Petitioners, husband and wife, who owned a building housing a
restaurant and apartments, were charged with various crimes in
connection with a fire in the building that resulted in the killing
of two tenants. At the close of the prosecution's case in chief at
their bench trial in a Pennsylvania state court, petitioners
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by filing a demurrer
pursuant to a Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure. The trial
court sustained the demurrer, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court
quashed the Commonwealth's appeal on the ground that it was barred
by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the granting of a demurrer is not the
functional equivalent of an acquittal, and that, for purposes of
considering a plea of double jeopardy, a defendant who demurs at
the close of the prosecution's case in chief "elects to seek
dismissal on grounds unrelated to his factual guilt or
innocence."
Held: The trial judge's granting of petitioners'
demurrer was an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the
Commonwealth's appeal was barred because reversal would have led to
further trial proceedings. Whether the trial is to a jury or, as
here, to the bench, subjecting the defendant to postacquittal
factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Pp.
476 U. S.
144-146.
507 Pa. 344,
490
A.2d 394, reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 476 U. S. 141
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
At the close of the prosecution's case in chief, the trial court
dismissed certain charges against petitioners on the ground that
the evidence presented was legally insufficient to support a
conviction. The question presented is whether the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars the prosecution from appealing this ruling.
I
Petitioners, husband and wife, owned a building housing a
restaurant and some apartments that burned under suspicious
circumstances, killing two of the tenants. Petitioners were charged
with various crimes in connection with this fire, including
criminal homicide, reckless endangerment, and causing a
catastrophe. [
Footnote 1] They
opted for a bench trial, and at the close of the prosecution's case
in chief challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by filing a
demurrer pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure
1124(a)(1). [
Footnote 2] The
trial court sustained petitioners' demurrer to charges of murder,
voluntary manslaughter, and causing a catastrophe, stating:
"As the trier of fact and law, the court was not satisfied,
after considering all of the facts together with all reasonable
Page 476 U. S. 142
inferences which the Commonwealth's evidence tended to prove,
that there was sufficient evidence from which it could be concluded
that either of the defendants was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of setting or causing to be set the fire in question."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 101a-102a.
The Commonwealth sought review of this ruling in the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania, but a panel of that court quashed the
appeal, holding it barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The
Superior Court granted review en banc and affirmed. 331 Pa.Super.
307,
480
A.2d 1046 (1984). Citing a number of our decisions as
controlling authority, the court set out two relevant principles of
law. First, a judgment that the evidence is legally insufficient to
sustain a guilty verdict constitutes an acquittal for purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
See, e.g., United States v. Martin
Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564
(1977);
Burks v. United States, 437 U. S.
1 (1978);
Sanabria v. United States,
437 U. S. 54
(1978);
United States v. Scott, 437 U. S.
82,
437 U. S. 91
(1978) (dicta);
Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U. S.
40 (1981). Second, when a trial court enters such a
judgment, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars an appeal by the
prosecution not only when it might result in a second trial, but
also if reversal would translate into further proceedings devoted
to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the
offense charged. The Superior Court concluded that, because
reversal of the trial court's granting of petitioners' demurrer
would necessitate further trial proceedings, the Commonwealth's
appeal was improper under
Martin Linen.
The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
which reversed.
Commonwealth v. Zoller, 507 Pa. 344,
490 A.2d
394 (1985). [
Footnote 3]
The court relied heavily on the statement in
United States v.
Scott, supra, that a trial
Page 476 U. S. 143
judge's ruling in a defendant's favor constitutes an
acquittal
"only when 'the ruling of the judge, whatever its label,
actually represents a resolution [in the defendant's favor],
correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the
offense charged.'"
Id. at 97 (quoting
Martin Linen, supra, at
430 U. S.
571). The court gave the following explanation of why
the trial court's ruling on petitioners' demurrer is not within
this definition of an acquittal:
"In deciding whether to grant a demurrer, the court does not
determine whether or not the defendant is guilty on such evidence,
but determines whether the evidence, if credited by the jury, is
legally sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . ."
"Hence, by definition, a demurrer is not a factual
determination. . . . [T]he question before the trial judge in
ruling on a demurrer remains purely one of law."
"We conclude, therefore, that a demurrer is not the functional
equivalent of an acquittal, and that the Commonwealth has the right
to appeal from an order sustaining defendant's demurrer to its
case-in-chief. In such a situation, the defendant himself elects to
seek dismissal on grounds unrelated to his factual guilt or
innocence."
Commonwealth v. Zoller, supra, at 357-358, 490 A.2d at
401. Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the case
to the Superior Court for a determination on the merits of the
appeal. We granted certiorari, 474 U.S. 944 (1985), and now
reverse. [
Footnote 4]
Page 476 U. S. 144
II
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred in holding that, for
purposes of considering a plea of double jeopardy, a defendant who
demurs at the close of the prosecution's case in chief "elects to
seek dismissal on grounds unrelated to his factual guilt or
innocence."
Commonwealth v. Zoller, supra, at 358, 490
A.2d at 401. What the demurring defendant seeks is a ruling that,
as a matter of law, the State's evidence is insufficient to
establish his factual guilt. [
Footnote 5] Our past decisions, which we are not inclined
to reconsider at this time, hold that such a ruling is an acquittal
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
See, e.g., United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., supra; Sanabria v. United States,
supra. [
Footnote 6]
United States v. Scott does not overturn these precedents;
indeed, it plainly indicates that the category of acquittals
includes "judgment[s] . . . by the court that the evidence is
insufficient to convict." 437 U.S. at
437 U. S. 91.
[
Footnote 7]
Page 476 U. S. 145
The Commonwealth argues that its appeal is nonetheless
permissible under
Justices of Boston Municipal Court v.
Lydon, 466 U. S. 294
(1984), because resumption of petitioners' bench trial following a
reversal on appeal would simply constitute "continuing jeopardy."
Brief for Respondent 87-88. But
Lydon teaches that
"[a]cquittals, unlike convictions, terminate the initial jeopardy."
466 U.S. at
466 U. S. 308.
Thus, whether the trial is to a jury or to the bench, subjecting
the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to
guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Arizona
v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203,
467 U. S.
211-212 (1984). [
Footnote 8]
When a successful postacquittal appeal by the prosecution would
lead to proceedings that violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the
appeal itself has no proper purpose. Allowing such an appeal would
frustrate the interest of the accused in having an end to the
proceedings against him. The Superior Court was correct, therefore,
in holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a postacquittal
appeal by the prosecution
Page 476 U. S. 146
not only when it might result in a second trial, but also if
reversal would translate into "
further proceedings of some
sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the
elements of the offense charged.'" Martin Linen, 430 U.S.
at 430 U. S. 570.
[Footnote 9]
We hold, therefore, that the trial judge's granting of
petitioners' demurrer was an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy
Clause, and that the Commonwealth's appeal was barred because
reversal would have led to further trial proceedings.
The judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Various misdemeanor charges were also filed against petitioners,
as well as charges relating to a previous fire in another building
that they owned. These other charges are not relevant to this
petition.
[
Footnote 2]
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1124, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.
(1985 Pamphlet), provides in relevant part:
"Challenges to Sufficiency of Evidence"
"(a) A defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain a conviction of one or more of the offenses charged by
a:"
"(1) demurrer to the evidence presented by the Commonwealth at
the close of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief;"
"
* * * *"
"(b) A demurrer to the evidence shall not constitute an
admission of any facts or inferences except for the purpose of
deciding the demurrer. If the demurrer is not sustained, the
defendant may present evidence and the case shall proceed."
[
Footnote 3]
Before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, petitioners' case was
consolidated with another case presenting the same double jeopardy
issue,
Commonwealth v. Zoller, 318 Pa.Super. 402,
465
A.2d 16 (1983).
[
Footnote 4]
For purposes of our jurisdiction, the judgment of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was final and subject to review at this
time under 28 U.S.C. ยง 1257(3).
Harris v. Washington,
404 U. S. 55
(1971). As explained in
Abney v. United States,
431 U. S. 651
(1977):
"[T]he guarantee against double jeopardy assures an individual
that, among other things, he will not be forced, with certain
exceptions, to endure the personal strain, public embarrassment,
and expense of a criminal trial more than once for the same
offense. . . . Obviously, these aspects of the guarantee's
protections would be lost if the accused were forced to 'run the
gauntlet' a second time before an appeal could be taken; even if
the accused is acquitted, or, if convicted, has his conviction
ultimately reversed on double jeopardy grounds, he has still been
forced to endure a trial that the Double Jeopardy Clause was
designed to prohibit."
Id. at
431 U. S.
661-662 (footnote omitted).
[
Footnote 5]
We of course accept the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's definition
of what the trial judge must consider in ruling on a defendant's
demurrer. But just as "the trial judge's characterization of his
own action cannot control the classification of the action [under
the Double Jeopardy Clause],"
United States v. Scott,
437 U. S. 82,
437 U. S. 96
(1978) (citation omitted), so too the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
characterization, as a matter of double jeopardy law, of an order
granting a demurrer is not binding on us.
[
Footnote 6]
See also Burks v. United States, 437 U. S.
1 (1978), where a Court of Appeals' reversal of the
defendant's conviction on the ground that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the jury verdict "unquestionably . . .
represente[d] a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of
the factual elements of the offense charged.'" Id. at 10
(quoting Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 571).
[
Footnote 7]
The status of the trial court's judgment as an acquittal is not
affected by the Commonwealth's allegation that the court "erred in
deciding what degree of recklessness was . . . required to be shown
under Pennsylvania's definition of [third-degree] murder." Tr. of
Oral Arg. 24.
"[T]he fact that 'the acquittal may result from erroneous
evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal
principles' . . . affects the accuracy of that determination, but
it does not alter its essential character."
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at
437 U. S. 98
(quoting
id. at
437 U. S. 106
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting)).
Accord, Sanabria v. United
States, 437 U. S. 54
(1978);
Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.
S. 203 (1984).
[
Footnote 8]
In
Rumsey, a trial judge, sitting as a sentencer in a
death penalty proceeding, entered an "acquittal,"
i.e., a
life sentence, based on an erroneous construction of the law
governing a particular aggravating circumstance. The Court held
that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a second sentencing hearing.
It distinguished
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.
S. 332 (1975), which holds that the prosecution may
appeal when the trial court enters judgment
n.o.v.
following a jury verdict of guilty.
Rumsey explains
that
"[n]o double jeopardy problem was presented in
Wilson,
because the appellate court, upon reviewing asserted legal errors
of the trial judge, could simply order the jury's guilty verdict
reinstated; no new factfinding would be necessary, and the
defendant therefore would not be twice placed in jeopardy."
467 U.S. at
467 U. S.
211-212.
[
Footnote 9]
The fact that the "further proceedings" standard which the
Superior Court quoted from
Martin Linen was first
articulated in
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.
S. 358,
420 U. S. 370
(1975), does not detract from its authority.
United States v.
Scott, supra, overrules
Jenkins only insofar as
Jenkins bars an appeal by the government when a defendant
successfully moves for dismissal on a ground "unrelated to factual
guilt or innocence. . . ."
Scott, supra, at
437 U. S. 99.
The issue before us in
Scott was what constitutes an
acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause; the question of the
circumstances under which an acquittal is appealable was not
presented.