, that circumscribe the capital jury's sentencing
decision.
Under Virginia law, murder is a capital offense only if it is
"willful, deliberate and premeditated" and is committed while the
perpetrator is engaged in another crime or under specified
aggravating circumstances. Va.Code § 18.2-31 (Supp.1985). As in any
criminal prosecution, of course, the State carries the burden of
proving all elements of the capital offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Following a sentencing hearing, the death sentence may not
be imposed unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt
statutorily defined aggravating factors. Virginia law recognizes
only two aggravating factors: whether, based on the defendant's
criminal record, there is a probability that he would commit future
crimes of violence, and whether the defendant's crime was
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the
victim. [
Footnote 2/9]"
Va.Code §§ 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4 (1983). The jury also is
required to consider any relevant mitigating evidence offered by
the defendant.
The existence of these significant limitations on the jury's
exercise of sentencing discretion illustrates why the Court's
per se rule is wholly unfounded. Just as the trial
judge's
Page 476 U. S. 52
charge at the guilt phase instructs the jurors that they may
consider only the evidence in the case, and that they must
determine if the prosecution has established each element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the charge at the penalty phase
directs the jurors to focus solely on considerations relevant to
determination of appropriate punishment, and to decide if the
prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt factors
warranting imposition of death. Accordingly, just as there is no
reason to presume racial bias on the part of jurors who determine
the guilt of a defendant who has committed a violent crime against
a person of another race, there is no reason to constitutionalize
such a presumption with respect to the jurors who sit to recommend
the penalty in a capital case.
Nor does anything in the circumstances of this jury's
recommendation of the death penalty suggest a likelihood that
sentencing decisions are being made on racial grounds, so as to
justify adoption of a
per se rule. There is no question
that the State proved the existence of the first aggravating factor
beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Supreme Court of Virginia noted,
since 1974, petitioner
"has been convicted of malicious maiming, escape, unlawful
wounding, malicious wounding, and second-degree murder. Four of
these offenses occurred in the penal system."
Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. at 625, n. 11, 273
S.E.2d at 44, n. 11. The court also expressly found that
petitioner's criminal record was "one of the most extensive" it had
reviewed in a capital case.
Id. at 581, 273 S.E.2d at 47.
The court further observed that, although the first aggravating
factor plainly supported the recommendation of death, the
circumstances of this crime were "vile" because petitioner had
committed an aggravated battery on his victim.
Id. at 527,
278 S.E.2d at 45.
Under the foregoing circumstances, there is no basis for
concluding that the jury's sentencing decision was tainted by
racial bias. The mere fact that the sentencing decision, after
Page 476 U. S. 53
the jury had found guilt and the existence of aggravating
factors beyond a reasonable doubt, involved an element of
discretion provides no ground for this Court to presume that the
decision was infected by racial prejudice. Instead, the rule that,
until today, afforded due process required petitioner to establish
that some special circumstances in his case, beyond the fact of an
interracial crime, raised a constitutionally significant likelihood
that racial prejudice would taint the proceedings.
Ristaino v.
Ross, 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 596.
The Court rejects that rule, and adopts a singularly unwise and
unjustified presumption that capital jurors harbor latent racial
bias.
III
The
per se rule announced today may appear innocuous.
But the rule is based on what amounts to a constitutional
presumption that jurors in capital cases are racially biased. Such
presumption unjustifiably suggests that criminal justice in our
courts of law is meted out on racial grounds. It is not easy to
reconcile the Court's holding today with the principles announced
and applied in
Ham v. South Carolina, Ristaino v. Ross,
and
Rosales-Lopez v. United States. [
Footnote 2/10] The manner in which petitioner was
tried and sentenced, and particularly the jurors who fulfilled
their civic duty to sit in his case, reflected not a trace of the
racial prejudice that the Court's new rule now presumes.
For these reasons, I dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
This case has traveled through each layer of review provided to
capital defendants in our state and federal systems. On July 12,
1978, petitioner committed the murder underlying this petition.
Trial commenced on December 3, 1979, and the jury convicted
petitioner on capital murder and other charges on December 4, 1979.
Following the jury's recommendation, the trial judge sentenced
petitioner to death on February 6, 1980. The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the convictions and sentences.
Turner v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513,
273 S.E.2d
36 (1980). This Court denied a petition for a writ of
certiorari. 451 U.S. 1011 (1981). Petitioner then filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for the County of
Southampton. That court denied relief, and the Supreme Court of
Virginia denied review. We denied a petition for a writ of
certiorari.
Turner v. Morris, 462 U.S. 1112 (1983). Then,
petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
By order entered May 23, 1984, the District Court denied the writ.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Turner v.
Bass, 753 F.2d 342 (1985). This Court granted certiorari, 471
U.S. 1096 (1985), and today reverses.
[
Footnote 2/2]
"Although
Ristaino involved an alleged criminal
confrontation between a black assailant and a white victim, that
fact pattern alone did not create a need of 'constitutional
dimensions' to question the jury concerning racial prejudice. 424
U.S. at
424 U. S. 596,
424 U. S.
597. There is no constitutional presumption of juror
bias for or against members of any particular racial or ethnic
groups. As
Ristaino demonstrates, there is no
per
se constitutional rule in such circumstances requiring inquiry
as to racial prejudice.
Id. at
424 U. S.
596, n. 8. Only when there are more substantial
indications of the likelihood of racial or ethnic prejudice
affecting the jurors in a particular case does the trial court's
denial of a defendant's request to examine the jurors' ability to
deal impartially with this subject amount to an unconstitutional
abuse of discretion."
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 190
(plurality opinion). Although JUSTICE WHITE's opinion in
Rosales-Lopez was for a plurality, JUSTICE REHNQUIST's
opinion concurring in the result was entirely consistent with the
foregoing language.
[
Footnote 2/3]
"Despite its importance, the adequacy of
voir dire is
not easily subject to appellate review. The trial judge's function
at this point in the trial is not unlike that of the jurors later
on in the trial. Both must reach conclusions as to impartiality and
credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor
evidence and of responses to questions.
See Ristaino v.
Ross, 424 U. S. 589,
424 U. S.
595 (1976), quoting
Rideau v. Louisiana,
373 U. S.
723,
373 U. S. 733 (1963) (Clark,
J., dissenting). In neither instance can an appellate court easily
second-guess the conclusions of the decisionmaker who heard and
observed the witnesses."
Id. at
451 U. S.
188.
[
Footnote 2/4]
At oral argument, counsel for petitioner conceded that there was
no question as to his client's guilt. Tr. of Oral Arg. 47.
[
Footnote 2/5]
In the event that the Court decides that this new rule is to be
applied prospectively only, the result of this decision will be to
require trial judges to ask prospective jurors this simplistic
question on
voir dire. Asking such a question in the
absence of circumstances that make clear a need for it could well
have the negative effect of suggesting to the jurors that race
somehow is relevant to the case.
[
Footnote 2/6]
As the facts of
Ristaino v. Ross demonstrate, such a
general question can prompt a juror who is aware of the defendant's
race, as the jurors were in this case, to admit to racial bias. 424
U.S. at
424 U. S. 593,
and n. 5. This general inquiry into bias does not have the
undesirable result of suggesting to the jurors that race is
relevant to the issues in the case.
[
Footnote 2/7]
The circumstances of
Ham v. South Carolina,
409 U. S. 524
(1973), are illustrative. There, a black defendant was tried for
possession of marijuana. The defendant was well known in the
community where the case was tried for his civil rights activities,
and the theory of his defense was that the police had framed him in
retaliation for those activities. On those facts, the Court held
that it was an unconstitutional abuse of discretion for the judge
to refuse to inquire into racial prejudice. Not only were racial
issues a central part of the trial, but also the defendant's
"reputation as a civil rights activist and the defense he
interposed were likely to intensify any prejudice that individual
members of the jury might harbor."
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. at
424 U. S.
697.
[
Footnote 2/8]
"In our heterogeneous society, policy as well as constitutional
considerations militate against the divisive assumption -- as a
per se rule -- that justice in a court of law may turn
upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the choice
of religion."
Id. at
424 U. S. 596,
n. 8.
[
Footnote 2/9]
The Supreme Court of Virginia properly has given the "vileness"
clause a limiting construction to ensure that the jury's discretion
in recommending capital punishment is channeled by appropriate
standards.
See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.
S. 420 (1980). Sentence of death may be imposed on the
basis of this aggravating factor only if the State makes a
two-pronged showing. First, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman."
Turner v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. at 526, 273 S.E.2d at 44-45. Second, the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt "torture of the victim,
an aggravated battery of the victim, or the perpetrator's depravity
of mind."
Id. at 526, 273 S.E.2d at 45.
[
Footnote 2/10]
The Court's opinion purports to reaffirm
Ristaino v. Ross,
ante at
476 U. S. 36, n.
7, and would distinguish all three of the above-cited decisions on
the ground that none of them was a capital case. The decision today
cannot be reconciled with the reasoning of
Ristaino and
Rosales-Lopez, in which we expressly held that the
Constitution does not require
voir dire questioning on
racial bias unless the defendant proves additional circumstances
beyond the fact that the case involves an interracial crime.
Moreover, those two cases rejected any constitutional presumption
that jurors are racially biased.