Respondents were employed by petitioner as members of the
Engineering Department on board a nonself-propelled fish-processing
barge. They sued petitioner in Federal District Court, seeking to
recover overtime benefits under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA). Finding that they were seamen because they performed work
of a maritime character on navigable waters, the District Court
held that respondents were excluded from such benefits under the
provision of the FLSA that excludes "any employee employed as a
seaman." The Court of Appeals reversed. Reviewing under a "
de
novo" standard, the Court of Appeals found that respondents'
"dominant employment" was "industrial maintenance," and that the
"maritime work" that they performed took only a small portion of
their time, and therefore concluded that respondents were not
seamen.
Held: The Court of Appeals erred in engaging in such
factfinding. The facts necessary to a proper determination of the
legal question whether an exemption to the FLSA applies in a
particular case should be reviewed by the courts of appeals
pursuant to the "clearly erroneous" standard of review set forth in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), like the facts in other
civil bench-tried litigation in federal courts.
Walling v.
General Industries Co., 330 U. S. 545.
Here, if the Court of Appeals believed that the District Court's
factual findings were "clearly erroneous" within the meaning of
Rule 52(a), it could have set them aside, whereas, if it believed
that the findings were unassailable, but that the proper rule of
law was not correctly applied to those findings, it could have
reversed the District Court's judgment on that ground. But it
should not simply have made factual findings of its own. Pp.
475 U. S.
712-715.
774 F.2d 349, vacated and remanded.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and
O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post,
Page 475 U. S. 710
p.
475 U. S.
715.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents sued their employer, petitioner Icicle Seafoods,
Inc., to recover overtime benefits to which they thought they were
entitled under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §
207(a)(1). After a 2-day trial, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington held that respondents were
excluded from the overtime benefits of the FLSA by 29 U.S.C. §
213(b)(6), which excludes "any employee employed as a seaman."
Reviewing this issue under a "
de novo" standard of review,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of
the District Court, holding that respondents were not "seamen," but
instead were industrial maintenance employees on a barge that
processed fish caught by a fishing fleet in the coastal waters of
the Pacific Northwest. 774 F.2d 349 (1985). We granted certiorari
to consider whether the Court of Appeals applied the appropriate
standard of review in passing on the District Court's judgment. 474
U.S. 900 (1985).
The District Court made the following pertinent findings of fact
related to whether respondents were "seamen" within the meaning of
§ 213(b)(6):
"2. Defendant Icicle Seafoods owned and operated a seafood
processing vessel named the ARCTIC STAR. Each of the Plaintiffs
worked for Defendant on board the ARCTIC STAR as members of the
Engineering Department. . . . The ARCTIC STAR is a
nonself-propelled barge which is moved from place to place with the
aid of a tow boat, and is located throughout the waters of
Page 475 U. S. 711
Alaska or Washington, depending on the season and type of
seafood being caught and processed."
"
* * * *"
"7. None of the Plaintiffs were members of the Processing Crew
on board the ARCTIC STAR. The Processing Crew performed all the
hands-on processing or packing of the fish or shellfish. Plaintiffs
were members of the Engineering Department on board the ARCTIC
STAR, considered themselves very distinct from the Processing Crew,
and did not perform any hands-on processing or packing of fish or
shellfish. As members of the Engineering Department, Plaintiffs
were responsible for maintaining all systems for support and
continuous operation of the vessel while at moorage or underway.
Although working in shifts, the Plaintiffs had to be available on
call 24 hours a day to perform work at a moment's notice if
necessary to keep the vessel operating. Even though the plaintiffs
were not licensed by the Coast Guard as engineers or members of an
engineering department, each of the Plaintiffs performed tasks
which conformed to those expected of Coast Guard licensed
personnel. The very description of the Plaintiff's work is that of
a marine engineer or member of an engineering department. In
summary, each of the Plaintiffs were members of the crew of the
ARCTIC STAR and performed work which was maritime in character and
rendered while the ARCTIC STAR was in navigable waters. Each of the
Plaintiff's employment was that of a seaman."
App. A-3 to Pet. for Cert. 2-3, 5-6. The Court of Appeals read
the District Court's opinion as holding that respondents were
"seamen" under § 213(b)(6) because the evidence showed that they
"performed work of a maritime character on navigable waters." 774
F.2d at 351.
In reviewing this conclusion, the Court of Appeals initially
pointed out that it and other Courts of Appeals have applied
Page 475 U. S. 712
conflicting standards of review to claims of exclusion from the
FLSA, and attributed these different approaches to three cases
decided by this Court within a few months of each other during its
October, 1946, Term.
Ibid. The Court of Appeals recognized
that, in
Walling v. General Industries Co., 330 U.
S. 545 (1947), this Court held that whether an employee
falls within the exclusion for "executives" under 29 U.S.C. §
213(a)(1) is a factual question subject to the "clearly erroneous"
standard of review set forth in Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 774 F.2d at 352. But it thought that, in
Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.
S. 649 (1947), and
Rutherford Ford Corp. v.
McComb, 331 U. S. 722
(1947), this Court appeared to apply a "
de novo" standard
of review to whether an employee falls within an exclusion for
employees covered by the Motor Carrier Act and to whether someone
is an independent contractor, rather than an employee. 774 F.2d at
352. The Court of Appeals reconciled its reading of these cases on
grounds that the regulations implementing the provisions at issue
in
Levinson and
Rutherford were "illustrative and
general," whereas those in
Walling were "specific," and
that the trial court's findings in
Walling were based on
the conflicting testimony of witnesses.
Ibid.
We think that neither
Levinson nor
Rutherford
should be read to depart from the rule laid down in
Walling. Levinson involved a case that was
brought to this Court from the Supreme Court of Illinois, and that
court had accepted the factual findings made by the Illinois
Appellate Court. But state courts are not required to apply Rule
52(a) -- a rule of
federal civil procedure -- to their own
appellate system for reviewing factual determinations of trial
courts.
Rutherford came up through the federal court
system, and this Court held that the District Court erroneously
based its conclusion that particular employees were independent
contractors on "isolated factors" in the employee's relationship
with the employer. 331 U.S. at
331 U. S.
729-730. We set forth a lengthy
Page 475 U. S. 713
summary of the facts without indicating the source for such a
summary; but a fair reading of the opinion indicates that we were
focusing on a legal question, and not on the allocation of
factfinding responsibilities between district courts and courts of
appeals. We therefore reaffirm our holding in
Walling that
the facts necessary to a proper determination of the legal question
whether an exemption to the FLSA applies in a particular case
should be reviewed by the courts of appeals pursuant to Rule 52(a),
like the facts in other civil bench-tried litigation in federal
courts.
The Court of Appeals in this case proposed to "apply a
de
novo standard of review to the application of the exemption to
the facts and [to] review the facts under a clearly erroneous
standard." 774 F.2d at 352, citing
United States v.
McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (CA9) (en banc),
cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984). But nowhere in its opinion did
the court ever mention any of the factual findings of the District
Court, much less discuss or analyze them. The Court of Appeals
seems to have believed that the District Court applied the wrong
legal standard for what constitutes a "seaman" under § 213(b)(6).
Whereas the District Court concluded that respondents were seamen
because they performed work of a maritime character on navigable
waters,
see App. A-3 to Pet. for Cert. 6, the Court of
Appeals held that, under the pertinent regulations, the critical
factor for determining whether an employee on a vessel is a seaman
is whether his "duties primarily aid navigation of the vessel." 774
F.2d at 353;
see also 29 CFR §§ 783.31, 783.33, 783.36
(1985). The Court of Appeals reviewed the record independently, and
found that the "dominant employment" of the respondents was
"industrial maintenance," and that the "maritime work" that the
respondents performed took but a small portion of their work time.
774 F.2d at 353. It therefore concluded that respondents were
industrial maintenance employees, and not seamen.
Ibid.
Page 475 U. S. 714
We think that the Court of Appeals was mistaken to engage in
such factfinding. The District Court found that "each of the
[respondents] . . . performed work which was maritime in character
and rendered while the ARCTIC STAR was in navigable waters." App.
A-3 to Pet. for Cert. 6. But it made no finding that the "maritime
work" was "incidental and occasional, taking but a small portion of
the work time." 774 F.2d at 353. The question of how the
respondents spent their working time on board the Arctic Star is a
question of fact. The question whether their particular activities
excluded them from the overtime benefits of the FLSA is a question
of law which both parties concede is governed by the pertinent
regulations promulgated by the Wage and Hour Administrator.
See 29 CFR pt. 783 (1985). If the Court of Appeals
believed that the District Court had failed to make findings of
fact essential to a proper resolution of the legal question, it
should have remanded to the District Court to make those findings.
If it was of the view that the findings of the District Court were
"clearly erroneous" within the meaning of Rule 52(a), it could have
set them aside on that basis. If it believed that the District
Court's factual findings were unassailable, but that the proper
rule of law was misapplied to those findings, it could have
reversed the District Court's judgment. But it should not simply
have made factual findings on its own. As we stated in
Anderson
v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564,
470 U. S.
574-575 (1985):
"The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is
not limited to the superiority of the trial judge's position to
make determinations of credibility. The trial judge's major role is
the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that
role comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge's efforts in
the court of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly
to the accuracy of fact determination, at a huge cost in diversion
of judicial resources. "
Page 475 U. S. 715
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly vacated, and
the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
The Court chastises the Court of Appeals for supplying a gap in
the District Court's factual findings with uncontested facts,
rather than "remand[ing] to the District Court to make those
findings."
Ante at
475 U. S. 714.
The criticism is unwarranted.
The issue in this case is whether respondents, who are
maintenance employees on a nonself-propelled seafood processing
barge, qualify as seamen under the Fair Labor Standards Act and are
therefore not entitled to overtime benefits under that Act.
See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The only dispute below was with
regard to the proper definition of "seaman" -- an issue on which
certiorari was denied and one on which the Court ventures no
opinion. The District Court "found that the [respondents] performed
work of a maritime character on navigable waters" and "concluded
that the [respondents] were
seamen' and exempt from the
overtime provision of the FLSA under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6)." 774
F.2d 349, 351 (CA9 1985). The Court of Appeals reversed because
"[o]ne does not become a `seaman' under the FLSA merely by
performing services aboard a vessel on navigable waters."
Id. at 353. Under a proper understanding of the statute,
it held that respondents were not seamen:
"These facts are undisputed. . . . . "
"
* * * *"
"The record indicates, and Icicle's counsel conceded at oral
argument, that the [processing barge] remained anchored most of the
time. During these periods, the [respondents] primarily monitored,
maintained and repaired the processing machinery and electric power
generators. Although some of their work may have been of a maritime
character, the dominant employment was
Page 475 U. S. 716
industrial maintenance. The maritime work was incidental and
occasional, taking but a small portion of the work time."
"We conclude that these employees, while working on a barge
anchored in navigable waters, are principally employed not as
exempt seamen, but as industrial maintenance employees."
Id. at 352-353.
The Court's only quarrel with the Court of Appeals is that it
"made factual findings on its own" on the issue whether "the
maritime work' was `incidental and occasional, taking but a
small portion of the work time.'" Ante at 475 U. S. 714.
Apparently, the Court would have preferred to see the case
"remanded to the District Court," ibid., for the purely
ministerial act of entry of formal findings on "these . . .
undisputed" facts. The "rationale for deference to the original
finder of fact," Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.
S. 564, 470 U. S. 574
(1985), embodied in Rule 52(a) does not compel the entirely
unrelated proposition that only district courts may make such
findings. Appellate courts in general and this Court in particular
have, after correcting an erroneous interpretation of law, applied
the proper legal standard to undisputed facts of record -- whether
or not such facts have been memorialized in formal findings by "the
original finder of fact." This practice not only promotes "the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of civil actions which
Rule 52(a) is intended to secure, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 1, but it also
allows appellate courts to give guidance to trial courts by
illustrating the proper application of a new legal standard in a
particular case.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.