Petitioner recipients of benefits under the federal Aid to
Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program brought class
actions in Federal District Court against respondent Director of
the Michigan Department of Social Services. They claimed that
respondent's policies of prohibiting the deduction of child care
costs and requiring the inclusion of stepparents' income for
purposes of calculating earned income, thereby determining
eligibility for and the amount of AFDC benefits, violated
applicable federal law. Petitioners sought an injunction, a
declaratory judgment, and "notice relief." While the actions were
pending, Congress amended the relevant federal statute to expressly
require States to deduct child care expenses and to include
stepparents' income. Granting respondent's motions to dismiss in
each case, the District Court held that the changes in federal law
rendered moot the claims for prospective relief, that the remaining
claims for declaratory and "notice relief " related solely to past
violations of federal law, and that such retrospective relief was
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed in
a consolidated appeal.
Held:
1. Petitioners are not entitled to "notice relief." Since there
is no continuing violation of federal law to enjoin, and therefore
no valid injunction to which notice could attach, the notice cannot
be justified as a mere case-management device that is ancillary to
a judgment awarding valid prospective relief.
Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U. S. 332,
distinguished. Absent these conditions, the Eleventh Amendment
limitation on the Art. III power of federal courts prevents them
from ordering "notice relief" against States, because it is not the
type of remedy designed to prevent ongoing violations of supreme
federal law. Pp.
474 U. S.
68-72.
2. Nor are petitioners entitled to a declaratory judgment that
respondent violated federal law in the past. Where there is no
claimed continuing violation of federal law or any threat of future
violation, a declaratory judgment is inappropriate, because its
purpose could only be to provide a federal judgment on the issue of
liability with the hope that it would be
res judicata in
state court proceedings, leaving to the state courts only a form of
accounting proceeding whereby damages or restitution
Page 474 U. S. 65
would be computed. This would be an inappropriate exercise of
federal judicial power, because it would have much the same effect
as an award of damages or restitution, which kinds of relief
against States are prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Pp.
474 U. S.
72-73.
742 F.2d 277, affirmed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL,
BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined,
post, p.
474 U. S. 74.
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
STEVENS, JJ., joined,
post, p.
474 U. S. 79.
BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined,
post, p.
474 U. S.
81.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners brought two separate class actions in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against
respondent Director of the Michigan Department of Social Services,
claiming that respondent's calculations of benefits under the
federal Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program
violated certain provisions of that federal law. Before a final
determination on the merits of either case could be made, Congress
amended the relevant statutory provisions. It is undisputed that
respondent's calculations thereafter have conformed to federal law.
Notwithstanding this fact, petitioners claim that they were
entitled to have the District Court award them both "notice relief"
and a declaration that respondent's prior conduct violated federal
law. The District Court denied petitioners both forms of relief,
and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. We now
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the
Eleventh Amendment
Page 474 U. S. 66
to the United States Constitution and applicable principles
governing the issuance of declaratory judgments forbid the award of
either form of relief.
The two class actions involved in this case were brought on
behalf of recipients of benefits disbursed under the AFDC program.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615. The AFDC program uses a person's
earned income in determining eligibility for, and the amount of,
benefits.
See § 602. The complaints alleged that certain
of respondent's policies and regulations violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983
by inflating their respective class members' earned income, and
thereby causing a reduction or termination of AFDC benefits
contrary to the applicable federal law.
One putative class challenged respondent's policy of prohibiting
the deduction of child care costs in the calculation of earned
income. While the case was pending in the District Court, Congress
changed the relevant provisions of the AFDC program to expressly
require participating States to deduct child care expenses up to a
specified amount. Respondent thereafter brought state policy into
compliance with this amendment and began deducting child care
expenses in the calculation of earned income. There is no claim
that respondent's current child care deduction policy violates
federal law.
The other putative class challenged respondent's policy of
automatically including stepparents' income in the calculation of
earned income. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction
preventing respondent from enforcing its automatic inclusion
policy. But again, while the matter was pending on the merits,
Congress amended the relevant section of the AFDC program to
expressly require States to include stepparent income in the
calculation of earned income. The parties thereafter stipulated
that the District Court should terminate its preliminary injunction
as of the effective date of the amendment. Here too, there is no
claim that respondent has not complied with federal law since that
time.
Page 474 U. S. 67
The District Court granted respondent's motions to dismiss in
each case. It held in each that the changes in federal law rendered
moot the claims for prospective relief, and that the remaining
claims for declaratory and notice relief related solely to past
violations of federal law. Such retrospective relief, the court
determined, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a consolidated appeal.
Banas v. Dempsey, 742 F.2d 277 (1984). It agreed that the
changes in federal law rendered moot the claims for prospective
relief.
Id. at 281-283. It also agreed that, because the
sought-after notice and declaratory relief was retrospective in
nature, the relief was barred by
Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U. S. 651
(1974). 742 F.2d at 286-288. It reasoned that, when there is no
prospective relief to which notice can be ancillary, even notice of
the sort approved in
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.
S. 332 (1979), cannot escape the Eleventh Amendment bar.
742 F.2d at 287-288. Declaratory relief is similarly barred under
such circumstances, it explained, because such relief could relate
solely to past violations of federal law.
Id. at 288.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits over
whether federal courts may order the giving of notice of the sort
approved in
Quern v. Jordan, supra, or issue a declaratory
judgment that state officials violated federal law in the past when
there is no ongoing violation of federal law. The decision by the
Court of Appeals in this case agrees with the result in
Colbeth
v. Wilson, 554 F.
Supp. 539 (Vt.1982),
aff'd, 707 F.2d 57 (CA2 1983)
(per curiam), but it conflicts with the decisions in
Appleyard
v. Wallace, 754 F.2d 955, 959-963 (CA11 1985);
Randall v.
Lukhard, 729 F.2d 966 (CA4) (en banc),
cert. denied,
469 U.S. 872 (1984);
Beltran v. Myers, 701 F.2d 91, 94
(CA9) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1134 (1983);
and
Silva v. Vowell, 621 F.2d 640, 650-654 (CA5 1980),
which all allowed notice relief even though changes in state policy
or federal law rendered moot
Page 474 U. S. 68
any claim for injunctive relief stopping ongoing violations of
federal law. We now affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The Eleventh Amendment confirms that "the fundamental principle
of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in
Art. III."
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U. S. 89,
465 U. S. 98
(1984). Because of the Eleventh Amendment, States may not be sued
in federal court unless they consent to it in unequivocal terms or
unless Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of power,
unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate the immunity.
Id. at
465 U. S. 99.
The landmark case of
Ex parte Young, 209 U.
S. 123 (1908), created an exception to this general
principle by asserting that a suit challenging the
constitutionality of a state official's action in enforcing state
law is not one against the State.
Id. at
209 U. S.
159-160. The theory of
Young was that an
unconstitutional statute is void,
id. at
209 U. S. 159,
and therefore does not "impart to [the official] any immunity from
responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."
Id. at
209 U. S. 160.
Young also held that the Eleventh Amendment does not
prevent federal courts from granting prospective injunctive relief
to prevent a continuing violation of federal law.
Id. at
209 U. S.
155-156,
209 U. S. 159.
We have refused to extend the reasoning of
Young, however,
to claims for retrospective relief.
See Pennhurst, supra,
at
465 U. S.
102-103;
Quern v. Jordan, supra, at
440 U. S. 337;
Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at
415 U. S.
668.
Both prospective and retrospective relief implicate Eleventh
Amendment concerns, but the availability of prospective relief of
the sort awarded in
Ex parte Young gives life to the
Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a continuing violation
of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in
assuring the supremacy of that law.
See Pennhurst, supra,
at
465 U. S. 102.
See also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.
S. 267 (1977). But compensatory or deterrence interests
are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh
Amendment. Petitioners concede that any claim they might
Page 474 U. S. 69
have had for the specific type of injunctive relief approved in
Ex parte Young was rendered moot by the amendments to the
AFDC program. They nevertheless seek "notice relief " of the type
approved in
Quern v. Jordan, arguing that notice is an
independent form of prospective relief protected against the
Eleventh Amendment bar by
Ex parte Young. In taking this
position, we think petitioners misconceive our Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence and our decision in
Quern.
Quern was the last chapter in the litigation that
initially gave rise to
Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The
plaintiffs in that litigation challenged a State's administration
of the federal-state program for Aid to the Aged, Blind, or
Disabled (AABD). The District Court issued a declaratory judgment
that current state regulations governing the administration of the
program violated federal regulations then in effect. [
Footnote 1] It therefore permanently enjoined
the state officials from continuing to violate federal law.
Although the language of the declaratory judgment was no broader
than necessary to complement the injunction against the current
violation of federal law, it implied that the defendants had
violated federal law in the past. The District Court therefore
issued a second injunction ordering the defendants to release and
remit all AABD benefits that they had wrongfully withheld on
account of their past violations of federal law. The Court of
Appeals affirmed,
Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (CA7
1973), but we reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred
the injunction ordering retroactive benefits because it was
effectively an award of money damages for past
Page 474 U. S. 70
violations of federal law.
Edelman v. Jordan, 451 U.S.
at
451 U. S.
666-669.
On remand, the District Court ordered the defendants to send
notice to the plaintiff class informing individual class members
that they were wrongfully denied benefits in a particular amount,
together with a returnable form for filing claims with the
appropriate state agency. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the District Court's proposed notice violated the Eleventh
Amendment because it would effectively result in a federal
adjudication of state liability for past violations of federal law.
Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F.2d 873, 875 (CA7 1977) (en banc).
At the same time, the Court of Appeals determined that the Eleventh
Amendment would not bar an order requiring state officials to
send
"a mere explanatory notice to applicants advising them that
there is a state administrative procedure available if they desire
to have the state determine whether or not they may be eligible for
past benefits."
Ibid.
We affirmed in
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.
S. 332 (1979), holding that, although
Edelman v.
Jordan, supra, retained continuing vitality after
Monell
v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.
S. 658 (1978),
see 440 U.S. at
440 U. S.
338-345, the specific notice order approved by the Court
of Appeals did not violate the Eleventh Amendment.
Id. at
440 U. S.
346-349. We explained that the appellate court's
particular notice order fell "on the
Ex parte Young side
of the Eleventh Amendment line rather than on the
Edelman
side."
Id. at
440 U. S. 347.
We reasoned that,
"unlike [the notice] ordered by the District Court, [this notice
was] more properly viewed as ancillary to the prospective relief
already ordered by the court,"
id. at
440 U. S. 349,
and it did no more than
"simply infor[m] class members that their federal suit is at an
end, that the federal court can provide them with no further
relief, and that there are existing state administrative procedures
which they may wish to pursue."
Ibid. We also stressed that the state defendants had
not objected to the expense of providing
Page 474 U. S. 71
such notice, state agencies rather than federal courts would be
the final arbiters of whether retroactive payments would be
ordered, and the notice would not automatically lead to any
particular action.
Id. at
440 U. S.
347-348.
Our review of the long, drawn-out
Jordan litigation
convinces us that neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court
conceived of the requested notice allowed in that case to be an
independent form of relief. We simply held that the specific order
fell within the
Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh
Amendment principle of sovereign immunity because it was ancillary
to a valid injunction previously granted and was sufficiently
narrow to retain its character as a mere case-management device.
The notice in
Quern v. Jordan did nothing other than
inform a diverse and partially victorious class concerning the
extent of the judgment in its favor,
cf. Fed.Rule
Civ.Proc. 23(d)(2), and that the federal courts could do no more
for them. There was no suggestion that the notice itself would bind
state officials in any way, or that such notice would be routinely
available as a form of relief in other cases. Because "notice
relief " is not the type of remedy designed to prevent ongoing
violations of federal law, the Eleventh Amendment limitation on the
Art. III power of federal courts prevents them from ordering it as
an independent form of relief.
Measured by the standards of
Quern, however, a request
for a limited notice order will escape the Eleventh Amendment bar
if the notice is ancillary to the grant of some other appropriate
relief that can be "noticed." Because there is no continuing
violation of federal law to enjoin in this case, an injunction is
not available. Therefore, notice cannot be justified as a mere
case-management device that is ancillary to a judgment awarding
valid prospective relief. Petitioners argue, however, that they are
entitled to a declaratory judgment that respondent violated federal
law in the past. Only if petitioners are correct in this assertion
can they properly
Page 474 U. S. 72
claim a right to "notice" of a judgment under the principles of
Quern.
The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, permits
a federal court to declare the rights of a party whether or not
further relief is or could be sought, and we have held that under
this Act declaratory relief may be available even though an
injunction is not.
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.
S. 452,
415 U. S. 462
(1974). But we have also held that the declaratory judgment statute
"is an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts,
rather than an absolute right upon the litigant."
Public
Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.
S. 237,
344 U. S. 241
(1952). The propriety of issuing a declaratory judgment may depend
upon equitable considerations,
see Samuels v. Mackell,
401 U. S. 66,
401 U. S. 73
(1971), and is also "informed by the teachings and experience
concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial power."
Wycoff, supra, at
344 U. S. 243;
cf. Younger v. Harris,
401 U. S. 37,
401 U. S. 44-45
(1971).
In applying these principles, we have held that a declaratory
judgment is not available in a number of instances. In
Great
Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293
(1943), we held that a declaratory judgment was not available to
obtain a determination of the constitutionality of a state tax even
though the relevant federal statute prohibited federal courts only
from issuing injunctions against the collection of such taxes.
Id. at
319 U. S. 299.
We held in
Samuels v. Mackell, supra, that a declaratory
judgment declaring a state criminal statute unconstitutional was
unavailable where it would have much the same effect as an
injunction prohibiting enforcement of the statute, and the latter
was barred by traditional principles of equity, comity, and
federalism.
Id. at
401 U. S. 69-73.
In
Wycoff, we held that it was inappropriate to issue a
declaratory judgment deciding whether the plaintiff's business was
interstate commerce, and therefore potentially immune from state
regulation. 344 U.S. at
344 U. S. 244,
344 U. S.
247-249. We reasoned that, if the federal judgment were
res judicata in subsequent
Page 474 U. S. 73
state proceedings, then the federal court will have lifted the
case out of the state court before the state agency or court can
hear it.
Id. at
344 U. S. 247.
On the other hand, if the federal judgment would not have such an
effect, then it would "serv[e] no useful purpose as a final
determination of rights."
Ibid.
We think that these cases demonstrate the impropriety of the
issuance of a declaratory judgment in this case. There is no
claimed continuing violation of federal law, and therefore no
occasion to issue an injunction. Nor can there be any threat of
state officials violating the repealed law in the future.
Cf.
Steffel v. Thompson, supra, at
415 U. S. 454.
There is a dispute about the lawfulness of respondent's past
actions, but the Eleventh Amendment would prohibit the award of
money damages or restitution if that dispute were resolved in favor
of petitioners. We think that the award of a declaratory judgment
in this situation would be useful in resolving the dispute over the
past lawfulness of respondent's action only if it might be offered
in state court proceedings as
res judicata on the issue of
liability, leaving to the state courts only a form of accounting
proceeding whereby damages or restitution would be computed. But
the issuance of a declaratory judgment in these circumstances would
have much the same effect as a full-fledged award of damages or
restitution by the federal court, the latter kinds of relief being
of course prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. The teachings of
Huffman, Samuels, and
Wycoff are that a
declaratory judgment is not available when the result would be a
partial "end run" around our decision in
Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651
(1974). [
Footnote 2]
Page 474 U. S. 74
JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent contends that, because the injunction
and declaratory judgment in
Quern implied past violations
of federal law, declaratory judgments expressly adjudicating the
question of past violations are routinely available. We think he is
mistaken. The District Court's injunction and declaratory judgment
against continuing and future violations of federal law in
Quern implied that similar violations had occurred in the
past because neither state nor federal policy had varied through
the time of judgment. Here, by contrast, there are no present
violations under the amended statute, and even if there were, an
injunction against them would not imply that past practice violated
the repealed federal law. Thus, a declaratory judgment that
respondent violated federal law in the past would have to stand on
its own feet as an appropriate exercise of federal jurisdiction in
this case. This it cannot do for the reasons we have previously
stated.
We hold that the District Court was correct in concluding that
neither the "notice" proposed by petitioners nor a declaratory
judgment should have issued in a case of this type. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is therefore
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
The declaratory judgment was embodied in paragraph 4 of the
District Court's judgment, which stated:
"Illinois Categorical Assistance Manual, Section 4004, and
Subsections thereunder, as applied to applicants for AABD are
invalid insofar as they
are inconsistent with the
requirements of [federal law as construed in] paragraphs 1 and
2."
Jordan v. Weaver, No. 71 C 70, p. 3 (ND Ill., Mar. 15,
1972) (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 2]
If, of course, petitioners would make no claim that the federal
declaratory judgment was
res judicata in later commenced
state proceedings, the declaratory judgment would serve no purpose
whatever in resolving the remaining dispute between the parties,
and is unavailable for that reason.
Wycoff, 344 U.S. at
344 U. S.
247.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN,
and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
Last Term, in my dissent in
Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234,
473 U. S. 257
(1985), I explained at length my view that the Court's Eleventh
Amendment doctrine "lacks a textual anchor [in the Constitution], a
firm historical foundation, or a clear rationale." Today's decision
demonstrates that the absence of a stable analytical structure
underlying the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence produces
inconsistent decisions.
In
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332
(1979), the State of Illinois contended that the notice relief
ordered by the Court of Appeals, which was identical in all
significant respects to
Page 474 U. S. 75
that requested in the instant case, [
Footnote 2/1] offended the Eleventh Amendment
because
"giving the proposed notice [would] lead inexorably to the
payment of state funds for retroactive benefits, and therefore it,
in effect, amounts to a monetary award."
Id. at
440 U. S. 347.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, writing for the Court, rejected that
argument:
"[T]he chain of causation which petitioner seeks to establish is
by no means unbroken; it contains numerous missing links, which can
be supplied, if at all, only by the State and members of the
plaintiff class and not by a federal court. The notice approved by
the Court of Appeals simply apprises plaintiff class members of the
existence of whatever administrative procedures may already be
available under state law by which they may receive a determination
of eligibility for past benefits. . . . The mere sending of that
notice does not trigger the state administrative machinery. Whether
a recipient of notice decides to take advantage of those available
state procedures is left completely to the discretion of that
particular class member; the federal court plays no role in that
decision. And whether or not the class member will receive
retroactive benefits rests entirely with the
Page 474 U. S. 76
State, its agencies, courts, and legislature, not with the
federal court."
Id. at
440 U. S.
347-348.
In the present case, the Court turns around and accepts the
argument made by the State of Illinois in
Quern with
respect to Green's request for declaratory relief. JUSTICE
REHNQUIST states that declaratory relief is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment because
"the award of a declaratory judgment in this situation would be
useful in resolving the dispute over the past lawfulness of
respondent's action only if it might be offered in state court
proceedings as
res judicata on the issue of liability,
leaving to the state courts only a form of accounting proceeding
whereby damages or restitution would be computed. But the issuance
of a declaratory judgment in these circumstances would have much
the same effect as a full-fledged award of damages or restitution
by the federal court, the latter kinds of relief being. . .
prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment."
Ante at
474 U. S.
73.
What the Court ignores is that the declaration by the District
Court in the
Quern litigation that Illinois officials had
violated federal law, combined with the notice relief we
sanctioned, would have yielded the same result. [
Footnote 2/2] The Court fails to explain adequately
why declaratory relief should be analyzed differently than notice
relief was in
Quern, since use of the declaratory judgment
in the State's courts is also left completely to the discretion of
individual notice recipients and the award of retroactive benefits
"rests entirely with the State, its agencies, courts, and
legislature, not with the federal court."
Quern, supra, at
440 U. S.
348.
Page 474 U. S. 77
By way of explication, the Court retreats to the position that
federal courts may grant relief prospectively, that is, against
ongoing and future violations of federal law, but not
retroactively, that is, against past violations of federal law.
Basically what the Court is doing, as it admits in this case, is
balancing the Eleventh Amendment and the Supremacy Clause.
Ante at
474 U. S. 68. If
relief is sought against continuing violations, the Court finds
that the Supremacy Clause outweighs the Eleventh Amendment; but if
relief is requested against past violations, the Court determines
that the Eleventh Amendment outweighs the Supremacy Clause. The
Court cites no constitutional authority for this balancing test,
and has not offered, and I suspect cannot offer, a satisfactory
analytical foundation for it.
Furthermore, I strenuously disagree with the Court's suggestion
that the balance it has struck sufficiently protects the supremacy
of federal law. It may be true that the availability of prospective
relief of the sort awarded in
Ex parte Young, 209 U.
S. 123 (1908), gives, as the Court puts it, some "life"
to the Supremacy Clause.
Ante at
474 U. S. 68.
That this rule saves the Clause from being completely moribund does
not, however, alter the reality that it is insufficient to ensure
that federal law is paramount. From this day forward, at least with
regard to welfare programs, States may refuse to follow federal law
with impunity, secure in the knowledge that all they need do to
immunize themselves from accountability in federal courts is to
conform their policies to federal law on the eve of judgment in a
suit brought to secure "prospective" injunctive relief. During the
period of noncompliance, States save money by not paying benefits
according to the criteria established by federal law, [
Footnote 2/3] while needy individuals
designated
Page 474 U. S. 78
by Congress as the beneficiaries of welfare programs are cheated
of their federal rights. Once again, the Court's doctrine
"require[s] the federal courts to protect States that violate
federal law from the legal consequences of their conduct."
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at
473 U. S. 258.
Surely the Supremacy Clause requires a different result.
The foregoing reveals the fundamental incoherence of the Court's
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Before the Court can develop a
coherent Eleventh Amendment doctrine, I believe that it must
reassess a long line of our precedents, beginning with
Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890),
and culminating in today's decision, that have perpetuated an
erroneous interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. As I
demonstrated in
Atascadero, supra, the Court's
constitutional doctrine of the sovereign immunity of States rests
on a mistaken historical premise. Because I treated the subject
exhaustively in that case, I will only restate my conclusions here.
Recent scholarship indicates that the Framers never intended to
constitutionalize the doctrine of state sovereign immunity;
consequently the Eleventh Amendment was not an effort to
reestablish, after
Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), a limitation on
federal judicial power contained in Article III. Nor, given the
limited terms and context in which the Eleventh Amendment was
drafted, could the Amendment's narrow and technical language be
understood to have instituted a broad new limitation on the federal
judicial power in cases "arising under" federal law whenever an
individual attempts to sue a State.
Atascadero, 473 U.S.
at
473 U. S.
258-259. Rather, as the historical records and the
language of the Constitution reveal, the Amendment was intended
simply to remove federal court jurisdiction over suits against a
State where the basis for jurisdiction was that the plaintiff was a
citizen of another State or an alien -- suits which result in the
abrogation of the state law of sovereign immunity in state law
causes of action.
Id. at
473 U. S.
259-280.
Page 474 U. S. 79
Because the disputes in the instant case are between citizens
and their own State and because a federal question is the source of
federal court jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment, properly
construed, is no bar to petitioners' suits.
I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Green asked the District Court to order that notices be sent out
to other AFDC recipients advising them of the outcome of the
litigation,
i.e., of the declaratory judgment and telling
them that state administrative proceedings might be available to
them to obtain retroactive benefits. App. 132. Similarly, the
notice approved in
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. at
440 U. S.
349,
"inform[ed] class members that their federal suit [was] at an
end, that the federal court [could] provide them with no further
relief, and that there [were] existing state administrative
procedures which they may wish to pursue."
The class members were "
given no more . . . than what they
would have gathered by sitting in the courtroom.'" Ibid.,
quoting Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F.2d 873, 877-878 (CA7
1977). And, of course, what class members would have gathered by
sitting in the courtroom was the substantive outcome of the
litigation -- a declaration that Illinois officials had violated
federal law.
[
Footnote 2/2]
It is not enough to distinguish the cases to observe that the
notice relief in
Quern was "ancillary" to a prospective
injunction because the "prospective" injunction had been moot for
three years before the Court of Appeals fashioned the notice relief
and for five years before this Court approved it -- Congress
abolished the federal program at issue in
Quern in
1974.
[
Footnote 2/3]
AFDC is a matching benefits program. States pay up to 50 percent
of their benefit payments, the Federal Government pays the
remainder. House Committee on Ways and Means, Background Material
and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on
Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 292 (Comm. Print 1984).
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE STEVENS
join, dissenting.
I concur in JUSTICE BRENNAN's and JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissents. I
contribute to this proliferation of opinions only to add a few
words as to why, even under the view of the Eleventh Amendment
accepted by the majority in
Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234
(1985), the majority reaches an incorrect result in this case.
I
JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion cogently explains how the decision of
the majority today repudiates
Quern v. Jordan,
440 U. S. 332
(1979). The Court in that case did not approve notice relief as a
"mere case-management device,"
ante at
474 U. S. 71,
nor does the majority suggest how informing class members of state
administrative procedures serves a case-management function in
federal court litigation. Rather, the
Quern Court,
explicitly posing the question whether
"the modified notice contemplated by the Seventh Circuit
constitute[s] permissible prospective relief or a 'retroactive
award' which requires the payment of funds from the state
treasury,"
concluded that "this relief falls on the
Ex parte Young
side of the Eleventh Amendment line, rather than on the
Edelman side."
Quern, supra, at
440 U. S.
346-347.
II
In abandoning the result it reached six years ago, the majority
misapplies its own Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. The majority
states that there are two kinds of remedies that can be sought
against a state officer: prospective relief "designed to end a
continuing violation of federal law,"
Page 474 U. S. 80
and retrospective relief serving mere "compensatory or
deterrence interests."
Ante at
474 U. S. 68.
Only in the former class of relief, it concludes, do the federal
interests involved outweigh the Eleventh Amendment interests
implicated by a suit against a state officer in his official
capacity.
* "Prospective" and
"retrospective" labels, however, should be irrelevant to analysis
of this case. The notice relief at issue here imposes no
significant costs on the State, creates no direct liabilities
against the State, and respects the institutions of state
government.
See Quern, supra, at
440 U. S.
347-348. This Court has never held that the Eleventh
Amendment poses any bar to such relief. Indeed, notice of the
availability of possible relief through existing state
administrative remedies, where the state agency and state courts
would be the sole arbiters of what relief would be granted, assists
in the vindication of state law by informing class members that
they may have causes of action under that law. In the Eleventh
Amendment balance set up by the majority opinion, it is thus hard
to see what weight, if any, exists on the State's side of the
scale, and why that weight should overcome the interest in
vindicating federal law.
Page 474 U. S. 81
I would hold that whether the Eleventh Amendment was intended
simply to provide that a State cannot be sued in federal court
where the basis of jurisdiction is that the plaintiff is a citizen
of another State or an alien (as I believe), or was intended to
constitutionalize a much broader principle of state sovereign
immunity (as the majority believes), there is simply nothing
offensive to that Amendment in an order that the State notify class
members of the possibility that they may be entitled to relief
through the state administrative process. Because that order
neither imposes significant costs on the State nor creates any
direct liabilities against it, the
Quern Court properly
placed it "on the
Ex parte Young side of the Eleventh
Amendment line." 440 U.S. at
440 U. S.
347.
* The distinction is hardly so neat as the majority implies. The
majority cites
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.
S. 267 (1977), as exemplifying permissible injunctive
relief.
Ante at
474 U. S. 68.
That case involved a continuing federal duty to remedy the effects
of past
de jure segregation; the Court upheld against
Eleventh Amendment attack an order that state officials pay costs
attributable to a program
"designed . . . to restore the schoolchildren of Detroit to the
position they would have enjoyed absent constitutional violations
by state and local officials,"
433 U.S. at
433 U. S. 281,
characterizing the relief both as "prospectiv[e]" and as
"compensatory,"
id. at
433 U. S. 290.
Yet petitioners here note that Congress has imposed on state
agencies a continuing federal duty to "take all necessary steps to
correct any . . . underpayment of aid under the State plan." 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(22);
see also 45 CFR § 205.10(a) (1984).
The relief in this case too might therefore be described as related
to a continuing federal duty, "part of a plan that operates
prospectively to bring about the delayed benefits of a
[constitutionally administered program]."
Milliken, supra,
at
433 U. S. 290
(emphasis in original).
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL,
and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
I joined JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent in
Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234,
473 U. S. 247
(1985), and I join his dissent in this case. I fully agree that the
Court's Eleventh Amendment approach, as demonstrated by the
difference between the result in this case and that in
Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U. S. 332
(1979), is sterile, produces inconsistent decisions, and is in
serious need of reconsideration.
Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.
S. 528,
469 U. S. 539,
439 U. S.
546-547 (1985).
But I also would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in
this case for the additional reason expressed in my dissent (joined
by JUSTICES BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS) in
Atascadero,
473 U.S. at
473 U. S. 302,
namely, the waiver by Michigan, "as a willing recipient of federal
funds,"
id. at
473 U. S. 304,
of any Eleventh Amendment barrier that otherwise might exist. The
State too easily avoids its responsibilities, and the Court by its
decision today allows the State to go its way unimpeded and
unburdened with any remedy for those who have been wronged during
the period of Michigan's noncompliance with federal law.